delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, and HIGHTOWER, DOGGETT, CORNYN and SPECTOR, Justices, join.In this case we consider whether Texas Revised Civil Statute article 6701d, section 107C(j) precludes a plaintiff’s cause of action against a manufacturer for injuries caused by a defective seat belt and shoulder harness system. We hold the provision, which prohibits evidence of the use or nonuse of a seat belt in a civil trial, was not intended to and does not apply to protect a seat belt manufacturer from liability for defective restraint systems.
Marilyn Glyn-Jones was injured when her 1982 Ford Escort was struck by another car. Upon impact, Glyn-Jones alleges her seat belt failed to protect her and, as a result, she was thrown about her vehicle, causing further injury. Glyn-Jones sued the other driver, John Hamilton, and the City of Dallas for negligence. In addition, Glyn-Jones sued Ford Motor Company, Bridgestone/Fire-stone, Inc. and Champion Motor Sales, asserting both breach of warranty and products liability claims. Specifically, Glyn-Jones alleged the seat belt and shoulder harness system, as well as the driver’s seat and seat track, were designed and/or manufactured in a defective condition.
Bridgestone/Firestone moved for summary judgment, contending that Glyn-Jones would be unable to prove at trial an essential element of her products liability claim.1 The trial court agreed that, because Glyn-Jones could not introduce evidence that she was in fact wearing her seat belt at the time of the collision, Glyn-Jones would be unable to prove causation. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. aet. 6701d, § 107C(j). The trial court, consequently, granted a take nothing judgment in favor of Bridgestone/Firestone and severed the judgment from all other claims. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment and remanded to the trial court, holding the statute unconstitutionally restricts Glyn-Jones’ common-law claim in violation of the Open Courts Provision. 857 S.W.2d 640; see Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. aet. 6701d, § 107C(j); Tex. Const. art. I, § 13.
We must initially determine whether section 107C(j) actually precludes Glyn-Jones from offering evidence that she used her seat belt in this case. Because we conclude that the legislature did not intend to bar use of such evidence, we need not reach the posed constitutional question. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
The general rule is that when a statute is clear and unambiguous “a court should not use rules of construction or extrinsic aids to construe it, but should give the statute its common meaning.” One 1985 Chevrolet v. State, 852 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex.1993), citing Cail v. Service Motors, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.1983); Ex parte Roloff, 510 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex.1974). Here, however, we are not presented with the statute as a whole, but a mere provision of the statute. Words in a vacuum mean nothing. Only in the context of the remainder of the statute can the true meaning of a single provision be made clear. Cf. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm’n, 573 S.W.2d 502, 505 (Tex.1978); Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex.1978). While the context normally provides clarity, however, here it creates ambiguity about the legislature’s purpose. Because our primary task is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, we must look behind the words in this ease to even determine the true purpose of the provision. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.005; see Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ins., 626 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tex.App.—Austin *1341981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), citing Edwards v. Morton, 92 Tex. 152, 46 S.W. 792 (1898).
Article 6701d, section 107C was enacted to mandate the use of seat belts and to provide a criminal penalty for the failure to wear a seat belt. The last sentence of the section states that “[u]se or nonuse of a safety belt is not admissible evidence in a civil trial.” Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat. ART. 6701d, § 107C(j). Bridge-stone/Firestone contends this sentence was intended to abolish crashworthiness actions against manufacturers of seat belts. If the legislature did so intend, it seems unlikely that it would utilize a subsection of a traffic statute to effect such a change. Instead, read in the context of the entire statute, we hold that the legislature did not intend section 107C(j) to preclude evidence necessary to a cause of action against a seat belt manufacturer for injuries allegedly caused by a defective seat belt.
Although the bare words of subsection (j), viewed in isolation, facially appear to advance Bridgestone/Firestone’s argument, we decline to foster an interpretation so obviously contrary to the legislature’s intent. As the court stated in Lunsford v. City of Bryan, 156 Tex. 520, 297 S.W.2d 115, 117 (1957):
Numerous decisions by this court have established the rule that courts are not bound by the literal meaning of words in the construction of statutes, but when the intent and purpose of the Legislature is manifest from a consideration of a statute as a whole, words will be restricted or enlarged in order to give the statute the meaning which was intended by the lawmakers.
See, e.g., Miers v. Brouse, 153 Tex. 511, 271 S.W.2d 419 (1954); Prudential, 626 S.W.2d at 827; Board of Ins. Comm’rs v. Sproles Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 94 S.W.2d 769, 775 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1936, writ refd); see also Tex.Gov’t Code ANN. § 312.-005.
Subsection (j) was included in section 107C in order to make clear that the sole legal sanction for the failure to wear a seat belt is the criminal penalty provided by the statute and that the failure could not be used against the injured person in a civil trial. By including subsection (j)) the legislature intended not to forge new ground in tort law, but merely to preserve the status quo. Debate on Tex.S.B. 500 on the Floor of the House, 69th Leg. (May 15, 1985); see also Nancy Casbeer, The Use of the Seat Belt Defense in Crashworthiness Cases, 40 Baylor L.Rev. 551, 564-65 (1988).
When the provision was enacted, a defendant was not permitted to introduce evidence of a plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt as evidence of contributory negligence. Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526 (Tex.1973); Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.1974). In Carnation, we held that plaintiffs “should not have the damages awarded to them reduced or mitigated because of their failure to wear available seat belts.” 516 S.W.2d at 117. By enacting a statute mandating the use of a seat belt, however, the legislature could have overruled our decision in Kerby and Carnation and established a basis for a negligence per se defense whenever a plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt. Instead, the legislature added subsection (j) to ratify Carnation’s holding. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex.1986).
The legislature did not, by adding subsection (j), seek to preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims against seat belt manufacturers for injuries caused by defective seat belts. We find no case, either in this state or in states with similar laws, where the interpretation urged by Bridgestone/Firestone was even argued, much less adopted.2 Every scholarly article we find discussing the various mandatory seat belt laws around the country focuses on the effect such laws have on the “seat belt defense,” never even contemplating the application argued for by Bridgestone/Firestone. See, e.g., Nancy Casbeer, The Use of the Seat Belt Defense in Crashworthiness Cases, 40 Baylor L.Rev. 551 (1988); Leonard Charles Schwartz, The Seat Belt Defense and Mandatory Seat Belt Usage: Law, Ethics, and Economics, 24 Idaho *135L.Rev. 275 (1988); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., New Seat Belt Defense Issues: The Impact of Air Bags and Mandatory Seat Belt Use Statutes on the Seat Belt Defense, and the Basis of Damage Reduction Under the Seat Belt Defense, 73 Minn.L.Rev. 1369 (1989); David A. Westenberg, Buckle Up or Pay: The Emerging Safety Belt Defense, 20 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 867 (1986).
The trial court erred in applying Texas Revised Civil Statute article 6701d, section 107C(j) to the facts of this case. We hold that evidence of Glyn-Jones’ use of the seat belt is admissible in this civil case and that summary judgment against Glyn-Jones was improperly granted. Consequently, without reaching the constitutional question, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision reversing summary judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
. The trial court earlier granted Bridge-stone/Firestone’s motion for partial summary judgment on Glyn-Jones' breach of warranty claims.
. Other states with provisions similar to section 107C(j) include: Montana Code Ann. § 61 — 13— 106; Oklahoma Stat.Ann. tit. 47, § 12-420; and Minnesota Stat.Ann. § 169.685, subd. 4.