dissenting.
Today’s tangled web of opinions is the product not of legal complexity, but of the unsuccessful attempt to explain away recent inconsistencies. Six months ago this court held that article III, section 19 of the Texas Constitution barred the candidacy of Patti Lou Dawkins. I joined the writing of Justice Cornyn with Justices Phillips, Cook and Hecht, not because the ineligibility provision represented the best public policy, but because the issue was fully resolved by unambiguous constitutional language recited in well understood prior opinions of this court. Each of these four now feels compelled to offer a separate written explanation for today’s conflicting constitutional interpretation.
Today we learn how ephemeral has been the commitment to our previous writing that in constitutional interpretation:
We are not free, by implementing a rule of construction, to “stretch” the meaning of unambiguous words to achieve a result we might consider to be more desirable, or even better public policy.
Dawkins v. Meyer, 825 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex.1992). During these six months, the Constitution has not been amended and the law has not changed. The respect for both the language of our state charter and this court’s precedent during a February frost has evaporated in the August heat. With good reason, one can only wonder why Patti Lou Dawkins was not favored with such fair weather.
The issue of whether resignation of a prior office removes the candidacy restrictions for the Legislature set forth in article III, section 19 of the Texas Constitution has already been clearly decided. After serving more than three of the four years of his term as county commissioner, Sam Jorrie resigned in order to run for state representative. Making precisely the same argument presented today, he contended that the constitutional bar extending for “the term for which he is elected or ap*786pointed” applied only to his tenure of office, the actual period of service, and not the entire term. This court flatly rejected that argument:
We ... hold that resignation at whatever time will not suffice to make eligible to the Legislature any person who has qualified for an elective or appointive term to a lucrative office under the State, the term of which does not expire until after the term of the legislator be-gins_ Since it is the term which controls, it makes no material difference whether the holder of the office resigns the day after he actually begins holding that office, the day of filing for the office of legislator, or the day before the election at which time the term of office of members of the Legislature begins.
Lee v. Daniels, 377 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Tex.1964) (emphasis added). The two month overlap in the two offices was held to preclude eligibility. Similarly, declaring the language of article III, section 19 “plain and unambiguous,” this court has held that the tender of a future resignation is ineffective to remove its candidacy restrictions. Kirk v. Gordon, 376 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex.1964).
Lee and Kirk were reaffirmed to bar the candidacy of Patti Lou Dawkins, who was willing to resign her appointment as a member of a state board but acknowledged that under these two rulings such action would be of no avail. See Dawkins, 825 S.W.2d at 453 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).1 None of today’s many writings commands a majority nor provides a sound reason for why the constitutional barrier should remain firm for Dawkins but crumble for Wentworth.2
The very authorities which this court found so persuasive in Lee are now casually dismissed as not “involvpng] either provisions or situations which mirror those we consider today.” 839 S.W.2d at 768. Those opinions of the highest courts in three states remain instructive. In Rowe v. Tuck, 149 Ga. 88, 99 S.E. 303 (1919), when considering whether resignation would remove the candidacy bar of a statute precluding eligibility for another position of a court recorder “during the term of his office,” the court found use of the word “term” controlling:
It may be that resignation ends the tenure, but it does not end the term. The term is fixed by statute.
Id. 99 S.E. at 305. Similarly, in examining a constitutional restriction on a legislative incumbent “during the time for which he is elected,” the court in State ex rel. Childs v. Sutton, 63 Minn. 147, 65 N.W. 262 (1895), with brevity and clarity, held that:
He was not merely prohibited from holding any office during the time which he might serve, but during the time for which he was elected. The difference is obvious, and the language too sweeping to be disregarded. The respondent could not nullify the constitutional prohibitory clause, “during the time for which he is elected,” by his resignation of the office of representative.
*787Id. 65 N.W. at 263. Baskin v. State of Oklahoma, 107 Okl. 272, 232 P. 388 (1925), also interpreted the phrase “during the term for which he had been elected” to encompass the full term, whether or not a resignation had been tendered:
To us the language is plain and unambiguous, and the general rule of law is, when a statute or Constitution is plain and unambiguous, the court is not permitted to indulge in speculation concerning its meaning, nor whether it is the embodiment of great wisdom.... This language is too sweeping and too plain to be disregarded.
... It is not within the province of the court to read an exception [for resignation] in the Constitution which the framers thereof did not see fit to enact therein.
Id. 232 P. at 389.
While only Texas may constitutionally restrict certain officeholders from running for the legislature, the language at issue today is by no means unique. The phrase “during the term for which he was elected” is found in article III, section 18 of the Texas Constitution, in article I, section 6 of the United States Constitution, and in most other state constitutions, as well as many state statutes and city charters. A compendium of relevant cases, cited by this court in Lee, appropriately concluded that:
In cases where the Constitution or a statute provides in specific terms that a person holding a certain office shall not be eligible, during the term for which he was elected or appointed to said office, to certain other offices, or any other office, the courts invariably hold that such ineligibility exists during the entire period for which the person was elected or appointed, and is not affected by resignation of the first office.
Annotation, Resignation of One Office as Affecting Eligibility to Another Office During Term of Former Office, 5 A.L.R. 117, 120-21 (1920) (emphasis added). The plurality ignores the consistent interpretation of this language as clearly encompassing the officeholder’s entire term, not his tenure.3
Lee, Kirk, Dawkins, and the authorities upon which they relied should control the disposition of this case. In the rejection of this prior constitutional interpretation, which it euphemistically calls a “reevalu-at[ion],” 839 S.W.2d at 768, the plurality offers very little new analysis.4 The proper constitutional interpretative method is now well-established:
In construing [a provision of the Texas Constitution], we consider “the intent of the people who adopted it.” In determining that intent, “the history of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to have direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied and the good to be accomplished, are proper subjects of the inquiry.” However, because of the difficulties inherent in determining the intent of voters over a century ago, we rely heavily on the literal text. We seek its meaning with the *788understanding that the Constitution was ratified to function as an organic document to govern society and institutions as they evolve through time.
Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 19 (Tex.1992, orig. proceeding) (quoting Edgewood, Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 111 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.1989) (citations omitted)). While generally paraphrasing this approach, the plurality proceeds to disregard it.5
The origin of the particular language at issue in article III, section 19 is summarily dismissed with the statement that “an adequate history of the constitutional convention” is “absent.” 839 S.W.2d at 768. While the applicable history may be sparse, it is of importance. The phrase “during the term for which he is elected or appointed” was not contained in the 1869 Constitution, which provided:
No judge of any court of law or equity, Secretary of State, Attorney General, clerk of any court of record, or any person holding a lucrative office under the United States, or this State, or any foreign government shall be eligible to the Legislature.
Tex. Const, of 1869, art. Ill, § 30. The reference to the officeholder’s term was added as a floor amendment during the 1876 Constitutional Convention. Journal of the Constitutional Convention 210 (1875); Constitutional Proceedings: Nineteenth Day, Daily Democratic Statesman (Austin, Texas), Sept. 28, 1875, at 1. The provision, since 1875, has read:
No judge of any court of law or equity, Secretary of State, Attorney General, clerk of any court of record, or any person holding a lucrative office under the United States, or this State, or any foreign government shall during the term for which he is elected or appointed, be eligible to the Legislature.
Tex. Const, art. Ill, § 19 (emphasis added).
While no record of debate demonstrates the amendment’s precise purpose, it has been described as “significant.” 1 George D. Braden, The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 135 (1977). It is an elementary principle of constitutional construction that the language used must be presumed to have been carefully selected. See, e.g., Leander Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tex.1972). We should not adopt an interpretation that renders a phrase meaningless or inoperative. Hanson v. Jordan, 145 Tex. 320, 323, 198 S.W.2d 262, 263 (1947).
Yet the plurality embarks on precisely such a course, interpreting “term” to define only the period of actual service in office until the time of resignation. Neither discussed nor distinguished is our pri- or determination that:
In order to avoid confusion a clear distinction must be made between the phrase, “term of office” and an individual’s tenure of office. The period of time designated as a term of office may not and often does not coincide with an individual’s tenure of office.
Spears v. Davis, 398 S.W.2d 921, 926 (Tex.1966). Additionally, in article III, section 19, “term” is modified by the phrase “for which he is elected or appointed." Clearly the intent of one appointing or voting to elect is to place another in office for a full term. Our decision in Lee correctly gives full effect to the literal text of the Constitution. See 1 Braden, supra, at 136 (“The majority [in Lee ] ... [felt] duty bound to assign meaning to every phrase in the section, and probably the majority was right.”).
Ordinarily, constitutional provisions are not read or construed in isolation. Vinson v. Burgess, 773 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.1989). Of at least twenty-seven provisions in which our state charter uses the word “term,” none suggests that the term ends on resignation. Indeed, some provide for filling “unexpired terms.” See, e.g., Tex. *789Const, art. XVI, § 27. If “term” means “tenure,” how can there ever be an unexpired term? Today’s redefining of the word “term” injects chaos into consistent constitutional construction.
Further, the plurality fails to observe that the result of the 1875 amendment was to incorporate nearly identical language in two adjoining constitutional provisions. Article III, section 18 provides:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the term for which he was elected, be eligible to (1) any civil office of profit under this State which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which may have been increased, during such term, or (2) any office or place, the appointment to which may be made, in whole or in part, by either branch of the Legislature. ...
The parallel phrases in sections 18 and 19 cannot reasonably be construed to have different meanings. If term means tenure, then section 18 is rendered meaningless and no longer prevents a legislator from resigning to seek the office which he or she has voted to create or expand. Under today’s decision, candidates may now resign to run for any office, without regard to the prohibitions of either section 18 or 19.
In “reserving] the issue when an officeholder must resign to avoid article III, section 19,” 839 S.W.2d at 767 n. 1, the plurality invites another round of election year litigation. Finding Wentworth’s resignation four years prior to the end of his appointed term sufficient to avoid the constitutional eligibility restriction, we are left to wonder what would happen if the resignation had been tendered with three years remaining, or with one year, six days, or ten months as in the case of Patti Lou Dawkins. Where does the Constitution draw the line? Disregarded is our pronouncement of six months ago that:
We will not countenance a construction of our constitution that would so plainly generate uncertainty concerning the eligibility of legislative candidates. To hold otherwise would unnecessarily complicate the already difficult duties performed by election officials and unwittingly encourage additional litigation on this issue.
Dawkins, 825 S.W.2d at 450.
We have previously deferred to the people of Texas the task of making constitutional corrections through the amendment process:
[T]he power to change such a result by amending our constitution lies not in our hands, but in the hands of the sovereign people of the State of Texas.
Dawkins, 825 S.W.2d at 450. This court has similarly refused to engraft de minim-is exceptions to eligibility requirements because of a concern that we would be exceeding our judicial powers:
Application of the rule of de minimis non curat lex would sacrifice the mandate of article V, section 2 of the constitution [setting forth judicial eligibility requirements] in favor of expediency.
Sears v. Bayoud, 786 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tex.1990, orig. proceeding). It is important to note that the restrictions imposed by article III, section 18, preventing qualified candidates from seeking office if the terms overlapped for even a few days, was cured by constitutional amendment.6 Today, however, unlike six months ago in Dawkins and two years ago in Sears,7 interpretation is substituted for constitutional amendment, with the power of the people arrogated to a plurality of the members of this court.8
*790While debate has occurred over the public policy underlying article III, section 19, there has until today been a rather clear understanding of its meaning. A study commission recommended its removal to our most recent constitutional convention:
[New section 3(d)] has made a substantial change in Article III, Section 19 of the Constitution of 1876. The 1876 document does not allow an officeholder to resign and to run for the Legislature during the term for which that officeholder was elected or appointed. This prevents many elected officials of state and local government from running for the Legislature.
Texas Constitutional Revision Comm’n, A New Constitution for Texas: Text, Explanation, Commentary 79 (Nov.1973). This proposal was rejected, however, in a committee report that retained the language “during the term for which he is elected or appointed,” with the explanation that:
[New subsection (f) ] prohibits certain appointed or elected officers from running for the legislature during the term for which they were appointed or elected. This provision is the same as Article III, Section 19, of the Constitution of 1876.... This subsection would prohibit those persons from running for the legislature during the term for which they were appointed or elected whether or not they resigned before running.
1 Texas Constitutional Convention, Official Journals, January 8, 1974-July 30, 1974, at 656, 659 (emphasis in original). Floor debate further indicated that resignation would not remove the candidacy bar. Texas Constitutional Convention, Official Proceedings, January 8, 1974-July 30, 1974, at 1115, 1334. The “during the term” limitation was retained in the final version.
Nor does the plurality consider the history of Article VII, section 16 under which the position for Wentworth’s previous appointment was created. Adopted in 1928, that provision responded to an educational survey under the direction of one of the nation’s leading educators, determining that:
The personnel of the governing boards of higher institutions is a matter of the most serious consequence to the institutions themselves and in general to the development of higher education.... [T]hese [appointees] are shaping the State’s policy relative to its most fundamental interest, not only for the present, but for years in the future_ [Certainly [appointees should] refuse to use such honors as a step to political preferment.
6 George A. Works, Texas Educational Survey Comm’n, Texas Educational Survey Report 346 (1925). This report further concluded:
[I]t is too much to hope that members serving for short periods will be able to do any considerable amount of constructive service_ The people of the State must realize that the institution cannot render to the State the largest possible measure of service if membership on the board is regarded as a political office.... [T]his service [must engage] the attention and devotion of men of consequence and attainment who will not under any circumstances undertake any other public career.
8 id. at 238-39; see also Tex. Const, art. VII, § 16 (interp. commentary). Barring candidacy for the full term of the appointment is consistent with the objective of this companion provision.9
Ignoring the invaluable history of article III, section 19, and its unambiguous text, the plurality frames the sole issue as whether the asserted interpretation promotes its underlying purpose to “bolster[ ] the separation of powers within our state government.” 839 S.W.2d at 767. Certainly “the evils intended to be remedied” are of importance in our constitutional inquiry. Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 79. They do not, *791however, provide a clear explanation, since the predecessor to article III, section 19 in the Constitution of 1869 also arguably sought to bolster the separation of powers. The general purpose cannot explain why the “during the term” clause was added in 1875. The objective remained the same, but the means of effectuating it was altered. In this situation, intent is not dis-positive: “[BJecause of the difficulties inherent in determining the intent of voters over a century ago, we rely heavily on the literal text.” Id.
This court should interpret the Texas Constitution with respect for its text and history to give full effect to the will of the people. Because today’s decision markedly veers from that path, I dissent.10
. Justice Gonzalez understandably relies on his recent writing in Dawkins. While I disagree with his reading of the constitution, at least he ■ has maintained some consistency.
. Both the plurality and Justice Cornyn highlight the fact that Dawkins is not being overruled, 839 S.W.2d at 768 and 776; Justice Cor-nyn further insists that Lee and Kirk were not reaffirmed in Dawkins. Id. at 778. With those cases relied upon as controlling precedent six months ago now overruled, what can be left of Dawkins? When a structure’s foundation is removed, how can it stand?
Apparently conceding that little remains of the Dawkins decision, at least Justice Hecht recognizes that today’s new interpretation "would almost certainly have affected the arguments made in Dawkins earlier this year.” Id. at 776. He nonetheless defends the inconsistencies on grounds that Dawkins had not resigned at the time she sought mandamus relief. Id.
Justice Phillips feels compelled to defend those whose departure from Dawkins necessitates his writing. He essentially concludes that the plurality’s invitation to further litigation on the question of when a resignation must be tendered removes any inconsistencies between the treatment of Wentworth and Dawkins. I strongly disagree. For Dawkins, the literal text of the constitution was adhered to, our prior decisions reaffirmed. Today those same precedents tire overruled, and the literal text of article III, section 19 disregarded.
. A number of other cases consider similar language and conclude that resignation does not remove the bar to eligibility. See, e.g., Chenoworth v. Chambers, 33 Cal.App. 104, 164 P. 428, 430 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1917) (“When we speak of the ‘term’ for which an officer has been elected, we mean the period of time fixed by statute during which he may serve, and not to the time he may happen to serve.”); Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 94 Fla. 620, 113 So. 913, 915 (1927); Crovatt v. Mason, 101 Ga. 246, 28 S.E. 891, 895 (1897) ("resignation could not affect the time for which he was chosen”); Wachter v. McEvoy, 125 Md. 399, 93 A. 987, 990 (1915) ("The term was not ended by ... resigna-tion_ If the Legislature had intended to limit the disqualification to the time of actual service or to the period of actual incumbency, it would have so stated...."); Richardson v. Hare, 381 Mich. 304, 160 N.W.2d 883, 888 (1968) (per curiam) ("resignation ... will not operate to create eligibility and counteract the prohibition”); Forman v. Bostwick, 139 A.D. 333, 123 N.Y.S. 1048 (1910); see also Meeks v. Tallahatchie County, 513 So.2d 563, 567 (Miss.1987) (“We do not read the statute to allow Meeks to shorten the period of his disqualification by resigning [his] office_”). The only decision to the contrary is the one upon which Justice Hecht bases his writing. Rugg v. Town Clerk of Arlington, 364 Mass. 264, 303 N.E.2d 723 (1973).
. Defending reexamination of Lee, 839 S.W.2d at 779 n. 8, Justice Cornyn does not indicate compelling reasons to engage in that process every six months.
. Justice Hecht would depart even further from this court's interpretive method, ignoring what he recognizes to be the "common" and "ordinary’ meaning of the constitutional text if any possible alternative construction can be conceived that would better serve perceived policy objectives.
.The section was amended in 1968 to add a proviso to the first sentence: "the fact that the term of office of Senators and Representatives does not end precisely on the last day of December but extends a few days into January of the succeeding year shall be considered as de mini-mus, and the ineligibility herein created shall terminate on the last day of December of the last full calendar year of the term for which he was elected.” Tex. Const, art. Ill, § 18; see also 1 Braden, supra, at 132.
. The time periods considered in each of these cases are remarkably similar to that at issue today — one month in Dawkins, eleven days in Sears, and twenty-one days for Wentworth. Yet, in both prior cases, this court found the candidates ineligible.
. Nor is today’s constitutional revision mandated by a judicial rule of construction first announced eighty-eight years after the provision to be interpreted was adopted. Willis v. Potts, 377 *790S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex.1964) (setting forth rule of strict construction against ineligibility).
. In its discussion of the appropriate manner for filling unexpired terms, die report further reflected an understanding that a term is a set period of time and not the length of actual service. 6 Works, supra, at 347.
. After argument in the court of appeals, Went-worth raised an additional issue that the eligibility restriction deprives him of equal protection under the United States Constitution. In Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982), a similar challenge to article III, section 19 was rejected. While much in Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in that case is persuasive, id. 457 U.S. at 976-90, 102 S.Ct. at 2850-57, 73 L.Ed. at 524-33, I accept Clements as determinative. With a state constitutional provision at issue here, Wentworth chooses to urge no state equal protection violation. Were this not true, I would consider whether the broader language of Texas Constitution article I, section 3 affords him greater protection than the federal charter. See Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.1992); see also City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 1076, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982).