specially concurring:
I agree with the majority that sections 113 — 3(b) and (c) appear to address the provision of fees to appointed counsel, not retained counsel. Thus, I agree with the majority that section 113 — 3(c) does not mandate the provision of fees to retained pro bono counsel.3 Indeed, the concept of pro bono representation is that the attorney volunteering the representation also volunteers to do so at a reduced or no fee, with the difference in fee to be borne by the attorney rather than the client (or the State). However, this does not mean that pro bono counsel can never be entitled to remuneration for the various court-imposed expenses, such as transcript expenses, attendant to their representation. For any defendant, including a defendant who has retained pro bono counsel, court charges (including charges for transcripts) are actually assessed by the court against the defendant himself, not the attorney, even if, as here, the attorney pays the costs initially. Thus, to the extent a defendant is entitled to have those costs waived due to indigence or some other reason, pro bono counsel would not have to bear them. For this reason, I do not read the majority opinion, or the statute it interprets, as having the unsavory effect of penalizing the type of pro bono service that Illinois public policy emphatically favors. Cf. 134 Ill. 2d Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble (“It is the responsibility of those licensed as officers of the court to use their training, experience and skills to provide services in the public interest for which compensation may not be available”). Here, however, although counsel argued to the trial court that the transcripts at issue were necessary for proper representation (see 402 Ill. App. 3d at 168), they abandoned this argument on appeal in favor of the arguments the majority opinion correctly rejects. For that reason, although I write separately to point out that the majority opinion does not mean that pro bono counsel in all cases must necessarily pay court expenses out of their own pockets, I agree with the majority’s resolution of this appeal.
I do not, however, join in the majority’s reasoning for distinguishing section 113 — 3(d) and related case law. See 402 Ill. App. 3d at 170. To me, the difference between section 113 — 3(d) on one hand, and sections (b) and (c) on the other, is that sections (b) and (c) address fees for attorneys, while section (d) addresses a cost of litigation, namely, expert witness fees. Section 113 — 3(d) applies regardless of the type of representation, because it has nothing to do with representation. Sections 113 — 3(b) and (c) apply to appointed counsel, because they address procedures related to appointed counsel. For that reason, I agree with the majority that case law holding that section 113 — 3(d) applies in cases defended by pro bono counsel does not affect our interpretation of sections 113 — 3(b) and (c).