concurring specially.
I fully concur with Divisions 2 through 6, but concur in the judgment only with regard to Division 1. The majority’s and dissent’s lengthy analyses of the grammatical structure of the aggravated stalking statute, OCGA § 16-5-91 (a), is unnecessary for a determination of this case.10 Here, we do not have a violation of a “condition of pretrial release, condition of probation, or condition of parole in effect prohibiting the behavior described. ...” Rather, Keaton is accused of violating an interlocutory (i.e., preliminary) injunction. OCGA § 16-5-91 (a) states:
A person commits the offense of aggravated stalking when such person, in violation of a . . . preliminary injunction, . . . follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without the *25consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.11
Stated another way, to be guilty of aggravated stalking, a defendant must engage in specific conduct that violates a preliminary injunction prohibiting certain stalking behavior.12
Here, the interlocutory order stated that “[Keaton] is enjoined from going to the home except to exercise his visitation rights with the children of the parties.” Nowhere in the order did the court enjoin Keaton from following, placing under surveillance, or contacting his estranged wife. Thus, Keaton cannot be guilty of aggravated stalking, which requires the accused to have violated an order or injunction prohibiting stalking. Keaton did violate the court’s order by going to the home for a reason not associated with visiting his children, but his actions do not constitute aggravated stalking prohibited by OCGA § 16-5-91 (a).
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Ellington and Presiding Judge Miller join in this special concurrence.
I agree with the dissent that the phrase included in OCGA § 16-5-91 (a) that states that “in effect prohibiting the behavior” modifies only “condition of pretrial release, condition of probation, or condition of parole” and does not modify the initial list of orders and injunctions. In order for one. of the orders or injunctions included in the initial list to be enforceable, it must identify the prohibited conduct with specificity. Thus, with a bond to keep the peace, a temporary restraining order, a permanent injunction, or one of the other orders in the initial list, it should be clear on the face of the order whether or not one is prohibited from engaging in conduct that if violated would fall within the aggravated stalking statute. On the other hand, conditions of pretrial release, probation, and parole are often listed on forms in general terms. Thus, the addition of the qualifying language — that the order must prohibit stalking in order to come within the ambit of the statute — is logical.
(Emphasis supplied.)
I do not agree with the majority that the dissent’s grammatical analysis leads to the absurd result that violation of any injunction (i.e., one prohibiting the construction of a fence that encroaches on a neighbor’s property) would satisfy the terms of the aggravated stalking statute.