dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which excludes allocution before a death penalty sentencing jury from the statutory right to allocution. My dissent does not seek to privilege allocution in a capital case. Rather, I believe that allocution in capital cases should be given the same meaningful status as all other allocutoiy statements authorized by our Code of Criminal Procedure. My disagreement with the analysis in the majority opinion lies with its definition of the term “court” as used in K.S.A. 22-3424(e). The majority has narrowly interpreted the term “court” to mean the sentencing judge. However, other statutes in the Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure require a broader definition of the term “court” that includes the sentencing jury as well as the sentencing judge.
K.S.A. 22-2201 provides direction for interpreting the meaning of words found in the Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure, stating:
“(1) In interpreting this code, such words and phrases as are defined in this article shall be given the meanings indicated by their definitions, unless a particular context clearly requires a different meaning.
“(2) Words or phrases not defined in this code but which are defined in the Kansas criminal code shall have the meanings given therein except when a particular context clearly requires different meanings.
*753“(3) Words and phrases used in this code and not expressly defined shall be construed according to the rules governing the construction of statutes of this state.”
Although the term “court” is not defined in the Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure, it is defined in the Kansas Criminal Code, K.S.A. 21-3101 et seq. K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4602 provides: “(a) ‘Court’ means any court having jurisdiction and power to sentence offenders for violations of the laws of this state.”
Pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2201(2), the definition of “court” in K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4602 applies to the term as it is used in K.S.A. 22-3424(e). The particular context of K.S.A. 22-3424(e) does not require a different meaning than that given in K.S.A. 21-4602. Under the death penalty sentencing statute, the legislature gave the jury the power to sentence defendants convicted of capital murder. K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4624(e). Thus, the term “court” as used in K.S.A. 22-3424(e) includes the juiy in a death penalty sentencing proceeding because the juiy has the jurisdiction and power to sentence offenders for capital murder. Although the majority’s definition of “sentencing judge” is appropriate for defendants convicted of any crime other than capital murder, its narrow definition fails to harmonize the statutoiy definition of the term “court” with the authority given to juries in the death penalty sentencing scheme.
K.S.A. 22-3424(e) states:
“Before imposing sentence the court shall: (1) Allow the prosecuting attorney to address the court, if the prosecuting attorney so requests; (2) afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant; (3) allow the victim or such members of the victim’s family as the court deems appropriate to address the court, if the victim or the victim’s family so requests; and (4) address the defendant personally and ask the defendant if the defendant wishes to make a statement on the defendant’s own behalf and to present any evidence in mitigation of punishment.”
When the term “court” in K.S.A. 22-3424(e) is interpreted in accordance with K.S.A. 22-2201(2) and K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4602, it is clear that the legislature intended to allow allocution for all defendants, including those whose sentences are determined by a juiy rather than a judge. The statutoiy right to allocution was es*754tablished in 1970 prior to the enactment of the death penalty sentencing scheme. See L. 1970, ch. 129, sec. 22-3424; L. 1990, ch. 99, sec. 4. At that time, the district court judge was the sole authority vested with the power to determine a defendant’s sentence and pronounce judgment against the defendant. When the legislature enacted the death penalty sentencing law in 1990, it did not demonstrate any intent to abrogate the defendant’s statutory right to allocution before the defendant’s sentence had been determined by the sentencing authority. Rather, the legislature provided a broad enough definition of the term “court” in K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4602(a) to sufficiently incorporate the death penalty sentencing jury in the statutory right to allocution as set forth in K.S.A. 22-3424(e). Thus, interpreting the term “court” as used in K.S.A. 22-3424(e) to include both sentencing judges and sentencing juries maintains the statutory right to allocution as it was initially intended by our legislature.
In addition, such an interpretation harmonizes K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4624(b), which authorizes capital defendants to waive the death penalty jury, with K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4624(e), thereby giving all capital defendants an equal opportunity for allocution prior to the determination of their sentences regardless of whether they choose to be sentenced by a judge or a jury. Although the majority recognizes that statutes “ ‘ “must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony, if possible,” ’ ” Pieren-Abbott v Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 83, 89, 106 P.3d 492 (2005), its interpretation of the statutory right to allocution does not harmonize K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4624(b) with K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4624(e). Such harmony requires that if a capital defendant is entitled to allocution before a sentencing judge, he or she is entitled to the same right before a sentencing jury.
The right of allocution is the right to speak unedited words that pass directly from the Kps of the defendant to the ears, mind, and heart of the sentencing authority, whether it be a judge or jury. Restricting allocution to a sentencing judge and not a sentencing jury creates a confusing and irrational double standard. The majority maintains that there is no disharmony. However, a clear dou*755ble standard exists when a judge can hear certain allocutory statements before making a sentencing decision, while a sentencing jury charged with exactiy the same responsibility may not consider such statements in their decision making process. “[Consistent decision-making is impossible when one decisionmaker may consider information forbidden to another.” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 294, 28 L. Ed. 2d 711, 91 S. Ct. 1454 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The timing of allocution is crucial. If it is to be an authentic, meaningful factor in the sentencing procedure, it must occur before the nature of the sentence has hardened into a fixed immutability. Anything after such hardening is a cruel sham. If a jury has the authority to determine the defendant’s sentence, the defendant must have the opportunity to make his or her plea for mercy to the jury before it determines his or her sentence. Allocution in a capital sentencing scheme after the jury has returned its verdict on sentencing is a meaningless formality — “no more than an empty gesture.” Tomlinson v. State, 98 N.M. 213, 215, 647 P.2d 415 (1982) (invalidating the defendant’s sentence for kidnapping and armed robbery because the sentencing judge did not give the defendant an opportunity for allocution prior to imposing sentence).
The majority tempers this concern by noting that K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4624(f) gives the judge the final authority for imposing the capital defendant’s sentence and K.S.A. 22-3424(e) gives a capital offender an opportunity to allocute before the judge pronounces sentence. However, K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4624(f) does not give the judge discretion to consider the defendant’s plea in mitigation. K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4624(f) provides:
“Notwithstanding the verdict of the juiy, the trial court shall review any jury verdict imposing a sentence of death hereunder to ascertain whether the imposition of such sentence is supported by the evidence. If the court determines that the imposition of such a sentence is not supported by the evidence, the court shall modify the sentence and sentence the defendant to life without the possibility of parole, and no sentence of death shall be imposed hereunder. Whenever the court enters a judgment modifying the sentencing verdict of the jury, the court shall set forth its reasons for so doing in a written memorandum which shall become part of the record.”
*756This statute only gives the judge discretion in determining whether the jury’s imposition of the death penalty is supported by the evidence. It does not allow the judge to consider additional mitigating circumstances or the defendant’s plea for mercy pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3424(e) because it does not authorize the judge to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. If the judge finds that the evidence supports the jury’s verdict, it must sentence the offender to death. See K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4624(e) (stating that the defendant shall be sentenced to death if the jury finds the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by the mitigating circumstances). Allowing a capital defendant an opportunity for allocution before the judge pronounces his or her sentence is not the equivalent of allowing the capital defendant an opportunity for allocution before the death penalty juiy. Rather, “that form of allocution [is] merely vestigial: since the jury’s verdict [has] fixed the sentence of death, the defendant’s speech before a judge would be but a hollow ritual.” State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 429, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988).
Death penalty jurisprudence further supports broadly construing “court” in K.S.A. 22-3424 to include the sentencing jury in a death penalty case. According to the United States Supreme Court:
“Death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country. . . . From the point of view of the defendant, it is different in both its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.” Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38, 65 L. Ed. 2d 392, 100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980) (invalidating a statute that prevented the court from instructing the jury on lesser included crimes if the defendant was charged with capital murder, and quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393, 97 S. Ct. 1197 [1977]).
Because death is different than any other sentence that may be imposed, it is incongruent to allow a defendant to address the sentencing authority prior to the determination of his or her sentence when lesser sentences are involved while denying the same right for the severest of all punishments. The Zola court aptly acknowledged this underlying rationale when it stated:
*757“The question for us is not what the Constitution commands, but what our civilization commends. Under our system of capital punishment, a jury of men and women forms the essential link between society and the defendant before the court. Each capital jury expresses the collective voice of society in making the individualized determination that a defendant shall live or die. Whatever the Constitution permits, it bespeaks our common humanity that a defendant not be sentenced to death by a jury ‘which never heard the sound of his voice.’” Zola, 112 N.J. at 429-30 (quoting McGautha, 402 U.S. at 220).
This basic principle of common humanity applies regardless of the nature of the crime or character of the defendant on trial. Perpetrators of some of humanity’s most heinous atrocities, notably the 11 Nuremberg defendants who participated in the murder of millions of innocent, powerless victims, were given an opportunity to make unsworn statements to the tribunal prior to sentencing. Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, Section V, Article 24(j) (1945). Such a right was afforded to Herman Goering, Rudolph Hess, Albert Speer, and in current times to Saddam Hussein (Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure [1969]) (at sentencing phase, right to submit statements is generally in writing but can also be oral). It is scarcely imaginable that these mass murderers should possess legal rights not available in Kansas to those defendants prosecuted under our capital murder statutes. Interpreting the term “court” in K.S.A. 22-3424(e) to include the sentencing jury dismisses any notion that Kansas law is willing to degrade common humanity to the point of denying those convicted of capital murder the opportunity to plead for mercy before their sentencers. Indeed, this interpretation comports with the legislature’s intention to treat persons convicted of crimes justly and “in accordance with their individual characteristics, circumstances, needs, and potentialities.” K.S.A. 21-4601, K.S.A. 22-2103.
“The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases. A variety of flexible techniques — probation, parole, work furloughs, to name a few — and various postconviction remedies, may be available to modify an initial sentence of confinement in noncapital cases. The nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the need for individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
*758The majority rationalizes its decision by presuming that jurors would be confused by the defendant’s unsworn, unchallenged statements. I disagree. The United States Supreme Court has entrusted juries with the responsibility of making death penalty sentencing decisions. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183. The McGautha Court specifically noted that
“one of the most important functions any juiy can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system — a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’ ” McGautha, 402 U.S. at 202 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 [1968], and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630, 78 S. Ct. 590 [1958]).
The United States Supreme Court further expressed its confidence in juries by requiring them, rather than judges, to balance mitigating and aggravating factors related to sentence enhancement. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). In that transferral of the function of sentencing from judge to juiy, surely the Court did not envision any selective restriction of the material that such juries would be allowed to hear based on their status as “lay” jurors. “In the face of the State’s forceful pleas in favor of the death penalty, it is difficult ... to accept the argument that the briefest statement by the defendant would inject a fatal emotionalism into the jury’s deliberations.” State v. Zola 112 N.J. 384, 431, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988).
The legislature has empowered jurors to make fife and death decisions. See K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4624(e). We should uphold a process that provides sentencing juries with the same opportunity for receiving relevant information given to sentencing judges. In order to have the capacity to raise this issue, defendants stand convicted of capital crimes that have caused overwhelming suffering and pain. However, their assaults on human life should not be compounded by any resultant diminution of the principles of fair *759and humane justice. By interpreting the term “court” in K.S.A. 22-3424(e) to include sentencing juries in accordance with the definition found in K.S.A. 21-4602(a) and the interpretive direction provided by K.S.A. 22-2201, we preserve the legislature’s intent to allow all defendants an opportunity for allocution prior to the determination of their sentences.
Davis, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.