Opinion
CHIN, J.Does a sheriff act on behalf of the state or county when conducting a criminal investigation, including detaining suspects and searching their home and vehicle? As we shall see, based on the analysis in prior California cases, sheriffs act on behalf of the state when performing law enforcement activities. Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the state is absolutely immune from tort liability under the federal civil rights act (42 U.S.C. § 1983, hereafter section 1983). Accordingly, as agents of the state when acting in their law enforcement roles, California sheriffs are likewise absolutely immune from prosecution for asserted violations of that section. We will reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal reaching a contrary conclusion in this case.
We also consider whether the sheriff’s deputies involved here were entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983 because reasonable officers in their position would have believed their actions were lawful under established law. We conclude that the Court of Appeal employed incorrect legal principles in *827resolving this issue. After explaining the applicable principles, we will remand to the Court of Appeal to reconsider this primarily factual issue in the context of defendants’ motion for nonsuit.
Finally, we determine whether plaintiffs stated a cause of action against the County of Los Angeles (County) and its sheriff’s department, sheriff, and deputies, under Civil Code section 52.1, for committing an unreasonable detention, search, and seizure. We conclude that plaintiffs did state a cause of action against these defendants, and we will affirm that portion of the Court of Appeal’s judgment so holding.
I. Facts
The following uncontradicted facts are largely taken from the Court of Appeal’s opinion in this case. The Task Force for Regional Auto Theft Prevention (TRAP) was an interagency task force run by the County’s sheriff’s department to facilitate theft investigations involving multiple jurisdictions. Defendant Steven Wiles, a police officer for the City of Vernon and a TRAP member, was investigating plaintiff David Venegas’s brother, Ricardo Venegas, who was believed to be involved in an automobile theft ring. Wiles and other TRAP officers (evidently, defendants Michael Gray, Robert Harris and Thomas Jimenez, each sheriff’s deputies) pursued a car driven by Beatriz Venegas, accompanied by her husband David. TRAP officers, noting a resemblance between David and Ricardo, stopped the car and learned that David was Ricardo’s brother. David argued with the officers and they handcuffed him and detained Beatriz. Wiles questioned David about his car, which had no license plates or vehicle identification number. David told Wiles he had just bought the car and it was a salvaged vehicle. The officers impounded the car to determine whether it was stolen.
When asked for identification, David told the officers it was at his home nearby. David refused to sign an entry and search waiver form to allow the officers to pick up his identification, but he gave verbal consent for the officers to accompany Beatriz to their home for that purpose. Wiles assured the couple their home would not be searched.
TRAP officers took Beatriz home and had her sign a written entry and search waiver form granting “full and unconditional authority” to the officers to enter and conduct a search for identification and “any related investigation in any related criminal or non-criminal law enforcement matter.” The officers accompanied her inside her home. While she was retrieving David’s identification card, the officers searched the entire house and found papers indicating that David was on felony probation. On learning this, Wiles directed the officers to arrest David for violating Vehicle Code section 10751, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor, and for also violating his probation. Police officers *828eventually booked David into custody. They detained Beatriz for two hours but did not charge her with any offense. The next day, after determining that the car was probably not stolen, Wiles directed that David be released from custody, but he was not released for another two days. No charges were ever filed against him.
Plaintiffs David and Beatriz Venegas filed an action against Wiles, the City of Vernon, the Vernon Police Department, and the County and its sheriff’s department, sheriff and deputies. The complaint purported to state causes of action under section 1983 on behalf of both plaintiffs for unreasonable search and seizure, and a similar cause of action under Civil Code section 52.1, subdivision (b), on David’s behalf. David also sued for false detention and arrest.
After certain of these claims were settled or resolved in defendants’ favor on demurrer, the remaining ones (concerning the legality of the search of the Venegas home and the detention/arrest of David and Beatriz) were tried. After plaintiffs rested their case-in-chief, defendants moved for a nonsuit, which the trial court granted, entering judgment in defendants’ favor.
Plaintiffs appealed and the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that (1) triable factual questions existed as to whether Beatriz’s and/or David’s detention was unreasonable and whether the search of their house was invalid; (2) the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers of County, its sheriff’s department, sheriff and deputies, to plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims on the ground these persons were immune from liability; and (3) the trial court erred in sustaining these defendants’ demurrers to plaintiffs’ Civil Code section 52.1 cause of action on the ground plaintiffs failed to allege they were members of a protected class.
II. State Agent Immunity Under Section 1983
County, on behalf of its sheriff’s department and sheriff (hereafter defendants) contends that California sheriffs conducting criminal investigations are acting on behalf of the state when performing law enforcement activities. Accordingly, defendants claim that, as a state agent, the sheriff enjoys the state’s immunity from prosecution for the asserted violations of section 1983 occurring in this case. Contrary to the Court of Appeal, we agree with defendants.
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the *829deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .. . .”
Is a sheriff engaged in a criminal investigation a “person” under section 1983? The United States Supreme Court has held that cities, counties, and local officers sued in their official capacity are themselves “persons” for purposes of section 1983 and, although they cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for their subordinate officers’ unlawful acts, they may be held directly liable for constitutional violations carried out under their own regulations, policies, customs, or usages by persons having “final policymaking authority” over the actions at issue. (McMillian v. Monroe County (1997) 520 U.S. 781, 784-785 [138 L.Ed.2d 1, 117 S.Ct. 1734] (McMillian). Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 690-692 [56 L.Ed.2d 611, 98 S.Ct. 2018] (Monell); see Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920] (Pitts); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1171 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860] (Peters).)
On the other hand, states and state officers sued in their official capacity are not considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from liability under the statute by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Howlett v. Rose (1990) 496 U.S. 356, 365 [110 L.Ed.2d 332, 110 S.Ct. 2430]; Will v. Michigan Dept, of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 63-67, 71 [105 L.Ed.2d 45, 109 S.Ct. 2304]; Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 348; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th atp. 1171.) As Will stated, “it does not follow that if municipalities are persons then so are States. States are protected by the Eleventh Amendment [of the United States Constitution] while municipalities are not. . . . ” (Will, supra, at p. 70.) Will continued, noting that “Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. [Citation.] As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 71.) The rule exempting the state and its officers applies to officers such as sheriffs if they were acting as state agents with final policymaking authority over the complained-of actions. (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 784—785.)
Defendants claim they are immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment on the ground that in California, the sheriff acts on behalf of the state rather than the county when engaged in investigating crime. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the sheriff was acting as an agent of County, not the state, while engaged in the warrantless search of plaintiffs’ home. The court relied primarily on two federal cases that had concluded that California sheriffs act on behalf of the county in performing at least some of *830their law enforcement functions. (Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo (9th Cir. 2002) 291 F.3d 549 (Bishop); vacated on other grounds and remanded in Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony (2003) 538 U.S. 701 [155 L.Ed.2d 933, 123 S.Ct. 1887] [Indian tribes lack standing to sue under § 1983]; Brewster v. Shasta County (9th Cir. 2001) 275 F.3d 803, 807-808 (Brewster), cert. den. sub nom. Shasta County v. Brewster (2002) 537 U.S. 814 [154 L.Ed.2d 17, 123 S.Ct. 75].) Defendants argue these federal decisions are inapposite, and they claim that two California cases are controlling. (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th 340; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 1166.) We agree with defendants that the state cases more accurately reflect California law.
The Court of Appeal in the present case concluded that the sheriff, exercising his or her crime investigation functions (here, searching plaintiffs’ house and seizing certain documents), acted as an agent of County, not the state. The court, largely ignoring Pitts, found Peters factually distinguishable because it involved the limited question whether the sheriff, in setting policies concerning the release of persons from county jail, acts on behalf of the state or county. The Court of Appeal therefore found Peters not dispositive of the issue whether sheriffs act for the state in carrying out crime investigations. Accordingly, the appellate court looked to the two above-cited federal cases holding that California sheriffs are county actors when investigating crime occurring within the county. (Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at p. 566; Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 807-808; see also Cortez v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2002) 294 F.3d 1186, 1191-1192 [sheriff’s department acts as county agent in administering county jail policies]; Streit v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2001) 236 F.3d 552, 559-565 [same].)
Based on its analysis of these federal cases, and its belief that a contrary rule would preclude all section 1983 suits against local law enforcement officers, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers of the County and its sheriff’s department and sheriff. We disagree. As is apparent, resolution of the question before us inevitably involves careful analysis of several state and federal cases. We start with the two California cases deemed by defendants to be most apposite, and then consider the principal federal cases cited by plaintiffs and relied on by the Court of Appeal.
A. Pitts
In Pitts, persons whose child molestation convictions were reversed on appeal brought civil actions against the County of Kern and its district attorney and his employees, asserting civil rights violations under section 1983 arising from alleged misconduct during the criminal prosecution. The district attorney and his employees prevailed under the doctrine of prosecuto*831rial immunity and, accordingly, Pitts was concerned only with the liability of the county. (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 345-347, 352.)
The plaintiffs’ action against the county alleged that its district attorney had established a pattern or practice of procuring false statements and testimony by threats, promises, and intimidation, and also failed to provide adequate training procedures and regulations to prevent such conduct. (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 352.) As noted above, although the county could not be held vicariously liable under section 1983, it could be held directly liable for constitutional violations carried out under its own policies. (Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 690-692.) Pitts held, however, that a district attorney represents the state rather than the county when preparing to prosecute crimes and training and developing policies for prosecutorial staff. Although Pitts involved district attorneys rather than sheriffs, the court relied on statutes and analysis applying to both kinds of officers.
In Pitts, we first observed that the question whether a public official represents a county or a state when acting in a particular capacity is analyzed under state, not federal law. (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 352-353, 356; see McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 786 [determining actual functions of government officer is dependent on relevant state law].) For guidance in resolving this question, Pitts next turned to McMillian, which had examined Alabama state law to determine whether a sheriff was a state or county official. In McMillian, after his murder conviction was reversed due to suppression of exculpatory evidence, the plaintiff sued an Alabama sheriff for damages under section 1983 for intimidating a witness and withholding evidence. The United States Supreme Court examined Alabama’s constitutional and statutory provisions concerning sheriffs and concluded that, while executing their law enforcement duties in Alabama, sheriffs are executive officers of the state, not the county, and accordingly are immune from section 1983 liability. (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 791-793.)
Among other factors, the McMillian court considered the role of sheriffs as state representatives under the Alabama Constitution and Alabama statutes, the authority of Alabama sheriffs to enforce state criminal laws in their counties, and the lack of similar enforcement authority by the counties themselves. (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 787-791.) McMillian concluded that these factors outweighed several countervailing factors that supported the conclusion that Alabama sheriffs were officers of the county, namely, that the county paid the sheriffs’ salary and provided them with equipment, lodging and expenses, that the sheriffs’ jurisdiction was limited by county borders, and that county voters elected these sheriffs. (Id. at pp. 791-792.)
*832Pitts applied McMillian’s, analytical framework to conclude that a California district attorney acts on behalf of the state rather than the county in preparing to prosecute crimes and in training and developing policies for prosecutorial staff. (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 356-366.) In reaching its conclusion, the court considered several constitutional and statutory provisions tending to support or negate state agency, but placed special emphasis on article V, section 13, of the state Constitution, providing that “[t]he Attorney General shall have direct supervision over every district attorney . . . in all matters pertaining to the duties of their . . . offices . . . .” Under this same provision, the Attorney General may require district attorneys to make appropriate reports “concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions,” and may prosecute violations of law if, in his or her opinion, state laws are not adequately being enforced in any county. (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 356-357.) We also noted in Pitts that Government Code sections 12550 and 12524, and Penal Code section 923 contain similar provisions placing county district attorneys under the supervision of the state Attorney General. (Pitts, supra, at pp. 357-358, & fn. 5.)
We observed in Pitts that, in contrast to the broad supervisory powers of the Attorney General over district attorneys, Government Code section 25303 bars county boards of supervisors from affecting or obstructing the district attorneys’ investigative or prosecutorial functions. (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 358.) We also pointed out that a district attorney acts in the name of the People of the state when prosecuting criminal violations of state law. (Id. at p. 359.)
Pitts readily acknowledged that other constitutional and statutory provisions would support a conclusion that a district attorney is a county officer: For example, county voters elect district attorneys (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 4, subd. (c)), who are listed as county officers (Gov. Code, § 24000, subd. (a)), are generally ineligible to hold office unless they are registered voters of the county in which they perform their duties (Gov. Code, § 24001), and are compensated as prescribed by the county board of supervisors (Gov. Code, § 25300). (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 360-361.) Furthermore, under Government Code section 25303, the county board of supervisors supervises the district attorney’s official conduct and expenditure of funds, although it cannot affect the district attorney’s independent investigative and prosecutorial functions. (Pitts, supra, at p. 361.) Necessary expenses incurred by the district attorney in the prosecution of criminal cases are considered county charges. (Gov. Code, § 29601, subd. (b)(2).)
Yet, after balancing the competing factors, and relying on McMillian’s similar analysis, we concluded in Pitts that, when preparing to prosecute and *833prosecuting crimes, a district attorney represents the state, and is not considered a policy maker for the county. (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 362.) We similarly concluded that a district attorney does not represent the county when training staff and developing policy in the area of criminal investigation and prosecution. We stated that “[n]o meaningful analytical distinction can be made between these two functions [i.e., prosecuting crime on the one hand, and training/policymaking' regarding criminal investigation and prosecution on the other]. Indeed, a contrary rule would require impossibly precise distinctions.” (Ibid.) Thus, the constitutional and statutory provisions discussed above give the Attorney General “oversight not only with respect to a district attorney’s actions in a particular case, but also in the training and development of policy intended for use in every criminal case.” (Id. at p. 363.)
B. Peters
As noted, Pitts involved the question whether district attorneys were state agents when investigating and prosecuting crime, or when training staff and developing policy involving such matters. Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, applied Pitts’s analysis and extended it to California sheriffs, concluding that in setting policies concerning the release of persons from the county jail, the sheriff acts as a state officer performing state law enforcement duties. Although Peters did not consider whether a sheriff acts as a state or county officer when, as here, investigating criminal activity, Peters’ s reasoning would clearly apply to the present case.
The plaintiff in Peters brought a civil rights action under section 1983, alleging that the sheriff and his deputies, relying on an inapposite arrest warrant, improperly detained her in county jail after she had posted bail. Peters applied the McMillan/Pitts analysis to determine whether a California sheriff acts as a state or county officer in setting policies governing release of prisoners from the county jail. Peters found Pitts to be controlling, noting that the same constitutional and statutory provisions governing district attorneys considered in Pitts also apply to sheriffs. (Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1170, 1174-1175.)
For example, article V, section 13 of the California Constitution provides that subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, “[t]he Attorney General shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers as may be designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as the Attorney General may seem advisable.” (Italics added.)
*834Similarly, Government Code section 12560, which relates to sheriffs, is substantially identical to Government Code section 12550, which relates to district attorneys and was relied on in Pitts. Section 12560 gives the Attorney General “direct supervision” of all sheriffs, with power to order reports “concerning the investigation, detection and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions,” and to direct their activities regarding these investigations. Peters also cited Government Code sections 26600 (sheriffs’ duty to preserve the peace through crime prevention projects), 26601 (sheriffs’ authority to arrest criminal offenders), and 26602 (sheriffs’ duty to prevent breaches of peace and investigate public offenses). As in Pitts, the court in Peters found all these provisions instructive on the issue whether a sheriff acts as a state or county agent in establishing policies for the release of arrestees from jail. (Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1174—1175.)
In addition, Peters pointed out that, as in Pitts with respect to district attorneys, the county board of supervisors has no direct control over a sheriff’s performance of law enforcement functions. Government Code section 25303, upon which Pitts relied for this proposition, applies to both offices. Among other things, that section reaffirms “the independent and constitutionally and statutorily designated investigative and prosecutorial functions of the sheriff and district attorney of a county. The board of supervisors shall not obstruct the investigative function of the sheriff of the county nor shall it obstruct the investigative and prosecutorial function of the district attorney of a county, [f] Nothing contained herein shall be construed to limit the budgetary authority of the board of supervisors over the district attorney or sheriff.” (Gov. Code, § 25303, italics added; see Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175.)
As in Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pages 360-361, Peters acknowledged that other constitutional and statutory provisions tended to support a theory of county agency. For example, article XI, sections 1, subdivision (b), and 4, subdivision (c), of the state Constitution provide for “an elected sheriff” in each county, and Government Code section 24000 includes sheriffs within the general category of county officers. But as in Pitts, Peters concluded that these provisions were outweighed by those supporting the argument that sheriffs are not policy makers for the county board of supervisors but are functionally independent of county control when performing their law enforcement functions. (Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1176-1177.)
C. Brewster and Bishop decisions
As indicated above, the Court of Appeal in this case relied on federal Ninth Circuit cases that had reached conclusions seemingly contrary to Pitts and Peters. (Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at p. 566; Brewster, supra, 275 *835F.3d at pp. 807-808.) These cases, while purporting to defer to state law as required by McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at page 786, nonetheless ultimately took the position that questions regarding section 1983 liability implicate federal law and accordingly were not necessarily controlled by Pitts or Peters. (See Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at pp. 562, 564-565 [Pitts factually distinguishable]; Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 807, 811 [expressly declining to follow Peters].) Lower federal court decisions such as Brewster and Bishop may be entitled to great weight but they are not binding on this court. (E.g., People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 431 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000]; People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86 [81 Cal.Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129].) In any event, having reviewed those federal decisions, we conclude that they erred in failing to follow the guidance given by McMillian, Pitts, and Peters.
1. Brewster—In Brewster, Shasta County and its sheriff’s department allegedly violated the plaintiff’s civil rights during a murder investigation by manipulating a witness into making a false identification, failing to test physical evidence, and ignoring exculpatory evidence. (Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at p. 805.) Brewster concluded that the sheriff was acting as a county agent during the investigation. The court concentrated on such factors as (1) inclusion of sheriffs as county officers in state Constitution article XI, section 1, subdivision (b), and Government Code section 24000, and (2) county supervision of sheriffs’ activities under Government Code section 25303. (Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 806-808.) Yet, as we noted above, Pitts and Peters found these factors insufficient to establish a county agency relationship with, respectively, district attorneys and sheriffs when performing law enforcement functions. (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 360-362; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.)
Brewster, like Justice Werdegar’s concurring and dissenting opinion herein, also deemed significant the fact that monetary damages assessed against sheriffs for section 1983 claims would be paid by the counties, not the state. (Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 807-808, citing Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a) [vicarious liability of government agencies for employee’s torts].) Section 815.2, subdivision (a), applies, however, to both the state and counties (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 360, fn. 7), and although it may provide a general basis for vicarious public liability, significantly subdivision (b) of the section immunizes both the state and county from torts that are committed by employees who are themselves immune. So, we dispute the present relevance of section 815.2, as it fails to answer the questions whether the sheriff was indeed acting as a county, not state, employee during the events in question, and whether he lacked immunity from federal civil rights actions—the very questions we are attempting to answer here.
*836In addition, we think the Brewster analysis is faulty for other reasons. As Brewster earlier acknowledged, if sheriffs indeed are acting as state agents in crime investigations, they would be immune from liability under section 1983 if sued in their official capacity, and their counties would not be liable for their actions. (Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at p. 805 [“if [the sheriff] is a policymaker for the state, then the county cannot be liable for his actions”].)
To the extent Brewster was referring to a sheriff’s liability when sued in his personal capacity, we have no occasion here to consider whether the Los Angeles County Sheriff is personally immune under any California statute. We note, however, that apart from the immunity sheriffs would enjoy while acting as state agents, sheriffs enjoy additional immunities under Government Code section 820.2 (discretionary acts) or section 820.4 (executing or enforcing laws). Significantly, Pitts discarded a similar argument under section 815.2, subdivision (a), because of the immunity of the district attorney under section 821.6 (instituting or prosecuting an action). (See Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 360, fn. 7.)
In any event, even assuming California sheriffs lack such immunity, the fact that their counties may be called on to pay any tort damage judgment rendered against their sheriffs sued in their personal capacity is only one of the many factors McMillian requires us to consider. That single factor, if it truly exists, is outweighed by the constitutional and statutory provisions discussed above, demonstrating that a sheriff represents the state, not the county, when performing law enforcement duties in his official capacity.
The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Werdegar suggests that the high court in McMillian found the vicarious liability point “critical” to its holding, but we read the case differently. What the high court found “critical” was the fact that the Alabama Supreme Court had determined that the framers of the Alabama Constitution took steps to ensure that its sheriffs would be considered executive officers of the state. (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 788-789.) Based on these critical factors, Alabama cases later concluded that sheriffs are state officers so that tort claims against them are deemed suits against the state. (Id. at p. 789.) The analysis in this opinion is consistent with McMillian, for our review of our state’s Constitution and statutes similarly convinces us that sheriffs while performing law enforcement duties are state agents, so that the present suits should be deemed suits against the State of California.
Justice Werdegar relies in part on Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (1994) 513 U.S. 30, 48 [130 L.Ed.2d 245, 115 S.Ct. 394], as emphasizing the importance of the “ ‘the vulnerability of the State’s purse’ ” (cone. & dis. opn., post, at p. 855), but that case did not involve a section *8371983 claim but was an action brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act against a multistate port authority, which unsuccessfully sought Eleventh Amendment immunity as a state agent. Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg wrote Hess, and several years later, she wrote the dissent in McMillian, joined by three other justices. In the latter case, as Justice Werdegar observes, the majority noted that the state would be liable for tort judgments against an Alabama sheriff. However, in her dissent in McMillian arguing that sheriffs are county, not state officers, Justice Ginsburg fails even to mention this factor. Rather, she cites such factors as the inclusion of Alabama sheriffs in the executive department, and impeachment of sheriffs by state officers, and says, “these measures are the strongest supports for the Court’s classification of county sheriffs as state actors.” (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 798.)
Surely, if payment of tort judgments were indeed the critical factor in determining whether a sheriff was a state officer, Justice Ginsburg, who authored Hess, would have at least mentioned that factor, and indeed would have been required to distinguish it, in her subsequent dissent in McMillian. Thus, it appears that we are instead instructed by both the majority and the dissenting opinions in McMillian to consider a variety of factors, not simply one, under state law in reaching an “understanding of the actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area.” (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 786.)
Justice Werdegar’s opinion also asserts that unquestionably a California sheriff is a county employee for purposes of Government Code section 815.2, citing Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 717 [117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865]. But Sullivan was not faced with the question whether such a sheriff might be deemed a state agent for purposes of federal section 1983 civil rights liability, or indeed for any other purpose. The question simply was not before us in that case. Thus, section 815.2 seemingly adds nothing helpful to the resolution of the question whether sheriffs are state or county agents.
2. Bishop—In Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d 549, a Native American tribe and its wholly owned gaming corporation sued the County of Inyo, its district attorney, and its sheriff, seeking equitable and monetary relief and alleging these defendants conducted an unlawful records search on tribal property. The federal appeals court in its now vacated opinion in Bishop concluded that both the district attorney and sheriff were acting as county officers in obtaining and executing an invalid search warrant aimed at uncovering welfare fraud. (Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at pp. 562-566.) As in Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pages 806-808, the Bishop court relied on such factors as (1) inclusion of district attorneys and sheriffs as county officers in state Constitution article XI, section 1, subdivision (b), and Government Code
*838section 24000, and (2) county supervision of the district attorney’s and sheriff’s activities under Government Code section 25303. (Bishop, supra, at pp. 563-564.) As we noted above, Pitts and Peters deemed these factors insufficient to establish a county agency relationship with, respectively, district attorneys and sheriffs when performing law enforcement activities. (Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 360-362; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.)
Acknowledging the constitutional and statutory supervisory authority of the state Attorney General over district attorneys and sheriffs in their law enforcement functions, Bishop nonetheless expressed concern that “to allow the Attorney General’s supervisory role to be dispositive . . . would prove too much,” for “if taken to its logical extreme, all local law enforcement agencies in California would be immune from prosecution for civil rights violation,” contrary to Monell's holding (Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 690-692) preserving section 1983 actions against local agencies. (Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at p. 564.) To the contrary, merely because the sheriff is a state officer, as demonstrated by the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, does not mean that all local law enforcement officers are also to be deemed state officers.
Pitts and Peters are clearly confined, respectively, to situations in which district attorneys and sheriffs are actually engaged in performing law enforcement duties, such as investigating and prosecuting crime, or training staff and developing policy involving such matters. (See Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 366; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.) Immunizing these persons when actually engaged in such activities would not violate Monell's broad refusal to find all local agencies immune from suit under section 1983. Other torts or civil rights violations by these and other local officers might well be deemed acts committed by county agents, for which they and their counties could be responsible. As Peters states, “This determination does not require an ‘all-or-nothing’ categorization applying to every type of conduct in which the official may engage. Rather, the issue is whether the official is a local policymaker with regard to the particular action alleged to have deprived the plaintiff of civil rights. [Citations.]” (Peters, supra, at p. 1172.)
Moreover, Bishop's analysis appears to express a policy concern (overly broad immunity from suit) that is extraneous to the high court’s factor-balancing test employed in McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pages 786, 790-791, a test that, as Brewster acknowledged, requires a weighing of the state’s Constitution, statutes, and case law. (Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at p. 806.)
Bishop also stressed the fact that the search warrant at issue there sought to disclose evidence of welfare fraud, a matter falling within the jurisdiction of *839the county’s health and human services department. (Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at p. 565.) The fact remains, however, that welfare fraud is a state offense (e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 11482-11483). Attempting to distinguish Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th 340, the Bishop court observed that Pitts involved prosecutorial conduct, whereas Bishop concerned investigating possible welfare fraud in advance of prosecution. (Bishop, supra, at pp. 564-565.) But nothing in Pitts supports such a fine distinction. Indeed, Pitts’ s precise holding was that a district attorney “is a state official when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting criminal violations of state law.” {Pitts, supra, at p. 360, italics added.) It is noteworthy that the plaintiffs in Pitts had alleged misconduct (procuring false witness statements and failing to provide adequate training procedures) squarely falling in the preprosecution category. (Id. at p. 352.)
3. Conclusion—In short, we are unconvinced that either Brewster or Bishop affords cogent reasons for ruling that in California, sheriffs act as county officers in performing their law enforcement activities. We conclude that, following the analysis prescribed in McMillian, Pitts and Peters, California sheriffs act as state officers while performing state law enforcement duties such as investigating possible criminal activity.
Plaintiffs assert that even if the sheriff acted as a state agent in this case, County’s other agents and employees played such a significant role in the events as to justify its liability. The limited issue before us, however, involves the potential liability of the County for the acts of its sheriff. The question of the County’s liability for the acts of other persons is not before us.
We conclude the trial court properly sustained the demurrers of County, its sheriff’s department, and its sheriff to plaintiffs’ civil rights action under section 1983.
III. Qualified Immunity of Sheriff’s Deputies Under Section 1983
As McMillian explains, the rule exempting the state and its officers from liability under section 1983 applies to officers such as sheriffs only if they were acting as state agents with final policymaking authority over the complained-of actions. (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 784-785.) Accordingly, the parties in this case have correctly assumed that the sheriff’s deputies would not be shielded by the sheriff’s own state agent immunity, and are “persons” who may be held liable for damages under section 1983 for violating someone’s constitutional rights. County, however, argues these deputies were entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983 because reasonable officers in their position would have believed their actions were lawful under established law. (See Saucier v. Katz (2001) 533 U.S. 194, *840201-202 [150 L.Ed.2d 272, 121 S.Ct. 2151] (Saucier)] Hunter v. Bryant (1991) 502 U.S. 224, 227 [116 L.Ed.2d 589, 112 S.Ct. 534].) Because this issue is primarily a factual one once the correct legal principles are identified, and the factual record is extensive, we will remand the case to the Court of Appeal for a redetermination of the issue.
Saucier furnishes adequate guidance as to the controlling principles. A rule of qualified immunity shields a public officer from an action for damages under section 1983 unless the officer has violated a “clearly established” constitutional right. (Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 201.) As stated in Saucier, “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 202.) The high court explained that “[i]f the law did not put the officer on notice that his- conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.” (Ibid.) Saucier confirmed that, despite a possible Fourth Amendment violation, officers still must be granted immunity “for reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their actions.” (Id. at p. 206.)
The plaintiff in Saucier brought a section 1983 action against police officers, alleging that they used excessive force in arresting him. At issue was whether the immunity analysis was so intertwined with the question of excessive force that the qualified immunity and constitutional violation issues should be treated as one question, to be decided by the trier of fact. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the inquiries merged into a single question for the jury. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ruling on qualified immunity required an analysis separate from the question whether unreasonable force was used in making the arrest. (Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 199.) Saucier set forth the following framework for ruling on a claim of qualified immunity; First, accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true, was a constitutional right violated? If so, was the right so well established that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the circumstances? (Ibid.)
Thus, Saucier makes clear that a ruling on qualified immunity requires an analysis separate from the question whether a constitutional violation occurred. Yet, the Court of Appeal in this case appeared to assume that a bare showing of possible constitutional rights violations would be sufficient to avoid defendants’ motion for nonsuit. The court phrased the relevant inquiry as simply whether the evidence, viewed in plaintiffs’ favor, “supported] a determination that respondents’ conduct violated a federal right under the Fourth Amendment,” and proceeded to find sufficient evidence to support such a violation. This analysis seemingly ignores Saucier and its emphasis on *841whether a reasonable officer would believe his conduct clearly unlawful. Without such a finding, defendant deputies would be immune from a section 1983 action. Significantly, the Court of Appeal opinion failed to cite Saucier, which was decided only a few months earlier.
Here, as the Court of Appeal noted, the trial court in granting nonsuit expressly found that the officers “acted reasonably by any objective standard.” The briefs before us argue at length as to whether or not the record supports that finding. Given the Court of Appeal’s failure to consider Saucier and review the evidence with the Saucier principles in mind, it is appropriate that the Court of Appeal reconsider this primarily factual issue.
IV. Liability of County and its Sheriff Under Civil Code Section 52.1
Finally, County argues that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding plaintiffs could state a cause of action against County, its sheriff’s department and its sheriff, under Civil Code section 52.1, for unreasonable search and seizure. According to County, the section applies only to so-called hate crimes and requires a showing, not alleged here, that the defendants acted with “discriminatory animus,” i.e., an intent to threaten or coerce another in violation of their constitutional rights, based on the victim’s actual or apparent racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual orientation or other minority status. (See, e.g., In re Michael M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 725-726 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 10] [describing the intent element underlying hate crime legislation].) We disagree, as nothing in Civil Code section 52.1 requires any showing of actual intent to discriminate.
Civil Code section 52.1, subdivision (a), provides that if a person interferes, or attempts to interfere, by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment of the constitutional or statutory rights of “any individual or individuals,” the Attorney General, or any district or city attorney, may bring a civil action for equitable or injunctive relief. Subdivision (b) allows “[a]ny individual” so interfered with to sue for damages. Subdivision (g) states that an action brought under section 52.1 is “independent of any other action, remedy, or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved individual under any other provision of law,” including Civil Code section 51.7.
Civil Code section 51.7, a separate and independent enactment referred to in section 52.1, declares that all persons have the right to be free from violence or intimidation because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, or position in a labor dispute, or because they are perceived by another to have *842any of these characteristics. Section 52, subdivision (b), makes persons who violate section 51.7 liable for actual and exemplary damages and penalties.
Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1797, 1809 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 282], concluded that a plaintiff who brings an action under Civil Code section 52.1 must be a member of one of the classes protected by Civil Code section 51.7. Thereafter, in 2000, after the events giving rise to this action, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 2719 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter Assembly Bill 2719) to explain that Boccato erred in that assumption, and to clarify that Civil Code section 52.1 applies to an affected plaintiff “without regard to his or her membership in a protected class identified by its race, color, religion, or sex, among other things.” (Stats. 2000, ch. 98, § 1.)
The Court of Appeal in the present case determined that the trial court, relying on Boccato’s erroneous interpretation of the statute, improperly sustained demurrers without leave to amend to plaintiffs’ cause of action under Civil Code section 52.1. The appellate court recognized that the pronouncements in 2000 of legislative intent did not apply in this case, but based on its independent interpretation of the statute, the court rejected Boccato and determined that Civil Code section 52.1 did not, in 1998, require a plaintiff to be a member of a protected class.
County evidently agrees with the Court of Appeal’s analysis in this respect, as it does not presently rely on Boccato, which indeed seems inconsistent with the statutory language of Civil Code section 52.1, subdivision (b), allowing “[a]ny individual” (italics added) whose exercise or enjoyment of constitutional or statutory rights has been interfered with to sue the perpetrator for damages. Had the Legislature intended to limit the scope of section 52.1 to individuals protected under section 51.7, it could easily have done so.
Instead of asserting that Boccato controls, County narrowly reads Assembly Bill 2719 as clarifying that a person can state a cause of action under Civil Code section 52.1 only if he or she is the victim of intimidation or interference based on an actual or perceived class or characteristic protected under section 51.7. We see no reasonable basis for such an interpretation. Assembly Bill 2719 explained that “[s]ection 52.1 of the Civil Code guarantees the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state without regard to his or her membership in a protected class identified by its race, color, religion, or sex, among other things.” (Italics added.) We cannot reasonably interpret this language, or the unambiguous language of section 52.1 itself, to restrict the benefits of the section to persons who are actual or perceived members of a *843protected class. Such an interpretation could have anomalous results, permitting or disallowing recovery based solely on the defendant’s perceptions of the plaintiff’s protected status.
In Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 338 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 949 R2d 941], we acknowledged that Civil Code section 52.1 was adopted “to stem a tide of hate crimes.” But contrary to County’s position, our statement did not suggest that section 52.1 was limited to such crimes, or required plaintiffs to demonstrate that County or its officers had a discriminatory purpose in harassing them, that is, that they committed an actual hate crime. We continued in Jones by simply observing that the language of section 52.1 provides remedies for “certain misconduct that interferes with” federal or state laws, if accompanied by threats, intimidation, or coercion, and whether or not state action is involved. (Jones, supra, at p. 338.) Plaintiffs have alleged such misconduct here.
County predicts that allowing unrestricted civil actions under Civil Code section 52.1 will result in “an incalculable increase in the filing of lawsuits in our State’s courts,” imposing heavy burdens on “the already financially-strapped court system . . . .” County observes that if section 52.1 indeed applied to all tort actions, the section would provide plaintiffs in such cases significant civil penalties and attorney fees as well as compensatory damages.
First, Civil Code section 52.1 does not extend to all ordinary tort actions because its provisions are limited to threats, intimidation, or coercion that interferes with a constitutional or statutory right. Second, imposing added limitations on the scope of section 52.1 would appear to be more a legislative concern than a judicial one, and perhaps the Legislature would be advised to reexamine the matter. But we need not decide here whether section 52.1 affords protections to every tort claimant, for plaintiffs in this case have alleged unconstitutional search and seizure violations extending far beyond ordinary tort claims. All we decide here is that, in pursuing relief for those constitutional violations under section 52.1, plaintiffs need not allege that defendants acted with discriminatory animus or intent, so long as those acts were accompanied by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion. The Court of Appeal was correct in holding that plaintiffs adequately stated a cause of action under section 52.1.
V. Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed as to plaintiffs’ asserted causes of action under 42 United States Code section 1983, and we remand to that court for its redetermination of the qualified immunity issue in light of our opinion. The Court of Appeal’s judgment sustaining plaintiffs’ causes of action under Civil Code section 52.1 is affirmed.
*844George, C. 1, Baxter, L, and Brown, J., concurred.