specially concurring.
While I agree with the majority that the judgment of the district court must be reversed, I do not agree with the conclusion reached in Part I of the majority’s opinion that § 13-21-117, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A) affects the liability of a hospital to an inpatient for the violent acts of another inpatient. In my view, that statute is inapplicable to the factual circumstance described in plaintiffs complaint. Thus, I concur in the judgment of reversal only.
I recognize that a statute must be interpreted to ascertain the intent of the legislative body that adopted it, and if its language is clear, a court must give effect to the words as written. However, the issue whether statutory language is clear cannot always be determined merely by focusing upon the words of the statute alone.
In order to ascertain the intended meaning of a statute, it is proper, I submit, to examine not only the words used in the statute itself, but to consider, as well, the problem that the statute was designed to address. In addition, other legislative pronouncements on the same subject may be considered and read together with the disputed statute so as to carry out the beneficent purposes of both. See People in Interest of M.K.A., 182 Colo. 172, 511 P.2d 477 (1973); Eugene Cervi & Co. v. Russell, 31 Colo.App. 525, 506 P.2d 748 (1972), aff'd, 184 Colo. 282, 519 P.2d 1189 (1974).
Further, it must be presumed that the statute was intended to produce a just and reasonable result. Ingram v. Cooper, 698 P.2d 1314 (Colo.1985). A statute may not be interpreted so as to produce an unreasonable or absurd result, unless its language will admit of no other possibility. Denver v. Holmes, 156 Colo. 586, 400 P.2d 901 (1965).
Application of these precepts to § 13-21-117 convinces me that this statute was not intended to apply to claims arising from injuries caused by a person who has been committed as an inpatient pursuant to *1355§ 27-10-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 11).
As pertinent here, the statute provides that no hospital “shall be liable ... for failure to warn or protect any person” from the actions of a “mental health patient,” unless that mental health patient has communicated a “threat of imminent physical violence against a specific per-son_” (emphasis supplied)
However, if a duty to warn or protect arises under the circumstances described by the statute, “the duty shall be discharged” either by making efforts to notify that other person, as well as notifying law enforcement agencies, “or by taking other appropriate action including, but not limited to, hospitalizing the patient.” (emphasis supplied)
Finally, the statute creates two exceptions to the general rule of non-liability. If the mental health care provider negligently releases an inpatient “from any mental hospital or ward,” or if the provider negligently fails to initiate involuntary commitment procedures, after evaluating the patient and determining that the patient “appears to be an imminent danger to others,” the statute has no applicability to any claim that might be based upon such actions.
The narrow question of interpretation presented for our consideration is whether the term, “mental health patient,” as used by this statute, includes all persons to which it might literally apply or only those patients who have not yet been “hospitalized.” The majority adopts the broadened definition; my consideration of the question convinces me that the General Assembly intended only the more restricted one.
Before this statute was adopted, the nature of the duty owed to a third party by a mental health care provider depended upon the status of the provider’s patient. In Perreira v. Colorado, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo.1989), for example, the supreme court noted that the varying common law standards that had been adopted depended for their applicability upon whether the person committing the violence was receiving treatment as an outpatient, as a voluntary inpatient, or as an involuntary inpatient. These differing standards were grounded upon the varying degrees of control over the patient that the mental health care provider could reasonably be expected to exert.
Thus, in the case of an outpatient, because the health care provider has, at best, only a minimal degree of control over the patient’s actions, the provider had a common law’ duty to warn or to protect a third party only in those instances in which the patient had identified that third party as a target. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.Supp. 1333 (D.Colo.1983), aff'd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir.1984) (applying Colorado law).
In contrast, because a health care provider has a greater degree of control over an involuntary inpatient, he had a common law duty to protect even unidentified third parties from such patient’s actions. See Per-reira v. Colorado, supra (decided after adoption of statute, but based upon incidents occurring before its adoption). See generally Annot., Liability of One Releasing Institutionalized Mental Patient for Harm He Causes, 38 A.L.R.3d 699 (1971).
Moreover, testimony on the bill that became § 13-21-117 informed the members of the General Assembly of the nature of these differing standards. See Tape Recording of Testimony before the House Education Committee on H.B. 1201 on February 5, 1986.
It seems to be conceded, even by the members of the mental health care profession who aided in the initial drafting of the bill, that the statute, both in its statement of the general rule and in its later exceptions, was intended merely to codify the common law rules adopted in Brady and by other courts. See Dice, The Duty to Warn and the Liability of Mental Health Care Providers, 16 Colo.Law. 70 (January 1987).
The statute’s principal purpose, therefore, was not to change the nature of the duty owed by such providers. Rather, the statute sought to protect such providers by specifying the steps that they could take to fulfill their duty to third parties in those instances in which a duty to warn or to protect exists. And, this purpose was served by the statute’s declaration that the *1356mental health care provider’s duty could be performed either by giving appropriate notice to the third party “or ” by taking other appropriate steps, including “hospitalization.” Dice, supra.
Hence, consideration of the nature of the problem that the legislation was intended to address justifies the dictum in footnote 8 of Perreira that § 13-21-117 “is instructive at least as to the duty of a psychiatrist in treating a voluntary outpatient.” (emphasis supplied)
In addition, the last sentence of this statute, which refers to involuntary treatment and evaluation, necessarily directs our attention to the statute providing for such treatment and evaluation. That statute requires involuntary hospitalization of a patient if the patient represents a danger to others, even if those others are not identified. Section 27-10-105, C.R.S. (1989 Repl. Vol. 11B); Dice, supra. And, if a mental health care provider negligently fails to cause an outpatient to be committed under this statute, § 13-21-117 is by its express terms inapplicable to any claim based on that failure. See Perreira v. Colorado, supra. Similarly, if an involuntary inpatient is negligently released and injures a previously unidentified third party, § 13-21-117 assures that the common law rule of Perreira will continue to apply.
Finally, as I interpret § 13-21-117, it is intended that a mental health care provider can fulfill any duty created by its terms either by giving appropriate notice of the threat, or by “hospitalizing the patient,” or by taking other appropriate steps. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I am convinced that the statute does not impose a duty upon such a provider both to warn the third person and to take other appropriate steps to protect him. See Dice, supra.
If I am correct in this latter conclusion, moreover, the interpretative inclusion of an involuntary inpatient within the term “mental health patient” leads to an unreasonable and illogical result.
I reject the notion that it was intended that a mental health care provider, knowing of a specific threat, by one inpatient against another, can fulfill any statutory duty owed merely by notifying the intended victim of the threat and informing the local constabulary. It is, after all, the very purpose of hospitalization of a potentially violent patient to prevent injury to others. And, this is accomplished by restricting the violent patient's freedom of action, not by warning other patients to protect themselves from him! See § 27-10-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1989 Repl.Vol. 11B).
Further, to interpret the statute as not applying when a mental health care provider is evaluating a person to determine whether he should be hospitalized, or when he is considering whether the inpatient should be released from hospitalization, but as applying during his interim hospitalization, would likewise lead to an unreasonable and illogical result. I cannot conclude that the General Assembly intended to impose such an unequal duty upon mental health care providers.
Hence, considering the specific problem that this legislation was intended to address, its legislative history and underlying purpose, its relationship to other statutes upon the same subject, as well as the results that would flow from any contrary interpretation, I am of the view that the term “mental health patient” as used in § 13-21-117 refers only to an outpatient, not to an involuntarily committed inpatient. Consequently, while I agree that the trial court’s judgment must be reversed and that this matter must be remanded to it for further proceedings, I would specifically advise that court that § 13-21-117 is inapplicable to this controversy.