dissenting.
For the sake of stare decisis, the majority follows the holding in Lawson v. Coos Co. Sch. Dist. #13, 94 Or App 387, 765 P2d 829 (1988), and, contrary to any conceivable legislative intent, creates a situation where only public bodies that are subject to the. Oregon Tort Claims Act are not protected against stale claims by a statute of ultimate repose.
ORS 12.110(4) provides:
“An action to recover damages for injuries to the person arising from any medical, surgical or dental treatment, omission or operation shall be commenced within two years from the date when the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered. However, notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 12.160, every such action shall be commenced within five years from the date of the treatment, omission or operation upon which the action is based or, if there has been no action commenced within five years because of fraud, deceit or misleading representation, then within two years from the date such fraud, deceit or *9misleading representation is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.”
ORS 30.275(8) provides:
“Except as provided in ORS 12.120 and 12.135, but notwithstanding any other provision of ORS chapter 12 or other statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action, an action arising from any act or omission of a public body or an officer, employee or agent of a public body within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 shall be commenced within two years after the alleged loss or injury.”
The phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of ORS chapter 12 or other statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action” in ORS 30.275(8) is subject to more than one reasonable reading. It could be read to mean that ORS 30.275(8) excludes all provisions of ORS chapter 12 or excludes only those provisions of ORS chapter 12 that limit the commencement of actions. If it excludes only those provisions of ORS chapter 12 that limit the commencement of actions, does that include a statute of ultimate repose that is in ORS chapter 12?
When statutory language lends itself to more than one interpretation, we may look to its legislative history to identify the context in which it was adopted as an aid to resolving the ambiguity. City of Portland v. Rice, 94 Or App 292, 296, 765 P2d 228, aff’d 308 Or 118, 775 P2d 1371 (1989). The legislative history of ORS 30.275(8) reveals that it was adopted in 1981 to preserve the two-year Statute of Limitations in all tort claims filed against the state.1 There is nothing to suggest that the language “notwithstanding any other provision of ORS chapter 12 or other statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action” was meant to apply to statutes of ultimate repose or to ORS 12.110(4). Our *10inquiry, then, is whether the legislature would have intended ORS 30.275(8) to apply to statutes of ultimate repose, had it considered the issue. Security State Bank v. Luebke, 303 Or 418, 737 P2d 586 (1987). We need to look to the language used, the statutory objective and any other evidence of the legislative meaning. ORS 174.010; State v. Parker, 299 Or 534, 704 P2d 1144 (1985).
The statutory objective of ORS 30.275(8) is to limit the liability of public bodies and their officers, employees and agents. Giese v. Bay Area Health District, 101 Or App 410, 413, 790 P2d 1198, rev den 310 Or 281 (1990). Given that objective, there is no reason why the legislature would have intended to expose public bodies, their officers, employees and agents to stale claims that could not be brought against non-government defendants because of ORS 12.110(4). It is an axiom of statutory construction that we should refuse to give literal applications to language when to do so would produce an unintended, absurd or unreasonable result. See Pacific Power & Light Co. v. State Tax Commission, 249 Or 103, 437 P2d 473 (1968). The majority violates that principle when it construes an ambiguous statute to mean what the legislature could not have intended.
Riggs, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.In 1969, the OTCA Statute of Limitations was changed to two years. Or Laws 1968, ch 429, § 3. In 1981, the legislative question relating to the Statute of Limitations was whether to repeal ORS 30.275 and make claims against the state subject to the same limitations as applied to claims against private parties. The legislative committee concluded that it would preserve the pre-1981 limitations. Minutes, Senate Committee on Justice 1, 2 (May 7, 1981). Although there is no explicit explanation for or discussion of the word “notwithstanding,” it appears from the committee minutes that the language was intended to make it clear that no other Statute of Limitations would apply to claims against the state, except those specified in ORS 30.275(8). Minutes, Senate Committee on Justice 4 (March 25, 1981).