This action was instituted by Maude S. Richardson against Maurice Seigle, et al., in the District Court of Love County, Oklahoma, to quiet title to the SEJ4 of the NE¡4 of Section 11, Township 6 South, Range 3 West, in Love County, Oklahoma.
From the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, defendants appeal.
The parties will generally be referred to as plaintiff and defendant in conformity with their appearance in the trial court.
The record discloses that plaintiff acquired title to the land on the 12th day of May, 1928. This tract of. land was not improved, except being fenced and used as pasture land. After the year 1931, no taxes were paid by plaintiff on the land. On August 7, 1945, the defendant, Otis Garrett, obtained a treasurer’s tax deed to the land, which was duly recorded.on the same day. On the 28th day of February, 1947, Maurice Seigle, the subsequent holder of the tax title, obtained a judgment in the District Court of Love County, Oklahoma in Cause No. 6062 against Maude S. Richardson, et al., quieting title to the land here involved.
Plaintiff alleged in her petition filed on March 29, 1950, that the defendants obtained the tax deed and the judgment in No. 6062 by fraud; that the residence and address of the plaintiff within the State of Oklahoma was disclosed by the public records of Love County in connection with the title to said land, and that defendants, in their proceedings to obtain the treasurer’s deed and the judgment in Cause No. 6062, refrained from examining the record to obtain information with reference to the residence and address of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff further, alleged that the judgment in Cause No. 6062 is void upon its face, for the reason that the affidavit for service by publication does not conform to the requirements of the statute and, therefore, the judgment rendered is void.
*769By answer defendants pleaded the validity of the treasurer’s deed and the judgment quieting their title to the land and pleaded that the plaintiff’s action is barred by the statute of limitations under Tit. 12 O.S.19S1 § 95(3) and Tit. 12 O.S.1951 §§ 176, 1031 and 1038.
Plaintiff contends upon the appeal that the judgment in Cause No. 6062 is void upon its face, for the reason that the name of the plaintiff, Seigle, appears in the body of the affidavit as the affiant, and that the affidavit is signed by C. C. Wilkins without designating him as attorney for the plaintiff.
The affidavit for service by publication, so far as here pertinent, reads as follows:
“Maurice Seigle, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
“That he is the Plaintiff in the above styled and numbered cause of action * * *
“Affiant further states that the purpose of this cause of action and the relief demanded * * * is to exclude said Defendants, and each of them, from any and all right, title, interest, lien or claim, * * * (describing land) * * * and to quiet and confirm Plaintiff’s title and possession to said real estate against said Defendants, and each of them, under and by virtue of the deeds alleged and referred to in said Petition by the Plaintiff.”
The remainder of the affidavit alleges that:
“ * * * Plaintiff, with due diligence, is unable to make service of summons within the State of Oklahoma, upon said Defendants, or either of them, and the plaintiff does not know and with due diligence is unable to ascertain whether said Defendants named in the alternative are living, or dead, or the whereabouts of any of said Defendants, * * * and plaintiff desired publication service upon such unknown parties, * * *.
“Affiant further states that the residences or place of business of said Defendants, or either of them, are unknown to the plaintiff, and cannot be ascertained by any means within the control of the Plaintiff, and this is one of the classes of cases prescribed by the Statute of Oklahoma, in which service by publication may be had, and the plaintiff wishes to obtain service by publication upon said Defendants, and each of them.
“/s/ C. C. Wilkins
“Subscribed and sworn to before me this the 16th day of December, 1946.
“/s/ J. G. Wilkins
Notary Public
“(SEAL)
My Commission Expires:
May 9th, 1947.”
To determine whether the affidavit for publication is sufficient to authorize service by publication on Maude S. Richardson, we must examine the entire judgment roll in Case No. 6062. The petition in Case No. 6062 does not appear in the record before us. However, the affidavit of mailing in Case No. 6062 recites that: “C. C. Wilkins, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: That he is the attorney for the Plaintiff * * * ” and the affidavit is signed “C. C. Wilkins.”
The notice by publication in that case bears the signature of C. C. Wilkins, as attorney for the plaintiff. The journal entry of judgment therein recites that the plaintiff, Maurice Seigle, appeared by his attorney, C. C. Wilkins. The journal entry of judgment further recites that:
“ * * * all the other above named defendants, and each of them (including Maude S. Richardson) had been duly and legally served by publication as provided by law, and that the plaintiff made and filed proper affidavits for publication service, and the notice was published in local newspapers of general circulation in Love County, Oklahoma and proof thereof made and filed herein, which is hereby approved by the court * * * and from all of the testimony produced herein the court finds that all of the defendants have been duly and legally served, as re*770quired by law, and the court has jurisdiction of all the defendants.”
From the foregoing we conclude that the trial court in Cause No. 6062 properly approved the affidavit for publication, for under the statute, Tit. 12 O.S.1951 § 171, as construed in Tolbert v. State Bank of Paden, 30 Okl. 403, 121 P. 212, C. C. Wilkins, as the attorney for the plaintiff in said cause, could make the affidavit. The judgment roll and the proof identifies C. C. Wilkins, the affiant, as the plaintiff’s attorney.
We cannot agree with plaintiff that the judgment in Cause No. 6062 is void on its face under our former decision in Faulkner v. Kirkes, Okl., 276 P.2d 264. In the Faulkner case the affidavit was made by the attorney for the plaintiff and it recited that he (the attorney) did not know and with due diligence could not ascertain the residence of the named defendant. It was pointed out that under Tit. 12 O.S.1951 § 171, the affidavit must state that the plaintiff does not know and with due diligence is unable to ascertain the residence of the defendant.
In the affidavit for publication in No. 6062, the affiant, plaintiff’s attorney, states that the plaintiff with due diligence is unable to make service of summons within the State of Oklahoma, and that the plaintiff does not know and with due diligence is unable to ascertain whether the defendants are living, or dead, or their whereabouts.
We therefore hold that the trial court in Cause No. 6062 properly held the service by publication made upon Maude Richard.son was valid, and that the judgment of the trial court in the present action holding said service void is erroneous.
Where a judgment has been rendered on service by publication and the judgment is valid on the face of the judgment roll, an action to set aside such judgment must be brought within three years after its rendition else the action is barred by limitations. 12 O.S.1951 §§ 176, 1031 and 1038. Vinson v. Oklahoma City, 179 Okl. 590, 66 P.2d 933.
However, plaintiff alleged in her petition, and contends here, that the plaintiff in Cause No. 6062 did not use diligence to ascertain whether the defendants herein, Maude Richardson, et al., were non-residents of the state; that no copy of the notice and petition to quiet title was mailed to her; and that the plaintiff’s therein (defendants here) could have by reasonable inquiry obtained information as to her residence.
We find it unnecessary to detail at length plaintiff’s allegations and proof of extrinsic fraud in the procurement of the judgment in view of our conclusion that plaintiff’s cause of action is barred under 12 O.S.1951 § 95(3).
Under 12 O.S.1951 § 95(3), an action for relief on the ground of fraud must be brought within two years, but the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud.
Plaintiff’s testimony is to the effect that she did not discover the alleged fraudulent judgment in Cause No. 6062 until March, 1950, and brought this action immediately thereafter. However, the proof shows conclusively that she paid no taxes on this land after the year 1931. Her proof further shows that on December 12, 1944, her husband, acting as her agent, wrote a letter to Otis Garrett, one of the defendants, stating that “We hold the fee title to SE NE 11-6S-3W, Love Co., Oklahoma, and we note you hold tax certificate upon the land * * He requested information about redeeming said certificates. The record does not disclose whether Mr. Richardson received a reply to that letter.
As we have indicated, the treasurer’s deed was issued and recorded on August 7, 1945, and plaintiff took no further action until she brought the present suit in March, 1950.
It is thus seen that for a period of nineteen years plaintiff paid no taxes upon this land, and although she became aware of *771the outstanding tax certificates in the hands of the defendant, Otis Garrett, she took no action to protect the property by payment of the delinquent taxes. These facts establish that during this entire period plaintiff knew or was charged with knowledge that the title to her land would be lost unless she took affirmative action to protect it against the outstanding tax certificates.
The phrase “Until the discovery of the fraud,” does not necessarily mean until the party has actual notice of the fraud alleged. Fraud is deemed to be discovered, within the statute of limitation, when in the exercise of reasonable diligence it could have been discovered. Yoder v. Weston, 122 Okl. 51, 250 P. 522. Constructive notice from public records required by law to be kept has been held to be sufficient notice. Caraway v. Overholser, 182 Okl. 357, 77 P.2d 688; McElhany v. Langston, 105 Okl. 209, 232 P. 439.
We therefore conclude that the plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered the alleged fraud, and that under this record her cause of actiqn is barred by the statute of limitations.
The case is reversed, with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
WELCH, C. J., and DAVISON, HALLEY, JOHNSON, BLACKBIRD and CARLILE, JJ., concur. WILLIAMS, J., dissents.