OPINION
BAILEY, Judge.Case Summary
Brenda Alexander (“Wife”) appeals the denial of her motion to correct error, which challenged the omission of an award of incapacity maintenance in the decree dissolving her marriage to Donald Alexander (“Husband”). She presents the sole issue of whether she is entitled to an award of incapacity maintenance.1 We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The parties were married on November 2, 1996. Two children were born of the marriage. On October 28, 2009, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage, which included a request for spousal incapacity or rehabilitative maintenance.
On December 14, 2010 and March 22, 2011, the trial court conducted evidentiary hearings. In support of her request for maintenance, Wife offered testimony that she had been injured in 1987 and had since continuously received disability payments from her former employer. She also offered the testimony of a vocational therapist, who opined that Wife’s ability to support herself was materially impaired.2
On June 10, 2011, the trial court entered its “Dissolution Decree and Judgment” in *880which it dissolved the parties’ marriage, divided the marital assets, made findings on child custody and support, and ordered Husband to pay $25,000 of Wife’s attorney’s fees. (App. 12.) The trial court did not award Wife either incapacity or rehabilitative maintenance.
On July 5, 2011, Wife filed her “Verified Motion for Clarification and/or Motion to Correct Error Pursuant to Trial Rule 59.” (App. 23.) Wife asserted that the trial court had made findings that would have supported an award of incapacity or rehabilitative maintenance, but then “did not rule on [Wife’s] request.” (App. 23.) On July 20, 2011, the trial court issued the following order:
The Court clarifies Dissolution Decree and Judgment Order as follows:
1. The Court considered the findings set forth; The Motion to Clarify as well as other findings, including Wife’s disability payments.
2. The Court declined to award Wife rehabilitative maintenance or Disability payments from Husband.
DECIDED.
(App. 26.) This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
A trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine whether it will grant or deny a motion to correct error. Williamson v. Williamson, 825 N.E.2d 33, 44 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). In the decree challenged by Wife’s motion to correct error, the trial court entered findings of fact sua sponte.3 In Cannon v. Cannon, 758 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ind.2001), the Court reviewed findings of fact from which the trial coui’t had concluded that a wife was not entitled to incapacity maintenance and observed that, because Indiana Code section 31-15-7-1 required findings in order to award maintenance, the findings supporting denial would be treated as “special findings” under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A)(3).
The reviewing Court will not set aside such findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Due regard must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. The relative weight and credibility of the evidence and witnesses at trial are within the purview of the trial court. Id. at 527.
Where, as here, a party had the burden of proof and appeals from a negative judgment, she must show that the evidence points unerringly to a conclusion different from that reached by the trier of fact, or that the judgment is contrary to law. Wilder-Newland v. Kessinger, 967 N.E.2d 558, 560 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied. “This means that even if we might have taken a different course of action than that which a trial court took, we are bound to review the order, and findings and conclusions for clear error only.” Id.
II. Analysis
In limiting an award of spousal maintenance to three narrow circumstances — incapacity, caregiver, or rehabilitative — our Legislature has evinced “a clear legislative intent to retain fairly strict limits on the power of courts to order maintenance without the consent of the parties.” Voigt v. Voigt, 670 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (Ind.1996). “Incapacity mainte*881nance” is addressed by Indiana Code section 31-15-7-2(1), which provides that a dissolution court may find “a spouse to be physically or mentally incapacitated to the extent that the ability of the incapacitated spouse to support himself or herself is materially affected” and may find “that maintenance for the spouse is necessary during the period of incapacity, subject to further order of the court.” Such an award is designed to help provide for a spouse’s sustenance and support; accordingly, the essential inquiry is whether the incapacitated spouse has the ability to support himself or herself. Matzat v. Matzat, 854 N.E.2d 918, 920 (Ind.Ct.App.2006).
A claim for incapacity maintenance is to be “evaluated by giving a strict if not literal interpretation to the [statutory] language[.]” Cannon, 758 N.E.2d at 526. That is, a trial court can award incapacity maintenance only if it finds a spouse to be physically or mentally incapacitated to the extent that his or her ability to support himself or herself was materially affected. Id. “And, although the language of the statute appears to give the trial court some discretion not to award maintenance even where it makes such finding, we believe the strict construction principles applicable in this area narrowly limit that discretion as well.” Id. Although it reiterated that a maintenance award is not mandatory, the Court observed in dicta:
Where a trial court finds that a spouse is physically or mentally incapacitated to the extent that the ability of that spouse to support himself or herself is materially affected, the trial court should normally award incapacity maintenance in the absence of extenuating circumstances that directly relate to the criteria for awarding incapacity maintenance.
Id. at 527.
Wife relies upon the foregoing language to support her claim of entitlement to incapacity maintenance. According to Wife, the trial court made special findings of her incapacity as contemplated by the relevant statute and identified no relevant extenuating circumstances, but inexplicably failed to award her incapacity maintenance.
The trial court found that Wife had suffered past injuries, has present medical conditions, receives disability payments, and is college-educated as an accountant. The trial court also acknowledged the testimony of Wife’s vocational expert that her ability to financially support herself is materially impaired, but did not adopt that opinion. This recitation of the evidence is not equivalent to entering a requisite statutory finding. See Parks v. Delaware Cnty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 862 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (observing that the trier of fact must adopt the testimony of the witness before the ostensible finding may be considered a finding of fact). Even if we were to construe the Cannon dicta as requiring an award of incapacity maintenance absent extenuating circumstances once the requisite statutory finding is made, here no such finding was made.
Indeed, the trial court clarified upon motion to correct error that an award of incapacity maintenance was not inadvertently omitted from the dissolution decree; the trial court intended to deny the maintenance request. The evidence before the trial court did not point solely to a conclusion opposite that reached. Although there was evidence that Wife had physical limitations and received disability payments, there was also evidence that she was college-educated, that she had recently provided child care for pay, and that her limitations would not entirely preclude sedentary work. We will not reverse a judgment merely because we might have, on the same evidence, reached a different conclusion. Wilder-Newland, 967 N.E.2d *882at 560. The denial of Wife’s request for incapacity maintenance is not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
CRONE, J., concurs. RILEY, J., dissents with separate opinion.. Although Wife requested an award of either incapacity or rehabilitative maintenance, she confines her argument on appeal to the propriety of an award of incapacity maintenance.
. Wife has herniated discs, degenerative disc disease, and carpal tunnel syndrome.
. Neither party made a written request for findings and conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). Findings are required by statute in order to support an award of incapacity maintenance, but there is no statutory requirement that special findings be entered where incapacity maintenance is denied.