THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Jonathan Mart, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Respondent,
v.
Great Southern Homes, Inc., Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2018-001598
Appeal From Richland County
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 6026
Heard April 5, 2021 – Filed September 13, 2023
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Ronald L. Richter, Jr. and Scott Michael Mongillo, both
of Bland Richter, LLP, of Charleston; and Eric Steven
Bland, of Bland Richter, LLP, of Columbia, all for
Appellant.
Charles Harry McDonald, of Belser & Belser, PA, of
Columbia; Beth B. Richardson, of Robinson Gray Stepp
& Laffitte, LLC, of Columbia; Terry E. Richardson, Jr.,
of Richardson, Thomas, Haltiwanger, Moore & Lewis, of
Barnwell; Brady Ryan Thomas, of Richardson, Thomas,
Haltiwanger, Moore & Lewis, of Columbia; and Matthew
Anderson Nickles, of Rogers, Patrick, Westbrook &
Brickman, LLC, of Columbia, all for Respondent.
MCDONALD, J.: Great Southern Homes, Inc. (GSH) appeals the circuit court's
order denying its motion to dismiss and compel arbitration in this action brought
by Jonathan Mart, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated
homeowners. Mart entered into a contract with GSH to purchase a custom-built
home and later brought this action for breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. Mart also seeks
declaratory relief to address two questions: 1) the validity of GSH's contract
provision requiring a home buyer to waive the implied warranty of habitability
without separate consideration, and 2) the validity of GSH's effort to transfer its
warranty obligations to a third party upon the closing of the transaction.1 Pursuant
to our supreme court's holding in Damico v. Lennar Carolinas, LLC, 437 S.C. 596,
604–05, 879 S.E.2d 746, 751 (2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2581 (2023), we
reverse and remand for arbitration.
Facts and Procedural History
In July 2015, Mart contracted with GSH, a large builder and seller of new homes,
to purchase a newly constructed home in the Longview North subdivision of
Kershaw County. GSH required Mart to execute its proprietary "Contract for Sale"
(Sales Contract) containing a disclaimer of warranty rights, including the implied
warranty of habitability. In place of this implied warranty protecting new home
buyers, GSH substituted an "Express Limited Warranty" (the Warranty) through a
third party, StrucSure Home Warranty.
The header at the top of the Sales Contract states: "CONTRACT SUBJECT TO
ARBITRATION (S.C. Code 15-48-10)." (Emphasis in original). The Sales
Contract later provides in an unnumbered, standalone paragraph on page 3:
ARBITRATION: Any dispute between the parties
hereto arising out of this contract, related to the contract
or the breach thereof, including without limitation,
disputes relating to the property, improvements, or the
condition, construction or sale thereof and the deed to be
delivered pursuant hereto, shall be resolved by final and
binding arbitration before three (3) arbitrators, one
selected by each party, who shall mutually select the
1
Mart has not alleged a construction defect or other problem with the house, nor
has he asserted that GSH has defaulted on any warranty claim.
third arbitrator pursuant to the South Carolina Uniform
Arbitration Act [(SCUAA)2].
Earlier in the document, in unnumbered paragraphs on pages 2 through 3, the Sales
Contract addresses the Warranty:
LIMITED WARRANTY: The Seller shall furnish the
Purchaser, at closing, with a limited warranty issued by a
warranty company approved by the South Carolina Real
Estate Commission. A sample copy of the warranty shall
be available for inspection during reasonable business
hours prior to closing at the offices of the Seller. This
limited warranty shall warrant workmanship for One (1)
year and warrant the structure itself for Ten (10) years
from date of closing. Said limited warranty shall be
incorporated in the deed delivered at closing. Purchaser
acknowledges that said limited warranty is not a
maintenance agreement. FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE
PURPOSES WARRANTY VISITS MAY BE VIDEO
W/AUDIO TAPED.
This Limited Warranty issued to the Purchaser
shall be in lieu of all other warranties, express or
impli[e]d, any warranty of habitability, suitability for
residential purposes, merchantability, or fitness for a
particular purpose is hereby excluded and disclaimed.
Seller shall in no event be liable for consequential or
punitive damages of any kind. There is no warranty
whatsoever on trees, shrubs, grass, vegetation or
erosion caused by lack thereof, nor on subdivision
improvements, including but not limited to, streets,
road[s], sidewalks, sewer, drainage or utilities.
Purchaser agrees to accept said limited warranty in
lieu of all other rights or remedies, whether base[d]
on contract or tort.
The issuance of a certificate of completion or occupancy,
or final inspection approval by any governmental entity
2
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-48-10 to -240 (2005).
shall constitute certification of completion of the
improvements in substantial conformity with the terms of
this contract and shall also constitute a final
determination, binding on the Parties hereto, that the
properties are in full compliance with all applicable laws,
regulations and building codes.
(Emphases in original).
Before the arbitration provision appears on page 3, paragraphs addressing termite
protection, a radon notice, risk of loss, and default follow the limited warranty
section of the Sales Contract.
Later, on page 4, the Sales Contract's "Miscellaneous" section provides, in
pertinent parts:
b. This Contract embodies the entire Agreement between
Seller and Purchaser with respect to the property. No
amendment or modification of this Contract (including
Contracts for charges in construction 'extras') shall be
valid unless contained in a writing executed by both
parties.
....
h. The provisions of this contract shall survive closing
and not merge in the deed.
GSH also provided Mart with a "Warranty Service Acknowledgment" form (the
Acknowledgment), stating "GSH provides a limited warranty on the original
installation of the materials and workmanship (as defined by the SC Residential
Construction Standards) of your home for the first year of occupancy from the date
of closing." It describes issues not covered by the limited warranty and provides
instructions for reporting a claim; Mart signed this Acknowledgement along with
the Sales Contract on July 18, 2015. However, in an affidavit filed in opposition to
GSH's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, Mart noted GSH did not provide
the separate StrucSure Warranty until closing, five months after Mart signed the
Sales Contract.3
At closing, Mart completed a "Home Enrollment Application" (the Application)
through StrucSure Home Warranty, LLC. Pursuant to this document, Mart agreed
"to resolve any claims, disputes, and controversies with the Builder [GSH], the
Administrator, and/or the Insurer through binding arbitration and not litigation."
Mart was charged a fee of $95 in conjunction with this Application.
The Warranty named StrucSure Home Warranty as "Warranty Administrator" and
further provided:
(1) This warranty is an insurance-backed, Express
Limited Warranty provided to You by Your Builder.
This warranty coverage booklet embodies the entire
extent of the Express Limited Warranty.
....
(10) This Express Limited Warranty is separate and
apart from any contracts between You and Your Builder,
including any sales agreements. It cannot be altered,
affected or amended in any manner by any other
agreement except only through a formal written
agreement signed [by] the Builder, the Insurer, the
Administrator, and You.
....
(13) The Warrantor provides no warranties which extend
beyond this document. All other warranties, express or
implied, including, but not limited to, all implied
warranties of fitness, merchantability, or habitability are
3
GSH also gave Mart a "Home Sale Information Sheet" when it provided the Sales
Contract and Acknowledgement. Mart claims this Information Sheet was the
cover page for the Sales Contract. GSH disputes this, asserting the Information
Sheet was not part of the Sales Contract and noting the Sales Contract contained
the "appropriate statutory language" for arbitration. GSH further notes the Sales
Contract was the first document it provided to Mart.
disclaimed and excluded to the extent allowed by law.
The warranties established herein supersede all implied
warranties.
The Warranty also contains its own, separate arbitration provision detailing the
matters subject to its arbitration requirement:
The parties to this Express Limited Warranty intend and
agree that any and all claims, disputes and controversies
by or between the Homeowner, the Builder, the
Administrator, and/or the Insurer, or any combination of
the foregoing, arising out of or related to this Express
Limited Warranty, any alleged Defect and/or Deficiency
in or to the subject Home or the real property on which
the subject Home is situated, or the sale of the subject
Home by the Builder, including, without limitation, any
claim of breach of contract, negligent or intentional
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure in the inducement,
execution, or performance of any contract, including this
arbitration agreement, or breach of any alleged duty of
good faith and fair dealing, shall be settled by binding
arbitration in a manner consistent with this arbitration
agreement. Agreeing to arbitration means You are
waiving Your right to a trial by a judge and/or a jury.
The Warranty further notes the parties "shall mutually agree" on an arbitration
service for submission and resolution of claims and, if no agreement can be
reached, claims are submitted to Construction Dispute Resolution Services. The
Warranty language specifies arbitration would be governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act,4 and requires Mart to cover the initial arbitration costs; thereafter,
the arbitrator may award or apportion costs and fees.
The Warranty limits the maximum aggregate liability to the home's sale price and
does not cover "special, incidental, indirect, or Consequential Damages and [does]
not reimburse parties for their attorney's fees or costs." Should a Warranty
provision be found void or in violation of law, the Warranty provides it will be
"deemed modified to the extent necessary so that it is no longer void or in violation
4
9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 307.
of law or public policy." The Warranty outlines numerous potential issues that
might arise with a home and notes appropriate "Builder Correction" remedies.
Finally, the Warranty provides Mart with an avenue to appeal an arbitration
decision.
GSH moved to dismiss Mart's complaint and to compel arbitration, relying upon
the language of the arbitration clause in the Sales Contract.5 Following a hearing,
the circuit court found the arbitration clauses in the Sales Contract and the
Warranty both covered claims "arising out of or relating to" the Sales Contract and
"these arbitration clauses are in conflict in numerous material respects." Thus, the
circuit court denied GSH's motion, concluding "there was no mutual assent
between Mart and Great Southern as to any arbitration procedure; and, therefore,
there was no meeting of the minds as to an agreement to arbitrate" claims arising
out of or related to the Sales Contract. GSH did not file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP
motion but timely appealed.
Standard of Review
"Arbitrability determinations are subject to de novo review. However, a circuit
court's factual findings will not be reversed on appeal if any evidence reasonably
supports the findings." Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 417 S.C. 42, 47–48, 790 S.E.2d
1, 3 (2016) (internal citation omitted).
5
Although GSH cited in its motion the Sales Contract's provision providing
arbitration would be conducted pursuant to South Carolina's Uniform Arbitration
Act, it argued, "although the Contract itself identifies the South Carolina Uniform
Arbitration Act, the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law." In support of its
contention before the circuit court that the FAA governs any arbitration under the
Sales Contract (or the Warranty), GSH provided the affidavits of two employees,
along with purchase orders noting the implications of this transaction for interstate
commerce. Although Mart and GSH dispute whether Mart merely purchased a
newly constructed home or had GSH build the home according to Mart's
specifications, the Sales Contract describes the transaction as a "building job." In
its briefing to this court, GSH asserts "each contract has its own arbitration
provision which provides for different methods of selecting arbitrators and other
details such as the latter [Warranty] provides for arbitration under the FAA and the
former [Sales Contract] under the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act."
Law and Analysis
I. Damico and the Sales Contract's Arbitration Provision
GSH raises several points challenging the circuit court's order, but the underlying
inquiry boils down to whether the circuit court erred by incorporating the
provisions of the Express Limited Warranty into the parties' Sales Contract when
examining the parties' agreement to arbitrate pursuant to the independent
arbitration agreement in the Sales Contract. GSH frames the question as "whether
two separate contracts, each with a distinct purpose and related arbitration
provision, can be conflated to produce a result of no arbitration whatsoever."
"Arbitration clauses are separable from the contracts in which they are imbedded."
Huskins v. Mungo Homes, LLC, 439 S.C. 356, 366, 887 S.E.2d 534, 539 (Ct. App.
2023) (quoting Hous. Auth. of Columbia v. Cornerstone Hous., LLC, 356 S.C. 328,
338, 588 S.E.2d 617, 622 (Ct. App. 2003)). Whether an arbitration clause is valid
"is distinct from the substantive validity of the contract as a whole." Munoz v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 540, 542 S.E.2d 360, 364 (2001). "Even if
the overall contract is unenforceable, the arbitration provision is not unenforceable
unless the reason the overall contract is unenforceable specifically relates to the
arbitration provision." Huskins, 439 S.C. at 366, 887 S.E.2d at 539–40 (quoting
New Hope Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 630, 667
S.E.2d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2008)).
In considering the arbitration requirement in the Sales Contract, the circuit court
incorporated the provisions of the separate Warranty document to ultimately find
"there was no meeting of the minds as to an agreement to arbitrate claims arising
out of and related to the Contract for Sale." Before we consider the merits of this
finding, we note the relationship between the FAA and the parties' express
contractual language in this transaction involving interstate commerce. In Munoz,
our supreme court referenced the United States Supreme Court's acknowledgement
in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), that "parties are free to enter into a contract
providing for arbitration under rules established by state law rather than under
rules established by the FAA." Munoz, 343 S.C. at 538 n.2, 542 S.E.2d at 363 n.2.
The Munoz court explained:
The FAA preempts state laws that invalidate the parties'
agreement to arbitrate "[b]ut it does not follow that the
FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
under different rules than those set forth in the [FAA]
itself." Such a result would be inimical to the FAA's
primary purpose of ensuring that arbitration agreements
are enforced according to their terms.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580,
592, 553 S.E.2d 110, 116 (2001) ("While the parties may agree to enforce
arbitration agreements under state rules rather than FAA rules, the FAA will
preempt any state law that completely invalidates the parties' agreement to
arbitrate."); but see Hicks Unlimited, Inc. v. UniFirst Corp., Op. No. 28158 (S.C.
Sup. Ct. filed June 14, 2023) (Howard Adv. Sh. No. 23 at 22) ("To the extent
Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp. and Damico v. Lennar Carolinas, LLC have been
read as allowing parties to agree the FAA preempts South Carolina law without an
accompanying demonstration the contract involves interstate commerce, we clarify
now they do not.").
As noted above, we find our supreme court's decision in Damico governs our
inquiry in this dispute.6 There, several homeowners in The Abbey subdivision in
Berkeley County brought a construction defect suit against their homebuilder and
general contractor, Lennar Carolinas, LLC. Damico, 437 S.C. at 603, 879 S.E.2d
at 750. Lennar moved to compel arbitration, citing the provisions in a series of
contracts signed by all but one of the homeowners when they purchased their
homes. Id. As the court of appeals' Damico opinion explains, "[t]he circuit court
denied the motion, finding the arbitration agreement included not just the
arbitration section of the parties' sales contract but also sections from a separate
warranty agreement (as well as parts of the deeds and covenants), and that the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable." Damico v. Lennar Carolinas, LLC,
430 S.C. 188, 194–95, 844 S.E.2d at 70 (Ct. App. 2020), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
Damico, 437 S.C. at 624, 879 S.E.2d at 762. Due to this conflation of the various
provisions, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's denial of Lennar's
motion to compel arbitration, concluding "the FAA, rather than the SCUAA
applies, and the circuit court erred in not considering the arbitration section as an
independent arbitration agreement." Id. at 195, 844 S.E.2d at 70. The court of
appeals further found the FAA required enforcement of the valid agreement to
arbitrate and concluded "the circuit court erred by considering the contract as a
whole rather than, as Prima Paint demands, focusing on the discrete arbitration
6
The United States Supreme Court denied Lennar Carolinas' petition for a writ of
certiorari on June 5, 2023. Lennar Carolinas, LLC v. Damico, 143 S.Ct. 2581
(2023).
provision." Id. at 199, 844 S.E.2d at 72; see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967) (holding the validity of an
arbitration agreement is considered separately from the substantive validity of the
contract in which the arbitration provision is found; the court does not consider
unconscionable terms outside of the arbitration provision).
Upon review of the homeowners' certiorari petition, our supreme court
unanimously affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' Damico opinion finding
"the circuit court impermissibly considered the terms found in the limited warranty
booklet" when analyzing the arbitration provision of the purchase and sales
agreement. Damico, 437 S.C. at 607–08, 879 S.E.2d at 753. However, the
supreme court nonetheless agreed with the homeowner petitioners that Lennar
Carolinas' sales contract's "arbitration provisions—standing alone—contain a
number of oppressive and one-sided terms, thereby rendering the provisions
unconscionable and unenforceable under South Carolina law." Id. at 604, 879
S.E.2d at 751. That is the distinction here: the arbitration provision in the GSH
Sales Contract—standing alone—contains no such oppressive or unconscionable
term. Challenged terms may be found elsewhere in the Sales Contract and/or the
Warranty agreement, but controlling case law does not permit us to consider the
language of the separate limited Warranty or the propriety of the waiver of implied
warranties in analyzing the standalone arbitration language of the Sales Contract.
Cf. D.R. Horton, 417 S.C. at 48–49, 790 S.E.2d at 4 (in which a majority of the
court found the arbitration agreement itself broadly encompassed the entirety of the
"Warranties and Dispute Resolution" section of the home purchase agreement).
The crux of Mart's complaint is that GSH's sales practice of seeking "a disclaimer
of critical warranty rights implied by law in South Carolina and designed to protect
the new homebuyer, who the law recognizes is at a significant disadvantage in
sophistication and bargaining power with a large volume homebuilder such as
Great Southern" is in itself unconscionable. And, while the circuit court's order did
not address whether the specific terms of the Sales Contract's arbitration clause
were unconscionable, Mart did not concede this point and raised unconscionability
in his opposition to GSH's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. But Mart's
purported challenge to the standalone arbitration provision was merely an
argument that the court "should read the [a]rbitration paragraph of the [Sales]
Contract . . . in conjunction with the limitation on remedies provisions contained
under separate paragraphs of the agreement." (emphasis added). This very
argument illustrates the difference between the arbitration paragraph in the present
case and the one in D.R. Horton. See supra. Mart was required to show that the
language in the arbitration section alone was unconscionable. Because Mart did
not separately challenge the standalone arbitration provision in the GSH Sales
Contract as unconscionable or as lacking material terms, we are handcuffed with
respect to Mart's challenge of the validity of the waiver of implied warranties. See,
e.g., Doe v. TCSC, LLC, 430 S.C. 602, 607, 846 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Ct. App. 2020)
("Because an arbitration provision is often one of many provisions in a contract
covering many other aspects of the transaction, the first task of a court is to
separate the arbitration provision from the rest of the contract. This may seem odd,
but it is the law, known as the Prima Paint doctrine."); One Belle Hall Prop.
Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Trammell Crow Residential Co., 418 S.C. 51, 62 n.6, 791
S.E.2d 286, 292 n.6 (Ct. App. 2016) ("In Prima Paint, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that an arbitration agreement is separable from the contract in which it
is embedded and the issue of its validity is distinct from the substantive validity of
the contract as a whole.").
II. Meeting of the Minds and Unconscionability
Because we agree with GSH that the circuit court erred in considering the terms of
the Warranty—as opposed to the standalone arbitration provision in the Sales
Contract—we need not further examine the circuit court's findings that the
arbitration provisions of the two documents "directly and materially conflict with
one another." However, "[t]he 'making' or formation of—in the sense of the very
existence of—the agreement to arbitrate is always a question for the court, not the
arbitrator." Simmons v. Benson Hyundai, LLC, 438 S.C. 1, 5, 881 S.E.2d 646, 648
(Ct. App. 2022), cert. denied (Mar. 30, 2023).
Here, the circuit court properly found South Carolina law requires a meeting of the
minds as to all essential and material contract terms. See Player v. Chandler, 299
S.C. 101, 105, 382 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1989) ("South Carolina common law requires
that, in order to have a valid and enforceable contract, there must be a meeting of
the minds between the parties with regard to all essential and material terms of the
agreement."). And, we look to South Carolina contract law to consider whether, as
Mart asserts, there 1) was no meeting of the minds, or 2) the arbitration mandate
"is unenforceable under South Carolina law because it violates S.C. Code §
15-48-10(a) and is unconscionable."7 See Simmons, 438 S.C. at 7, 881 S.E.2d at
7
The circuit court did not separately address Mart's argument that the arbitration
clause is invalid under 15-48-10(a), perhaps because the court's "meeting of the
minds" finding was dispositive. In any event, the required statutory language is
found on the first page of the Sales Contract and even if it were not, where
interstate commerce is involved, "the FAA will preempt any state law that
649 (holding that whether the parties have an agreement to arbitrate is decided
applying South Carolina law, and the parties must "manifest a mutual intent to be
bound").
In support of their respective positions, both parties cite to Judge Geathers' opinion
in York v. Dodgeland of Columbia, Inc., 406 S.C. 67, 749 S.E.2d 139 (Ct. App.
2013); the circuit judge noted York in her order as well. In York, this court held the
trial court did not err in finding the parties were bound by valid arbitration
agreements applicable to their vehicle purchases "because each Appellant entered
into an arbitration agreement that (A) complied with the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA); (B) evidenced intent to arbitrate; (C) was not unconscionable; and (D) was
not void as against public policy." Id. at 78, 749 S.E.2d at 145.
We find York supports GSH's position. Although the circuit court correctly noted
York's acknowledgement that where the material terms of a contract are
inconsistent and conflicting, there can be no meeting of the minds, we find no such
inconsistency or conflict here. The standalone arbitration provision in the Sales
Contract contains no inconsistent or conflicting terms and, as noted above, it was
error to incorporate the language of the separate Warranty document to find
inconsistency. Absent the inconsistencies noted in the circuit court's order, Mart's
argument that there was no "meeting of the minds" cannot prevail. Without some
proof that the parties did not mutually assent to arbitration or a finding that the
arbitration clause itself is unenforceable, the parties are bound by their agreement.
Finally, we note that as in Damico, while the Sales Contract here is certainly an
adhesion contract, "a take-it-or-leave it contract of adhesion is not necessarily
unconscionable, even though it may indicate one party lacked a meaningful choice.
Rather, to constitute unconscionability, the contract terms must be so oppressive
that no reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest person would
accept them." Damico, 437 S.C. at 612, 879 S.E.2d at 755 (internal citations
omitted). "The distinction between a contract of adhesion and unconscionability is
worth emphasizing: adhesive contracts are not unconscionable in and of
themselves so long as the terms are even-handed." Damico, 437 S.C. at 614, 879
completely invalidates the parties' agreement to arbitrate." Zabinski, supra, 346
S.C. at 592–93, 553 S.E.2d at 116; see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(a) (2005)
("Notice that a contract is subject to arbitration pursuant to this chapter shall be
typed in underlined capital letters, or rubber-stamped prominently, on the first page
of the contract and unless such notice is displayed thereon the contract shall not be
subject to arbitration.").
S.E.2d at 756 (emphasis in original). The standalone arbitration clause here differs
from those found unconscionable in South Carolina cases considering adhesion
contracts between sophisticated builders and individual new home purchasers.
See, e.g., Damico, 437 S.C. at 615-17, 879 S.E.2d at 757–58 (finding, among other
things, that Lennar's ability to ensure there was never "mutuality of parties" at
arbitration by exercising its "sole election" to choose the parties would potentially
force purchasers to litigate against subcontractors separately in circuit court,
rendering the arbitration agreement "unconscionable and unenforceable as
written"); D.R. Horton, 417 S.C. at 50, 790 S.E.2d at 5 (finding arbitration
provision unconscionable and unenforceable where relief was left "to the whim of
D.R. Horton while simultaneously allowing no monetary recuperation" when
repairs were inadequate); Huskins, 439 S.C. at 369–71, 887 S.E.2d at 541–42
(finding unconscionable and unenforceable the final two sentences of an arbitration
clause that effectively shortened the statutory limitations period to ninety days (or
thirty days in certain circumstances) would "disproportionately affect the
homebuyer's ability to bring a claim" but severing the offending language from the
remainder of the arbitration clause and thus affirming as modified the circuit
court's order compelling arbitration). Thus, to the extent the question of
unconscionability is properly before this court, we find the standalone arbitration
provision of the Sales Contract here is not unconscionable.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, we reverse the order of the circuit court and remand this
matter for arbitration.8
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
KONDUROS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
8
Because we remand this matter pursuant to the arbitration provision of the Sales
Contract, we need not consider GSH's remaining appellate issues. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (stating a court need not address remaining issues when another issue is
dispositive).