dissenting.
I agree with the majority that when we are called upon to interpret a statute we are not bound by a trial court’s construction of the statute and that upon our de novo review and determination we are required to give “effect to the intent of the legislature.” Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Hill, 254 *472Va. 88, 91, 488 S.E.2d 345, 346 (1997) (citing City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 250 Va. 451, 457, 464 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1995)). Moreover, I agree with the majority that a word in a statute is to be given “its everyday, ordinary meaning unless the word is a word of art.” Stein v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 65, 69, 402 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1991) (citing Lovisi v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 848, 850, 188 S.E.2d 206, 208 (1972)). However, by construing the word “money[s]” so narrowly as to include only “coins and paper currency” the majority disregards the “everyday, ordinary meaning” of the word “money” in the modern world of business and government and fails to give “effect to the intent of the legislature.”
Here, the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the part of Code § 63.2-1908 under review was to relieve a noncustodial parent of having to repay a debt created by an administrative support order during such time that the parent “is the recipient of public assistance moneys for the benefit of minor dependent children.” As appellant noted, “the obvious reason for the statutory exception to assessment and collection is to prohibit the Commonwealth from depleting the extremely limited financial resources of families with children as needing and receiving public assistance.” The legislature merely acknowledged the unfairness of collecting a debt for TANF benefits paid from the noncustodial parent during the time that the parent is receiving “public assistance moneys for the benefit of minor dependent children.” Here, the public assistance moneys paid for the minor dependent children were food stamps and Medicaid benefits. In other words, public policy did not condone taking “public assistance moneys” paid to a parent for a minor dependent child during the time the parent is receiving such benefits to repay other public assistance funds that were paid on behalf of the noncustodial parent.
Furthermore, in today’s world I seriously doubt that any public assistance benefits or “moneys” are paid in “coins and paper currency” or cash. Proper government accounting would require that such public assistance benefits be paid by check, voucher, coupon, etc.; not by “coins or paper currency.” The majority has adopted the most narrow and restrictive *473meaning of the word “moneys,” in disregard of the “everyday, ordinary” meaning of the word in the context of the legislature’s intent. Black’s Law Dictionary 1021 (7th ed. 1999) defines “money[s]” as “assets that can be easily converted to cash.” Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1160 (2d ed. 1983) variously defines “money[s]” as “any substance or article used as money, as bank notes, checks, etc.;” and as “property, possessions, wealth.” This broader definition of “money[s]” was clearly what the legislature intended by enacting Code § 63.2-1908 and is the only construction that achieves a reasonable and meaningful result.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent and I would reverse the trial court’s decision upholding the administrative support order.