dissenting.
I agree completely with all that is said in the well-reasoned and compelling dissent of Justice Hines. As he concludes, the majority “has clouded the law and chosen to construct a result different from that mandated by the duly enacted statutes, and from the jury’s verdicts.” Dissent of Justice Hines, p. 16. I write separately only to express some additional observations as to why Justice Hines’ analysis is clearly correct and why the judgment of conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
After reading the majority opinion, one is left with the impression that Dixon is the only real victim in this case, and that the true culprit is the “conflicting nature of the statutory scheme relating to sexual conduct, especially with respect to teenagers. . . .” Majority opinion, p. 8. To the contrary, however, the statutory scheme is clear and unambiguous. The charges against Dixon are not conflicting, but relate to his criminal acts which are overlapping, rather than identical. Statutory rape involves only his sexual conduct, whereas aggravated child molestation involves his conduct that is both sexual and injurious to the victim.
The majority concedes, as it must, that Dixon’s acquittal on the forcible rape charge does not prove that the sexual act that he is charged with committing was wholly consensual. It also recognizes that, as a result of the sexual encounter, the 15-year-old girl suffered vaginal injuries and bruising. Nevertheless, the majority summarily dismisses her injuries as “slight,” thereby eliminating the girl’s status as the victim of aggravated child molestation. Majority opinion, p. 4. However, the General Assembly has not quantified the *10extent of the physical injury to the victim which elevates the offense of child molestation to that of an aggravated nature. Instead, the legislative intent is clear that perpetrating an act of child molestation which injures the child to any degree constitutes aggravated child molestation.
In her separate concurrence, Justice Hunstein acknowledges that the General Assembly “did intend to impose felony punishment upon sexual predators regardless of the age of the offender, so as to include teenage sexual predators within its ambit.” Concurrence of Justice Hunstein, p. 8. I not only completely agree with that statement, but I also firmly believe that this case clearly falls within the “ambit” contemplated by that cogent observation. Here, the 15-year-old victim testified that Dixon engaged in an act of non-consensual sexual intercourse with her and that she was injured by that conduct. The jury also heard from two other young girls, one of whom testified that Dixon exposed himself to her, whereas the other recounted that he placed his hands inside her underwear and touched her genital area. The trial court admitted this evidence of Dixon’s commission of other similar acts for the limited purpose of illustrating his intent, motive or bent of mind in engaging in the act of intercourse with the 15 year old. I submit that, having heard all of the relevant and probative evidence, the jury was authorized to find that Dixon was a “teenage sexual predator[ ] who prey[s] upon other children.” Concurrence of Justice Hunstein, p. 9. However, whether the jury did or did not so find is not material to our appellate review. We must affirm the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict finding Dixon guilty of aggravated child molestation if the evidence was sufficient to establish that Dixon molested the victim and that she was injured thereby. The evidence was clearly sufficient to support that finding.
The majority appears to have lost sight of the fact that the young female upon whom Dixon committed an “immoral or indecent act” which physically injured her is the actual victim in this case. He was prosecuted only because she chose to press charges and to testify against him at trial. Whether she was a willing partner and whether she suffered physical injury as a result of Dixon’s act were credibility issues for the trier of fact. Having heard from her and from the other witness for the prosecution and the defense, the jury found that Dixon committed the alleged act of child molestation and that she was injured as a result of his conduct. If the jury had not believed her, then it would have convicted him only of statutory rape. Since we have juries to determine the credibility of young girls who claim to be victims of aggravated child molestation, I cannot subscribe to the majority’s wholesale rejection of the applicability of that crime to teenage males whose sexual acts result in the infliction of only “slight” injuries.
*11This is especially true considering the General Assembly’s response to this precise issue. The majority declares that “the misdemeanor statutory rape provision, adopted in 1996, is the most recent legislative judgment regarding the appropriate punishment for Dixon’s conduct.” Majority opinion, p. 7. To the contrary, however, the General Assembly has more recently expressed its clear and unequivocal intent that persons who commit a serious violent felony, which includes aggravated child molestation, “shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and shall not be eligible for first offender treatment.” Ga. L. 1998, pp. 180,181, § 1 (3). This legislative pronouncement was made for the express purpose of repudiating the decision in State v. Allmond, 225 Ga. App. 509 (484 SE2d 306) (1997), wherein the Court of Appeals held that first offender status was available to perpetrators of violent felonies. I believe that today’s opinion constitutes an even greater deviation than Allmond from the clear intent of the General Assembly. This is so because the majority does not simply allow a teenage boy the opportunity to receive a more lenient sentence for his commission of an act of aggravated child molestation. It also grants him complete immunity from conviction for that crime so long as the victim is a young female who, despite having been subjected to his act of non-consensual intercourse, sustains only “slight” injuries.
The rule of lenity likewise simply does not apply in this case, since a greater sentence is clearly authorized when the crime involves an injury to the victim. Under the majority’s interpretation of that rule, however, the harm done to the victim is irrelevant to the defendant’s criminal liability. That construction is antithetical to the framework of Georgia’s criminal law. To give but one of many possible examples, if Dixon can injure a 15-year-old girl by engaging in non-consensual intercourse with her and, under the rule of lenity, evade prosecution for aggravated child molestation, then one whose reckless driving kills another cannot be found guilty of the felony of vehicular homicide, because the rule of lenity limits his culpability to misdemeanor punishment under OCGA§ 40-6-390 (b).
According to the majority, the “elementary rules of statutory construction show that the legislature intended for Dixon’s conduct to be prosecuted as misdemeanor statutory rape rather than felony child molestation, whether simple or aggravated.” Majority opinion, p. 8.1 submit that the General Assembly does not have such disregard for the welfare of this state’s children as to permit a teenage sexual predator who injures a young female during an act of non-consensual intercourse to escape punishment for the felony of aggravated child molestation. In my opinion, the explanation for today’s opinion is not a statutory conflict attributable to the General Assembly, but the majority’s own subjective belief that the girl was a willing *12partner in the sexual act, rather than a victim who was injured by Dixon’s sexual aggression. However, the credibility of the child was a matter for the jurors who heard her testimony, and is not to be decided by this or any appellate court. The jury believed her and found that Dixon committed an act constituting aggravated child molestation. The evidence supports that finding and, despite the majority’s efforts to place the blame on the General Assembly, there is no legal justification whatsoever for reversing the conviction and sentence.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this dissent.