(concurring). On June 19, 1984, this Court entered an order,1 with opinion to follow, *333stating that 1983 PA 256 was unconstitutional because the bill that became Act 256 had been altered or amended on its passage to change its original purpose in violation of Const 1963, art 4, § 24.2
I
Act 256 divides the state into 38 senatorial and 110 representative districts and constitutes a reapportionment of the Legislature that differs from the plan approved by this Court on May 21, 1982. In re Apportionment of State Legislature — 1982, 413 Mich 96, 212; 321 NW2d 565 (1982).3
Act 256 originated as House Bill 4481. As introduced and passed by the House, the bill would have amended provisions of the Election Law concerning a special election on income taxes held in Detroit in 1981 and the delivery of absentee bal*334lots in school district elections. The Senate received the bill on December 14, 1983, and it was referred to a committee.
Shortly before midnight on December 21, 1983, the Senate convened and took up House Bill 4481, and amended it to provide for legislative reapportionment. The title and all the provisions of the bill were eliminated in their entirety. A new title and provisions concerning legislative reapportionment were substituted, and the bill was thereupon approved by the Senate. Shortly after midnight, the House of Representatives convened. Substitute House Bill 4481 was transmitted to the House, which approved it before adjourning at 1:35 a.m. on December 22, 1983.
Subsequently, the Governor signed the bill, and it became Act 256. As so approved by the Legislature and the Governor, the only aspects of original House Bill 4481 to be found in substitute House Bill 4481, which became Act 256, were its number (4481) and the constitutionally required4 enacting clause: "The People of the State of Michigan enact”.
II
The constitution provides that no bill shall be passed or become law at a regular session of the Legislature until it has been printed or reproduced and is in the possession of each house for at least five days.5 The purpose of this limitation is "to *335prevent hasty and careless legislative action”, "to deal effectively with so-called snap legislation”, and to require "greater publicity in legislative proceedings”.6 To safeguard against those provisions being evaded by an amendment of a bill that *336has been in the possession of one or both houses for the requisite time,7 the constitution further provides that "no bill shall be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined, by its total content and not alone by its title”.8
The plaintiffs commenced this action, claiming that Act 256 is unconstitutional.9 The circuit court so held, and this Court granted leave to appeal prior to decision by the Court of Appeals.
The Attorney General, relying on Moeller v Wayne County Board of Supervisors, 279 Mich 505, 512, 514; 272 NW 886 (1937), argues that Act 256 is constitutional because its substance — apportionment — is germane to elections and House Bill 4481 as originally introduced provided for amendments to the Election Law. Moeller concerned 1933 PA 84, which amended § 30 of an earlier act.10 In rejecting the contention that Act 84 vio*337lated the change-in-purpose provision of the 1908 Constitution, this Court stated that it was "not limited by the title or contents of the bill as introduced into either branch of the legislature, but to the title of the act which is being amended”, and that it was of the opinion "that the provisions as are now found in the act are comprehended and included in the title of the original act. The amended act relates to the powers and duties of boards of supervisors and is not invalid upon that ground”.
Moeller concerned an amendatory act. Although House Bill 4481 was introduced and approved by the House as an amendatory act, it ceased to be an amendatory act when the Senate eliminated all the provisions of House Bill 4481, except the number 4481 and the enacting clause, and added the substitute reapportionment provisions. The substitute bill, in contrast with original House Bill 4481, was not an amendment of the Election Law. Thus, even if the purpose of an act being amended may be considered, the reapportionment provisions are regarded as germane to the Election Law, and germaneness is the test or standard for determining whether there was a change in purpose, Moel-ler is not in point because Act 256 is not an amendatory act and, unlike original House. Bill 4481, did not purport to amend the Election Law.
In United States Gypsum Co v Dep’t of Revenue, 363 Mich 548, 554, 556; 110 NW2d 698 (1961), this Court sustained against a change-in-purpose challenge an act of the Legislature that imposed the business activities tax although the tax imposed had been changed from a tax on individual and corporate income in the bill as introduced to a tax on business gross receipts in the amended or substitute bill enacted. Both the original bill and the *338bill enacted were, the Court said, bills to raise revenue by imposing a tax on income. In so holding, the Court stated that the test of whether an amendment or substitute is "germane” to the original bill is whether the change represents "an amendment or extension of the basic purpose of the original, or the introduction of entirely new and different subject matter”. The Court said that the major purposes of the bill enacted in that case were "all within the original objectives of the bill as first introduced and as described in the title of the original version of the bill”.
Moeller and United States Gypsum — the only cases decided by this Court involving the change-in-purpose provision — were decided before the change-in-purpose provision took its current form. The words "as determined by its total content and not alone by its title” were added in the 1963 Constitution.11 The committee proposal that recommended adding these words to the original 1908 constitutional provisions stated that they would "strengthen[ ] the provision. By reference to the title alone, a title too broad would circumvent the provisions confining bills to their original purpose”.12
Act 256 is unconstitutional. In substituting the subject matter of reapportionment for the subject matter of original House Bill 4481, Act 256 introduced an "entirely new and different subject matter”.13 There is no commonality of purpose whatso*339ever between Act 256, reapportioning the Legislature, and original House Bill 4481, which would have amended the Election Law relating to delivery of school district election absentee ballots and the 1981 special election in Detroit. There is, thus, no need to consider now whether germaneness or some other test or standard other than the language of the change-in-purpose provision itself is the governing test or standard.
Ill
The Attorney General argues that the change-in-purpose provision was satisfied by the media coverage of the legislative consideration of the reapportionment question, which was the subject matter of other bills that had not been in the possession of both houses for five days. The inquiry under the constitution is whether the bill is in the possession of both houses for five days and whether there has been a change in purpose. If these constitutional requirements have been satisfied, the constitution is not violated even if extensive substantive changes are adopted overnight with the attendant risk of hasty or snap judgment. Conversely, where a bill has not been in the possession of both houses for five days or there has been a change in purpose, the constitutional requirements are not satisfied even if it could be shown by material not part of the Journals of the House and Senate14 that the *340purposes of publicity and avoiding hasty judgment have been fully satisfied. Any other construction of the constitution would expose many enactments to judicial inquiry regarding the extent of the publicity and the adequacy of the legislative consideration (snap judgment or considered judgment), creating opportunities for litigation that might result in undue interference with the effective exercise of legislative power.
IV
Finally, the Attorney General argues that this challenge comes too late, and that providing relief will impede the orderly conduct of the 1984 primary and general elections. This Court, in response to Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533; 84 S Ct 1362; 12 L Ed 2d 506 (1964), entered an order on June 22, 1964, reapportioning the Legislature. Nevertheless, there was an orderly election in 1964. Although it is arguable that this action should have been commenced earlier, this Court’s order of June 19, 1984, as amended on June 21,1984,15 will not preclude the orderly conduct of the 1984 elections. It would not be appropriate for this Court to allow the 1984 elections for the House to be carried out in legislative districts prescribed in an unconstitutional law where that can be avoided and an orderly election can be conducted.16
The June 19,1984 order reads as follows:
"This cause having been brought to this Court by appeal prior to decision by the Court of Appeals and having been argued by counsel and due deliberation having been had thereon by the Court, it is hereby ordered that the judgment of the Circuit Court for the County of Oakland is affirmed, and this Court’s stay of the effectiveness of that judgment is vacated. The Court holds that 1983 PA 256 is unconstitutional as in violation of the second sentence of Const 1963, art 4, § 24 which provides 'No bill shall be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and not alone by its title’. The Court further holds that nominating procedures heretofore conducted under 1983 PA 256, including the special primary election held June 5, 1984, are invalid.
"It is further ordered that, in the absence of the enactment of a law providing otherwise and given immediate effect before June 10, 1984, (a) nomination and elections for the Legislature will be conducted within districts as adopted by this Court in In re Apportionment of State Legislature-1982, 413 Mich 96 (1982), and (b) the date for qualifying for nomination for election to the Legislature shall be extended to Tuesday, July 10, 1984.
"Because of the urgency of this question, pursuant to GCR 1963, 866.3(c) the Clerk is directed to issue this judgment order forthwith. The opinion of the Court will follow.”
On June 21, 1984, the following order was entered:
"On order of the Court, the motion by defendants-appellants Secretary of State and Attorney General for amendment of this Court’s order of June 19, 1984, is immediately considered, plaintiffs-appellees having responded that they have no objection to the relief requested in the motion. This Court grants the requested relief and the order of June 19, 1984, is therefore amended to provide as follows:
"I. The date for qualifying for nomination to the Michigan House of Representatives shall be June 27,1984, at 4:00 p.m.
*333"II. A person filing a petition for election to the Michigan House of Representatives shall not be allowed to withdraw the petition after June 29, 1984, at 12:00 noon.
“III. Challenges to the sufficiency of a petition for election to the Legislature shall be filed no later than June 29,1984, at 12:00 noon.
"IV. Since it may be necessary to make changes in precinct boundaries in some instances to implement the Court’s order, the clerks of a city or township are hereby authorized to make necessary administrative changes with approval of the State Director of Elections.
“V. Candidates for delegate to county political conventions who have previously filed petitions shall be placed on the ballot in the precinct in which they reside.
“VI. Minor political parties shall certify nominees for the office of state representative to Secretary of State or county clerk, if applicable, no later than August 6, 1984, at 5:00 p.m.
"Cavanagh, J., not participating.”
"Sec. 24. No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. No bill shall be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and not alone by its title.” Const 1963, art 4, § 24.
The plan approved by this Court is set forth in Public and Local Acts — Michigan, Session of 1983, pp 983 ff.
Const 1963, art 4, § 23.
"Sec. 26. No bill shall be passed or become a law at any regular session of the legislature until it has been printed or reproduced and in the possession of each house for at least five days. Every bill shall be read three times in each house before the final passage thereof. No bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house. On the final passage of bills, the votes and names of the members voting thereon shall be entered in the journal. Const 1963, art 4, § 26.
The following appears in the Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1907:
"This is a new section. It was inserted to prevent hasty and careless legislative action, also, to deal effectively with so-called snap legislation. The provision that no bill shall be passed until it has been printed and in the possession of each house for five days means much greater publicity in legislative proceedings. Time is thus provided whereby the people may become acquainted with proposed legislation and to petition, or remonstrate, before a bill is passed. It is believed that this provision will measurably improve the tone of legislative action. When the legislature is convened in special session the revision limits its action to those matters expressly stated in the governor’s proclamation. This wisely limits the sphere of action of the legislature, in special session; and the governor’s proclamation is notice to the public of the work which the legislature can lawfully undertake. The provision that no bill shall be altered on its passage so as to change its original purpose is included so that by no possibility can the publicity secured by the five day rule be nullified or evaded.” 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1907, p 1422. (Emphasis in the original.)
The following appears in the Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1961:
"The committee is of the opinion that this section should be retained and strengthened somewhat. The first sentence of the section [the five-day provision] is a preventive against hasty and careless legislation. It allows publicity to be given to pending legislative action so the electorate becomes informed. This provision does not prevent unprinted amendments, but the last sentence of the section prevents any change in original purpose.
"The last sentence [the change-in-purpose provision] was first found in the 1908 constitution. The provision that no amendment is allowed which would change a bill’s original purpose is to preclude the possibility that the publicity insured by the 5 day provision will not be nullified or evaded.
"The new language strengthens the provision. By reference to the title alone, a title too broad would circumvent the provision confining bills to their original purpose.
"The committee is of the opinion that the 'original purpose’ provision along with the requirement that bills must be printed for 5 days prior to passage is a limitation which should be retained. Action taken in haste is likely to prove itself not in the best interests of the people.” 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 2334-2335.
See fn 6.
See fn 2.
Plaintiffs are registered voters in the 20th House District and seek to enjoin a special general election in that district as constituted under Act 256 otherwise required to be held on August 8, 1984. No primary was required because only one Republican and one Democratic candidate filed.
Section 30 concerned the compensation of members of a board of supervisors. As introduced, the amendatory act concerned only compensation. As enacted, it contained provisions not in the original bill that precluded members of a board of supervisors from receiving any civil appointment within or from any county authority (except where authorized by city or village charter) and from being interested in any contract or business transaction with the county. See 1933 PA 84, amending 1929 CL 1152.
In Moeller the bill, as introduced and enacted, amended only one section of the original act and there was thus no change in the title. The added provisions, precluding a member of a board of supervisors from obtaining additional remuneration from the county either by holding other county office or being interested in county contracts, seem to have been substantially related to the provisions of the original amendatory bill and to § 30 of the act being amended (establishing the compensation of members of a board of supervisors), which both the original and enacted bill purported to amend.
The provisions requiring that the bill remain in the possession of each house for at least five days and prohibiting alteration or amendment "so as to change its original purpose” were first adopted as art 5, § 22, of the 1908 Constitution.
2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2334. See fn 6 for text.
The Election Law is primarily concerned with election procedures and does not generally establish the office to be voted upon. The office is generally established either in the constitution or in separate *339legislation or local charter authorized by law. The statutory provisions governing the boundaries of senatorial and representative districts were compiled in Chapter 4 concerning the Legislature and not in Chapter 168 concerning elections. 1925 PA 291 (concerning senatorial districts), 1943 PA 228 and 1953 PA 178 (both concerning representative districts), were compiled, as was Act 256, in Chapter 4.
Cf. Attorney General v Rice, 64 Mich 385, 390-391; 31 NW 203 (1887); People ex rel Hart v McElroy, 72 Mich 446, 449-452; 40 NW 750 (1888); Sackrider v Saginaw County Board of Supervisors, 79 Mich 59, 66; 44 NW 165 (1889); Attorney General v The Detroit & Saline Plank Road Co, 97 Mich 589, 592; 56 NW 943 (1893).
See fn 1 for text.
The only question presented by this action is whether Act 256 is violative of Const 1963, art 4, § 24. The question whether the Legislature may, subsequent to May 4, 1982 (In re Apportionment — 1982, supra, p 144), enact a reapportionment bill was not presented. The question whether (see Legislature of the State of California v Deukmejian, 34 Cal 3d 658; 194 Cal Rptr 781; 669 P2d 17 [1983]), and subject to what limitations, if any (see In re Apportionment of State Legislature — 1982, supra, p 173, fn 34), the Legislature might enact a *341reapportionment bill has not been, and could not be, decided in the instant case because such issues were not presented. The order of June 19, 1984, should not be read as expressing any view on those issues and in joining in that order I did not, and do not now, express any view on the merits of the questions not presented or decided.