Civil Code section 51, also known as the “Unruh Civil Rights Act” (hereafter section 51) was never intended to apply to the membership decisions of private clubs such as defendant. I do not condone the apparent discrimination in which defendant has engaged. In fact, I find it shortsighted and backward. My personal views, however, are irrelevant. Our judicial role is to apply the law, not to make it. If the statute is to be recast, the Legislature, and not this court, must do so. Because the majority usurps the legislative function and oversteps its judicial role, I am compelled to dissent.
Section 51 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability, are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Italics added.)
*633The majority correctly rejects plaintiff’s broad assertion that “all private associations and organizations, including private clubs, constitute ‘business establishments’ within the meaning of section 51.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 614.) As the majority properly concludes after reviewing the relevant cases (id. at pp. 609-613), “there is nothing in the language or history of the Unruh Civil Rights Act that indicates the Legislature intended, as a general matter, to bring the membership decisions of truly private social clubs within the reach of the statute.” (Id. at p. 618.)
The majority also correctly observes that an entity that, by virtue of its nature, purpose, and structure, otherwise would fall within the reach of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, cannot avoid the nondiscrimination mandate of the statute merely by donning the cloak of a private social club. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 619.) It concludes, however, that it need not “determine whether defendant constitutes a ‘private club’ rather than a place of public accommodation” under the criteria traditionally employed to make that assessment (id. at p. 621) because “the business transactions that are conducted regularly on the club’s premises with persons who are not members of the club are sufficient in themselves to bring the club within the reach of section 51’s broad reference to ‘all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.’ ” (Ibid., first italics in original, second added.)
There is no basis for the majority’s assumption that the Legislature intended to regulate the activities of private social clubs under section 51 whenever such clubs conduct regular business transactions on premises with nonmembers. Nor is there any basis in the record to support the majority’s assumption that such transactions inured to the financial benefit of defendant’s club members. Finally, the criteria traditionally employed to determine whether an entity is a “business enterprise”—factors outlined but ultimately ignored by the majority in favor of its novel and suspect “regular business transactions” approach—show that defendant should be treated as an entity whose membership decisions are exempt from the generally applicable public accommodation law.
I.
The Majority’s “Regular Business Transactions” Analysis
The majority asserts defendant obtains direct “financial benefits from regular business transactions, conducted on its premises, with persons who are not members of the club.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 621.) Namely, the club “regularly . . . permits nonmembers to use its facilities, for a fee, in connection with ‘sponsored events.’ ... In carrying on such activities for a *634fee, the club operates as the functional equivalent of a commercial caterer or a commercial recreational resort—classic forms of ‘business establishments’. . . .” (Ibid.) In addition, the majority observes, defendant obtains fees from nonmember “invited guests” for the use of club facilities, and for purchase of food and beverages on premises (ibid.), and it again reasons: “To the extent the club obtains payment from nonmembers for meals served to guests in the club’s dining room, for drinks obtained by guests from the club’s bar, and for guests’ use of the club’s golf course or other facilities, the club, once again, appears to have been operating in a capacity that is the functional equivalent of a commercial enterprise.” (Id. at pp. 621-622.) Finally, the majority notes, club members benefit indirectly from regular business transactions between nonmembers and the golf and tennis pros on the club’s premises. (Id. at p. 622.)
The majority concludes that these various “regular business transactions” with nonmembers render defendant a business establishment under section 51. It finds “the direct and indirect financial benefits that the club derived from its business transactions with nonmembers . . . inured to the financial benefit of the club members, because the revenue from such transactions permitted the members to maintain the club’s facilities and services—which were reserved primarily for the benefit of the members—through the payment of dues and fees lower than would have been required in the absence of the income obtained from nonmembers.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 623, italics added.)1
The majority’s analysis is faulty in two respects. First, private clubs like defendant have historically acted in the manner described by the majority, i.e., they have long allowed nonmembers, when sponsored by a member, to make use of club facilities for weddings and special events, etc., on a fee-for-use basis, or as invited guests. In so operating, “country clubs” have traditionally engaged in regular on-premises “business transactions” with nonmembers, and have long derived a financial benefit to the extent that such fees may diminish the contributions required by club members to operate their establishment. The majority provides no reason to suspect this was not the norm for private country clubs in 1959, when the Unruh Civil Rights Act was enacted,—and when it was generally understood that “[mjembership clubs or organizations, e.g., country clubs owned by and *635operated for the benefit of the members,” did not “fall within the scope of the statutory principle . . . (Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights In “Business Establishments” Statute—A Problem In Statutory Application (1960) 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. 260, 289, italics added [hereafter Horowitz].)
Indeed, it would astound those who drafted and enacted section 51 to learn, 36 years later, that private country clubs have always been within the statute, so long as they regularly do what such clubs traditionally have done, i.e., allow nonmembers to use their facilities for a fee and under the sponsorship of a member. I cannot acquiesce in the majority’s revisionist interpretation of section 51.
Second, I question the majority’s application of its own test. The assumption underlying much of its analysis is that the club’s “commercial-like” activities are intended to operate in the black—i.e., to generally produce a net financial benefit rather than merely break even or produce a loss. Only then could those activities reduce the fees and dues that club members would otherwise be required to pay.
The majority, however, offers little to support its assumption, because, as it concedes, the record contains scant information on this point. Although there was testimony that the club imposed a “markup” on food and drink sold to members and nonmembers, the record contains no testimony about whether this “markup” simply covered costs, or whether it produced a profit or loss. Similarly, although the record discloses that “greens fees” charged during “sponsored events” were “higher than that charged at other times” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 601), this tells us nothing about whether those fees charged to nonmembers were set to cover costs, make a profit, etc. Accordingly, there is no clear record evidence about whether, for example, the “sponsored events” the majority relies on are self-sustaining (i.e., break even), make a profit, or lose money (and hence require subsidization by club members). Indeed, we do not even know how much money is involved in the transactions on which the majority bases its conclusion. We may infer from the record that no more than $75,000 (and possibly much less) of defendant’s 1981 total receipts of $1.5 million were attributable to sponsored events. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 602 & fn. 3.) We simply do not know the amount of money received for goods and services incurred by invited guests. Given the state of the record, I find no evidentiary support for the majority’s conclusion that these “regular” transactions with nonmembers constitute a sufficient portion of defendant’s gross receipts to render the club a “business establishment” under section 51. Nor do I find any record support for the majority’s assumption that these transactions actually work to reduce the club members’ fees and dues.
*636Furthermore, the majority’s approach raises an important issue for private clubs such as defendant that, no doubt, wish to conduct their affairs within the law. Specifically, may a club such as defendant avoid the majority’s interpretation of section 51 by simply structuring its fees and charges to nonmembers in a fashion that guarantees the club will incur no net financial benefit from its regular transactions with nonmembers? In other words, it would appear that under the majority’s analysis, a private club such as defendant would not fall within the purview of section 51 if it conducted its transactions with nonmembers on a “break even” basis.
Ultimately, the majority casts doubt even on its novel “net financial benefit” rationale. It suggests that, regardless whether on-premises transactions with nonmembers inure to the financial benefit of club members, private clubs such as defendant may fall within section 51 simply by virtue of the fact that commercial on-premises transactions with nonmembers regularly occur. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 620-621; see also id. at pp. 622-623 & 629-630.) Indeed, at the conclusion of its analysis, the majority concedes that it leaves private clubs such as defendant at risk of violating section 51 so long as they “regularly” conduct on-premises commercial transactions with nonmembers, even if those transactions do not inure to the financial benefit of club members. (See maj. opn., ante, at fn. 11, p. 623.)
In summary, the majority suggests no basis for believing the 1959 Legislature that enacted section 51 would have intended to cover private clubs such as defendant merely because the entity engages in regular on-premises commercial transactions with nonmembers. Similarly, I find no support in the history of the statute, and the majority cites none, for the proposition that, to the extent such transactions inure to the direct financial benefit of club members, the club becomes a business establishment under section 51. Finally, there is nothing in the record to support the majority’s conclusion that the transactions at issue here inured to the direct financial benefit of the club’s members.
II.
The Traditional Analysis Not Taken
The proper criteria for deciding whether defendant’s membership decisions should be subject to section 51 are set out—but not applied—by the majority: “The cases identify a number of factors that may be relevant to this determination, including (1) the selectivity of the group in the admission of members, (2) the size of the group, (3) the degree of membership control over the governance of the organization (and particularly the selection of *637new members), (4) the degree to which club facilities are available for use by nonmembers, and (5) whether the primary purpose served by the club is social or business. [Citations.] Although no single factor has been viewed as controlling, many decisions consider the selectivity or lack of selectivity in the admission process to be of prime importance. As we have seen, most of these factors were considered by this court in Isbister [v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72 (219 Cal.Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212)] in reaching the conclusion that the Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz was a place of ‘public amusement’ rather than a private club.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 620.)
After a careful application of these traditional criteria, both the trial court and the Court of Appeal determined that defendant properly should be considered a private club whose membership decisions are not subject to the provisions of section 51.1 agree.
First, defendant’s process for choosing and admitting proprietary members is very selective. The club does not advertise for, or publicly solicit, new members. A prospective member can be proposed for membership only by a current member, and a membership committee, made up of existing members, conducts a thorough investigation and numerous interviews with the prospective member to assure social compatibility of the prospective member with the current members. Thus, unlike in Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72 [219 Cal.Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212] (Isbister), in which club membership was open to all boys in the community on a nonselective basis, defendant strictly limits its membership in an attempt to create a socially compatible, close-knit organization.
Second, the size of the proprietary membership of the club—limited to 350 members—also is compatible with the status of a private social club. Although the size of the membership suggests the club may not constitute an intimate social group in which all members are close personal friends, the club is considerably smaller than the national and international service organizations that several decisions have determined do not qualify as “private” clubs exempt from public accommodation statutes. (See United States Jaycees v. McClure (Minn. 1981) 305 N.W.2d 764, affd. Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609 [82 L.Ed.2d 462, 104 S.Ct. 3244] [United States Jaycees; 295,000 members]; Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1035 [224 Cal.Rptr. 213], affd. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club (1987) 481 U.S. 537 [95 L.Ed.2d 474, 107 S.Ct. 1940] [Rotary International; 900,000 members].) In this regard, I note the State of New York recently enacted legislation expanding that state’s public accommodation statute to cover private clubs that have more *638than 100 members and that provide regular meal service and regularly receive payment for meals, beverages, or services “from or on behalf of a nonmember for the furtherance of trade or business.” (N.Y. Exec. Law, § 292, subd. 9 (as amended by 1994 N.Y. Laws, ch. 262).) Our Legislature, however, has not enacted a similar amendment to section 51, and in the absence of such legislative action we cannot conclude that the size of defendant’s membership itself is sufficient to render the country club a “business establishment” within the meaning of section 51.
The remaining criteria also support the conclusion that defendant is a private club. It is owned by the proprietary members, and those members, through an elected board of directors, make all policy decisions relating to governance of the club, including the selection of new members. In light of this structure, the relationship between a prospective member and the “proprietor” of the club—i.e., the current club members—involves a continuing personal and social relationship, one quite different from the proprietor-customer relationship that typifies an ordinary business transaction. (See Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 281, fn. 78 [“If the ‘members’ do not own and control the enterprise, they are in effect simply patrons of the proprietor, and the critical proprietor-patron relationship is then no different than that of, e.g., innkeeper and patron.”].)
The club’s policies concerning access to, and use of, the facilities by nonmembers also are consistent with defendant’s status as a private club, at least with regard to the exemption of the club’s membership decisions from the application of section 51. As a general matter the club’s facilities are open only to club members, their families, and invited guests. Past cases demonstrate that a member-owned-and-operated club does not forfeit its status as a private club simply because it permits its members to invite nonmember guests to use the facilities. (Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972) 407 U.S. 163, 171 [32 L.Ed.2d 627, 636, 92 S.Ct. 1965]; Wright v. Cork Club (S.D.Tex. 1970) 315 F.Supp. 1143, 1151-1152.) Similarly, the fact that the club permits its members to sponsor occasional events at the club—such as golf tournaments, weddings, or bar mitzvahs—attended by nonmembers, that the golf and tennis pro shops on its premises are open to nonmembers as well as to members, and that club employees frequently are permitted to use the facilities on the day of the week that the club is closed to members, do not in themselves demonstrate that the club should not *639properly be considered a private social club with respect to its membership decisions.2
Finally, the lower courts properly concluded that defendant’s primary function and purpose are recreational and social, rather than business oriented, and that this characteristic further supports the conclusion that defendant is a private club under section 51. To be sure, the fact that the club is a recreational facility does not, in itself, demonstrate the inapplicability of section 51. As our decision in Isbister, supra, 40 Cal.3d 72, clearly demonstrates, our public accommodation statute long has applied to places of public amusement, and were the club’s facilities operated as a for-profit enterprise, there would be no question but that section 51 would apply to the use of all of its facilities. But in deciding whether a nonprofit private club properly should be considered a “business establishment” whose membership decisions are subject to section 51, the social and recreational focus of the club’s activities is significant, because it suggests that the relationships among members that the club is intended to foster are largely social and personal relationships—the type of relationships to which public accommodation statutes traditionally have not applied—rather than business relationships. (Cf. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1055-1058; United States Jaycees v. McClure, supra, 305 N.W.2d 764, 768-769.)
Plaintiff asserts, however, that even if the social and recreational aspects of defendant club predominate over its business-oriented elements, such a club still is a valuable source of potential business contacts, and the club’s discriminatory exclusion of women from membership inevitably will have an adverse impact on plaintiff’s and other women’s opportunities in the *640business world. There is no denying that plaintiff’s point has considerable force as a matter of policy, and, indeed, it was just such policy considerations that led lawmakers in New York City to expand the reach of that city’s Human Rights Law to encompass a designated category of private clubs. (See New York State Club Assn. v. New York City (1988) 487 U.S. 1, 5-6 [101 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11, 108 S.Ct. 2225] [quoting statement of legislative purpose].) But although such policy considerations properly may lead a legislative body to decide that a particular category of private clubs should be brought within the coverage of a public accommodation law, in the absence of such specific legislative action the considerations on which plaintiff relies provide no appropriate basis for a court to find that a private club is a “business establishment” within the reach of a general public accommodation statute such as section 51.
Plaintiff’s argument affords no principled basis on which this court may determine which private clubs should or should not be considered “business establishments” for purposes of section 51. Granted, social contacts such as those available at defendant’s club may well prove to have considerable value in a business context. But as the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, at p. 616), public accommodation statutes historically have been intended to protect “civil,” as distinguished from “social,” rights. Accordingly, although the policy considerations proffered by plaintiff arguably constitute weighty grounds to support a legislative decision to expand the scope of section 51 to cover at least some private country clubs and similar groups, the strength of plaintiff’s policy arguments do not alter the conclusion that section 51, in its present form, was not intended to apply to the membership decisions of a private country club like defendant.
III.
“Businesslike Attributes”
Plaintiff further contends that even if, by its nature and purpose, a private country club does not necessarily constitute a “business establishment” within the meaning of section 51, defendant possesses sufficient “businesslike attributes” to render it a “business establishment” under the reasoning of this court’s decision in O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790 [191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427] (O’Connor). As explained by the majority, ante, at pages 610-612, in O’Connor we held a defendant nonprofit condominium owners association had “sufficient businesslike attributes to fall within the scope of the act’s reference to ‘business establishments of every kind whatsoever.’ ” (33 Cal.3d at p. 796.) Plaintiff in the *641present case maintains that defendant has many of the same attributes as the condominium owners association in O’Connor. In this regard, plaintiff relies on the relatively large number of persons (between 80 and 110) employed by defendant, the extensive land and facilities owned by the club, and the fact that both club members and guests pay substantial fees for services, food, and beverages obtained at the club.
These attributes of defendant do not demonstrate that it properly should be considered among the “business establishments of every kind whatsoever” contemplated by section 51.
First, employment of numerous persons and ownership of significant land and facilities do not invariably constitute hallmarks of a “business establishment.” If a club is a “private social club” in light of the various factors discussed above, the fact that it employs many persons and owns considerable property does not transform it into a business establishment for purposes of its membership decisions. Conversely, the modest facilities and small number of persons employed by a commercial entity would not shield it from application of section 51.
Second, with regard to defendant’s policy of charging members and their guests for services, food, and beverages provided by the club, this court specifically spoke to the effect of such a practice in our decision in Isbister, supra, 40 Cal.3d 72, in which we emphasized that “ ‘[p]rivate’ groups and institutions do not fall prey to the Act simply because they operate ‘nongratuitous’ residential or recreational facilities for their members or participants; an ‘accommodation’ must be ‘public’ to be covered.” (40 Cal.3d at p. 84, fn. 14, italics added.) Accordingly, simply because the members of a private club have chosen to finance activities at the club on a pay-as-you-go basis does not render the club a “business establishment” within the meaning of section 51.
A conclusion that the club at issue here does not possess sufficient businesslike attributes to render it a “business establishment” for purposes of section 51 is in no way inconsistent with O’Connor, supra, 33 Cal.3d 790. As explained by the majority, the issue in O’Connor was whether the policy of the defendant condominium owners association, of excluding all families with children from the condominium complex, violated section 51, in light of our previous determination, in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721 [180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115] (Marina Point), that an apartment complex’s comparable policy of excluding families with children from housing was unlawful under section 51. In reaching the conclusion that *642the condominium owners association in O’Connor, like the apartment complex owner in Marina Point, constituted a “business establishment” for purposes of section 51, the court in O’Connor relied on its determination— after a review of the purpose and function of the condominium owners association—that, “[i]n brief, the association performs all the customary business functions which in the traditional landlord-tenant relationship rest on the landlord’s shoulders.” (33 Cal.3d at p. 796.) In other words, the O’Connor decision was premised on the assumption that the condominium association occupied the position of landlord or proprietor insofar as it possessed the authority to enforce a discriminatory policy of exclusion, and for that reason, the association represented a type of “business establishment” to which section 51 was intended to apply. In the present case, by contrast, the club’s discriminatory policy with respect to proprietary membership—despite its incidental effect on plaintiff’s access to potential business contacts—does not deprive plaintiff of the opportunity to enter into a commercial transaction, but rather denies her the opportunity to enter into the social relationship embodied in club membership.
Accordingly, defendant does not have sufficient businesslike attributes to render it a “business establishment” under section 51, at least with respect to its membership decisions. (See ante, fn. 2 at p. 639.)
IV.
Legislative Policy Choices
For the reasons discussed above, it is clear that the current provisions of section 51 were not intended to apply to the membership decisions of a private country club like defendant. As I have noted, although in recent years other states have amended their public accommodation statutes specifically to cover some designated aspects of such private clubs, the California Legislature has not enacted any similar modification of section 51.
Concerns raised by the discriminatory membership practices of private clubs, however, have by no means entirely escaped the California Legislature’s attention. Within the past decade, the Legislature has enacted a number of statutes that explicitly bar individuals and corporations from claiming a tax deduction, for what otherwise would be a deductible trade or business expense, with regard to any expenditure made at a club that “restricts membership or the use of its services or facilities on the basis of age, sex, race, religion, color, ancestry, or national origin.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 17269, subd. (a) [personal income tax]; 24343.2, subd. (a) [corporate tax].) These statutes also require any private club that maintains such a *643discriminatory policy, and that holds an alcoholic beverage license, to include on any receipt furnished to a taxpayer a statement informing the taxpayer that “[t]he expenditures covered by this receipt are nondeductible for state income tax purposes or franchise tax purposes.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17269, subd. (b), & § 24343.2, subd. (b); see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23438, subd. (a).)
Furthermore, the Legislature also has adopted a variety of other statutes that, while authorizing certain categories of private clubs to obtain liquor licenses, withhold such licenses from specified clubs that restrict membership on the basis of designated categories, such as race, religion, national origin, or gender. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 23426.5 [tennis club], 23428.5 [press club], 23428.18 [labor council], 23428.19 [handball or racquetball club], 23428.20, subd. (d) [condominium homeowners association], 23428.21 [local dental society], 23428.22 [club promoting cultural ties between United States and foreign country], 23428.23 [letter carriers local], 23428.24 [nonprofit social organization with more than 350 members], 23428.25 [Hidalgo Society], 23428.26 [nonprofit property owners association having at least 2,500 members], 23428.27 [peace officers and employees association].) Although California has not adopted a general antidiscrimination statute applicable to all private clubs that hold liquor licenses,3 the numerous, individual club-license statutes that have been enacted demonstrate that the general topic of discrimination in private club membership has been a repeated and familiar item on the legislative agenda.
As reflected in these recent legislative enactments, both in California and in other states, there are a variety of ways to address the serious public policy questions presented when private clubs choose to restrict their membership in a discriminatory fashion. Although one possible remedy is legislative action to bring a designated category of private clubs within the reach of a state’s public accommodation statute, other means exist to deal with this issue. The choice among alternative remedies—or the decision as to what combination of remedies should be invoked—is, by its nature, a legislative determination, not a judicial one. Thus, because the current provisions of section 51 were not intended to apply to the membership decisions of a private country club such as defendant, any expansion of the scope of this *644statute to reach such membership decisions must be made by the Legislature, and not by this court.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied September 21, 1995.
Similarly, the majority, ante, at page 599, asserts that “[b]ecause such ‘business transactions’ with nonmembers are conducted on a regular and repeated basis and constitute an integral part of the club’s operations—supplementing the members’ own financial contributions and reducing the dues and fees that members otherwise would be required to pay in order to maintain the club’s facilities and operations—we conclude that the club [is a ‘business establishment’ under section 51].”
The use of the club’s facilities by nonmembers raises a potential issue as to the applicability of section 51 that is not presented by the facts before us. In a number of cases decided under the public accommodation statutes of other states, courts have concluded that when a private club makes its facilities available to persons who are not members of the club, the club may not discriminatorily exclude from such access a segment of the community on the basis of a classification that would not be permitted under the public accommodation statute. (See, e.g., Commonwealth, Hum. R. Com’n v. Local Ord. of Moose (1972) 448 Pa. 451 [294 A.2d 594, 597]; Batavia Lodge No. 196 v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights (1974) 35 N.Y.2d 143 [359 N.Y.S.2d 25, 316 N.E.2d 318].) A serious question under section 51 would be presented if defendant, in opening its facilities for use by nonmembers in a sponsored event, proposed to preclude the attendance of any guests on the basis of their particular race or gender, or on some other criterion prohibited by law. In the present case, however, there is no claim that defendant has imposed any such discriminatory policy with regard to the use of its facilities by nonmembers, and thus we have no occasion to address the applicability of section 51 to such conduct. We need hold only that the club’s policies relating to the use of its facilities by nonmembers do not subject the membership decisions of the club to the provisions of section 51.
In 1993, a bill was introduced that would have prohibited the issuance or renewal of a club liquor license to any club that denies membership on the basis of “color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, disability, or age,” and that has (1) a membership of 400 or more, (2) provides regular meal service, and (3) regularly accepts payment from or on behalf of nonmembers for expenses incurred at the club in furtherance of trade or business. (Assem. Bill No. 159 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).) Although the measure passed both houses of the Legislature, it was vetoed by the Governor, and the Legislature did not override the veto.