dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion for the following reasons:
*51After defendant had been placed in the patrol car, Officer Ault checked the back of the mug shot he had of Sandra Jordan and noted that defendant’s physical description differed from that of Sandra Jordan. Officer Ault did not check the physical description written on the back of the photograph until after he had ordered the officers back into the house to search for any other persons.
The officers then entered the house over the objection of the other woman and subsequently discovered Sandra Jordan hiding in the attic.
The issue on appeal is whether the officers, having probable cause to arrest and then arresting defendant as Sandra Jordan, could have had at the same time probable cause to believe that defendant was not Sandra Jordan and that the real Sandra Jordan was still in the house.
The majority concludes that the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant pursuant to the arrest warrant issued for Sandra Jordan. The facts giving rise to probable cause that defendant was Sandra Jordan were: (1) defendant resided at the address where Sandra Jordan was supposed to be, and (2) gave a name which was an alias used by Sandra Jordan. In addition, however, the majority concludes that the above facts also gave the officers probable cause to believe that defendant was not Sandra Jordan. I cannot agree with the second conclusion.
Probable cause in this context means a well warranted suspicion that defendant was or was not the person named in the arrest warrant. See, State v. Willis, 24 Or App 409, 412, 545 P2d 1392, rev den (1976). I conclude, as did the trial court, that the police officers had a well warranted suspicion, based upon the facts recited above, that defendant was Sandra Jordan. How then could the officers at the same time have had a well warranted suspicion, arising from the same facts, that Sandra Jordan was still in the house? Having arrested defendant the police officers did not *52have probable cause to reenter the house and search for Sandra Jordan. While it is true that the officers may not have been positive of defendant’s identity, the mere doubt present in this case was not sufficient to justify the search.
I have no disagreement with any of the hypothetical examples of probable cause for multiple arrests given in the majority opinion. All are proper. However, they are all distinguishable on their facts from the case at bar.
For the above reasons I respectfully dissent.