(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that counsel’s inadvertence is not good cause to avoid sanctions. I disagree, however, with the majority’s analysis on whether the commissioner abused her discretion in determining the proper sanction in this case.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
[t]he court may affirm the agency action or remand to the agency for further proceedings. The court shall reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from agency action ... if it determines that substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been preju*789diced because the agency action is any of the following:
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n. Otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(%) (2001). We are also required to “give appropriate deference to the view of the agency with respect to particular matters that have been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(ll)(e). I cannot see how the majority can apply these rules of judicial review to this case when the industrial commissioner did not provide any reasons for choosing the sanction she did.
In situations involving dismissal or default, we have said:
[Fundamental fairness should require a district court to enter an order to show cause and hold a hearing, if deemed necessary, to determine whether assessment of costs and attorney fees or even an attorney’s citation for contempt would be a more just and effective sanction. Dismissal and entry of a default judgment should be the rare judicial act. When noncompliance is the result of dilatory conduct by counsel, the courts should investigate the attorney’s responsibility as an officer of the court and, if appropriate, impose on the client sanctions less extreme than dismissal or default, unless it is shown that the client is deliberately or in bad faith failing to comply with the court’s order.
Kendall/Hunt Publ’g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Iowa 1988). Fundamental fairness is an important consideration the commissioner must use in processing a workers’ compensation claim. See Michael Eberhart Constr. v. Curtin, 674 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Iowa 2004) (holding it is unfair to allow claimant to amend his petition after the hearing); Univ. of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics v. Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Iowa 2004) (holding in determining if a party has sufficient notice of an issue, the test is fundamental fairness, not whether the notice meets the technical rules of common-law pleading); Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824, 828 (Iowa 1992) (same). I believe fundamental fairness requires the commissioner to apply the analysis used in Kendall/Hunt before the commissioner defaults a party or dismisses an action.
Although the commissioner gave a reason for sanctioning the claimant, the commissioner did not give any reasons for choosing the harshest sanction, dismissal of the appeal. The Administrative Procedure Act only requires us to give “appropriate deference to the view of the agency.” Giving appropriate deference to the view of the commissioner is not the same as yielding to the commissioner’s judgment, when the reviewing court does not know the reasons why the commissioner chose to dismiss the appeal as the sanction for counsel’s inadvertence. In order for us to determine whether the commissioner abused her discretion in choosing the appropriate sanction, she must provide the reviewing court with reasons for her actions so the reviewing court can at least determine that the commissioner properly exercised her discretion. See Litterer v. Judge, 644 N.W.2d 857, 362 (Iowa 2002).
Dismissal may have been the appropriate sanction; however, under this record I am unable to give the commissioner the appropriate deference without knowing the reasons why the commissioner chose the extreme sanction of dismissal. See State v. Keopasaeuth, 645 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 2002) (holding the reasons why a court imposes a sentence in a criminal case must be detailed sufficiently to allow appellate review of the discretionary action); State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000) *790(holding although the reasons need not be detailed, at least a cursory explanation must be provided to allow appellate review of the discretionary action). Therefore, I would remand this case to the agency to determine the appropriate sanction and require the commissioner to articulate her reasons for imposing the sanction.