concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part.
I concur in the majority’s analysis and holdings with respect to all issues presented with the exception of that portion of the majority’s analysis and holding regarding the admissibility of Judge Baskervill’s testimony. Specifically, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the plain language of Code § 19.2-271 barred Judge Baskervill from testifying at the contempt hearing. Initially, I agree with the majority that the “victim of a crime” language in Code § 19.2-271 does not apply under the circumstances of this case. I also agree that Code § 18.2-459, which authorizes a district court judge to prepare and submit to the circuit court a certificate detailing “the particular circumstances of the offense,” does not apply because this case did not involve an appeal from the district court to the circuit court. However, because I believe that the plain language of Code § 19.2-271 does not encompass situations where the testifying judge had not considered, in her judicial *198capacity, the “matter” about which she was testifying, I would affirm the trial court’s decision to admit Judge Baskervill’s testimony.
A.
Initially, I agree that, in their appellate briefs, neither party addressed the threshold issue of whether Code § 19.2-271 applies under the circumstances of this case, focusing instead on the “victim” exception contained in the statute. However, I note that the trial court apparently concluded that the plain language of the statute did not apply when it admitted the judge’s testimony, reasoning that the incidents about which the judge proposed to testify occurred “outside of a judicial proceeding.” Thus, I believe that it is entirely appropriate to address the plain meaning of Code § 19.2-271 rather than merely assuming, as does the majority, that the statute applies. See Finnerty v. Thornton Hall, Inc., 42 Va.App. 628, 635, 593 S.E.2d 568, 571 (2004) (noting that “a pure question of statutory interpretation” is “a matter within the core competency of the judiciary”); see also One 1968 Buick v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1313, 1316 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (“A preliminary issue which we raise sua sponte is one of statutory interpretation.”); Bartus v. Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., 176 Wis.2d 1063, 501 N.W.2d 419, 423 (1993) (holding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals “had the authority to raise the question of statutory interpretation sua sponte,” and declining “to adopt a per se rule requiring courts to seek additional briefing” because the court “consider[ed] such a rule both unnecessary and unduly burdensome to the courts”).
I also note that the language quoted by the majority, specifically, that “ ‘such an exercise of sua sponte judicial power would impermissibly place us in the role of advocate— far outside the boundaries of our traditional adjudicative duties,”’ was derived in an entirely different context. In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 113, 116, 609 S.E.2d 58, 59 (2005), this Court declined to raise, sua sponte, the validity of an alternative holding of the trial court, specifically, the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine under the *199circumstances of that case. I do not believe that, in this dissent, I am addressing an alternative, unappealed ruling from the trial court. Rather, I address the only ruling from the trial court pertaining to an issue—the applicability of a statute—that has been properly presented to this Court on appeal.
Regardless, I believe that, where a party has challenged the applicability of a particular statute on appeal, appellate courts always have the authority to raise and construe the plain meaning of that statute.12 Indeed, as noted by the Virginia Supreme Court, an appellate court “cannot be forced to accept a flawed construction of a statute ... simply because of an oversight or tactical decision by one or both of the parties.” Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 464, 472, 593 S.E.2d 263, 268 (2004) (raising, sua sponte, the issue of whether the unconstitutional portions of a statute could be severed so as to prevent the entire statute from being declared invalid); cf. Mack v. City of Detroit, 467 Mich. 186, 649 N.W.2d 47, 60 (2002) (“The jurisprudence of [this state] cannot be, and is not, dependent upon whether individual parties accurately identify and elucidate controlling legal questions.”).
Moreover, avoiding the plain meaning issue merely because it has not been expressly raised in the parties’ appellate briefs gives rise to an unacceptable risk of rendering what amounts to an advisory opinion: a decision construing language con*200tained in a statute that does not apply in the first place. And, as recently noted by the Virginia Supreme Court, an appellate court may “consider, sua sponte, whether a decision would be an advisory opinion because the Court does not have the power to render a judgment that is only advisory.” Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35, 40, 607 S.E.2d 367, 369 (2005); see also Commonwealth v. Harley, 256 Va. 216, 219-20, 504 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1998) (“ ‘[Cjourts are not constituted ... to render advisory opinions, to decide moot questions or to answer inquiries which are merely speculative.’” (quoting City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 229-30, 135 S.E.2d 773, 775-76 (1964)) (omission in original)); Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 415, 421, 598 S.E.2d 754, 757 (2004) (same).
For these reasons, I do not share the majority’s reluctance to address the initial applicability of Code § 19.2-271 despite the parties’ failure to expressly raise the issue on appeal, especially in light of the trial court’s apparent ruling that the statute is, according to its plain language, inapplicable under the circumstances of this case.
B.
The construction and applicability of Code § 19.2-271 is a pure question of law. Accordingly, this Court should review the trial court’s judgment de novo. See Sink v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 655, 658, 507 S.E.2d 670, 671 (1998) (“[Although the trial court’s findings of historical fact are binding on appeal unless plainly wrong, we review the trial court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo.”).
I begin, as always, with the plain language of the statute, for “ ‘[wjhere the legislature has used words of a plain and definite import the courts cannot put upon them a construction which amounts to holding the legislature did not mean what it has actually expressed.’ ” Barr v. Town & Country Properties, 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990) (quoting Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934)). “We must ... assume that the legislature chose, with care, the *201words it used when it enacted the ... statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret the statute.” Id.
Also, when interpreting the plain language of a statute, this Court must be cognizant of the general principle that a statute “operat[ing] to limit the introduction of relevant evidence ... must be strictly construed____” Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 456, 374 S.E.2d 303, 309 (1988). This rule is applicable regardless of whether the language chosen by the General Assembly harbors any ambiguity. See Va. Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 256 Va. 151, 157 n. 3, 500 S.E.2d 814, 817 n. 3 (1998) (“[A] finding of ambiguity is not a prerequisite for applying a narrowing construction [of a statute].”). Thus, because Code § 19.2-271 disqualifies individuals who would otherwise be competent to testify, the statute should be narrowly construed against the disqualification of the witness and in favor of the admissibility of evidence. See Bennett, 236 Va. at 456, 374 S.E.2d at 309; see also Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Bowers, 181 Va. 542, 546, 25 S.E.2d 361, 362 (1943) (“While this statute has its useful purposes it is in derogation of the common law, and, therefore, must be strictly construed.”).
Code § 19.2-271 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
No judge shall be competent to testify in any criminal or civil proceeding as to any matter which came before him in the course of his official duties.
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... Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any judge ... who is the victim of a crime, shall not be incompetent solely because of his office to testify in any criminal or civil proceeding arising out of the crime.
According to the plain language of Code § 19.2-271, a judge is therefore only incompetent to testify about a “matter” that “came before him in the course of his official duties.” A “matter” is generally defined as “[a] subject under consideration, esp. involving a dispute or litigation,” or “[s]omething that is to be tried or proved; an allegation forming the basis of a claim or defense.” Black’s Law Dictionary 992 (7th ed. *2021999). The question at issue is, therefore, whether the “subject under consideration” at the contempt hearing ever “came before” Judge Baskervill “in the course of [her] official duties.” I believe, as did the trial court, that it did not.
Initially, I agree with the majority that the statute rendered Judge Baskervill incompetent to testify as to the contents of the April 16 and July 1 orders, for those “matters” certainly “came before” her in the course of her official duties. To the extent the trial court permitted her to testify about the foundation and contents of those orders, I agree that the court erred. However, because those orders were admissible regardless of whether Judge Baskervill testified at the hearing, I also believe that error was harmless. See Young v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 780, 782, 75 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1953) (holding, in the context of a contempt proceeding, that “[f]ormal proof of the [underlying] order was not necessary as the court could take judicial notice of its own order”).
Although Judge Baskervill issued the April 16 and July 1 orders and, thus, should not have been permitted to testify as to the substance of those orders, she did not issue the show cause order for contempt. Nor did she preside over a contempt hearing or otherwise consider the issue of the Sheriffs misconduct while “in the course of [her] official duties.” Thus, although the April 16 and July 1 orders certainly “came before [her] in the course of [her] official duties,” the “matter” of whether Sheriff Epps violated those orders did not.13 Because it was the latter that was “under consideration” at the contempt hearing, and about which Judge Baskervill primarily sought to testify, I believe that Code § 19.2-271 did not render Judge Baskervill wholly incompetent to testify at the *203contempt hearing.14
Also, as noted in Baugh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 368, 417 S.E.2d 891 (1992), judges in contempt cases are often “indispensable witnesses],” and their testimony is “essential to prosecution of an offense....” Id. at 371, 417 S.E.2d at 894. If, as the majority holds, Code § 19.2-271 prohibits a judge from testifying in a contempt hearing, the question remains as to how that “essential” testimony may be presented to the trial court. Although this Court held in Baugh that admitting a certificate or similar affidavit in lieu of a judge’s oral testimony does not violate a defendant’s confrontation rights, that holding has been called into question by the rule recently announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Specifically, in Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that admitting “testimonial” hearsay evidence violates the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 50-51, 124 S.Ct. at 1363-64. A certificate or affidavit prepared by a judge, and admitted during a show cause hearing to prove a charge of contempt, is “testimonial” evidence that seems to fall squarely within the Crawford rule. Thus, the continued validity of the holding in Baugh—with respect to alternative means of presenting the testimony of a judicial witness—is dubious, at best. Indeed, the trial court here recognized the potential constitutional issue, noting that admitting the affidavit prepared by Judge Baskervill “might well defy the [defendant’s] right to confrontation.”
Thus, the majority’s holding and rationale leads to the inescapable conclusion that, if a judge witnesses a defendant’s contemptuous conduct and thereafter either recuses herself or *204is unable to preside over the contempt hearing, there may be no conceivable manner in which the defendant can be convicted of contempt. I cannot believe that the General Assembly intended this absurd result. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 115, 597 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2004) (“[0]ur case law uses the phrase ‘absurd result’ to describe situations in which the law would be internally inconsistent or otherwise incapable of operation.” (emphasis added)).
For these reasons, I would hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that Judge Baskervill was competent to testify at the contempt hearing regarding the out-of-court conduct of the appellant because the “matter” about which she sought to testify never “came before [her] in the course of [her] official duties.” Thus, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s analysis and holding and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
. I further note that addressing the plain meaning of a statute sua sponte does not give rise to the same concerns as the well established rule against mounting, sua sponte, a constitutional challenge to a statute. The rule against raising the constitutionality of a statute sua sponte is grounded in the "deference due to acts of the General Assembly.” Benderson Dev. Co. v. Sciortino, 236 Va. 136, 148, 372 S.E.2d 751, 757 (1988) ("Because of the deference due to acts of the General Assembly, we do not seek out constitutional challenges to statutes and decide them sua sponte. We will consider such challenges only when they have been properly raised and preserved in the court below, appropriately assigned as error, and briefed and argued on appeal.” (citation omitted)). Addressing the plain meaning of a statute, however, merely interprets—not invalidates—the language chosen by the General Assembly, and the deference accorded to acts of the General Assembly thereby remains intact.
. As noted by Judge Elder, Judge Baskervill was arguably engaged in the course of her official duties when she observed the contemptuous conduct. But that is not the judicial behavior at which the statute is directed. Rather, the judge must have considered the contemptuous conduct while in the course of her judicial duties. Observing a defendant’s misconduct is not equivalent to considering that conduct in a judicial capacity.
. I agree that the amendments to the statute were intended to broaden its scope and applicability. However, by retaining the language "came before him,” the General Assembly retained the requirement that the judge must have actually considered the matter in his or her judicial capacity. Although the language of the statute does not indicate that the judge must have presided over the matter during a trial, hearing, or other formal judicial proceeding, I believe the language "came before,” when narrowly construed, indicates that the matter must have been presented to the judge in a manner involving some form of a deliberative process.