In re Ryan A. CA5

Filed 10/26/23 In re Ryan A. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re RYAN A., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, F085649

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 21JL-00001A)

v.
OPINION
RYAN A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Mark V.
Bacciarini, Judge.
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General,
Louis M. Vasquez and Jesica Y. Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
 INTRODUCTION
In December 2020, appellant Ryan A., then 17 years old, was arrested for
allegedly molesting a young child who was in the foster care of his mother. In January
2021, the Merced County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a),1 alleging one count of
committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years, in violation of
Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). Appellant denied the allegation.
In December 2022, following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the trial court
sustained the allegation. In January 2023, the court declared appellant a ward of the
court; ordered him confined for 23 days in the Juvenile Justice Correctional Complex,
with credit for time served; and placed him under the supervision of a probation officer,
with various terms and conditions. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
During the jurisdictional hearing, appellant repeatedly sought to introduce
testimonial and documentary evidence that originated from the dependency case-related
investigation into the molestation allegation by officials with Merced County Health and
Human Services Agency (agency) and Merced County Sheriff’s Department.2 The trial
court excluded the majority of the evidence sought under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 8273 and Evidence Code section 1040. Appellant claims the evidence was

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
stated.
2 We do not describe the information sought in any detail due to its confidential nature, but
in general, it included the agency’s investigation and determination following receipt of the
molestation allegation, including written reports, steps taken, interviews conducted, and
statements made; and information reported to, actions taken by, and determinations made by the
sheriff’s department.
3 Section 827 was recently amended by Assembly Bill No. 505 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.),
effective January 1, 2024, but that amendment is not relevant to the issue raised in this appeal.

2.
relevant and its exclusion violated his federal and state rights to due process, truth-in-
evidence, confrontation, and a fair trial.4
The People respond that forfeiture applies to claims not raised in the trial court,
including appellant’s constitutional claims; appellant’s rights were not violated; and if
there was any error, it was not prejudicial.
Although not acknowledged by either party, the record indicates a petition for
disclosure of juvenile records was filed in this case pursuant to section 827 and the matter
was referred to the dependency court for resolution months prior to the jurisdictional
hearing, in accordance with state procedural requirements. (In re Jenkins (2023) 14
Cal.5th 493, 504–505, 524 (Jenkins) [state statutory- and rule-based “in camera review
procedures provide the ‘proper mechanism to resolve a defense Brady disclosure request
involving information in a juvenile file’”], citing & quoting J.E. v. Superior Court (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1338 (J.E.).)5 As we shall discuss, the petition process provided
for under section 827 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.552,6 vests in the juvenile
court the exclusive authority to grant or deny access to material from confidential

4 The state Constitution provides, “Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by
statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature,
relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post
conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense,
whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing
statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code Sections 352, 782
or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the
press.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2), italics added [formerly art. I, § 28, subd. (d)].)
Appellant does not offer any substantive argument on his truth-in-evidence claim (People v.
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363–364 [“If a party’s briefs do not provide
legal argument and citation to authority on each point raised, ‘“the court may treat it as waived,
and pass it without consideration.”’”]), but in any event, both Welfare and Institutions Code
section 827 and Evidence Code section 1040 long predated the addition of the provision to the
state Constitution (People v. Guzman (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 184, 192 [truth-in-evidence
provision added to Cal. Const. by Prop. 8, passed by voters in 1982]).
5 Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady).
6 All further reference to rules are to the California Rules of Court unless otherwise stated.

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juvenile records (Jenkins, supra, at p. 524, citing J.E., supra, at pp. 1337–1338), and this
process serves to protect the right to a fair trial, including the right to disclosure of
exculpatory and impeachment evidence under Brady (Jenkins, supra, at p. 525, citing
J.E., supra, at pp. 1336, 1338–1339). Appellant fails to show that a section 827 petition
for disclosure was granted by the dependency court, to which it appears the matter was
referred, and that the trial court thereafter improperly excluded evidence, in contravention
of the dependency court’s order. In the absence of an order under section 827 permitting
disclosure, appellant fails to meet his burden of demonstrating error by the trial court in
excluding the evidence during the jurisdictional hearing and we affirm the judgment.7
FACTUAL SUMMARY
I. Prosecution Case
A. G.
At the time of the jurisdictional hearing, G.L. was eight years old and about to
enter third grade. She was living with A., whom she identified as her mother, and her
four brothers, D., X., E. and J.8 Prior to living with A., G. lived with M.; M.’s son,
appellant; and her older brothers, D. and X. She was sometimes alone with appellant and
“[h]e did bad things.”
G. described one incident that occurred when she was lying down in her bedroom
at M.’s house watching TV. Appellant closed the door, pulled his pants down, and pulled
her pants down. Appellant was next to her on the bed and he moved her on top of him.
She testified, “He started doing gross things, things I don’t want to talk about.” She then

7 Given our conclusion that appellant did not meet his initial burden of demonstrating error
by the trial court (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 378; People v. Giordano (2007) 42
Cal.4th 644, 666), we do not consider whether, or to what extent, he forfeited specific legal
claims based on the failure to object in the trial court on the same grounds now advanced on
appeal.
8 At the time of the hearing, G. and her four brothers were using different first names than
when they lived with M. and appellant.

4.
described feeling his private part touching her private part, and said she knew “he was
going to do gross things.” When asked by the prosecutor to mark the areas she was
referring to as private parts on diagrams, she drew circles indicating her genitals and
appellant’s genitals. G. testified appellant did those things to her “[a] lot” before she
moved from M.’s house to A.’s house.
On cross-examination, G. testified that she did not like living at M.’s house
because of appellant, and that M. spanked her “[a] lot” with a belt or a “chancla.” She
also testified that D. saw what appellant did to her and X. saw “a little bit.” G. explained
she knew D. saw them and when he later asked her what was going on, she told him. X.
also told G. that he saw them and he described to her what he saw. G. testified that after
D. left M.’s house for A.’s house, he told A. what happened.9 G. subsequently moved to
A.’s house, too, and she then told A. what happened.
G. testified that she told one person that the incident with appellant never
happened. She could not recall the person’s name, but her denial occurred when she was
pointing to where appellant touched her on some drawings. She testified she was scared
so she stated it never happened and nothing was wrong. G. did not recall speaking with a
police officer, and she did not recall removing the clothing of two other foster children in
the home. She denied she would remove her own clothing or remove the clothing of
other children in the home.
B. D.
G.’s brother, D., was 11 years old when he testified. He said that appellant
sometimes babysat during the time D., G., X., and another brother lived at M.’s house.
D. testified that he saw what appellant did to G. He knew appellant had gone into G.’s
room and, after the movie he was watching on TV ended, he went in G.’s room, too. He

9 During her testimony, M. stated D. and X. were removed from her home in July 2019 and
G. was removed in November 2019.

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saw G. was on top of appellant and appellant’s private part was out. He recalled they
were both clothed and they were lying down in the bed. He ran back to his room and told
X.
D. did not tell any adults that day because he was scared M. was going to hit him,
but he later told J. and A. after he moved to their house. He said that M. threw a shoe at
him one time, and she spanked him and his siblings with her hand and with a sandal or a
“chancla.”
He also described one other incident in which he saw G. and appellant lying down.
D. saw appellant had G.’s pants down and he told X. to look, but they did not see
anything else. D. said he finally told A. after she saw he looked worried and asked him
what was wrong. He told her that he had other siblings still at M.’s house and then
disclosed to A. “the bad things that happened over there.”
On cross-examination, D. remembered leaving M.’s house for a short time and
going to a large house, where he felt sad.10 He remembered being interviewed by
someone about what he saw and being asked to draw what he saw. He said he told the
woman the bad stuff appellant did, but answered, “‘I don’t know,’” to some questions.
D. denied he told a social worker that he did not see appellant do anything to G.
C. Law Enforcement Testimony
Detective Zambrano was the lead investigator assigned to the criminal case, but he
died between completing the investigation and the jurisdictional hearing. Zambrano was
assisted by Detective Martinez, who testified. Martinez did not author any reports or
interview any witnesses for the criminal case, as she was not the lead detective. She
recalled the sheriff’s department received a phone call about a sex crime in August 2019,

10 M. later testified that in January 2019, D. and X. were moved to a new home out of the
area before returning to her home.

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and she explained that a report based on the call would have been sent electronically to
the detectives’ division.
Martinez testified that she was present along with Deputy Ortiz for the children’s
forensic interviews, but she did not interview the children or write the report. She also
did not recall hearing G. tell the interviewer she had been molested 100 times or respond
no when asked whether something happened that bothered her. Martinez explained that
if a sexual assault is acute, meaning within the past 72 hours, they would take the victim
directly to the hospital for a forensic exam, but if the assault occurred outside that
window, they would not do so. She was unaware what occurred between the children’s
forensic interviews and appellant’s arrest approximately 10 months later.
II. Defense Evidence
A. Social Worker
Social worker Cristal X., formerly V., was the first witness called by the defense.
She invoked official information privilege under Evidence Code section 1040, as well as
Welfare and Institutions Code section 827. The trial court sustained the claim of official
information privilege and precluded counsel from questioning her on any investigations
she conducted in her official capacity, but took judicial notice that she was a mandated
reporter.
B. M.
M. testified that she used to work for agencies and became a foster parent in 2012.
G. was in M.’s care from August 2017, when she was three years old, to November 2019,
when she was five years old. G.’s brother, E., came with G. in 2017. In January 2019, D.
and X. were removed from M.’s home for aggressive behavior and sent to a home out of
the area, but she accepted them back 11 days later and they remained in her home until
July 2019. G. remained with her until November 2019. She testified that D., X., and G.
were all liars.

7.
 M.’s house had four bedrooms. She had her own room, E. shared a bedroom with
Mi., G. shared a room with S., and appellant had his own room. When M. was asked if
she could take D. and X., appellant moved in with his older brothers two blocks away.
Approximately five other adults would visit the house per week, and no one reported
suspecting appellant of child abuse. Nor did any of the children tell her that appellant
was engaged in any inappropriate touching or behavior.
Based on information she received from the agency, M. had to have G. with her at
all times because G. would take other children’s clothes off. She also testified G. craved
attention. She denied she and her partner ever had sex when the children were home.
She said he did not live with her, and they would see each other when the children were
at school.
Social services employees came to M.’s house on August 2, 2019. When they
departed, they left G. in her care, and no one told her she needed to remove appellant
because he presented a danger to G. based on inappropriate touching.
M. testified that D. accused her of hitting X., and after G. left her care, G. falsely
accused her of physical abuse. The misdemeanor case against her was later dismissed by
the district attorney after she succeeded in having her guilty plea withdrawn, which had
been entered by her attorney without her knowledge and agreement.
C. Law Enforcement Testimony
Officer Bethel, who worked for a police department in a different county at the
time of the hearing, testified that when he was with the sheriff’s department, he received
a call for service from a child protective services worker on August 2, 2019, concerning
appellant and he wrote a report. At his supervisor’s direction, he contacted Detective
Martinez, which ended his involvement in the matter.
Detective Ortiz listened in on the forensic interviews of G. and her two brothers,
and he summarized the interviews in a report, which was the only case-related task he
was given. He recalled G. reported there was penetration.

8.
 D. Expert Testimony
Sandra Wilkinson testified for the defense as an expert in sexual assault
examinations and forensic interviews. Wilkinson opined that G. should have been taken
for a forensic examination after reporting penetration and the failure to do so was
malpractice. She explained that while the first 120 hours is acute for the purpose of
collecting DNA and documenting injuries, an examination of a nonacute assault would
detect trauma to the hymen because it does not heal intact.
Wilkinson also testified that the forensic examinations in this case were very
poorly done, and deficiencies included asking leading questions that contained
information not already disclosed by G. and asking questions with multiple parts that
resulted in unclear answers. Wilkinson described G. as “sexualized,” meaning she had
knowledge of things a typical three- or four-year-old would not, and Wilkinson said the
greatest deficiency in the interview was the interviewer’s failure to follow up on G.’s
statements that the perpetrator did things like they do in movies and the interviewer’s
acceptance of G.’s description of penetration and what sounded like ejaculation.
Wilkinson said these statements from a victim should elicit followup questions, and that
because penetration of a young child is exceedingly painful, G.’s response that she did
not remember when asked certain questions was “a huge red flag.” Wilkinson found “the
interview to be totally unhelpful.” She said the state standard for forensic interviewing
involves a specific 10-step process and although the forensic interviewer initiated the
process, it failed because the interviewer quickly abandoned her efforts.
E. Appellant
Appellant spoke with Cristal X. on August 2, 2019, for an investigation, but he
was never interviewed by police. He was not arrested then, and he denied ever touching
G. inappropriately. When social workers left that day, he remained in the home. He was
later arrested in December 2020.

9.
 He testified that either his mother or his older brother was always at the house, and
social workers, sometimes in multiples, came two or three times a week.
F. G. and D.
G. testified that the bad thing appellant did to her occurred in her room and D. saw
it. Neither she nor appellant was wearing any clothes, and she denied previously
testifying appellant was wearing a shirt.11 G. did not report what happened to the woman
who came to M.’s house to interview her because appellant told her not to tell anyone,
and she told only her mom she was in a lot of pain.
D. testified that he saw appellant with G. two times, once in his room and once in
her room. The first time was in his room, when he and X. were in there watching TV.
Appellant came in and sat in front of D.’s bed. He called G., and D. and X. saw appellant
and G. both had their pants down. G. saw D. watching and said, “‘Stop, [D.] You gotta
stop, [D.]’”
The second time was when D. went into G.’s room to tell appellant the movie he
and X. were watching had ended. He saw G. on top of appellant and appellant’s private
part was out. He ran back to his room and stayed there.
DISCUSSION
I. Procedural Background
In April 2021, appellant filed a motion seeking pretrial discovery, in accordance
with Brady. Among other items, appellant sought G.’s dependency case file, the sheriff
department’s reports, and the forensic interviews. A minute order from a hearing held on
August 31, 2021, reflects that the parties informed the court they resolved their discovery
dispute.12

11 The jurisdictional hearing took two days, with an almost five-month passage of time
between the first day, when G. testified for the prosecution, and the second day, when she was
called to testify by the defense.
12 The Honorable Margaret Johnson.

10.
 It appears appellant also followed the legal procedure in place to obtain
confidential juvenile records vis-à-vis filing a petition under section 827, although neither
the petition nor the filing date appears in the record. On February 23, 2022, the trial
judge, who presided over the jurisdictional hearing, ordered the petition be sent to
dependency court for consideration. The disposition of appellant’s petition by the
dependency court does not appear in the record, but later references to section 827 during
the jurisdictional hearing suggest that disclosure of information was denied, given the
prosecutor’s repeated objections and reference to “lack of a [section] 827 order.”
During the jurisdictional hearing, defense counsel sought to question multiple
witnesses about G.’s behavioral issues and a statement she made denying the molestation
occurred; issues with G.’s brothers; the social worker’s investigation into the allegation
of sexual abuse and initial conclusion; the number and identity of service providers who
visited the house; and the approximately 17-month delay between the social worker’s call
to law enforcement reporting the allegation and appellant’s arrest for the crime. Most of
the information sought was part of, or related to, G.’s and her brothers’ dependency
cases. The trial court limited many of counsel’s questions under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 827 and Evidence Code section 1040, and also rejected counsel’s arguments
that some of G.’s statements were admissible as admissions and for impeachment.
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Kopatz (2015) 61 Cal.4th 62, 85; People v. DeHoyos
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 131.) “Under this standard, a trial court’s ruling will not be
disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a
manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 304; accord,
People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 26.) “‘[W]e review the ruling, not the court’s
reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.’” (People v. Zamudio

11.
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 351, fn. 11; accord, People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39.)
Further, “th[e] routine application of state evidentiary law does not implicate [the]
defendant’s constitutional rights” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 545, fn.
omitted; accord, People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1116), including the right to
present a defense (People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1203, citing People v.
Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102–1103).
III. Legal Principles
“Disclosure obligations in criminal proceedings are governed by both statutory
procedures and federal constitutional due process rights. Penal Code section 1054.1
specifies the matters that the prosecution must disclose to the defense, including
exculpatory evidence and felony convictions of material witnesses. (Pen. Code,
§ 1054.1, subds. (d), (e).) Although these statutory discovery procedures are expressly
applicable only to criminal proceedings, the juvenile court has the discretion to apply
them in juvenile delinquency proceedings as well. (Clinton K. v. Superior Court (1995)
37 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1248.) The constitutional disclosure obligations, which are
delineated in Brady and its progeny, exist independently of these statutory procedures.
(Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 377–378.)
“To comply with Brady constitutional due process requirements, the prosecution
must disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence that is favorable to the accused and
material on the issue of guilt or punishment. (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031,
1042; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 7.) Broadly speaking,
exculpatory evidence is evidence that tends to exonerate the defendant from guilt. (See
Kennedy v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 359, 377.) The impeachment
component includes evidence that might undermine a prosecution witness’s credibility.
(People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 518; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 16; People v. Superior Court (Meraz ) (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 28, 51
[evidence favorable to the accused is ‘“evidence that the defense could use either to

12.
impeach the state’s witnesses or to exculpate the accused”’].) Disclosure may be
required even when the evidence is subject to a state privacy privilege, as is the case with
confidential juvenile records. (Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 57–58
(Ritchie); see Webb, supra, at p. 518.) The Brady disclosure requirement applies to
juvenile delinquency proceedings as well as criminal proceedings. (Joe Z. v. Superior
Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 806, fn. 5; see Robert S. v. Superior Court (1992) 9
Cal.App.4th 1417, 1423.)” (J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1334–1335, fn. omitted.)
Under state law, “Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2), authorizes the
trial court to decline to disclose confidential records maintained by a public entity when it
finds the ‘necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information … outweighs the
necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice.’” (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th
52, 73.) Further, “Section 827 of the Welfare and Institutions Code contains protections
concerning the confidentiality of juvenile records, whether or not they are covered by
other state or federal privileges, and vests the juvenile court with exclusive authority to
determine the extent to which those records may be released to third parties.” (People v.
Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 432, citing § 827 & T.N.G. v. Superior Court (1971) 4
Cal.3d 767, 778; accord, Jenkins, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 524; Lorenza P. v. Superior
Court (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 607, 610–611.)
“There is a strong public policy of confidentiality of juvenile records (In re
Keisha T. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 220, 231), and section 827 et seq. set forth detailed
provisions to protect this confidentiality. Section 827 specifies who is authorized to
inspect the files, and it lists the prosecutor as one of the authorized persons. An
authorized person, in turn, may not disclose information from the files to an unauthorized
person without a court order. (§ 827, subd. (a)(4), (5); see T.N.G. v. Superior Court
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 767, 780–781; In re Keisha T., supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 234.)” (J.E.,
supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1337, fns. omitted.)

13.
 “Section 827 also contains provisions that permit unauthorized persons to directly
petition the juvenile court for access to the confidential records. (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(P);
R.S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1053–1054.) Under section 827 the
juvenile court has ‘exclusive authority to determine whether and to what extent to grant
access to confidential juvenile records’ to unauthorized persons. (In re Elijah S. [(2005)]
125 Cal.App.4th [1532,] 1541.) This statutory scheme reflects a legislative determination
that the juvenile court has ‘both the “‘sensitivity and expertise’ to make decisions about
access to juvenile records.”’” (J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1337, fn. omitted,
quoting People v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 488, 491; accord, Jenkins,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 524.)
“To support a section 827 petition, the petitioner is required to make a good cause
showing warranting the in camera review. (Rule 5.552(c)(2).) The court is then required
to engage in a careful balancing of the competing interests when making its disclosure
decision. The court’s duty ‘is to “balance the interests of the child and other parties to the
juvenile court proceedings, the interests of the petitioner, and the interests of the public.”
… To do so, the court “must take into account any restrictions on disclosure found in
other statutes, the general policies in favor of confidentiality and the nature of any
privileges asserted, and compare these factors to the justification offered by the
applicant” in order to determine what information, if any, should be released to the
petitioner.’” (J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1337–1338, fn. omitted, quoting People
v. Superior Court, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 492 & citing rule 5.552; accord, Jenkins,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 524–525.)
IV. Analysis
As stated, the subject matter of the evidence sought by appellant, both
documentary and testimonial in form, related to the agency’s initial investigation and
determination regarding the allegation that G. had been molested by appellant, including
statements made by G. and others during the course of that investigation, the social

14.
worker’s call to law enforcement, and law enforcement’s response. All of this
information was contained in, or generated in the context of, G.’s dependency case, and
possibly the dependency cases of her brothers. During the jurisdictional hearing, the trial
court sustained the prosecutor’s objections to certain documents and lines of questioning
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and Evidence Code section 1040.
Appellant’s claim of entitlement to reversal based on the erroneous exclusion of
evidence relies on a mischaracterization of his right to access and to disseminate
confidential information from juvenile case files; and his contention that “it is unclear
how or why the prosecutor and the juvenile court were so convinced section 827 forbid[s]
the defense from independently introducing any and all information that was also
contained in the siblings’ dependency files” is undercut by both the law and the record in
this case. The confidentiality of juvenile records and proceedings must be balanced
against the rights of those criminally accused to disclosure of exculpatory and
impeachment evidence. (Jenkins, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 504–505, 524–526; J.E.,
supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1334–1337.) As discussed, the record reflects a petition
was filed under section 827 and the trial court referred it to dependency court, in
accordance with the proper procedure for seeking confidential information contained in
juvenile case files. Resolution of that matter rested exclusively with the dependency
court. (Jenkins, supra, at p. 524; accord, J.E., supra, at pp. 1337–1338.) Notably,
appellant does not claim a Brady violation, and he makes no mention of his petition or its
resolution. (Pack v. Kings County Human Services Agency (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 821,
826, fn. 4 (Pack)[“The petition for review of juvenile court records is a special
proceeding on a collateral matter,” and “[a]n order denying the petition is appealable as a
final judgment in a special proceeding.”], citing In re Keisha T. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th
220, 229 (Keisha T.).)
Appellant asserts that “the defense already rightfully had access to much of the
information, because this was a juvenile case ‘involving the’ accusing ‘minor(s),’” and he

15.
reasons that “[b]ecause everyone in the room was entitled to access the confidential
information, nothing in section 827 barred the defense’s introduction of evidence or the
impeachment of witnesses with information simply because it was also contained in a
dependency file and/or related to the actions of a social worker.” (Italics added.)
appellant is incorrect.
A juvenile case file may be inspected by “The attorneys for the parties, judges,
referees, other hearing officers, probation officers, and law enforcement officers who are
actively participating in criminal or juvenile proceedings involving the minor.” (§ 827,
subd. (a)(1)(E), italics added.) In the context of case file access under section 827, the
minor was G., or her brothers, not appellant, and given that appellant was not a party in
the underlying dependency proceedings, his defense counsel did not have the right to
inspect the juvenile case files absent a court order. (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(Q); Keisha T.,
supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 232; see Lorenza P. v. Superior Court, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d
at p. 611 [criminal defense counsel for mother of minors had right to review minors’
underlying dependency records without a court order because mother was a party to the
dependency proceeding].) Moreover, a right of inspection by an authorized person does
not equate to a right to freely disseminate the information to third parties. (Jenkins,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 524; accord, J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1337; Keisha T.,
supra, at pp. 233–234.) “[A]llowing individuals with access to juvenile court records …
to disseminate them[] would turn the expressed policy of confidentiality on its head.”
(Keisha T., supra, at p. 234, citing In re Tiffany G. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 443, 451.)
As explained, the procedures under section 827 “‘protect both the defendant’s
right to a fair trial and the state’s interest in confidentiality of the files’” (Jenkins, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 525, quoting J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338), and that is the
“‘proper mechanism to resolve a defense Brady disclosure request involving information
in a juvenile file’” (Jenkins, supra, at p. 524, quoting J.E, supra, at p. 1338). Here,
appellant has not shown that he obtained a section 827 order from the dependency court

16.
permitting him to obtain and disclose information from dependency case files, and that
the trial court thereafter excluded the evidence, in contravention of the order. Contrary to
appellant’s position that the trial court erred, the record reflects a section 827 petition was
filed and transferred to the dependency court for resolution. Appellant does not
acknowledge this referral, let alone challenge it, but any claim of error related to that
underlying decision would be subject to timeliness and forfeiture principles. (Pack,
supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 826, fn. 4.) To the extent appellant’s argument is interpreted
as claiming the trial court had the authority to simply admit the evidence because the
court was presiding over a juvenile wardship proceeding, that position, too, neglects to
account for the requisite petition and disclosure order process under section 827.
“‘Appellate jurisdiction is limited to the four corners of the record on appeal .…’”
(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 743, quoting In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th
634, 646.) “On appeal, we presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct,
‘“[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the
record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.”’” (People v. Giordano, supra,
42 Cal.4th at p. 666.) The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating error on
appeal (People v. Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 378), including providing an adequate
record for review (People v. Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856, 866). “‘[A]ny
uncertainty in the record must be resolved against the defendant.’” (Ibid., quoting People
v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 529 & citing People v. Chubbuck (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 1, 12.)
Appellant has not met his burden of demonstrating error on appeal. In the absence
of any evidence that appellant obtained an order via the petition process under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 827, his claim that the trial court erred in excluding the
evidence under section 827 and Evidence Code section 1040 necessarily fails.13

13 Appellant sought to introduce some of the disputed evidence on grounds of impeachment
and admissions. While these grounds do not supplant the need to comply with section 827, we

17.
 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

PEÑA, J.

discern no fault with the court’s additional determinations that G.’s out-of-court statements made
during the dependency case investigation were admissible neither for impeachment nor as
admissions. G. admitted in her testimony that she denied the molestation allegation at one point
when asked about it. (Evid. Code, § 1235; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1219 [“The
‘fundamental requirement’ of [Evidence Code] section 1235 is that the statement in fact be
inconsistent with the witness’s trial testimony.”].) Further, she was not a party to the juvenile
wardship petition brought against appellant. (Evid. Code, § 1220.) Nor do we discern any
apparent error with the trial court’s rulings on grounds of hearsay or relevance.

18.