Com. v. Blazier, R.

J-S33044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RYAN L. BLAZIER :
:
Appellant : No. 702 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 6, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-07-CR-0000760-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: November 9, 2023

Appellant Ryan L. Blazier appeals the judgment of sentence entered by

the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County after a jury convicted Appellant of

aggravated indecent assault as well as two counts each of institutional sexual

assault, witness intimidation, and corruption of minors. We affirm.

Appellant was charged in connection with allegations that he had

sexually molested two minors while serving in the capacity as the head coach

of the boys’ wrestling team at Bellwood-Antis Junior High School. Two male

students (A.S. and E.A.) made separate allegations that Appellant had

sexually assaulted them during wrestling practice.

Appellant proceeded to a jury trial at which the Commonwealth offered

the testimony of numerous witnesses, including both victims. E.A., who was

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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thirteen years old at the time of the abuse, indicated that in 2019, he would

attend practices when Appellant trained him alone in the junior high wrestling

room. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 10/12/21, at 177, 79. E.A. indicated that he

was in the “referees’ position” on his hands and knees, when Appellant pulled

down E.A.’s pants, touched both the outside and inside of his butt and pushed

his fingers into E.A.’s anus. N.T., 10/12/21, at 183-85.

This assault caused the victim to yell out loudly in pain, which was heard

by one of the school’s janitors, Thomas Gority. N.T., 10/12/21, at 185-87;

N.T., 10/13/23, at 217. Mr. Gority, afraid that “somebody really got hurt,”

went to investigate the source of the cries and found the wrestling room door

to be locked. N.T., 10/13/23, at 21.

Mr. Gority unlocked the door with his master key and discovered

Appellant crouched behind E.A. Id. at 218-19. When Mr. Gority demanded to

know “what the hell is going on,” Appellant attempted to explain his actions

as “trying to man [E.A.] up.” Id. After Mr. Gority retorted that “I hope you

didn’t do what I think you did,” Appellant left the room and could not be found

at the school. Id. at 210.

E.A. indicated that Appellant subsequently told him if he revealed

anything about the abuse, “he would strike me and my dad and … would end

up hurting him.” N.T., 10/12/21, at 188. E.A. did not tell his father about the

abuse as he took Appellant’s threats seriously. Id. at 189.

Another male student, A.S., alleged that Appellant assaulted him during

wrestling practice when A.S. was thirteen years old. A.S. indicated that

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Appellant would require him to be his wrestling partner and would squeeze

and pinch his groin and testicles while A.S. was in the referees’ position. N.T.,

10/13/21, at 117-19. Both A.S. and E.A. confirmed that pinching a wrestler’s

private parts were not accepted forms of competitive wrestling. N.T.,

10/12/21, at 192; N.T., 10/13/21, at 117-18.

A.S. also explained that Appellant would direct him to engage in a

“wrestle off” with another student wrestler in the wrestling room. When A.S.

lost the “wrestle offs,” Appellant allowed the winning wrestler to return to the

group practice and isolate A.S. in the wrestling room. N.T., 10/13/21, at 124-

26. A.S. claimed that Appellant removed A.S.’s clothing, put a shirt over A.S.’s

face, and sodomized him against the wrestling room wall. Id. at 120-23. When

A.S. tried to scream, Appellant would put his hand across A.S.’s mouth and

would punch his head. Id. at 123-24. A.S. also indicated that he believed that

Appellant penetrated him with a foreign object during one of the assaults. Id.

at 121-22. A.S. claimed that Appellant threatened A.S. “not to tell anyone or

he would come after me.” Id. at 126.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of aggravated

indecent assault (as to E.A.) as well as two counts each of institutional sexual

assault, witness intimidation, and corruption of minors. On January 6, 2022,

the trial court imposed a term of four (4) to eight (8) years’ imprisonment for

aggravated indecent assault, two terms of three (3) to six (6) years’

imprisonment for institutional sexual assault, two terms of one and one-half

(1½) years to three (3) years’ imprisonment for corruption of minors, and two

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terms of four (4) to eight (8) years’ imprisonment for intimidating a witness.

As the trial court set all the individual sentences to run consecutively,

Appellant received an aggregate sentence of twenty-one (21) to forty-two

(42) years’ imprisonment. On January 18, 2022, Appellant filed a post-

sentence motion,1 which the trial court denied on May 12, 2022.

Thereafter, on June 8, 2022, Appellant filed this timely appeal and

complied with the trial court’s direction to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant raises the

following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred by denying the post-sentence
motion for judgment of acquittal as to count 17, the offense of
corruption of minors - sexual offenses, a felony of third degree,
inasmuch as the evidence did not suffice to prove the element
of a course of conduct beyond a reasonable doubt?

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the
motion for new trial based upon the weight of the evidence,
inasmuch as the verdicts were so contrary to the evidence as
to shock the sense of justices and so that the right may be
given another opportunity to prevail?

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying
discovery of confidential counseling records of a minor victim,
A.S., by its order, dated September 3, 2021, and entered of
____________________________________________

1 Our rules of criminal procedure provide that “a written post-sentence motion

shall be filed no later than 10 days after the imposition of sentence.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1). While Appellant filed his post-sentence motion twelve
days after the judgment of sentence was imposed, we nonetheless find this
motion to be timely filed. As the tenth day was a Sunday, and the eleventh
day was Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, Appellant was required to file a post-
sentence motion by Tuesday, January 18, 2022. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (for
computations of time, if the last day of any such period shall fall on a Saturday,
Sunday, or on a legal holiday, such day shall be omitted from the
computation).

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record on September 8, 2021, at ¶ 8, notwithstanding that the
request was reasonable and material to the defense at trial,
which prejudiced [Appellant] at trial by preventing full and
effective cross-examination of that minor victim and other
Commonwealth witnesses and deprived Appellant of a fair trial?

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an
aggregated sentence of not less than 21 years nor more than
42 years, consisting of minimum terms at the upper end of the
aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines on three counts
and exceeding the aggravated range on four counts, imposed
consecutively, without an adequate basis for such departures,
and doing so while fixating on the gravity of the offenses and
ignoring other factors, resulting in an unreasonable sentence?

Appellant’s Brief, at 11-12 (issues renumbered for ease of review, suggested

answers omitted).

First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for judgment of acquittal as to corruption of minors as it related to E.A. Before

we analyze the merits of this argument, we must address whether Appellant

has properly preserved this claim for review in his Rule 1925(b) statement.

It is well-settled that an appellant’s court-ordered Rule 1925(b)

statement must concisely identify each error with sufficient detail to identify

the issue to be raised for the judge. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). This Court has

held that:

Rule 1925 is a crucial component of the appellate process, which
“is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing upon
those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306, 308
(1998). “When an appellant fails adequately to identify in a
concise manner the issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the
trial court is impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis which is
pertinent to those issues.” In re Estate of Daubert, 757 A.2d
962, 963 (Pa.Super. 2000). “In other words, a Concise Statement
which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised

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on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement at
all.” Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa.Super.
2001).

“In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
on appeal, an appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement must state with
specificity the element or elements upon which the appellant
alleges that the evidence was insufficient.” Commonwealth v.
Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citing
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa.Super. 2009)).

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2015).

Where a 1925(b) statement raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting a particular conviction and “does not specify the allegedly

unproven elements[,] … the sufficiency issue is waived [on appeal].”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2008).

In the instant case, the trial court required Appellant to file a concise

statement pursuant to Rule 1925(b). Appellant submitted a Rule 1925(b)

statement containing twenty-three issues, which included challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting seven of his convictions. However,

Appellant failed to identify any element of any of the crimes he was convicted

which allegedly were not supported by sufficient evidence.2

We emphasize that requiring “[s]uch specificity is of particular

importance in cases where, as here, the appellant was convicted of multiple

crimes each of which contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gibbs, 981 A.2d at 281. Therefore,
____________________________________________

2 In his appellate brief, Appellant characterizes his first argument as
challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion for acquittal. Our review of
the record reveals that Appellant’s motion for acquittal also baldly asserted
that there was insufficient evidence to support all seven of his convictions.

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as Appellant failed to provide any specific detail in his concise statement for

his sufficiency claims to allow for proper review, these issues are waived.

Second, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying his motion for new trial based upon the weight of the evidence. We

must also determine whether Appellant’s weight challenge was similarly

waived for lack of development in his Rule 1925(b) statement.

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement indicates that the trial court abused

its discretion in failing to grant Appellant’s motion for a new trial, in which

Appellant claimed that the jury’s verdicts as to all seven of Appellant’s

convictions were so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

This claim fails for the same reason as Appellant’s sufficiency claim. “In

order to preserve a challenge to either the sufficiency or weight of the

evidence on appeal, an appellant's Rule 1925(b) concise statement must state

with specificity the elements or verdicts for which the appellant alleges that

the evidence was insufficient or against the weight of the evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1048 (Pa.Super. 2022) (finding

the appellant had waived his challenge to the weight of the evidence as he did

not specify the reasons for which his four convictions were against the weight

of the evidence).

Appellant raised a single claim in both his 1925(b) statement and his

post-sentence motion vaguely challenging the weight of the evidence as to all

seven of his convictions. Appellant did not give any specific reason as to why

any of the individual verdicts was contrary to the weight of the evidence, but

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instead argued that he was entitled to a new trial based on an unsupported

allegation that all seven verdicts were against the weight of the evidence.

Thus, we find this issue to be waived.

Third, Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion by denying

his discovery request for A.S.’s counseling records. Appellant contends that

such a request was reasonable and material to his defense and the denial of

this discovery prevented him from effectively cross-examining A.S.

In its September 9, 2021 opinion resolving Appellant’s pretrial motions,

the trial court determined that Appellant was not entitled to receive A.S.’s

counseling records, which the trial court deemed to be confidential. While the

trial court based this conclusion on a citation to “42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5544,” it is

clear that the trial court was referring to the psychiatrist/psychologist-patient

privilege codified in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5944, which provides that:

[n]o psychiatrist or person who has been licensed under the act
of March 23, 1972 (P.L. 136, No. 52), to practice psychology shall
be, without the written consent of his client, examined in any civil
or criminal matter as to any information acquired in the course of
his professional services in behalf of such client. The confidential
relations and communications between a psychologist or
psychiatrist and his client shall be on the same basis as those
provided or prescribed by law between an attorney and client.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5944. This Court has further provided that:

the psychiatrist/psychologist-patient privilege is absolute and the
statute contains no exceptions for disclosure. Commonwealth v.
Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120, 125 (1987); 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5944. The privilege “is designed to protect confidential
communications made and information given by the client to the
psychotherapist in the course of treatment, but does not protect
the psychotherapist's own opinion, observations, diagnosis, or

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treatment alternatives.” [Commonwealth v.] Farrell, 150 A.3d
[87, 97-98 (Pa.Super. 2020)] (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).

The privilege applies not only to psychiatrists and psychologists,
but to any member of a patient's treatment team. Id. at 100,
quoting Commonwealth v. Simmons, 719 A.2d 336, 343 (Pa.
Super. 1998) (“[A]ny oral communication by [patient] in private
to any member of the treatment team and used by the team for
the purpose of psychotherapeutic evaluation is privileged.
Additionally, any reference to such a communication in [the
facility's] files is privileged as well.”) (emphasis in original).

Commonwealth v. Segarra, 228 A.3d 943, 953–54 (Pa.Super. 2020). In

Segarra, this Court held that the trial court erred in ordering a child advocate

to review the minor victim’s mental health records, which were protected by

both the Section 5944 privilege as well as the statutory set forth in the Mental

Health Procedures Act (MHPA), 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7116.

In his appellate brief, Appellant offers no argument to challenge the trial

court’s determination that A.S.’s mental health records were protected from

discovery through the Section 5944 privilege. We thus find the trial court did

not err in denying Appellant’s motion to compel disclosure of such records.

Lastly, Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in imposing

an aggregate sentence of 21-42 years’ imprisonment, when several of the

individual sentences were imposed in the upper end of the aggravated range

or exceeding the aggravated range. Appellant argues that the trial court erred

in imposing these aggravated range sentences consecutively without

adequately providing a basis for such departures. Appellant also contends that

the trial court solely considered the gravity of his offenses and ignored other

sentencing factors.

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In reviewing such claims, we are mindful that:

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right. Prior to reaching the
merits of a discretionary sentencing issue[, w]e conduct a four-
part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a
timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether
the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3)
whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 489 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(quotation marks, some citations, and emphasis omitted).

As noted above, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion and

notice of appeal. Appellant has also included a Rule 2119 statement in his

appellate brief to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We proceed to determine

whether Appellant raised a substantial question as to the appropriateness of

the sentence under the Sentencing Code.

In doing so, we note that our Court must evaluate on a case-to-case

basis on whether a sentencing claim raises a substantial question for review.

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010). “A

substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable

argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Id. (citations

omitted).

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This Court has held that “an allegation that the court failed to state

adequate reasons on the record for imposing an aggravated-range sentence

… raises a substantial question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Booze,

953 A.2d 1263, 1278 (Pa.Super. 2008). In addition, an allegation that the

sentencing court focused exclusively on the seriousness of the crime raises a

substantial question for review on appeal.” Com. v. Lewis, 45 A.3d 405, 411

(Pa.Super. 2012).

However, given that the Sentencing Code gives a trial court discretion

to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences, a challenge to a trial court’s

decision to impose consecutive sentences does not ordinarily raise a

substantial question. Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338–39

(Pa.Super. 2015); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a). As such,

the imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences
will present a substantial question in only “the most extreme
circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly
harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of
imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 372
(Pa. Super. 2012)[(en banc)]. [An appellant] may raise a
substantial question where [s]he receives consecutive sentences
within the guideline ranges if the case involves circumstances
where the application of the guidelines would be clearly
unreasonable, resulting in an excessive sentence; however, a bald
claim of excessiveness due to the consecutive nature of a
sentence will not raise a substantial question. Commonwealth
v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2013).

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338–39 (Pa.Super. 2015)

(citation and quotation omitted).

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Even assuming arguendo that Appellant adequately raised a substantial

question for our review, we find that Appellant is not entitled to relief in

challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Our standard of review

for a sentencing claim is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 536 (Pa.Super. 2023) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 592-93 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted)).

The Sentencing Code requires a sentencing court to “follow the general

principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is

consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721. “The balancing

of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the sentencing court.”

Commonwealth v. Miller, 275 A.3d 530, 535 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation

omitted).

In imposing sentence, a sentencing court must review the nature and

circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant,

the sentencing court’s observations of the defendant (including any

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presentence investigation), the findings upon which the sentence was based,

and the sentencing guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d). “[W]hen a court

possesses a pre-sentence report, it is presumed the court “was aware of and

weighed all relevant information contained [in the report] along with any

mitigating sentencing factors.” Commonwealth v. Velez, 273 A.3d 6, 10

(Pa.Super. 2022).

Although a trial court is required to consider the sentencing guidelines

when imposing sentence,

the sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature – they are
not mandatory. A court may therefore use its discretion and
sentence defendants outside the guidelines, as long as the
sentence does not exceed the maximum sentence allowed by
statute. When a court deviates from the sentencing guidelines, it
must state the reasons for doing so on the record. This Court may
vacate a sentence if it finds the “sentencing court sentenced
outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is
unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3).

Velez, 273 A.3d at 10 (some citations omitted). See Moury, 992 A.2d at 171

(“Although Pennsylvania's system stands for individualized sentencing, the

court is not required to impose the ‘minimum possible’ confinement”).

The Commonwealth established that Appellant used his position of

influence as a wrestling coach to sexually assault two minor victims, who were

students entrusted to his care and tutelage. Appellant took advantage of his

access to the junior high athletic facilities to isolate and molest the two boys

within the confines of their own school. Appellant further threatened to harm

the victims and their families if they revealed his abuse.

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In imposing Appellant’s sentences, the trial court reviewed Appellant’s

pre-sentence investigation report and permitted multiple witnesses to give

victim impact statements or to testify on behalf of the defense at Appellant’s

sentencing hearing. The trial court expressly indicated that it had considered

the sentencing factors including Appellant’s rehabilitative needs along with the

gravity of the offense, the impact of Appellant’s actions on the lives of the

young victims’ and the community as a whole, and the protection of the public.

The trial judge also stated that he had “strongly considered” the sentencing

guidelines in this case, noting that he had been a panel member that was

responsible for promulgating the sentencing guidelines.

Nevertheless, the trial court expressly acknowledged that it had chosen

to deviate from the sentencing guidelines and impose individual sentences

even beyond the aggravated range on some counts as the sentencing

guidelines did not adequately address the gravity of the offenses and the

impact of Appellant’s crimes on his young victims.

While the trial court shared that Appellant’s lack of remorse was a major

factor in its decision, the trial court emphasized that the most compelling

factor was the “permanent destruction of the victims’ lives” that had been

“shattered” when Appellant “stole their childhood[], extinguished the light of

their youth and their innocence to which every child is entitled.” Order,

1/6/22, at 2.

Our review of the record in this case demonstrates that the trial court

reasonably deviated from the guideline ranges and acted within its discretion

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in running the sentences consecutively. See Commonwealth v. Clary, 226

A.3d 571, 581 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“[D]efendants convicted of multiple offenses

are not entitled to a ‘volume discount’ on their aggregate sentence”).

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion

in imposing Appellant’s sentence.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

11/9/2023

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