SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
Leander Williams v. New Jersey State Parole Board (A-26-22) (087613)
Argued April 24, 2023 -- Decided August 3, 2023
FASCIALE, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the legal question is whether the New Jersey State Parole
Board may impose a condition that mandates enrollment at a residential treatment
program (RTP) for adult inmates who are entitled to administrative parole release
under the Earn Your Way Out Act (EYWO Act), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55b to .55f.
Leander Williams pled guilty to non-violent third- and fourth-degree drug
offenses. His primary parole eligibility date was approximately eight months after
the EYWO Act became effective. During his prison sentence, Williams successfully
completed multiple alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs, including an 87-day
Alcoholics Anonymous program and a residential program in the Albert M. “Bo”
Robinson Assessment and Treatment Center (Bo Robinson) for 187 days. After the
Bo Robinson program and while remaining in the custody of the Department of
Corrections, Williams resided at the Harbor Residential Community Release
Program for 90 days for further rehabilitation.
Approximately one month before his primary parole eligibility date, a panel
of the Parole Board certified that Williams met the “criteria for administrative parole
release” under the EYWO Act, which entitled him to automatic administrative parole
release. The panel imposed 21 general parole conditions and the “special” condition
that Williams participate in an RTP for a minimum term of 180 days. Williams
administratively appealed to the Parole Board, arguing that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59
precluded the panel from requiring an RTP as a condition of his administrative
parole release under the EYWO Act. The panel upheld the imposition of residential
treatment but recommended that the Board reduce his mandated “term” of 180 days
to 90 days.
The Parole Board issued its final agency decision and upheld the requirement
that Williams reside at the RTP, determining that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a)
authorized the panel to impose an RTP and that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d) was
“inapplicable.” Williams appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the Parole
Board’s determination. The Court granted certification. 252 N.J. 481 (2023).
1
HELD: The Parole Board cannot mandate participation in an RTP for inmates
administratively paroled under the EYWO Act. Although N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59
generally authorizes the Parole Board to impose parole conditions on adult inmates
who have been administratively released under the EYWO Act, an RTP is not among
the conditions that can be imposed in that setting.
1. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) details the process for release under the Parole Act.
Under that provision, the Parole Board retains substantial discretion to deny parole if
it finds the State makes a showing of lack of cooperation or a reasonable expectation
of a future violation of parole conditions imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59.
The process governing release under the EYWO Act, which took effect on February
1, 2021, is different. “Administrative parole release” means the release of an adult
inmate who has met the criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(a). In this
streamlined parole process, parole-eligible inmates who satisfy the criteria must
automatically be released by the Board. According to a press release, the EYWO
Act “place[s] a greater focus on reentry[,] allowing us to reduce recidivism and
improve individuals[’] ability to integrate back into their communities.” Like the
Parole Act release provision, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b) authorizes the imposition of
parole conditions via reference to the entirety of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59. (pp. 14-17)
2. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59, which governs the imposition of parole conditions, has
multiple subsections. Subsection (b)(1)(a) lists various mandatory and discretionary
parole conditions. The Parole Board relies on the part of subsection (b)(1)(a)
devoted to discretionary conditions as its sole authority to impose an RTP on
Williams. That part is a non-exhaustive list stating that the Board member or panel
certifying release “may impose any other specific conditions of parole deemed
reasonable in order to reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal or delinquent
behavior, including a requirement that the parolee comply with the Internet access
conditions,” and “[s]uch special conditions may include, among other things, a
requirement that the parolee make full or partial restitution”; “that the parolee have
no contact with the victim”; and “that the person shall not own or possess an animal
for an unlawful purpose or to interfere in the performance of duties by a parole
officer.” Although RTPs are not among the conditions mentioned in subsection
(b)(1)(a) of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59, they are directly addressed in subsection (d) of
that statute, which provides that the Board “may parole an inmate to any residential
facility funded in whole or in part by the State if the inmate would not otherwise be
released pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53] without such placement.” (pp. 17-20)
3. The Parole Board and Appellate Division concluded that the language “include,
among other things,” in (b)(1)(a) should be read expansively to authorize the
requirement that Williams reside at the RTP. In J.K. v. State Parole Board, the
Court interpreted “include, among other things” to be terms of enlargement. 247
N.J. 120, 131-32 (2021). But that enlargement cannot be understood as infinite in
2
scope. When specific words follow more general words in a statutory enumeration,
courts can consider what additional items might also be included by asking whether
those items are similar to those enumerated. An RTP is not like the class of specific
conditions expressed in (b)(1)(a). In an RTP, one’s liberty is significantly more
curtailed than being unable to access certain internet websites, being prohibited from
having contact with a specific person, or being barred from possessing an animal.
And N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d) authorizes the imposition of an RTP as a parole
condition “if the inmate would not otherwise be released pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.53] without such placement.” Reading the statutes together, to impose an RTP
for inmates who are ineligible under the EYWO Act, the Parole Board would
generally have to show: (1) under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a), that “there is a
reasonable expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of parole” pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59; (2) under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a), that an RTP is
“deemed reasonable in order to reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal or
delinquent behavior”; and (3) under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d), that “the inmate would
not otherwise be released [under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53] without such placement.” If
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d) was “inapplicable” and “irrelevant,” as suggested by the
Parole Board, then it would be easier to impose mandatory “terms” of residential
treatment on low-level offenders who qualify for automatic release under the EYWO
Act than it is for the Parole Board to impose the same residence “terms” for adult
inmates convicted of more serious offenses who are not eligible for administrative
parole. That would be illogical. (pp. 20-27)
4. It is true that the Legislature expressed concern about recidivism and recognized
a need to facilitate reentry in enacting the EYWO Act. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 30:1B-
6.10(a). At the same time, however, the Legislature expressly contemplated that
residential treatment could be completed during incarceration. Upon completion of
the programming and satisfaction of the additional requirements set forth in N.J.S.A.
30:4-123.55d, the EYWO Act contemplates that adult inmates earn their way out --
subject, of course, to sanctions for violation of parole conditions. And the
Legislature has not granted leave to impose an RTP on those inmates who
successfully earned their way out through that Act. Williams has fully satisfied and
complied with the legislatively imposed process for his release, and his continued
outpatient rehabilitation can be and has been prescribed by the Board. But the
Board’s prescriptions must remain within the limits imposed by the Legislature,
which do not include an RTP. It is now time for Williams’ “successful integration
as a productive, law-abiding citizen.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55c. (pp. 27-30)
REVERSED and REMANDED to the Parole Board.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, PIERRE-
LOUIS, and WAINER APTER; and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily
assigned) join in JUSTICE FASCIALE’s opinion.
3
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-26 September Term 2022
087613
Leander Williams,
Appellant-Appellant,
v.
New Jersey State Parole Board,
Respondent-Respondent.
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division .
Argued Decided
April 24, 2023 August 3, 2023
John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued
the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; John P. Flynn, on the brief).
Stephanie Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel and on the briefs, and Christopher C.
Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs).
Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation,
attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on
the brief).
1
Katherine Beilin argued the cause for amicus curiae
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey
(Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Katherine
Beilin and CJ Griffin, on the brief).
JUSTICE FASCIALE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, the legal question is whether the New Jersey State Parole
Board may impose a condition that mandates enrollment at a residential
treatment program (RTP) for adult inmates who are entitled to administrative
parole release under the Earn Your Way Out Act (EYWO Act), N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.55b to .55f.
The Parole Board found that it had such authority under N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.59(b)(1)(a) and required that Leander Williams successfully complete a
minimum term of 180 days at an RTP upon his parole release. Williams
argues that the Parole Board’s reliance on N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a) is
misplaced. He maintains that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d) precludes requiring
participation in an RTP and that the Parole Board failed to correctly read
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 in its entirety. Williams also contends that, by requiring
him to reside at an RTP for a minimum of 180 days after he earned his way out
of prison, the Parole Board failed to differentiate between automatic
administrative parole release under the EYWO Act and parole in the normal
course under the Parole Act of 1979, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to .76. The
2
Appellate Division agreed with the Parole Board that N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.59(b)(1)(a) authorized an RTP as a condition of release under the EYWO
Act.
We hold that the Parole Board cannot mandate participation in an RTP
for inmates administratively paroled under the EYWO Act. Our holding
harmonizes the processes for release established by the EYWO Act and the
Parole Act with N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59, which permits the Parole Board to
impose conditions for inmates released on parole under both Acts. Reading
those provisions together, we conclude that although N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59
generally authorizes the Parole Board to impose parole conditions on adult
inmates who have been administratively released under the EYWO Act, an
RTP is not among the conditions that can be imposed in that setting.
We therefore reverse.
I.
A.
Williams has struggled with substance abuse for years. The appellate
court noted that he has a long drug-related criminal history. In this case,
police charged him with non-violent third- and fourth-degree drug offenses.
Williams then pled guilty to those charges and received an aggregate eight-
year prison term with four years of parole ineligibility in accordance with his
3
negotiated plea agreement. His primary parole eligibility date was October 21,
2021, which was approximately eight months after the EYWO Act became
effective.
During the prison sentence, Williams successfully completed multiple
alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs while in the custody of the New
Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC). As an inmate convicted of low-level
drug offenses who did not commit any prohibited acts or serious disciplinary
infractions while imprisoned, Williams not only addressed his longstanding
substance abuse problem, but also focused on re-entry into society. Williams
therefore participated in meaningful and relevant rehabilitation programs
before reaching his primary parole eligibility date.
For example, he successfully completed an 87-day Alcoholics
Anonymous (A.A.) program. Then, while under the custody of the DOC,
Williams resided in the Albert M. “Bo” Robinson Assessment and Treatment
Center (Bo Robinson) for 187 days. Bo Robinson’s Clinical Director
confirmed in writing that Williams attended his weekly caseload group
sessions, his biweekly individual counseling sessions, and his Relapse
Prevention specialty group session. After Williams completed the Bo
Robinson program, the DOC transferred him to the Harbor Residential
Community Release Program (Harbor House) for further rehabilitation.
4
While remaining in the DOC’s custody, he resided at the Harbor House
for 90 days. According to its program counselor, the Harbor House is a
“residential treatment and community release program” that “provides
treatment and training to individuals [like Williams] who are preparing to re -
enter society.” Counseling at the Harbor House “focuses on changing criminal
and addictive behaviors.” At the Harbor House, residents are subjected to
random drug testing.
B.
Approximately one month before his primary parole eligibility date, a
panel of the Parole Board reviewed Williams’ case to determine whether he
was eligible for parole under the EYWO Act. The panel certified that he met
the “criteria for administrative parole release.” That determination entitled
him to automatic administrative parole release under the Act.
At the same time, the panel established conditions for release. In
accordance with N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a), the panel imposed twenty-one
general parole conditions, which, pursuant to that subsection, were enumerated
in Williams’ Certificate of Administrative Release. Williams agreed to abide
by those conditions, including, for example, obeying all laws; refraining from
the purchase, use, possession, distribution, or administration of any narcotic
drug or controlled dangerous substance; consenting to legal law enforcement
5
searches for contraband; and submitting to drug and alcohol testing as directed
by his parole officer.
Beyond the twenty-one general parole conditions, the panel also imposed
the “special” condition that Williams participate in an RTP for a minimum
term of 180 days. It specifically required that Williams successfully complete
the Re-Entry Substance Abuse Program (RESAP) at Kintock-Newark. The
panel also mandated that Williams comply with an aftercare discharge
treatment plan “as developed by KINTOCK-NEWARK.” It imposed
participation in an RTP even though Williams had earned his way out of
prison, in part, by successfully completing rehabilitation programs while
serving his aggregate prison sentence.
C.
In October 2021, Williams administratively appealed to the Parole Board
and objected to the imposition of the RTP condition. Williams’ counsel
argued that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 precluded the panel from requiring an RTP as
a condition of his administrative parole release under the EYWO Act because,
although parolees under the EYWO Act are supervised and subject to various
conditions under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59, mandatory participation in an RTP
cannot be one of them. He differentiated the legislatively streamlined, yet
6
rigorous parole process available under the EYWO Act and the general parole
process for adult inmates under the Parole Act.
In November 2021, the panel of the Parole Board considered Williams’
administrative appeal. On the one hand, it recognized that he had a
“substantial criminal history involving drugs.” On the other hand, it
acknowledged that Williams had participated in relevant rehabilitation
programs while serving his sentence. Although the panel upheld the
imposition of residential treatment, it recommended that the Board reduce his
mandated “term” of 180 days at Kintock-Newark be reduced to a “term of 90
to 180 days.”
Williams’ counsel wrote to the Parole Board, informed it that the panel
rejected his administrative appeal, and requested that the Parole Board issue a
final decision. He requested that the Parole Board address his argument that ,
under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d), the panel cannot parole Williams to an RTP.
D.
In December 2021, the Parole Board issued its final agency decision and
upheld the requirement that Williams reside at the RTP. It acknowledged that
Williams was entitled to administrative parole release under the EYWO Act.
The Parole Board noted that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b) authorizes a panel of the
Parole Board to subject inmates paroled administratively to “provisions and
7
conditions” established in accordance with N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59. But instead
of relying on N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d), it determined that N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.59(b)(1)(a) authorized the panel to impose participation in an RTP. The
Parole Board concluded that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d) was “inapplicable.” It is
unclear whether the Parole Board accepted the recommendation that Williams’
“term” at the RTP be reduced from a minimum of 180 days to a “term of 90 to
180 days.”
E.
Williams appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the Parole
Board’s determination. The Appellate Division acknowledged that for adult
inmates released under the EYWO Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b) permits a
panel of the Parole Board to establish parole conditions in accordance with
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59. Without expressly analyzing subsection N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.59(d), which is the only part of that statute that explicitly mentions
“residential facility,” the appellate court agreed substantially with the Parole
Board that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a) authorized participation in an RTP as
a condition for parole of adult inmates under the EYWO Act. Relying on this
Court’s decision in J.K. v. State Parole Board, 247 N.J. 120, 131-32 (2021),
the Appellate Division reasoned that the list of parole conditions enumerated
8
in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a), which did not mention “residential facility,”
should be read expansively to authorize the imposition of residential treatment.
We granted Williams’ petition for certification. 252 N.J. 481 (2023).
We also granted motions by the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
(ACLU) and Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL)
to appear as amici curiae.
II.
On appeal, Williams maintains that we must harmonize the relevant
statutes. He asserts that under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b), the EYWO Act
permits a panel of the Parole Board to establish parole conditions for
administratively released adult inmates in accordance with N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.59. But he contends the Parole Board mistakenly relies only on subsection
(b)(1)(a) of that statute, and that it erroneously determined that subsection (d)
is “inapplicable.” Williams urges us to read the entirety of N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.59, especially subsection (d), which he maintains cannot permit mandated
participation in an RTP because he was “otherwise [automatically] released”
under the EYWO Act. Williams emphasizes that the structure and purpose of
the EYWO Act established a streamlined parole process for inmates like him
who are low-level offenders, behaved well in prison, and completed relevant
and rigorous rehabilitative programs while serving their prison terms. He
9
contends that additional “confinement” to an RTP for inmates who have earned
their way out and are therefore entitled to release under the EYWO Act
amounts to a strained misapplication of the relevant statutes.
The ACLU and ACDL agree with Williams’ position that the EYWO
Act streamlined the parole process for, in general, (1) low-level offenders; (2)
who have been infraction-free; and (3) who have completed relevant
rehabilitation programs while imprisoned. If eligible under the EYWO Act,
amici argue, those inmates are automatically entitled to parole release, noting
that the EYWO Act incentivizes eligible adult inmates to work hard during
imprisonment to prepare for reentry into society. The ACLU and ACDL
contend that a transfer from prison to an RTP, which is similar to
“confinement,” does not constitute release and thus frustrates the EYWO Act’s
structure and purpose. They say, “Out means out.” 1
The Parole Board counters that “the term ‘administrative parole release’
as it is defined in [the] EYWO Act refers only to the legislatively created
1
The ACLU and ACDL assert due process arguments not raised by the
parties. Although we do not reach those contentions, see Liberty Ins. Corp. v.
Techdan, LLC, 253 N.J. 87, 114 n.6 (2023), we note that our conclusion that
mandated participation in an RTP is unauthorized for EYWO Act parolees
renders amici’s additional assertions moot. See State in Int. of A.R., 234 N.J.
82, 97 (2018) (“We have often stated, ‘[c]ourts should not reach a
constitutional question unless its resolution is imperative to the disposition of
litigation.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v.
County of Morris, 186 N.J. 78, 80 (2006))).
10
process for releasing eligible persons through the parole system without a
formal parole consideration hearing; it introduces no changes to what parole
ultimately entails.” The Board maintains that it therefore has authority under
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a) to require adult inmates paroled under the
EYWO Act to complete residential treatment because the list of parole
conditions that the Board may impose under that section is not exhaustive. In
the Board’s view, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d) serves solely as a grant of
permission to parole inmates who would not otherwise be released under the
Parole Act to an RTP; the section is “inapplicable” and “irrelevant” to the
conditions that may be imposed on inmates who earn release under the EYWO
Act.
In response to amici’s emphasis on N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(a)(3), a
provision that sets completion of any relevant rehabilitation programs at the
correctional facility as a condition for automatic release under the EYWO Act,
the Board contends that the condition “does not preclude the Board from
determining that additional programming is necessary to ensure that any
parolee successfully completes the parole period.” The Board also stresses
that “[t]here are significant differences in the experiences of parolees and
incarcerated persons at [RTPs].”
11
III.
This appeal requires us to answer the legal question of whether, under
the relevant statutes, the Parole Board may impose a special condition
mandating participation at an RTP for adult inmates who are entitled to
administrative parole release under the EYWO Act. Although we ordinarily
employ a deferential standard when reviewing a Parole Board administrative
determination in the specialized area of parole supervision, J.I. v. State Parole
Bd., 228 N.J. 204, 230 (2017), in matters of statutory interpretation -- like here
-- our review is de novo, Verry v. Franklin Fire Dist. No. 1, 230 N.J. 285, 294
(2017).
Discerning “the Legislature’s intent is the paramount goal when
interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the
statutory language.” DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). We
“ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance .” Ibid.
“[I]f there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one
plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, ‘including
legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction.’”
Id. at 492-93 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75
(2004)).
12
A statute’s words and phrases should “be read and [interpreted] with
their context.” State v. Lopez-Carrera, 245 N.J. 596, 613 (2021) (quoting
N.J.S.A. 1:1-1). We do not read words in isolation; instead, we consider
“them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation
as a whole.” Ibid. (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).
Our approach to interpretation of related statutes is well-settled. When
more than one statute deals with the same subject -- like here -- we interpret
them together “in pari materia . . . as a unitary and harmonious whole.” Jones
v. Morey’s Pier, Inc., 230 N.J. 142, 164 (2017) (quoting St. Peter’s Univ.
Hosp. v. Lacy, 185 N.J. 1, 14-15 (2005)); see also State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6,
11 (2023) (harmonizing the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance,
and Marketplace Modernization Act with pretrial intervention and
expungement statutes). In addition to referencing the same subjects , N.J.S.A.
30:4-123.53(a) (releasing adult inmates on parole) and N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59
(granting the Board statutory authority for imposing conditions of release and
parole supervision) cross-reference one another.
Moreover, whole-act interpretation implicates “other rules of statutory
interpretation.” Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 2A Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 46:5, at 236-37 (7th ed. 2022). “A statute or
provision relating to a specific subject may be understood as an exception to a
13
statute or provision relating to a general subject.” Id. at 238. Thus, “[w]here
one section of an act deals with a subject in general terms [like 59(b)(1)(a)]
and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way [like
59(d)], the two always should be harmonized.” 2A Sutherland § 47:11, at 336.
A.
The key related provisions here are the statutes that govern release under
the Parole Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a), and the EYWO Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.55d, and the statute cross-referenced by both provisions as governing the
imposition of conditions upon parolees, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59.
We begin with the statutes that govern release under the Parole and
EYWO Acts. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) details the process for release under the
Parole Act. That statute provides that
[a]n adult inmate who is not eligible for administrative
parole release pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d]
shall be released on parole at the time of primary parole
eligibility, unless information supplied in the report
filed pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.54] or developed
or produced at a hearing held pursuant to section
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55] indicates by a preponderance of
the evidence that the inmate has failed to cooperate in
his or her own rehabilitation or that there is a reasonable
expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of
parole imposed pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59] if
released on parole at that time.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) (emphases added).]
14
Under the release provision of the Parole Act, the Parole Board thus retains
substantial discretion to deny parole if it finds the State makes a showing of
lack of cooperation or a reasonable expectation of a future violation of parole
conditions.
The process governing release under the EYWO Act, which went into
effect on February 1, 2021, is different. Under the EYWO Act, the Parole
Board does not have the discretion to deny parole that it otherwise has under
the Parole Act. Indeed, the EYWO Act facilitates meaningful opportunities for
adult inmates to earn their way out of prison, rather than being subject to the
normal parole process under the Parole Act.
“‘Administrative parole release’ means the release of an adult inmate
who has met the criteria” set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(a), and it “occurs
after a hearing officer reviews the pre[-]parole report and the inmate is
certified for release by an assigned member of the board panel.” N.J.S.A.
30:4-123.55c. Unlike parole under the Parole Act, a hearing is not required for
inmates who meet the criteria. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.22(b). In this streamlined
parole process, when a primary eligibility date approaches, a hearing officer
simply reviews the pre-parole report against objective criteria to determine
whether to recommend administrative parole release. Parole-eligible inmates
who satisfy the criteria must automatically be released by the Board .
15
Specifically, an adult inmate must be released administratively if
(1) the inmate has not been previously convicted of,
adjudicated delinquent for, or is currently serving a
sentence imposed for any crime enumerated in [any of
the cited statutes];
(2) the inmate has not committed any prohibited acts
required to be reported to the prosecutor pursuant to
regulations promulgated by the commissioner during
the current period of incarceration, and has not
committed any serious disciplinary infraction,
designated in regulations promulgated by the
commissioner as a prohibited act that is considered to
be the most serious and results in the most severe
sanctions, within the previous two years;
(3) the inmate has completed relevant rehabilitation
programs, as determined by the Department of
Corrections and State Parole Board, available at the
correctional facility or applied for but was unable to
complete or was denied access to these programs due to
circumstances beyond the inmate’s control including,
but not limited to, capacity limitations or exclusionary
policies of these programs; and
(4) crime victims have received notification as
required by law.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(a).]
A press release accompanying the rollout of the EYWO Act noted
sponsors’ views that the Act “place[s] a greater focus on reentry[,] allowing us
to reduce recidivism and improve individuals[’] ability to integrate back into
their communities.” Press Release: On Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, Governor
16
Murphy Signs Criminal Justice Reform Legislation (Jan. 20, 2020),
https://www.nj.gov/governor/news/news/562020/approved/20200120a.shtml.
Co-sponsors of the EYWO Act characterized the legislative parole reforms as
creating “a pathway to reentry and providing access to needed resources” for
parolees, ibid., and declared that “[c]omprehensive and effective rehabilitation
programs will restore hope, dignity, and provide former inmates the second
chance they deserve to do better once released,” ibid.
Pursuant to the statute’s next subsection, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b), an
adult inmate administratively released on parole under the EYWO Act “shall,
during the term of parole supervision, remain in the legal custody of the
Commissioner of Corrections” and shall “be supervised by the Division of
Parole of the State Parole Board.” Such individuals are “subject to the
provisions and conditions established by the appropriate board panel in
accordance with the procedures and standards set forth in [N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.59].” Ibid. Thus, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b) authorizes parole conditions
(some mandatory and some discretionary) through reference to the entirety of
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59, just like N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a), which prescribes the
mechanism for release under the Parole Act.
17
B.
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59, which governs the imposition of parole conditions
by the Board, has multiple subsections. Two of them are relevant to this
appeal.
Subsection (b)(1)(a) enumerates various mandatory and discretionary
parole conditions. It also grants broader authority to set parole conditions,
because a panel of the Parole Board can establish conditions that “include,
among other things,” the enumerated conditions. Subsection (b)(1)(a) requires
each parolee to abide by conditions of parole established by the appropriate
panel of the Parole Board and requires those conditions to be enumerated in
writing in an inmate’s certificate of parole. Indeed, the panel enumerated
those conditions in writing when it administratively released Williams under
the EYWO Act.
The first part of subsection (b)(1)(a) addresses conditions that the panel
of the Parole Board “shall” impose. This part of subsection (b)(1)(a) states in
pertinent part that such conditions
shall include, among other things, a requirement that
the parolee conduct himself in society in compliance
with all laws and refrain from committing any crime, a
requirement that the parolee will not own or possess
any firearm . . . , a requirement that the parolee refrain
from the unlawful use, or the possession or distribution
of a controlled dangerous substance, controlled
substance analog or imitation controlled dangerous
18
substance . . . , a requirement that the parolee obtain
permission from his parole officer for any change in his
residence, and a requirement that the parolee report at
reasonable intervals to an assigned parole officer.
[(emphases added).]
Notably, residential treatment is not listed as a requirement.
The second part of subsection (b)(1)(a) addresses “other specific
conditions” that the panel of the Parole Board “may” impose. The Parole
Board relies on this part of subsection (b)(1)(a) as its sole authority to impose
an RTP on Williams. This part of (b)(1)(a) -- also a non-exhaustive list that
“include[s], among other things,” enumerated special conditions -- provides in
part that
based on prior history of the parolee . . . , the member
or board panel certifying parole release pursuant to
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55] may impose any other specific
conditions of parole deemed reasonable in order to
reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal or
delinquent behavior, including a requirement that the
parolee comply with the Internet access conditions set
forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. Such special
conditions may include, among other things, a
requirement that the parolee make full or partial
restitution, the amount of which restitution shall be set
by the sentencing court upon request of the board. In
addition, the member or board panel certifying parole
release may, giving due regard to a victim’s request,
impose a special condition that the parolee have no
contact with the victim, which special condition may
include, but need not be limited to, restraining the
parolee from entering the victim’s residence, place of
employment, business or school, and from harassing or
19
stalking the victim or victim’s relatives in any way.
Further, the member, board panel or board certifying
parole release may impose a special condition that the
person shall not own or possess an animal for an
unlawful purpose or to interfere in the performance of
duties by a parole officer.
[(emphases added).]
Once again, participation in an RTP is not listed.
Although RTPs are not among the parole conditions expressly mentioned
in subsection (b)(1)(a) of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59, they are directly addressed in
subsection (d) of that statute, which provides, in pertinent part, that the Board
“may parole an inmate to any residential facility funded in whole or in part by
the State if the inmate would not otherwise be released pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
30:4-123.53] without such placement.” (emphases added).
C.
Against the backdrop of the relevant statutes, the question at the heart of
this appeal turns on the relationship between 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a) and (d).
The Board argues that (d) extends its authority under (b)(1)(a) to release to
RTPs certain inmates who would otherwise have to remain incarcerated at a
correctional facility. Williams and amici contend that (d) is instead the sole
provision granting permission to impose a post-parole RTP, which cannot be
imposed under (b)(1)(a), such that RTPs can be imposed only upon those
inmates specified in (d).
20
The release provisions of both the Parole Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a),
and the EYWO Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b), cross-reference the entirety of
30:4-123.59 and therefore do not provide an answer. Nor do subsections
(b)(1)(a) and (d) of 30:4-123.59 provide explicit guidance. Subsection (d)
does not refer to the imposition of an RTP as a “condition of parole” or
otherwise address section (b)(1)(a); and subsection (b)(1)(a) does not expressly
include RTPs among, or exclude them from, the conditions of parole listed in
that section. Moreover, “[a] statutory subsection may not be considered in a
vacuum, but must be considered in reference to the statute as a whole and in
reference to statutes dealing with the same general subject matter.” 2A
Sutherland § 46:5, at 225-26; see also Ryan v. Renny, 203 N.J. 37, 58 (2010).
The Parole Board and Appellate Division concluded, relying on J.K.,
that the language “include, among other things,” in (b)(1)(a) should be read
expansively to authorize the requirement that Williams reside at the RTP for a
minimum “term” of 180 days upon release on parole under the EYWO Act. In
J.K., this Court interpreted “include, among other things” to be terms of
enlargement, not limitation, regarding the listed conditions. 247 N.J. at 131.
The definition of “include” warranted that interpretation. See 2A Sutherland §
47:7, at 310 (“The word ‘includes’ is usually a term of enlargement, and not of
limitation, and conveys the conclusion that there are other items includable,
21
though not specifically enumerated.”); Black’s Law Dictionary 912 (11th ed.
2019) (“The participle including typically indicates a partial list.”); New
Oxford American Dictionary 879 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that the use of
“including or includes implies that there is more than what is listed”).
But although the phrase “include, among other things,” is a term of
enlargement, that enlargement cannot be understood as infinite in scope. At
minimum, the Constitution would serve as a final backstop for the imposition
of parole conditions, and our conclusion in J.K. that the term indicates the
Legislature “did not intend to specify every permissible condition of parole
that the Board may impose” implicitly makes clear that not every imaginable
condition would be “permissible.” See 247 N.J. at 131 (emphasis added).
Subsection (b)(1)(a) itself, moreover, limits the imposition of “any other
specific conditions” by the Board to those “deemed reasonable in order to
reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal or delinquent behavior.”
Although the Appellate Division here relied on J.K. to determine that the
Board could impose conditions beyond those explicitly listed, its analysis
overlooks a key distinction: in J.K., “[n]o statutory impediment emerge[d]
from the Parole Act that denie[d] the Board the ability to permit international
relocation of a . . . parolee . . . who enjoys dual citizenship with another
country, while maintaining Board supervision.” Id. at 132.
22
Traditional principles of statutory interpretation teach that limits can be
found in the examples explicitly provided in each list, as well as in the context
in which the list appears. In interpreting non-exhaustive lists within a
statutory scheme, courts may apply a canon of statutory interpretation known
as ejusdem generis, which literally means “of the same kind.” 2A Sutherland
§ 47:17, at 364-86; see, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 317 (2010)
(determining that 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)’s definition of “foreign state” does not
encompass individual officials “because the types of defendants listed are all
entities,” and “[a] word may be known by the company it keeps.”).
Ordinarily, the doctrine instructs that, “where general words follow
specific words in an enumeration describing a statute’s legal subject, the
general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” 2A Sutherland § 47:17,
at 364-68 (footnotes omitted). But the doctrine also applies to specific words
or phrases following general ones. Id. at 368-70; see also Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders v. State, 159 N.J. 565, 576 (1999) (“Under the ejusdem generis
principle of statutory construction, when specific words follow more general
words in a statutory enumeration, we can consider what additional items might
also be included by asking whether those items are similar to those
enumerated.”); People v. Arias, 195 P.3d 103, 109 (Cal. 2008) (explaining
23
that, “when a particular class of things modifies general words, those general
words are construed as applying only to things of the same nature or class as
those enumerated,” whether the specific terms follow the general terms used
“or vice versa”). The doctrine, in short, seeks to reconcile incompatibility
between specific and general words. 2A Sutherland § 47:17, at 381. The
relationship between the general and specific words guides “how much broader
the act’s application should be.” 2A Sutherland § 47:18, at 393.
Here, the general phrase of (b)(1)(a) that we consider is “to reduce the
likelihood of recurrence of criminal or delinquent behavior.” The specific
phrases that follow reference compliance with “[i]nternet access conditions,”
“full or partial restitution,” “no contact with the victim,” and not owning or
possessing an animal “for [an] unlawful purpose” or “interfer[ing] in the
performance of duties by a parole officer.” An RTP is not like the expressed
class of specific conditions. In an RTP, one’s liberty is significantly more
curtailed than being unable to access certain internet websites, being
prohibited from having contact with a specific person, or being barred from
possessing an animal. Here, Williams was prohibited from exercising his own
free will to leave the RTP. Instead, he was required to serve a minimum term
of 180 days at the facility. See State v. Smeen, 147 N.J. Super. 229, 233 (App.
Div. 1977) (“We regard custody as denoting an involuntary confinement in
24
either a penal or medical facility, and the critical aspect of involuntariness . . .
is . . . defendant’s not being at liberty by an exercise of his own will to choose
to leave that facility.”).
That brings us to the specific limitation embodied in N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.59(d), which provides in pertinent part, that “[t]he appropriate board panel
may parole an inmate to any residential facility funded in whole or in part by
the State if the inmate would not otherwise be released pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
30:4-123.53] without such placement.” (emphases added). Unlike the
category of inmates who are eligible for release under the EYWO Act, the
Parole Board’s release of an adult inmate under the Parole Act is discretionary.
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a). Thus, it can impose participation in an RTP for
inmates who are ineligible for administrative release under the EYWO Act.
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d); N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a). Along those lines, the
Parole Board admits that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d) places an additional hurdle
that authorizes it to “parole an inmate to a residential facility, rather than
denying parole completely, when it concludes that placement [of that inmate]
will tip the evidence in favor of a reasonable expectation that the inmate will
not violate conditions of parole if released.”
Reading the statutes together, to impose an RTP for inmates who are
ineligible under the EYWO Act, the Parole Board would generally have to
25
show: (1) under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a), that “there is a reasonable
expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of parole” pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59; (2) under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a), that an RTP is
“deemed reasonable in order to reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal
or delinquent behavior”; and (3) under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d), that “the
inmate would not otherwise be released [under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53] without
such placement.”
If N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d) was “inapplicable” and “irrelevant,” as
suggested by the Parole Board, then it would be easier to impose mandatory
“terms” of residential treatment on low-level offenders who qualify for
automatic release under the EYWO Act than it is for the Parole Board to
impose the same residence “terms” for adult inmates convicted of more serious
offenses who are not eligible for administrative parole. That would be
illogical. The fundamental differences between the streamlined automatic
administrative parole release and the process for release under the Parole Act
detailed above instead support the view that requiring parolee participation in
an RTP is precluded under the EYWO Act.
Unlike under the Parole Act, the EYWO Act applies solely to adult
inmates who have been convicted of low-level non-violent offenses, who have
behaved well while imprisoned, and who have completed relevant and rigorous
26
rehabilitation programs while serving their prison sentences. The Legislature
empowered this category of inmates to earn their way out of prison. Parole
release under the EYWO Act is automatic so long as objective criteria are
satisfied, and that release cannot be thwarted through imposition of an RTP.
D.
Finally, we consider the Parole Board’s policy-based argument that,
even though N.J.S.A. 30:4-123-55d(a)(3) requires, among its criteria, that an
inmate “complete[] relevant rehabilitation programs,” completing a
rehabilitation program “within a highly controlled prison environment does not
mean that a parolee will not continue to require programming to mitigate the
risk of recidivating.”
We note first that, in earning his way out, Williams not only participated
in A.A. while in prison, but he also received intense residential treatment
outside of prison -- while under the custody of the DOC -- at Bo Robinson and
the Harbor House. Thus, his rehabilitation plan included treatment outside
prison, not solely “within a highly controlled prison environment.”
Nevertheless, it is true that the Legislature expressed concern about
recidivism and recognized a need to facilitate reentry in enacting the EYWO
Act. See Press Release: On Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, Governor Murphy
Signs Criminal Justice Reform Legislation (EYWO co-sponsor opining that
27
“[i]t’s critical that we stop this woeful pattern [of recidivism] by making sure
that these men and women have the . . . resources they need . . . to be
productive members of society after leaving prison”).
N.J.S.A. 30:1B-6.10(a), for example, provides that the Commissioner of
the Department of Corrections and the Chairperson of the State Parole Board
“shall coordinate reentry preparation and other rehabilitative services for
inmates in all State correctional facilities pursuant to” the EYWO Act.
“Appropriate staff within the [DOC] and State Parole Board [are] responsible
for engaging with each inmate to develop and implement an individualized,
comprehensive reentry plan for services during the inmate’s incarceration.”
Ibid.
----
A reentry plan is a collaborative effort that occurs before a primary
parole eligibility date and can, like here, specifically focus on people who will
benefit from substance abuse treatment. The “plan may be refined and updated
during incarceration as needed, and shall include recommendations for
community-based services prior to the inmate’s actual return to the
community.” N.J.S.A. 30:1B-6.10(a). DOC and Parole Board staff determine
which “rehabilitative services shall be incorporated into a comprehensive
reentry plan in order to prepare each inmate for successful integration upon
release,” and the DOC establishes “guidelines, timelines, and procedures to
28
govern the institutional reentry plan process.” Ibid. Significant reentry
preparation and much-needed rehabilitation services while imprisoned are
therefore relevant to eligibility for administrative parole release.
At the same time, however, the Legislature expressly contemplated that
residential treatment could be completed during incarceration. A reentry
plan’s ultimate aim is “to prepare an inmate for successful integration as a
productive, law-abiding citizen upon release from incarceration.” N.J.S.A.
30:4-123.55c. When hearing officers certify that an inmate “completed
relevant rehabilitation programs,” as required by N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(a)(3),
it is reasonable to conclude that the inmate successfully completed those
programs. “Completed” means “to bring to an end and especially into a
perfected state.” Completed, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/complete (last visited July 3, 2023). Upon completion of the
programming and satisfaction of the additional requirements set forth in
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d, the EYWO Act contemplates that adult inmates earn
their way out -- subject, of course, to sanctions for violation of parole
conditions. And the Legislature has not granted leave to impose an RTP on
those inmates who successfully earned their way out through that Act, like
Williams.
29
Given his rehabilitative success, a Parole Board panel approved
Williams’ plan to live with his wife upon release, and a Parole Board evaluator
recommended that Williams obtain “outpatient substance abuse counseling[,]
[m]andatory random drug testing, [and] [r]egular 12-step program
participation.” Those “specific conditions” are otherwise enumerated in his
Certificate of Administrative Parole Release, and he agreed to abide by them.
In sum, Williams has fully satisfied and complied with the legislatively
imposed process for his release, and his continued outpatient rehabilitation can
be and has been prescribed by the Board. But the Board’s prescriptions must
remain within the limits imposed by the Legislature, which do not include an
RTP. It is now time for Williams’ “successful integration as a productive,
law-abiding citizen.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55c.
IV.
For the reasons stated, we conclude the Parole Board is statutorily
precluded from mandating participation in an RTP for inmates administratively
paroled under the EYWO Act, including Williams.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the matter is
remanded to the Parole Board for any appropriate steps to implement this
decision.
30
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON,
PIERRE-LOUIS, and WAINER APTER; and JUDGE SABATINO
(temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE FASCIALE’s opinion.
31