RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2298-21
IN THE MATTER OF A.N.H.
___________________________
Submitted November 8, 2023 – Decided November 29, 2023
Before Judges Whipple, Mayer and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Petition No. 0210-XTR-
2021-1.
Louis P. Nappen, attorney for appellant A.N.H. (Evan
F. Nappen Attorney at Law, PC, attorneys; Louis P.
Nappen and Andrew G. Bitar, on the briefs).
Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent State of New Jersey (K. Charles Deutsch,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
A.N.H.1 appeals from a March 24, 2022 order granting the State's petition
for a Final Extreme Risk Protective Order (FERPO) entered under the Extreme
Risk Protective Order Act of 2018 (Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:58-20 to -32. We affirm.
We recite the facts from the testimony presented to the trial judge and the
judge's April 11, 2022 written amplification of reasons in support of her March
24, 2022 order.
In March 2020, A.N.H. applied for a firearms permit. In his application,
A.N.H. represented he was never confined or committed to a mental institution
or hospital for mental health treatment, nor treated or observed by a doctor or
psychiatrists for a mental health condition. Based on the information in his
application, A.N.H. received a firearms permit. In June 2020, A.N.H. bought a
handgun.
In August 2021, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF) contacted the Dumont Township Police Department (DTPD)
regarding suspicious messages posted by A.N.H. on an online messaging
platform and a social media platform. Based on the JTTF's intelligence, the
1
We use initials because "[a]ll records related to proceedings for [Final Extreme
Protective Orders] are confidential and may not be disclosed to anyone other
than the respondent . . . , except if good cause is found by the court to release
such records." Admin. Off. of the Cts., Administrative Directive #19-19,
Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders, (Aug. 12, 2019) (Guidelines).
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DTPD commenced a background investigation regarding A.N.H., which
revealed his purchase of the handgun and undisclosed mental health issues.
On August 18, 2021, the DTPD filed an ex parte petition for a Temporary
Extreme Risk Protective Order (TERPO) against A.N.H. The municipal court
judge for Dumont Township granted a TERPO. Thereafter, police officers with
the DTPD went to A.N.H.'s home and confiscated his handgun in accordance
with the TERPO. Later that same day, A.N.H. voluntarily went to the DTPD
and relinquished his Firearm Purchaser Identification Card (FPIC).
On March 22 and 24, 2022, a Superior Court judge conducted a plenary
hearing to determine whether to issue a FERPO. The judge granted the State's
petition for a FERPO on March 24, 2022. After A.N.H. appealed from that
order, the judge provided an April 11, 2022 written amplification of reasons.
During the hearing on the State's petition for a FERPO, the judge heard
testimony from Detective Lieutenant Luke Totten with the DTPD. The judge
also considered various police reports of incidents with A.N.H. and medical
records from A.N.H.'s stay at the New Bridge Medical Center in Bergen County
(formally known as Bergen Regional Medical Center). Additionally, the judge
heard testimony from Dr. Elliot L. Atkins, a licensed clinical psychologist.
Detective Lieutenant Totten testified regarding the DTPD's involvement
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with A.N.H. In March 2014, the DTPD responded to a situation at the local high
school involving a threat by A.N.H., who was then fifteen years old, to "throw
[a classmate] out the window." A year later, the DTPD responded to a reported
assault by A.N.H. on his father and his father's estranged wife. In May 2016,
the DTPD responded to a report that A.N.H. threatened his sister with a
"[s]amurai sword."
As a result of the May 2016 incident, while A.N.H. was still a minor, his
mother took him to New Bridge Medical Center for a psychological evaluation
and treatment.2 The attending physician at the hospital, Dr. Edward G. Hall,
diagnosed A.N.H. with impulse control disorder with unspecified depressive
disorder. Dr. Hall noted that, while A.N.H. exhibited limited insight, poor
judgment, and "[i]mpulsive aggressiveness," A.N.H. was "[i]ntelligent" and
displayed "no clear clinical evidence of a danger to self or others." However,
Dr. Hall further opined A.N.H. displayed superficial cooperation and provided
"guarded" and "short standard answers" to the doctor's questions.
2
A.N.H. claims he committed himself voluntarily. Because A.N.H. was a minor
at the time, he could not legally or voluntarily commit himself. A.N.H.'s mother
signed the hospital admission paperwork. According to the hospital admission
records, A.N.H. had a police escort upon arrival due to "extreme aggressivity
and assaultiveness demonstrated at home."
A-2298-21
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According to the testimony, A.N.H. "pressured" his mother to sign the
hospital's release form because A.N.H. was not legally authorized to sign release
forms for himself. Dr. Hall discharged A.N.H. three days after his admission to
the hospital and instructed A.N.H. to seek mental health treatment through a
specific treatment program. A.N.H. did not seek mental health treatment per
Dr. Hall's discharge instructions.
Two days after A.N.H.'s release from the hospital, the DTPD responded
to a report that A.N.H. brandished a knife at his fellow high school classmates.
In June 2018, the DTPD responded to a local restaurant regarding a
dispute between A.N.H. and his co-workers. According to the police report,
A.N.H. "grab[bed his boss's] ponytail and pulled him to the ground." A.N.H.
then retrieved a hammer from his vehicle and returned to the restaurant. The
boss declined to press charges against A.N.H.
Based on A.N.H.'s incidents involving the DTPD, and the information
provided by the JTTF, Detective Lieutenant Totten testified there was "good
cause to . . . pursue a TERPO." Additionally, the detective explained A.N.H.
omitted information related to his mental health history in his FPIC application.
The judge then heard testimony from Dr. Atkins, an expert in clinical and
forensic psychology, who testified on behalf of A.N.H. Dr. Atkins conducted a
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four-hour interview with A.N.H. and prepared a written report. Although Dr.
Atkins had the DTPD reports regarding incidents with A.N.H., the doctor did
not have A.N.H.'s hospital records at the time he rendered his report. Based on
his subsequent review of the hospital's medical records, Dr. Atkins testified
those records "reaffirm[ed]" his conclusions regarding A.N.H.
Dr. Atkins further testified A.N.H. was not a danger to himself or others.
The doctor discounted A.N.H.'s prior incidents with the police, attributing those
incidents to A.N.H.'s "immaturity and his extremely turbulent family situation."
Dr. Atkins had no information to determine whether A.N.H.'s hospitalization in
May 2016 was voluntary or involuntary. Additionally, Dr. Atkins was unaware
the hospital diagnosed A.N.H. with depressive disorder and impulse control
disorder. Despite lacking important information, Dr. Atkins opined A.N.H.
"never presented as a danger to himself or others," and "today . . . is neither
depressed nor impulsive . . . [he] has grown up and matured." However, Dr.
Atkins admitted there was a likelihood A.N.H. would experience depression in
the future based on his prior depression diagnosis.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge found the State proved "by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . [A.N.H.] poses a significant danger of bodily
injury to [him]self or others by possessing, owning, or receiving a firearm ." As
A-2298-21
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a result, the judge issued a FERPO.
The judge found Detective Lieutenant Totten's testimony credible. She
also found Dr. Atkins' testimony "credible in some respects and not credible in
other respects." She noted the doctor "didn't appear to have a good working
understanding or knowledge of the facts . . . in [A.N.H]'s history," and
"minimized some of [A.N.H.]'s prior history." The judge also found from the
testimony that it was "unclear whether . . . Dr. Atkins had a good understanding
of whether there was a recommendation for follow-up treatment."
The judge then considered the FERPO factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f)
as applied to A.N.H. Factors one through eight under the Act require a judge to
determine whether the subject displays any of the following characteristics:
(1) has any history of threats or acts of violence by the
respondent directed toward self or others;
(2) has any history of use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force by the respondent against another
person;
(3) is the subject of a temporary or final restraining
order or has violated a temporary or final restraining
order issued pursuant to the "Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act of 1991," . . . ;
(4) is the subject of a temporary or final protective order
or has violated a temporary or final protective order
issued pursuant to the "Sexual Assault Survivor
Protection Act of 2015," . . . ;
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(5) has any prior arrests, pending charges, or
convictions for a violent indictable crime or disorderly
persons offense, stalking offense pursuant to section 1
of [L. 1992, c. 209] [(N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10)], or domestic
violence offense enumerated in section 3 of [L. 1991,
c. 261] [(N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19)];
(6) has any prior arrests, pending charges, or
convictions for any offense involving cruelty to animals
or any history of acts involving cruelty to animals;
(7) has any history of drug or alcohol abuse and
recovery from this abuse; or
(8) has recently acquired a firearm, ammunition, or
other deadly weapon.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f).]
If a judge finds at least one of the foregoing factors, the judge may
consider four additional factors pertaining to a subject's mental health.
Specifically, a judge may consider whether the subject:
(12) has any prior involuntary commitment in a hospital
or treatment facility for persons with psychiatric
disabilities;
(13) has received or is receiving mental health
treatment;
(14) has complied or has failed to comply with any
mental health treatment; and
(15) has received a diagnosis of a mental health
disorder.
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[Guideline 3(d).]
Regarding factors one, two, and eight, the judge found there was no
question those factors applied in A.N.H.'s case. Regarding the mental health
factors, based on A.N.H.'s medical records, the judge found A.N.H. "was
voluntarily committed," "received mental health treatment" while at a hospital,
"received a diagnosis" of depression, and "upon his discharge . . . was
recommended to receive mental health treatment."
A.N.H. filed an appeal. Pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b), the judge issued a
written statement of reasons amplifying her decision to issue a FERPO. In her
amplification, the judge repeated her findings that Detective Lieutenant Totten
was a credible witness and that "Dr. Atkins' testimony [was] credible in some
respects and not credible in other[]" respects, due to his lack of a "clear
understanding of the facts which le[d] to [A.N.H.]'s mental health
hospitalization." For those reasons, the judge explained she "did not place great
weight on Dr. Atkins's conclusion . . . that [A.N.H.] did not pose a danger to
[him]self or others and was able to safely possess firearms." Additionally, the
judge set forth a detailed analysis for her application of factors one, two, eight,
twelve, thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen in issuing the FERPO.
In finding factor one, the judge explained there was no dispute A.N.H. had
A-2298-21
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a "history of threats and acts of violence." Regarding factor two, the judge relied
on her analysis under factor one and determined A.N.H. had a "history of both
threatened and actual violence." In applying factor eight, the judge found
A.N.H. acquired a firearm in June 2020, the JTTF became involved in August
2021, and A.N.H., "at wors[t] . . . falsified his application; at
best . . . minimized his mental health issues" when he applied for his FPIC.
Turning to the mental health factors, regarding factor twelve, the judge
stated A.N.H. was committed to the hospital "voluntarily." However, the judge
noted his commitment was a direct result of the incident with the samurai sword;
A.N.H. was escorted to the hospital by the DTPD; and A.N.H. was committed
to the hospital by his mother for a mandatory seventy-two hours. The judge
found factor thirteen applied because A.N.H. received mental health treatment
at the hospital in May 2016. In applying factor fourteen, because A.N.H. failed
to seek the recommended follow-up mental health treatment per Dr. Hall, and
Dr. Atkins testified "no one can predict with 100% certainty whether a person
will [again] experience past [mental health] symptoms," the judge concluded
A.N.H. failed to comply with mental health treatment. Finally, because A.N.H.
was diagnosed by Dr. Hall with impulse control disorder and an unspecified
depressive disorder, the judge found factor fifteen applied.
A-2298-21
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On appeal, A.N.H. raises the following arguments:
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY FINDING THAT
N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f)(8) APPLIES SINCE
APPELLANT HAS NOT RECENTLY PURCHASED
A FIREARM.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY APPLYING
FACTOR 12, WHICH CONCERNS INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENTS, TO APPELLANT'S VOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT FOR THREE DAYS AT A MENTAL
HEALTH FACILITY.
POINT III
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY GRANTING THE
FERPO WHERE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO
PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE OUTSIDE OF
HEARSAY THAT APPELLANT POSED A
SIGNIFICANT, IMMEDIATE, AND PRESENT
DANGER OF CAUSING BODILY INJURY TO
HIMSELF OR OTHERS.
POINT IV
PER BRUEN, DENIAL OF SECOND AMENDMENT
RIGHTS UPON N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f)(8)'S
"RECENTLY ACQUIRED A FIREARM,
AMMUNITION, OR ANOTHER DEADLY
WEAPON" STANDARD SHOULD BE FOUND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A-2298-21
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"The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is
limited." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We are bound by the trial
court's findings "when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."
Id. at 411-12. Where evidence is testimonial, as in this case, and involves
credibility questions, deference is "especially appropriate" because the trial
judge observed the witnesses first-hand. Id. at 412.
Our review of a FERPO is guided by our holding in In re D.L.B., 468 N.J.
Super. 397 (App. Div. 2021). As we explained in D.L.B., the Act is intended to
address the growing number of mass shootings by removing firearms from those
who have shown "red flags" indicative of future violence. Id. at 400-02.
There are eight factors under the Act to be considered by the trial judge
when deciding whether to issue a FERPO. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f)(1) to (8). No
single factor is determinative. After weighing each of the factors, "[t]he court
shall issue the FERPO . . . if it finds 'by a preponderance of the evidence at the
hearing that the respondent poses a significant danger of bodily injury to the
respondent's self or others' by possessing a firearm." D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. at
406-07 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:58-24(b)). If one of the eight statutory factors is
found by a judge, the Guidelines list consideration of additional factors related
to a subject's mental health.
A-2298-21
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Here, the judge issued the FERPO finding factors one, two, eight, twelve,
thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen applied. Having reviewed the record, we are
satisfied the judge did not abuse her discretion in finding the State met its burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that A.N.H. was a danger to himself
and others for the reasons set forth in the judge's written amplification of reasons
in support of the FERPO.
A.N.H. specifically challenges the judge's findings that FERPO factors
eight, twelve, and fourteen applied. A.N.H. also contends there was insufficient
evidence to support the judge's finding that he was a "significant, immediate and
present danger" to himself and others.
The State agrees the judge's finding that factor eight applied was mistaken
because A.N.H. had not recently acquired a firearm. However, A.N.H. does not
challenge the judge's findings under factor one, history of threats or acts of
violence directed toward self or others, and factor two, history of use, or
threatened use of physical force against others. Thus, the judge properly then
considered A.N.H.'s mental health under factors twelve, thirteen, fourteen, and
fifteen.
In considering factor twelve, the judge had to determine if A.N.H. had a
prior involuntary commitment in a hospital or treatment facility for persons with
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psychiatric disabilities. The judge found this factor applied because A.N.H.'s
mother took A.N.H., who was a minor at the time, to the local hospital for a
psychiatric evaluation based on the May 2016 sword incident with his sister.
This matter is similar to a civil commitment of a minor under Rule 4:74-
7A. Under that Rule, a parent may request admission of a minor under the age
of fourteen to a hospital for mental health treatment without a court order.
A.N.H.'s own expert, Dr. Atkins, agreed A.N.H.'s mother took her son, with a
police escort, to the local hospital for a psychiatric evaluation and that A.N.H.
remained in the hospital for a seventy-two hour "mandatory hold" because the
hospital "found a reason to keep him." Based on these discrete facts, the judge
did not err in finding factor twelve applied.
Regarding factor thirteen, receipt of mental health treatment, factor
fourteen, failure to comply with any mental health treatment, and factor fifteen,
diagnosis of a mental health disorder, 3 we are satisfied the record supported the
judge's findings in support of the FERPO. Based on the medical records, A.N.H.
received mental health treatment at a local hospital in May 2016, thus satisfying
factor thirteen. The same medical records indicated A.N.H. was directed to
3
Contrary to A.N.H.'s argument, the Act does not require the mental health
diagnosis to be rendered at or around the date of the FERPO.
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participate in continued mental health treatment following his discharge from
the hospital and failed to do so, thus satisfying factor fourteen. Additionally,
the hospital records revealed a diagnosis of unspecified depressive disorder and
impulse control disorder upon A.N.H.'s discharge on May 17, 2016, thus, the
judge did not err in applying factor fifteen.
The judge carefully reviewed the police and medical records, considered
the trial testimony, and rendered credibility findings in support of the issuance
of the FERPO. Given the ample evidence in support of finding factors one, two,
twelve, thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen applicable, we are satisfied the judge did
not abuse her discretion in issuing the FERPO. Except as to the finding of factor
eight, the judge's application of the factors under the Act and the Guideline was
correct, and the weight accorded to each factor by the judge was supported by
the evidence.
We next consider and reject A.N.H.'s argument that the judge
impermissibly relied on hearsay in issuing the FERPO. "[T]he rules governing
admissibility of evidence at trial shall not apply to the presentation and
consideration of information at the [FERPO] hearing." D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super.
at 406 (quoting Guideline 5(c)) (second alteration in original). Moreover, the
judge did not rely solely on hearsay evidence. Rather, the judge considered and
A-2298-21
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relied on Detective Lieutenant Totten's personal knowledge regarding A.N.H.'s
interactions with the DTPD in support of the FERPO.
We also reject A.N.H.'s claimed violation of his Second Amendment
rights based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in N.Y. State Rifle
& Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022). Prior to the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Bruen, the Court approved of state-
imposed limitations on the right of mentally ill people to possess firearms. See
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (stating "nothing in
our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitio ns on the
possession of firearms by . . . the mentally ill"); see also McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) ("We made it clear in Heller that our holding
did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as 'prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by . . . the mentally ill.'") Indeed, Bruen recognized
that laws prohibiting possession of a firearm by a mentally ill individual are
"presumptively lawful." Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2162, n.26 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring). Based on United States Supreme Court precedent, we discern no
violation of A.N.H.'s Second Amendment rights under the Act.
Affirmed.
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