In re Z.B. CA4/1

Filed 11/29/23 In re Z.B. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re Z.B. et al., Persons Coming D082433
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH (Super. Ct. Nos. J520668A-C)
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.K.,

Defendant and Appellant;

L.H.,

Respondent.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alexander M. Calero, Judge. Affirmed.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant, K.K.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Respondent, L.H.
 Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
After declaring them dependents of the court, the juvenile court
removed L.B., S.B., and Z.B. (together, the children) from the physical
custody of their mother, K.K. (Mother). Three-year-old L.B. and S.B.
(collectively, the twins) were placed in a resource home while four-year-old
Z.B. was ordered to go on a home visit with L.H. (Father) in Iowa. Mother
appeals those dispositional orders. She argues that substantial evidence does
not support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that there
were no reasonable means to protect the children without removing them
from her custody. We disagree and affirm the dispositional orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Background Information
Mother began drinking alcohol in high school. Her drinking became an
issue beginning with her divorce in 2016, when she began drinking every day.
Although she stopped drinking for periods of time since then, she resumed
drinking whenever there was a stressor.
In July 2019, Mother was arrested because she was driving under the
influence (DUI), punched her boyfriend in the face, and tossed Z.B. onto a
bed. A year later, Mother was arrested again following a physical altercation
with her boyfriend. She was so intoxicated that she pulled down her pants
and began defecating and urinating in front of the law enforcement officers.
Three months later, Mother was intoxicated and transported to the hospital,
while the children entered a foster care facility because no other family
members could care for them.

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 B. The First Dependency Case
In February 2021, Mother was arrested again for a DUI violation after
she engaged in two hit and run collisions with her children in the car.
Following this incident, Mother’s first dependency case was opened, and the
children were engaged in a family reunification, then family maintenance
case with Mother from March 2021 to October 2022.
During Mother’s case, she secured an Alcoholics Anonymous (AA)
sponsor and completed a 12-step program. She also attended a DUI program,
which included having a breathalyzer installed on her vehicle.
Mother’s boyfriend (the twins’ father) did not successfully complete
services and had a criminal protective order protecting the children and
Mother from him. (He is not a party to this appeal.) Father resides in Iowa
and was not ordered into services, but he got cited for a DUI violation in
August 2022, and was diagnosed with severe alcohol use disorder and alcohol
dependence.
In October 2022, the juvenile court followed the Agency’s
recommendation, terminated jurisdiction and awarded sole physical custody
to Mother. Mother also received sole legal custody for the twins and shared
legal custody of Z.B. with Father. Father received supervised visits with Z.B.
in Iowa, while the boyfriend was granted unsupervised visits with the twins.
C. Facts Leading to Present Dependency Case
In early April 2023, just six months after the court terminated
jurisdiction, Mother was again arrested for a DUI violation. She had L.B. in
the car and a blood alcohol level of .327, four times the legal limit. She was
driving on the highway with a popped tire and would not pull over until
another driver got in front of her and forced her to stop. She was belligerent,

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uncooperative, and bit and kicked a Marine who was there to help the law
enforcement officer.
Law enforcement officers performed a welfare check two days later and
found Mother lying on the closet floor and unresponsive. There were clothes,
trash, and dirty diapers everywhere. Z.B. was hungry and there was little
food in the refrigerator. Mother eventually responded to the officers, was
very intoxicated and threatened to hurt herself if her children were removed.
The psychiatric emergency response team involuntarily retained her on a 72-

hour Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 5150 psychiatric hospitalization.
While hospitalized, Mother admitted to the social worker that she relapsed
and made threats to kill herself if the kids were taken away. Mother also
gave the Agency the names of a few people it could assess as a safety plan for
the children.
In an interview with the social worker, the boyfriend reported that
Mother has a long history of alcoholism. She could not care for her children
when she drank because she passed out and left the children unattended and
neglected. In addition to alcohol, she also abused Xanax and Ambien, which
caused her to black out. She also had a history of threatening suicidal
ideation.
The boyfriend was not an available noncustodial parent given the
active criminal protective order. The Agency had not yet been able to contact
Father.
D. The Petitions and Detention Hearing
In April 2023, the Agency filed petitions under section 300, subdivision
(b) as to all the children. The petitions alleged they “suffered or there is a

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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substantial risk that the children will suffer, serious physical harm or
illness.” The petition cited Mother’s “long history of alcohol abuse and
involvement with Child Welfare Services due to alcohol abuse, including
driving while intoxicated” with the children. The children were detained in a
confidential resource home.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found that continued care
in Mother’s home was contrary to the children’s welfare. The juvenile court
also found “it would be a detriment to place the children” with Father. The
boyfriend did not request detention. The children were removed from
Mother’s custody and detained in a resource family home.
E. The Agency’s Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
In mid-April 2023, Mother once again was placed on a section 5150
psychiatric hold because she made suicidal statements after drinking heavily
and taking 14 sleeping pills.
Mother reported to the social worker that she would do whatever she
needed to do to regain custody of her children, including wearing a SCRAM
CAM (alcohol monitoring) bracelet to prove she was not drinking. She said,
“ ‘I will blow in breathalyzers and get a [SCRAM CAM]. I need to get them
home ASAP.’ ” She admitted relapsing and believed, “ ‘It reinforces I cannot
drink.’ ”
Mother said she was diagnosed with situational depression and that
she would want to take medication when her relationship is bad. She stated
she had been seeing a psychiatrist since 2020 and had been on the same
medication for years. She also saw a therapist every other week but stopped
when her insurance changed.
She had a breathalyzer installed on her car in July 2021 and removed
it in approximately February 2023. Although she had not attended AA

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meetings since March 2023 because she was busy and tired, she
acknowledged the need to prioritize her services.
The social worker asked Mother, “ ‘If you have concerns of the trauma
the children went through the last time, [w]hy did this happen again?’ ”
Mother said she slacked on her meetings because she was stressed out and,
after her boyfriend accused her of drinking, she thought, “ ‘If I’m being
accused of drinking, [I] might as well drink.’ ” Before this most recent
relapse, Mother claimed she had a two-year period of sobriety. She was
horrified about her relapse. She wanted a stronger relapse prevention plan
and understood she needed to go to meetings and speak to her sponsor.
The boyfriend declined to participate in the case even though his
protective order was modified to a no negative contact order.
Father wanted placement even though he had not seen Z.B. since
summer 2022. He claimed he no longer drank alcohol, although he
acknowledged a history of abuse, with the longest period of sobriety being 15
months. He completed three outpatient treatment programs and one
inpatient program. He had four DUI arrests, the most recent in August 2022,
but none of them involved the children. He denied he drank alcohol when he
cared for Z.B. He had almost a year of sobriety and admitted it was a bad
decision to drive while drunk. He was also on probation, wore a SCRAM
CAM bracelet, attended AA meetings four to five times per week, had a
relapse prevention plan and had a sponsor.
At Mother’s suggestion, the Agency assessed the Florida-based
maternal grandfather for placement. The Agency was not comfortable with
him being a visitation supervisor or placing the children with Mother with
maternal grandfather in his home. He knew very little about Mother’s
relapse and had never seen her under the influence of alcohol. The Agency

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was concerned he was not forthcoming when asked difficult questions,
including the impact of Mother’s drinking on the children.
The Agency recommended the court make a true finding on the
petitions, declare the children dependents, place them in a resource family
home, and order reunification services and liberal supervised visits for the
parents. The Agency assessed there was a “substantial danger to the
physical health” of the children if they were returned to Mother’s home and
there were “no reasonable means” to protect them without removal. The
Agency believed given Mother’s “extensive alcohol history” and DUI
violations, she needed “intensive substance abuse treatment” and the ability
to demonstrate “sobriety and acts of protection over time.”
F. The Agency’s Addendum Reports
In its June 2023 report, the Agency reported that Mother pled guilty to
criminal charges. She was required to serve five years on probation, obtain
an alcohol monitoring device and an interlock device, and attend a multiple
conviction program, a mother’s against drunk driving program, a drug
treatment program, and a child abuse course. Mother also had to serve 120
days on house arrest.
Meanwhile, the maternal grandfather advised he planned to go back to
Florida and did not know when he would return. He suggested he could
alternate between Florida and San Diego. The Agency also learned he
allowed Mother to have access to the children in the home on two occasions
without the presence of an approved visitation supervisor. When confronted,
he initially denied a visit occurred, but eventually said he let Mother into the
home briefly to use the restroom. His story did not align with Mother’s story.
When asked why he did not disclose that Mother was in the home with the
children until asked, he replied, “ ‘For no real good reason. I did not think it

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was essential to the discussion. The situation was handled in the best
manner I thought was possible and that was it.’ ”
Mother said she was abstaining from alcohol and had 30 days of
sobriety. She had her SCRAM CAM bracelet, was in a treatment program
five days a week, and was attending AA meetings. She recognized she put
the children in danger but wanted them back in her care.
Mother’s alcohol treatment counselor informed the social worker that
Mother failed to reveal the extent of her relapse or that she was put on a
second section 5150 psychiatric hold. The counselor stated that this
information “ ‘might have’ ” changed his assessment about whether to
recommend Mother participate in inpatient treatment.
The boyfriend did not want to be involved in the case plan although he
hoped he could still see the twins. For the children’s sake, he hoped the
Agency kept them away from Mother.
Father still was interested in taking placement of Z.B. but needed more
time to figure out how to meet Z.B.’s medical and educational needs. The
Agency also wanted to confirm Father’s sobriety before placing Z.B. in his
care.
Mother informed her AA sponsor about her relapses, and that the
Agency was involved, however she neglected to share details. Her sponsor
assumed the Agency was involved due to a domestic violence incident. The
Agency was concerned Mother “discloses what she believes is needed in her
plan for reunification rather than her path to sobriety.”
By the end of June 2023, the Agency recommended the court place Z.B.
with Father and terminate jurisdiction. Upon agreement of the parties, the
court found good cause to bifurcate the jurisdiction from disposition. At the
end of the jurisdiction hearing, the court found the allegations in the petition

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true and set a contested disposition hearing at the end of June. The court
also authorized a two-week out-of-state visit for Z.B. with Father.
The Agency continued to further evaluate Z.B.’s placement with
Father. Father was compliant with probation, wore a SCRAM CAM, had a
breathalyzer secured to his vehicle, and had the paternal grandmother as a
support. His sponsor reported they spoke multiple times per week and that
Father was “in the right place and . . . committed to making the right
choices.” He said Father had the tools he needed to maintain sobriety and
was demonstrating he could use those tools. In mid-June, Father tested
negative for all substances.
G. The Contested Dispositional Hearing
At the contested dispositional hearing at the end of June 2023, the
juvenile court received the detention report, the jurisdiction and disposition
report, and three addendum reports into evidence. The court took judicial
notice of the sustained petition.
The social worker testified she was not aware if a formal safety
inspection was completed or whether the Agency spoke with the maternal
grandmother about moving into the home. She also did not know whether
there was any specific individual the Agency considered to move into the
home with Mother and the children. The social worker did confirm that
Mother had a SCRAM CAM, tested negative for all substances, and attended
treatment, therapy, AA meetings, and regularly scheduled visits with her
children. She also testified about Father’s history, current circumstances,
cooperation, willingness to facilitate contact with Mother, and the Agency’s
recommendation that Z.B. be placed with him.
The maternal grandfather testified he would not allow Mother to visit if
he were supervising and suspected she was under the influence of alcohol.

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He said he would report any incidents to the Agency and would work with the
Agency’s rules. Despite this, he believed the children could be placed safely
in Mother’s care. He said he understood the court’s order required supervised
contact, but he did not know why.
Mother testified she had regular supervised visits at her home or the
park and that she typically focused on mealtime, playing with the children,
and bathing them. She did not like how much she drank during her divorce
from 2016 to 2018 but believed it was circumstantial and did not realize then
that she had a problem. She confirmed DUI violations in 2019, 2021, and
2023, that her SCRAM CAM was court-ordered, and that she participated in
services and had frequent communication with her sponsor. Additionally, she
acknowledged she relapsed because she gradually “started to attend less
meetings” and “let other stuff” take precedence.
Mother further testified she would follow the Agency’s rules and
regulations and would provide any information requested about individuals
who frequented her home. She understood she needed to change and stated,
“I love being sober. And I will do whatever it takes.” She said she had
informed the Agency about five individuals who were open to living in her
house with her and her children. They were “only evaluated for placement
and were told they could not reside in [her] house and get placement of the
children.” Finally, Mother expressed concern for Z.B. if he was placed with
Father in Iowa.
H. Juvenile Court’s Findings and Orders
Noting the recent termination of Mother’s prior dependency case, the
juvenile court recounted the basis for jurisdiction, including that “driving
intoxicated with one of the minors in the car” while her “blood-alcohol level
content was . . . four times over the legal limit.” Mother also was not “100

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percent truthful about what happened to her support network or service
providers.” There also was “information in the report that there was a visit
where just Mother and the maternal grandfather were present.” As such, the
court was concerned “about the credibility of [Mother’s] testimony on the
stand.” Additionally, “the therapy Mother has been engaged in over the
course of the time from the first dependency case . . . did not prevent” the
mid-April incident. The court commended mother for attending AA meetings,
noting that she is “required” to wear a SCRAM CAM, however “it is not clear
how much time would transpire” before law enforcement would act following
“a SCRAM violation.”
The juvenile court declared there was “clear and convincing evidence”
to remove custody of the children from Mother pursuant to section 361,
subdivision (c)(1). “There are no reasonable means by which the [children’s]
health can be protected without removing the [children] from [Mother].” The
court specifically found that a family maintenance plan with the maternal
grandfather was not appropriate based on his testimony where he
“minimize[d] the substance use issues.” It also noted “the maternal
grandfather’s concerns about needing to spend some time . . . in California
and then some time in Florida,” before finding that it was “unclear . . .
whether or not he would be suitable for remaining in the home.”
In considering whether Z.B. should be placed with Father, the juvenile
court did “not find . . . clear and convincing evidence of detriment.” However,
the court had concerns for Father’s substance abuse and willingness to
implement Z.B.’s individualized education program for his “special needs.”
Thus, it ordered a home visit within 90 days pursuant to section 361.2,
subdivision (b)(2). It also ordered services for Mother and supervised visits
and found that the foster placement for the twins was “appropriate.” Finally,

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the court set a 90-day special hearing regarding the home visit and a six-
month review regarding reunification.
DISCUSSION
I.
Relevant Legal Principles
“The fundamental right to the care and custody of one’s child is
protected by Constitution and statute.” (In re Henry V. (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 522, 525 (Henry V.); accord In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398,
419–420; In re James T. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 58, 64.) “A child may not be
taken from a parent’s physical custody during juvenile dependency
proceedings, except for a temporary detention period, unless clear and
convincing evidence supports a ground for removal specified by the
Legislature.” (Henry V., at p. 525.)
Section 361 is the governing statute, and it imposes restraints on the
juvenile court’s authority to remove a child from a parent’s physical custody.
(§ 361, subd. (c).) It provides that “[a] dependent child shall not be taken
from the physical custody of his or her parents, . . . unless the juvenile court
finds clear and convincing evidence” that “[t]here is or would be a substantial
danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no
reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected
without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.”
(§ 361, subd. (c)(1), italics added.)
We review a dispositional order removing a child from a parent for
substantial evidence, “keeping in mind that the trial court was required to
make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing
evidence.” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520 .) “[A]ppellate review of
the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a finding requiring clear and
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convincing proof must account for the level of confidence this standard
demands.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995.) In applying
this standard of review, “the question before the appellate court is whether
the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at
pp. 995−996.) We view the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence. (Ibid.)
II.
Substantial Evidence Supports Removal of the Children
from Mother’s Custody
Mother timely appealed the dispositional orders. She contends that
substantial evidence does not support the court’s findings and orders
removing the children from her custody. We are not persuaded.
As noted, section 361 restrains a juvenile court from removing children
from the physical custody of their parents unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of two conditions: (1) “[t]here is or would be a substantial
danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being” of the children if returned home, and (2) “there are no reasonable
means by which the [children’s] physical health can be protected without
removing” them. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Accepting the juvenile court’s factual
findings and all reasonable inferences supporting them (In re Heather A.
(1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193), we conclude substantial evidence supports
the court’s findings that these conditions were proven by clear and convincing
evidence.

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 A. There Was Sufficient Evidence of Substantial Danger to the
Children If Returned Home to Mother’s Custody
Regarding the first condition, Mother argues “[t]he dispositional order
removing the children from Mother was not supported because the clear and
convincing standard of proof was not met.” In her reply brief, she contends
that the “children were not in substantial danger.” She generally cites In re
Katrina (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, for the proposition that there “was a
higher standard [at the disposition hearing for removal] than that required
for taking jurisdiction.” Mother does not cite facts or specifically challenge
the evidence supporting the court’s finding of substantial danger to the
children if returned to Mother’s custody.
Here, there was clear and convincing evidence of substantial danger to
the children. The Agency’s reports set forth Mother’s extensive history with
alcoholism, including her prior recent dependency case with the children and
the services she received during that case and since. Despite her prior
successful dependency case, just six months after the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction, Mother was pulled over for a DUI violation with one
of her children in the car. Her relapse was substantial and was followed by
two section 5150 psychiatric holds. Mother even concedes that her “history
combined with her relapse was a serious concern.” She admitted that her
relapse happened when she “slacked on her meetings because she was
stressed out.” When her boyfriend accused her of drinking, she thought, “ ‘If
I’m being accused of drinking, [I] might as well drink.’ ”
Although Mother engaged in services, the court found that she was not
“100 percent truthful about what happened to her support network or service
providers.” The record shows Mother continued to tell her therapist she was
sober, had a relapse prevention plan in place, had a support network, and
openly discussed her treatment and self-care, despite her relapse in

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December 2022. Similarly, Mother did not disclose to her alcohol treatment
counselor the severity of her relapse or that she was twice taken to the
hospital on a section 5150 psychiatric hold. She also did not discuss details of
her relapses or Agency involvement with her sponsor.
These events led the Agency to have concern that Mother was “not
being truthful to her service providers and/or committed to her sobriety.” The
court agreed. It had similar “concerns . . . about the credibility of [Mother’s]
testimony on the stand” and “concerns regarding protective issues relating to
substance use and the impact on the minors.” The social worker’s
professional opinion that “the risks of keeping the children in [Mother’s] care
without successful treatment could be lethal” is entitled to credence and
supports the court’s determination that there was “substantial danger to the .
. . children if [they] were returned to her.” (In re Cole C. (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 900, 918 (Cole C.) (“The court was entitled to find the social
worker’s opinion credible and give great weight to her assessment.”)
B. There Was Sufficient Evidence of No Lesser Alternative Than
Removal of the Children from Mother’s Custody
Mother’s primary argument on appeal is that there was insufficient
evidence to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence,
that there were no reasonable means to protect the children without
removing them from her custody.
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1), requires a second condition be met
before the juvenile court may remove a child from her parent’s custody.
There must also be clear and convincing evidence of “no reasonable means” of
protecting the child other than removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) In other words,
“California law requires that there be no lesser alternative before a child may
be removed from the home of his or her parent.” (Jasmine G., supra, 82
Cal.App.4th at p. 284, italics added.)

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 Mother asserts that there were reasonable means to protect the
children which would have allowed them to remain safely in her home. She
insists services through the Agency and probation coupled with adults she
claims could have lived in the home with her, were reasonable means of
protecting the children thereby allowing them to stay in her care. We
disagree these measures were sufficient to protect the children given other
facts in the record.
The Legislature directs that a child only be removed from his or her
parent if there are no reasonable means to protect the child short of removal.
(See § 361, subd. (c)(1).) The juvenile court is entitled to rely on the social
worker’s assessment and rely on their opinion. (Cole C., supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at p. 918 .) Ultimately, “[a]lthough the court must consider
alternatives to removal, it has broad discretion in making a dispositional
order.” (Ibid.) The reviewing court cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute
its judgment for that of the juvenile court. (Ibid.)
In the present case, substantial evidence supports that there were no
reasonable means to protect the children without removing them. The
juvenile court specifically considered and rejected Mother’s suggestion that
the maternal grandfather could live in the home with her and the children.
It found that “placement in family maintenance with the maternal
grandfather available to be in the home” was not appropriate because he
“minimize[d] the substance abuse issues” and “need[ed] to spend some time”
in both California and Florida. Substantial evidence in the record supports
these findings.
The record supports the court’s doubt that maternal grandfather
“would be suitable for remaining in the home.” The maternal grandfather
testified he believed the children could be placed safely in Mother’s care and

16
that she was perfectly capable of taking care of them. Although he
understood her visits were supervised, he testified that he did not know why
they were supervised. Additionally, he had never seen Mother under the
influence of alcohol and was initially reluctant to review the graphic details
of Mother’s relapse in the police reports. He also evaded difficult questions
about the impact her drinking had on the children and minimized the risks of
driving under the influence by generalizing that anyone who drove a car was
susceptible to death. Finally, he was not forthcoming about the fact that he
allowed Mother to have contact with the children when he was not an
approved supervisor.
The court’s concern that the maternal grandfather might not be
committed long term to San Diego is also supported by the record. About a
month before trial, the maternal grandfather advised that he planned to go to
Florida and had “not made the plans to come back out.” He suggested that he
may be able to alternate residing in San Diego and Florida for two weeks at a
time.
Mother also argues that there were “adults who would reside in her
home to add an extra security measure.” At trial, she testified that there
were five individuals she previously identified for placement. When Mother’s
counsel asked for a continuance during trial so the Agency could evaluate
them, the court noted it reviewed the record, found that the Agency’s efforts
were “appropriate,” and that it did “not find good cause to continue this
matter.” Substantial evidence demonstrates that the commitment levels of
these five individuals varied, and that none of them indicated a willingness to
move into Mother’s home.
Mother also argues that other reasonable means to protect the children
included alcohol testing, the SCRAM CAM bracelet and “unannounced home

17
inspections by the social worker and the children’s attorney.” But the court
correctly found that “there would be a delay” before law enforcement arrived
following a SCRAM violation if Mother drinks alcohol. Similarly,
unannounced visits and substance abuse testing only detect Mother’s alcohol
use after the children have been put at risk of harm. (In re A.F. (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“Unannounced visits can only assess the situation and
mother’s sobriety at the time of the visit. Substance abuse testing can only
detect use after the fact—which would be after mother had already placed the
minor at risk again.”].) Thus, the court correctly concluded that these
suggestions were not means to protect the children.
In her reply brief, Mother argues that “she admitted the problem and
began working hard to ensure it did not happen again.” She points to her
participation in a substance abuse program and her criminal probation
requirements as “an extensive recovery plan for [M]other to comply with.”
The juvenile court did, in fact, consider whether the reasonable means
Mother suggests could have prevented removal of her children, including “her
work engaging in voluntary services,” attendance at AA meetings, and
wearing a SCRAM CAM bracelet. While it praised Mother’s efforts as
“commendable,” it ultimately rejected her suggestions due to her credibility
and history, the severity of her relapse, and the fact that her participation in
therapy since the last dependency case did not prevent her from relapsing.
Indeed, even though a parent such as Mother may be participating in
services, removal can still appropriate due to a significant history of
substance abuse. (In re J.C. (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [“Given his years-
long struggles with drug abuse, his seven months of sobriety did not mean
that he was no longer at risk of relapsing.”].)

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 Finally, despite Mother’s citations to In re Henry V., supra, 119
Cal.App.4th 522, that case is not helpful to her. (Id. at pp. 529–530 [“The
social worker’s suggestion that out-of-home placement would be useful to
secure [the mother’s] further cooperation was not a proper consideration. . . .
A mother’s fundamental right to the custody of her child is not a bargaining
chip.”].) There, as opposed to here, there was “ample evidence that
appropriate services could have been provided to [the mother and child] in
the family home,” while there was not “clear and convincing evidence of a
threat to [the child’s] safety or emotional well-being.” (Id. at p. 529.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision to
remove the children from Mother’s custody. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7
Cal.4th 295, 319 [“ ‘ “When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced
from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision
for that of the trial court.” ’ ”].) We conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion. (In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1227 [The trial court
has “broad discretion to determine what best serves a child’s interests”].)

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 DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s dispositional orders are affirmed.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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