2023 IL App (1st) 231756B-U
No. 1-23-1756B
Second Division
December 1, 2023
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
____________________________________________________________________________
) Appeal from the
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Circuit Court of
ILLINOIS, ) Cook County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) No. 23 CR 2753
v. )
)
JEREMIAH SMITH, ) Honorable
) Shelley Sutker-Dermer,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McBride and Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in revoking defendant’s pretrial release under the
SAFE-T Act where the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that no
condition or combination of conditions would reasonably prevent him from
obtaining additional felony or Class A misdemeanor charges.
¶2 Defendant Jeremiah Smith appeals from an order of the trial court revoking his pretrial
release pursuant to the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act. See Pub.
Acts 101-652, § 10-255; 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52
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(lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023). Specifically, defendant argues that
the trial court erred in determining that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that
there was no condition or combination of conditions that would reasonably prevent him from being
charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor while on pretrial release. Defendant
also argues that the trial court erred by failing to articulate the specific reasons for this conclusion
on the record. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On February 6, 2023, defendant was arrested for an unrelated domestic battery charge
while at work at a Sweetgreen restaurant. During a custodial search incident to that arrest, police
officers discovered multiple plastic bags of suspect crack cocaine in defendant’s pocket.
Consequently, defendant was charged in this case (number 23 CR 0275301) with one count of
possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2022)) and one count of
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West
2022)).
¶5 A D-Bond was initially set at $10,000. The bond was later reduced to $5000, which
defendant paid on April 1, 2023. Defendant subsequently failed to appear for two court hearings,
and, on August 9, 2023, a no bail warrant was issued.
¶6 On August 17, 2023, defendant appeared in court in Maywood, Illinois after being charged
in a new case (number 23 CR 0875401) with armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping. The State
filed a petition for a hearing on the violation of bail bond conditions (VOBB) based on the new
offenses alleged in the Maywood case. The trial court executed a no bail warrant and defendant
was held on VOBB.
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¶7 Defendant’s case was transferred to Skokie on August 18, 2023, where the State filed a
substantively identical petition for a hearing on the VOBB. Defendant continued to be held on no
bail.
¶8 On September 20, 2023, just two days after the SAFE-T Act became effective, defendant
requested a review of the bond set in case number 23 CR 0875401. Because the SAFE-T had taken
effect and a VOBB had been filed, the trial court characterized the proceeding as a revocation
hearing under the SAFE-T Act. Both parties accepted this characterization.
¶9 In aggravation, the State claimed that defendant’s criminal history included a felony
violation of an order of protection, as well as a juvenile adjudication for aggravated unlawful use
of a weapon.
¶ 10 The State further proffered the facts of the Maywood case as follows. On June 14, 2023,
defendant approached the victim outside a convenience store and asked the victim if he was named
“Dave.” The victim replied that he was not Dave. The victim then entered the convenience store,
where he had a brief conversation with a co-defendant Kirk. Kirk placed his arm around the victim
and ushered him out of the store while defendant, who was wearing a mask, held the door for them.
¶ 11 The victim was forced into an SUV and driven away. Inside the SUV, defendant held the
victim at gunpoint while Kirk took his wallet and cell phone. When the victim tried to reclaim his
property, defendant pointed a gun at his chest and Kirk pointed a gun at his knee. At some point,
defendant held the butt of his gun to the victim’s head, ordered him to keep his head down, and
demanded to know the victim’s gang affiliation.
¶ 12 After about 20 minutes, the SUV parked in a forest preserve. Defendant and his co-
defendants placed a pillowcase over the victim’s head and discussed whether to kill him. They
ultimately forced the victim out of the SUV, pushed him down a hill, and drove away.
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¶ 13 The victim was able to walk home and call the police. The SUV was found the next day,
and a facemask like the one allegedly worn by defendant was recovered from the floorboard. The
victim also identified defendant as one of the perpetrators from a photo array.
¶ 14 In mitigation, defendant noted that he was 19 years old, the father of an infant daughter,
and a caregiver for his grandmother with dementia. Defendant was also a senior at CCA Academy,
employed as a certified culinary professional, and a lifelong resident of Cook County, save for two
years when he lived in Mississippi. Defendant also personally claimed that he had an exculpatory
affidavit from the victim, though the affidavit was never presented to the trial court. Defendant
requested that he be placed on electronic monitoring.
¶ 15 After hearing from the parties, the court ruled:
“I’m going to disregard the juvenile background. The pending armed robbery [and
aggravated] kidnapping case *** is a violation of the bail bond that was set in this case
which is a revocation. A request for a revocation.
In reviewing it, the Court’s going to find by clear and convincing evidence that no
condition or combination of *** conditions *** would be reasonable to prevent the
defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. So it is
hereby ordered the defendant [is] to remain detained in this case.”
¶ 16 This appeal followed.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 Pretrial release in Illinois is now governed by the SAFE-T Act, as codified in article 110
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)). Under the
SAFE-T Act, “[a]ll persons charged with an offense shall be eligible for pretrial release before
conviction.” 725 ILCS 5/100-2(a) (West 2022). It is presumed that a defendant is entitled to release
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if he complies with certain conditions, such as attending all required court proceedings and
refraining from committing any criminal offenses. Id. Generally, a defendant will be denied
pretrial release only if he is charged with a non-probationable offense and the State proves by clear
and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to the community. Id. § 2.
¶ 19 Of particular relevance here is section 110-6 of the Code, which controls the revocation of
pretrial release. Section 110-6 provides that:
“When a defendant has previously been granted pretrial release under this Section
for a felony or Class A misdemeanor, that pretrial release may be revoked only if the
defendant is charged with a felony or Class A misdemeanor that is alleged to have occurred
during the defendant’s pretrial release after a hearing on the court’s own motion or upon
the filing of a verified petition by the State.” 725 ILCS 110-6(a) (West 2022).
At such a hearing, the defendant is entitled to the representation of counsel and an opportunity to
be heard regarding the violation and the evidence in mitigation. Id. It is the State’s burden to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that “no condition or combination of conditions of release would
reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant for later hearings or prevent the defendant from
being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.” Id. In deciding whether to
revoke pretrial release, the trial court “shall consider all relevant circumstances, including, but not
limited to, the nature and seriousness of the violation or criminal act alleged.” Id.
¶ 20 On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred by “failing to state the reasons
for its revocation of pretrial release[.]” Defendant notes that the Code requires the trial court to
consider “all relevant circumstances” when deciding whether to revoke pretrial release. According
to defendant, “it is unclear whether the court made those considerations” because it did not
articulate the reasons for its ruling. Thus, he requests that we vacate the court’s revocation order
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and find him eligible for release or, alternatively, remand for a new revocation hearing at which
the court can more fully explain the basis for its ruling.
¶ 21 Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive. First, he completely glosses over the fact that
nothing in the language of section 110-6 requires the court to articulate the specific reasoning
behind its ruling. Rather, the text of the statute requires only that the trial court consider all relevant
circumstances in making its decision. 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2022). Of course, the most
reliable indicator of the meaning of a statute is its language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.
Accettura v. Vacationland, Inc., 2019 IL 124285, ¶ 11. Had the legislature intended to require trial
courts to explain their reasoning on the record, it would have said so. See, e.g., 725 ILCS 110-5(h)
(West 2022) (providing that a court imposing electronic monitoring “shall set forth in the record
the basis for its finding”); see also Relf v. Shatayeva, 2013 IL 114925, ¶ 34 (“Where the legislature
has employed certain language in one part of a statute and different language in another, we may
assume different meaning were intended[.]”). To the extent that defendant suggests that the court
did not in fact consider all relevant circumstances, this argument ignores the long-established
principle that the trial court is presumed to know and apply the law absent an affirmative indication
to the contrary. People v. Martinez, 2021 IL App (1st) 172097, ¶ 56. As we see no such indication
in the record, we reject defendant’s argument.
¶ 22 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that no condition or
combination of conditions could reasonably prevent him from being charged with a subsequent
felony or Class A misdemeanor.
¶ 23 Preliminarily, we note that the parties seem to agree that the standard of review is abuse of
discretion, which occurs only where the court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or so unreasonable
that no reasonable person would agree with it. People v. Smith, 2022 IL 127946, ¶ 25. In support,
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the parties both cite People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st), ¶¶ 1, 9, where this court reviewed the
“virtually nonexistent” caselaw regarding the appeal of bail orders under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 604(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) and determined that such orders should be reviewed for abuse of
discretion. To our knowledge, no appellate or supreme court decision has addressed the proper
standard of review for the revocation of pretrial release under the SAFE-T Act. However, we need
not necessarily decide the standard of review here, as we would not disturb the trial court’s decision
under any standard.
¶ 24 The record shows that while on bond in this case, defendant was arrested for the extremely
serious charges of armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping. Although the motivation for those
alleged offenses remains unclear from the record, the facts are egregious. According to the State’s
proffer, defendant and his co-defendants confronted the victim at a convenience store, forced him
into a vehicle, and robbed him at gunpoint. They then drove the victim to a secluded area, covered
his head with a pillowcase, and discussed murdering him before ultimately deciding to set him
free. The victim identified defendant as one the offenders from a photo array and a mask similar
to the one defendant allegedly wore was recovered from the vehicle the following day.
¶ 25 In response, defendant primarily emphasizes mitigating factors such as his employment,
his educational efforts, and his role as a caretaker for his young child and ill grandmother.
Defendant asserts that the court could have sufficiently minimized any threat he posed to the
community by setting conditions on his release. However, none of the mitigating factors defendant
relies upon prevented him from violating his bond in the present case by being arrested for serious
felonies. Nor was the trial court required to elevate these mitigating factors above the seriousness
of the violation. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred in revoking defendant’s
pretrial release under the facts of this case.
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¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 28 Affirmed.
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