St. Vincent Charity v. Paluscsak

[Cite as St. Vincent Charity v. Paluscsak, 2023-Ohio-4641.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

ST. VINCENT CHARITY, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 111932
v. :

MICHAEL PALUSCSAK, ET AL., :

Defendants-Appellants. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 21, 2023

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-18-898214

Appearances:

Davis & Young, Matthew P. Baringer, and Thomas W.
Wright, for appellee St. Vincent Charity.

Porter Wright Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Tracey L. Turnbull,
and Jared M. Klaus, for appellee United Collection
Bureau, Inc.

The Law Office of Boyd W. Gentry, Boyd W. Gentry, and
Zachary P. Elliott, for appellees George Gusses Co., L.P.A.,
George Gusses, Robin A. Worline, and Joseph T.
Szyperski.

Robert S. Belovich, L.L.C., and Robert S. Belovich; The
Misra Law Firm, L.L.C., and Anand N. Misra, for
appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Michael Paluscsak (“Paluscsak”) appeals the trial

court’s decision granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs-appellees St. Vincent

Charity Medical Center (“SVCMC”); United Collection Bureau, Inc. (“UCB”); and

attorneys George Gusses, Robin Worline, and Joseph Szperski and their law firm,

George Gusses Co. LPA, collectively known as “the Gusses.” We affirm the trial

court’s decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} In September 2015, Paluscsak had an MRI performed on his knee at

SVCMC. He was billed $1,175.40 for the procedure, but he did not pay it. After the

bill went unpaid for 18 months, SVCMC referred the account to UCB for

collections. On June 2, 2017, UCB sent a collections letter to Paluscsak and also

hired the Gusses to file a debt collection action against Paluscsak. On July 11, 2019,

the Gusses filed a lawsuit.

{¶3} On August 14, 2017, Paluscsak filed an answer to the Gusses’ complaint

and also filed counterclaims on behalf of a putative class based on the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act

(“OCSPA”). Paluscsak claimed that the appellees committed fraud and abuses of

process because the debt collection was initiated in the name of “St. Vincent

Charity” and not the formal name “St. Vincent Charity Medical Center.” Paluscsak

argued in his counterclaim that the letters from UCB and the Gusses falsely stated
that he owed money to St. Vincent Charity when the entity does not exist. Further,

Paluscsak contended that the Gusses signed a complaint on behalf of St. Vincent

Charity, omitting the words “Medical Center” in an effort to cheat unsuspecting

and unsophisticated consumers.

{¶4} Although Paluscsak did not file an objection, he claims that the Gusses

violated the FDCPA because they filed the complaint in Cleveland Municipal Court

instead of Garfield Heights Municipal Court, where he resides. However, the

matter proceeded in the Cleveland Municipal Court.

{¶5} After the filing of the complaint and counterclaim, a number of

motions were filed and ruled upon. SVCMC dismissed its complaint against

Paluscsak in the municipal court, leaving Paluscsak’s counterclaim as the sole

issue. UCM filed a motion to certify the case to the Cuyahoga County Common

Pleas Court (“trial court”). The municipal court granted the motion because the

amount sought in Paluscsak’s counterclaim exceeded the jurisdictional monetary

limit of the municipal court. On May 22, 2018, the case was transferred to the trial

court.

{¶6} On June 19, 2018, Paluscsak moved for default judgment against the

appellees. SVCMC filed a motion for leave to file an answer to the counterclaim.

The trial court granted SVCMC’s motion, but denied Paluscsak’s motion for default

judgment. On July 10, 2018, the trial court also dismissed Paluscsak’s claims for

fraud and abuse of process. On August 14, 2018, the trial court dismissed
Paluscsak’s counterclaim against the appellees for fraud and abuse of process and

denied the motion with respect to the FDCPA and OCSPA claims.

{¶7} The trial court dismissed Paluscsak’s case because his counsel failed to

appear. Paluscsak filed an appeal in St. Vincent Charity v. Paluscsak, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 108641, 2020-Ohio-1501 (“Paluscsak I”), where the court reversed

the trial court’s decision, stating: “The trial court abused its discretion in

dismissing appellant’s counterclaim for failure to prosecute based on appellant’s

failure to participate in the May 7, 2019 phone conference.” Id. at ¶ 49.

{¶8} On September 14, 2020, the trial court ordered Paluscsak to appear in

person for a deposition on October 1, 2020. Paluscsak appealed the order to this

court and subsequently to the Supreme Court, and both appeals were dismissed.

On August 26, 2021, Paluscsak filed a motion to compel discovery from the Gusses,

and, on September 20, 2021, filed the same motion against UCB. On December 13,

2021, the trial court denied both motions.

{¶9} On January 10, 2022, UCB and the Gusses filed motions for summary

judgment, with SVCMC filing to join the summary judgment motions. The

motions argued that Paluscsak does not have standing because he admitted that

he had not suffered any injury as a result of UCB’s use of SVCMC’s abbreviated

name of St. Vincent Charity and that the use of the abbreviated name was not false,

deceptive, or misleading. The motions also argued that Paluscsak’s FDCPA and

OCSPA claims fail as a matter of law.
 {¶10} On August 15, 2022, the trial court granted the appellees’ summary

judgment motions. The trial court reasoned that Paluscsak had no standing

because he was not injured by the use of the nickname or the case being filed in

Cleveland instead of Garfield Heights. The trial court also reasoned that

Paluscsak’s claims under FDCPA and OCSPA fail as a matter of law because he did

not demonstrate he was injured.

{¶11} Paluscsak filed this appeal and assigned six assignments of error for

our review:

1. The trial court committed prejudicial error in holding that
Paluscsak lacked standing to bring his counterclaim;

2. The trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to
consider claims on collection actions taken in violation of R.C.
1319.12 and the resulting unauthorized practice of law;

3. The trial court committed prejudicial error in finding that
counterclaim defendants did not violate the FDCPA by filing a
collection lawsuit in a court district where Paluscsak did not
reside or where he did not sign a contract on which the
collection claim was based;

4. The trial court committed prejudicial error in finding the
counterclaim defendants did not violate the FDCPA by filing a
collection lawsuit in the name of an unregistered fictitious
name;

5. The trial court committed prejudicial error in concluding that
the counterclaim defendants did not violate the OCSPA; and

6. The trial court abused its discretion and prejudicial error in
denying Paluscsak’s motion to compel.
II. Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

{¶12} Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate when “(1)

there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, and (3) after construing the evidence most favorably

to the party against whom the motion is made, reasonable minds can only reach a

conclusion that is adverse to the nonmoving party.” Chester/12 Ltd. v. Epiq

Constr. Servs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 111626 and 112198, 2023-Ohio-1886, ¶ 17,

citing Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370, 696 N.E.2d

201 (1998); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267

(1977).

{¶13} “The moving party has the initial burden of setting forth specific facts

that demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment.” Id. at ¶ 18, citing Dresher

v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). “If the moving party

fails to meet this burden, summary judgment is not appropriate.” Id. “If the

moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden of

setting forth specific facts using evidence permitted by Civ.R. 56(C) to show that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. “Summary judgment is appropriate if the

nonmoving party fails to meet this burden.” Id.

{¶14} “We review the trial court’s judgment de novo, using the same

standard that the trial court applies under Civ.R. 56(C).” Id. at ¶ 19, citing Grafton
v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). “Accordingly,

we stand in the shoes of the trial court and conduct an independent review of the

record.” Id.

B. Standing

{¶15} In Paluscsak’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

committed prejudicial error holding that he lacked standing to bring his

counterclaim. “‘Standing’ is defined as ‘[a] party’s right to make a legal claim or

seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.’” Torrance v. Rom, 2020-Ohio-3971,

157 N.E.3d 172, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of

Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27, citing

Black’s Law Dictionary 1442 (8th Ed.2004). “A party must establish standing to

sue before a court can consider the merits of a legal claim.” Id., citing Ohio Contrs.

Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088 (1994). “‘To have

standing, a party must have a personal stake in the outcome of a legal controversy

with an adversary.’” Id., quoting Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 322,

2010-Ohio-6036, 944 N.E.2d 207, ¶ 9, citing Ohio Pyro, Inc. at ¶ 27. “The lack of

standing may require a court to dismiss an action.” Id., citing Thies v. Wheelock,

2017-Ohio-8605, 100 N.E.3d 903, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.).

{¶16} “In order for [Paluscsak] to establish standing, he must show he

suffered ‘(1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the appellees’ allegedly unlawful

conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’” Id. at ¶ 24, quoting
Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 22,

citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119

L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). “These three factors comprise the constitutional minimum for

standing.” Id., citing Lujan at 560. “Finally, ‘[i]t is well settled that standing does

not depend on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is

illegal or unconstitutional. Rather, standing turns on the nature and source of the

claim asserted by the plaintiff.’” Id., citing Moore at ¶ 23, citing Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

{¶17} Paluscsak asserts that he has suffered injury from paying his attorney

fees and his usage of vacation time to fight this case. Paluscsak’s injuries “‘must be

concrete and not simply abstract or suspected’ to be compensable.” Cronin v.

Governor of Ohio, 2022-Ohio-829, 186 N.E.3d 851, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting Ohio

Contrs. Assn. at 320. “Further, an injury that is borne by the population in general,

and which does not affect the plaintiff in particular, is not sufficient to confer

standing.” Id., citing State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich, 2013-Ohio-946, 989 N.E.2d

140, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), rev’d on other grounds, 147 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-1176,

59 N.E. 3d 1240. “To show standing, a private litigant

‘must generally show that he or she has suffered or is threatened with
direct and concrete injury in a manner or degree different from that
suffered by the public in general, that the law in question has caused
the injury, and that the relief requested will redress the injury.’”
Id. at ¶ 17, quoting Bowers v. Ohio State Dental Bd., 142 Ohio App.3d 376, 380,

755 N.E.2d 948 (10th Dist.2001), quoting State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial

Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 469-470, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999).

{¶18} Paluscsak’s arguments are misplaced and do not demonstrate the

proper definition of an injury. In order to have standing, Paluscsak must

demonstrate that he was injured by the appellees’ usage of the name St. Vincent

Charity versus St. Vincent Charity Medical Center. Instead, Paluscsak argued that

he was injured from having to pursue this lawsuit. Paluscsak has not demonstrated

he suffered an injury as a result of the use of the hospital’s nickname. The facts are

Paluscsak received an MRI and subsequently did not render payment for the

service. The bill was turned over to a collection agency, who filed a complaint

against Paluscsak for payment. There was no showing of a direct or concrete injury

that Paluscsak suffered from omitting “Medical Center” from the complaint.

{¶19} Therefore, Paluscsak’s first assignment of error is overruled.

C. R.C. 1319.12 and Unauthorized Practice of Law

{¶20} In Paluscsak’s second assignment of error, he argues that the trial

court erred by refusing to consider claims based on collection actions taken in

violation of R.C. 1319.12 and the unauthorized practice of law. Specifically,

Paluscsak contends that there is no direct attorney-client relationship between

SVCMC and the Gusses because UCB selected the attorney and has the sole right
to receive the proceeds of collection. As a result, Paluscsak claims that SVCMC is

misrepresenting its interest and the relationship between the appellees.

{¶21} “‘When a collection agency engages in the unauthorized practice of

law, it constitutes an “action that cannot legally be taken” within the meaning of

the FDCPA.’” Capital One Bank (USA), NA v. Reese, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2014-

P-0034, 2015-Ohio-4023, ¶ 90, quoting Foster v. D.B.S. Collection Agency, 463 F.

Supp. 2d 783, 804 (S.D.Ohio 2006). See, e.g., Poirier v. Alco Collections, Inc., 107

F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that collections agency violated 15 U.S.C.

1692e(5) when it engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by instituting a

lawsuit against a debtor since the debt had not been properly assigned).

{¶22} Paluscsak’s argument is misplaced because he fails to demonstrate

how UCB, as a collection agency, did not adhere to R.C. 1319.12(B) and (C), which

state:

(B) A collection agency with a place of business in this state may take
assignment of another person’s accounts, bills, or other evidences of
indebtedness in its own name for the purpose of billing, collecting, or
filing suit in its own name as the real party in interest.

(C) No collection agency shall commence litigation for the collection
of an assigned account, bill, or other evidence of indebtedness unless
it has taken the assignment in accordance with all of the following
requirements:

(1) The assignment was voluntary, properly executed, and
acknowledged by the person transferring title to the collection
agency.
 (2) The collection agency did not require the assignment as a
condition to listing the account, bill, or other evidence of
indebtedness with the collection agency for collection.

(3) The assignment was manifested by a written agreement
separate from and in addition to any document intended for the
purpose of listing the account, bill, or other evidence of
indebtedness with the collection agency. The written
agreement shall state the effective date of the assignment and
the consideration paid or given, if any, for the assignment and
shall expressly authorize the collection agency to refer the
assigned account, bill, or other evidence of indebtedness to an
attorney admitted to the practice of law in this state for the
commencement of litigation. The written agreement also shall
disclose that the collection agency may consolidate, for
purposes of filing an action, the assigned account, bill, or other
evidence of indebtedness with those of other creditors against
an individual debtor or co-debtors.

(4) Upon the effective date of the assignment to the collection
agency, the creditor’s account maintained by the collection
agency in connection with the assigned account, bill, or other
evidence of indebtedness was canceled.

{¶23} Paluscsak also fails to demonstrate how the Gusses engaged in the

unauthorized practice of law. He simply states that the “Gusses knowingly enabled

the unauthorized practice of law by UCB,” and that “there is no direct attorney

client relationship between the alleged real party in interest (SVCMC) and the

lawyer (Gusses) prosecuting the lawsuit.” We find that Paluscsak’s arguments are

misplaced because SVCMC voluntarily dismissed its action against him and UCB

complied with R.C. 1319.12 by filing suit in its own name as the real party in

interest. Additionally, the Gusses did not engage in the unauthorized practice of

law because they filed suit on behalf of UCB, not SVCMC. Attorneys and law firms
do not engage in the unauthorized practice of law by instituting a legal action to

collect on a debt against the debtor, because they file the action on behalf of the

creditor rather than for themselves. See Reese at ¶ 91.

{¶24} Therefore, Paluscsak’s second assignment of error is overruled.

D. Incorrect Location for Filing of Claim

{¶25} In Paluscsak’s third assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

committed prejudicial error in finding that the appellees did not violate the FDCPA

by filing a collection lawsuit in a court district where he did not reside. The initial

action filed by the appellees was filed in Cleveland Municipal Court and Paluscsak

resides in Garfield Heights. He argues that the failure to file in Garfield Heights

Municipal Court violates 15 U.S.C. 1692i, which states:

Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any
consumer shall —

(1) in the case of an action to enforce an interest in real property
securing the consumer’s obligation, bring such action only in a
judicial district or similar legal entity in which such real
property is located; or

(2) in the case of an action not described in paragraph (1), bring
such action only in the judicial district or similar legal entity —

(A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued
upon; or

(B) in which such consumer resides at the
commencement of the action.
{¶26} The case was moved to the common pleas court in Cuyahoga County, the

county in which Garfield Heights is located, in accordance with R.C. 1319.12(D),

which states:

A collection agency shall commence litigation for the collection of an
assigned account, bill, or other evidence of indebtedness in a court of
competent jurisdiction located in the county in which the debtor
resides, or in the case of co-debtors, a county in which at least one of
the co-debtors resides.

{¶27} Further, Paluscsak did not object to the case being filed in Cleveland

Municipal Court, but rather filed counterclaims. Because Paluscsak did not object

to the action being initiated in Cleveland in his response and counterclaims, we

will review for plain error. “Crim.R. 52 affords appellate courts ‘limited power’ to

correct plain errors that occurred during the trial court proceeding.” State v. Pugh,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111099, 2022-Ohio-3038, ¶ 18, citing State v. Perry, 101

Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 9.

{¶28} Crim.R. 52(B) provides that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting

substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention

of the court.” Under the plain-error standard, “the defendant bears the burden of

‘showing that but for a plain or obvious error, the outcome of the proceeding would

have been otherwise, and reversal must be necessary to correct a manifest

miscarriage of justice.’” State v. West, 168 Ohio St.3d 605, 2022-Ohio-1556, 200

N.E.3d 1048, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-

4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 16.
 {¶29} The case was moved to the common pleas court, which has the

jurisdiction to hear the case because he resides in Cuyahoga County. Additionally,

SVCMC voluntarily dropped their complaint from the municipal court; thus, the

county court had the proper jurisdiction.

{¶30} Therefore, Paluscsak’s third assignment of error is overruled.

E. FDCPA and OCSPA Violations

{¶31} In Paluscsak’s fourth and fifth assignments of error, he argues that

the trial court erred when it failed to find that the appellees violated the FDCPA

and OCSPA by filing a lawsuit under St. Vincent Charity rather than St. Vincent

Charity Medical Center. Paluscsak further claims that the filing constituted a false,

deceptive, or misleading representation on the part of the appellees, in violation of

15 U.S.C. 1692e(5), which states:

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.
Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the
following conduct is a violation of this section:

***

(5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is
not intended to be taken.

{¶32} Paluscsak does not demonstrate that the appellees used any false,

deceptive, or misleading representations in order to get him to pay the outstanding

bill. See Stout v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-42, 2021-

Ohio-609, where Stout filed a verified complaint against defendants, alleging
abuse of process, defamation, violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

and the Consumer Sales Practices Act. The Stout Court held “an attorney can only

be held liable if he acts maliciously and has an ulterior purpose which is completely

separate from his client’s interest.” Id. at ¶ 72. “[T]he ulterior motive

contemplated by an abuse of process claim generally involves an attempt to gain

an advantage outside the proceeding, using the process itself as the threat.” Id. at

¶ 76, quoting Sivinsky v. Kelley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94296, 2011-Ohio-2145,

¶ 36. Paluscsak has failed to establish an ulterior motive outside the process itself

to obtain payment on the account. Id. at ¶ 78.

{¶33} Additionally, we previously determined that Paluscsak lacked

standing to bring an action under FDCPA and OCSPA regarding the use of the

abbreviated name, St. Vincent Charity, because he failed to demonstrate he

suffered an injury as a result.

{¶34} Therefore, Paluscsak’s fourth and fifth assignments of error are

overruled.

III. Motion to Compel

A. Standard of Review

{¶35} “We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to compel

for an abuse of discretion.” United States Specialty Sports Assn. v. Majni, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110830, 2022-Ohio-3035, ¶ 14, citing Wolnik v. Matthew J.

Messina, DDS, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88139, 2007-Ohio-1446, ¶ 15.
 {¶36} “The Ohio Supreme Court recently explained that an abuse of

discretion ‘involves more than a difference in opinion * * *.’” State v. Price, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111921, 2023-Ohio-3790, ¶ 32, quoting State v. Weaver, 171

Ohio St.3d 429, 2022-Ohio-4371, 218 N.E.3d 806, ¶ 24. “That is, a trial court’s

judgment that is ‘profoundly and wholly violative of fact and reason’ constitutes an

abuse of discretion.” Id.

B. Law and Analysis

{¶37} In Paluscsak’s sixth assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his motions to compel discovery from UCB and

the Gusses regarding their contractual relationships and communications about

actions taken against him. On August 26, 2021, Paluscsak filed a motion to compel

discovery from the Gusses and, on September 20, 2021, filed the same motion

against UCB. On December 13, 2021, the trial court denied both motions. “Courts

have broad discretion over discovery matters.” Huntington Natl. Bank v. Dixon,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101273, 2015-Ohio-1735, ¶ 19, citing State ex rel. Citizens

for Open, Responsive & Accountable Govt. v. Register, 116 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-

Ohio-5542, 876 N.E.2d 913, ¶ 18. Paluscsak has not demonstrated how the trial

court abused its discretion in its denial of his motion to compel attorney-client

communications.

{¶38} UCB hired the Gusses to file a debt collection action against

Paluscsak. UCB entered into a written attorney-client agreement and provided that
agreement to Paluscsak, who continually argues that there is no agreement

between the parties. Further, Paluscsak has not demonstrated why the

communications between client UCB and attorneys the Gusses are essential to his

case or claims. Additionally, the communications are considered privileged. “‘The

attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential

communications.’” Total Quality Logistics, LLC v. BBI Logistics LLC, 12th Dist.

Clermont No. CA2021-04-012, 2022-Ohio-1440, ¶ 19, quoting Swidler & Berlin v.

United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 141 L.Ed.2d 379 (1998). “It

‘exempts from the discovery process certain communications between attorneys

and their clients.’” Id., quoting Cargotec, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 155

Ohio App.3d 653, 2003-Ohio-7257, 802 N.E.2d 732, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.).

{¶39} Therefore, Paluscsak’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶40} Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR