State v. Young

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
v. )
) I.D. No. 2304008917
DEVON D. YOUNG, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: October 20, 2023
Decided: January 31, 2024

OPINION

Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence

DENIED

Evan D. Sweeney, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Dover,
Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Cara M. Brophy, Esquire, Office of Defense Services, Dover, Delaware, Attorney
for Defendant.

Primos, J.
 Before the Court is a Motion to Suppress filed by Defendant Devon Young
based on evidence that was seized from his home because he had allegedly violated
the terms of his probation. Because the motion raised a legal issue, the Court held
oral argument, and supplemental briefing followed.
Defendant Devon Young argues that 11 Del. C. § 4321(d), which addresses
warrantless searches of probationers, is unambiguous and allows searches only of
probationers’ persons, not of their homes. The State agrees that Subsection 4321(d)
is unambiguous but argues, contrary to the defense, that it authorizes searches of
probationers’ homes as well as their persons. The State argues in the alternative that,
should the Court find the statute ambiguous, available legislative history establishes
the General Assembly’s intent to codify the then-current practice of allowing
probation officers to search probationers’ homes as well as their persons.
In the Court’s view, Subsection 4321(d) is ambiguous because there are two
reasonable, but divergent, interpretations of its plain language. After reviewing the
pertinent legislative history for House Bill 524, the Court finds that the legislature’s
intent was for “searches of individuals” to include probationers’ homes as well as
their persons. This finding is further buttressed by the legal principle of stare decisis.
For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Defendant Devon Young’s Motion
to Suppress should be DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
On April 17, 2023, members of the Delaware State Police (“DSP”) Kent
County Governor’s Task Force and Dover Probation and Parole responded to a
probation check at 3978 Barratts Chapel Road in Frederica, Delaware, with negative
results.2 At that time, Defendant Devon Young (“Mr. Young”) was on Level III

1
Citations in the form of “Ex. __” refer to the exhibits accompanying the motions and
supplemental briefs. Citations in the form of “(D.I. __)” refer to docket items.
2
Mot. to Suppress [hereinafter “Def.’s Mot.”] at 2 (D.I. 9).
2
probation.3 Mr. Young was contacted by two law enforcement officers—his
supervising officer, PO James, and DSP Detective Ciglinsky—at 10544 South
DuPont Highway in Felton, Delaware.4 Mr. Young was handcuffed for a purported
curfew violation, placed into Detective Ciglinsky’s vehicle, and transported back to
3978 Barratts Chapel Road without incident.5
Subsequently, Mr. Young’s residence was subjected to an approved
administrative search that revealed a large amount of drugs, paraphernalia, and
cash.6 On July 3, 2023, Mr. Young was indicted on four counts of Drug Dealing,
three counts of Drug Possession, one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance,
and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.7
Title 11 Del. C. § 4321(d) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Probation and parole officers shall exercise the same powers as
constables under the laws of this State and may conduct searches of
individuals under probation and parole supervision in accordance with
Department [of Correction] procedures while in the performance of the
lawful duties of their employment ….8

On August 16, 2023, Mr. Young filed a motion to suppress evidence that was
found at his residence (the “Motion”), arguing that 11 Del. C. § 4321(d) is
unambiguous in that the General Assembly intended to authorize probation officers
to conduct “searches of individuals,” i.e., warrantless searches of individual
probationers, but not of their homes or vehicles.9 Prior to searching a probationer’s
home, according to Mr. Young, a probation officer must first obtain a search warrant

3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
11 Del. C. § 4321(d).
9
Def.’s Mot. at 3.
3
based upon probable cause.10 In advancing this argument, Mr. Young points to the
Delaware Supreme Court’s statement that “[p]articularly when conducting
warrantless searches, probation officers may act only pursuant to explicit statutory
authority.”11 According to Mr. Young, Department of Correction (“DOC”)
Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 (“Procedure 7.19”)12 exceeds that statutory
authority in purporting to authorize warrantless searches of probationers’
residences.13
In its written response filed on September 12, 2023, the State agreed that
Subsection 4321(d) is unambiguous, but argued that it unambiguously authorizes
searches of probationers’ homes and vehicles as well as their persons.14 The State

10
Id. at 4.
11
Id. at 3 (quoting McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1125 (Del. 2002)).
12
See State of Delaware DOC Bureau of Community Corrections Probation and Parole Procedure
No. 7.19 (amended effective June 5, 2001) [hereinafter “Procedure 7.19”]. Subsequent to the
events at issue in this case, on June 30, 2023, Procedure 7.19 was amended. The 2001 version of
Procedure 7.19, the version applicable here, allows for administrative searches of probationers’
“living quarters, common areas, surrounding property, and automobile(s).” Id. at 14 § VI.G.1.b. It
further defines “Search/Living Quarters and Property” as “[a] search of the offender’s living
quarters, which should be confined to the area actually occupied by the offender, and may include
common areas such as kitchen, bathroom, … etc. and the offender’s property, i.e., [automobile].”
Id. at 3 § IV.4. See also Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d 825, 829 (Del. 2008); Jacklin v. State, 16 A.3d
938, 2011 WL 809684, at *2 (Del. Mar. 8, 2011) (TABLE). Procedure 7.19 also provides that
the following factors should be considered when deciding whether to search: [1]
The Officer has knowledge or sufficient reason to believe [that] the offender
possesses contraband; [2] The Officer has knowledge or sufficient reason to believe
[that] the offender is in violation of probation or parole; [3] There is information
from a reliable informant indicating [that] the offender possesses contraband or is
violating the law; [4] The information from the informant is corroborated; [5]
Approval for the search has been obtained from a Supervisor.
Sierra, 958 A.2d at 829 (alterations in original). See also id. at n.17 (citing Procedure 7.19
§ VI.E.).
13
Def.’s Mot. at 3. Notably, Mr. Young does not argue that Delaware courts have “never allowed
admin [sic] searches of probationers [sic] homes – in fact defendant concedes that numerous courts
have done so [ ]; rather, defendant argues that the issue presented here – whether the statute upon
which those searches rely supports such searches – has not been raised before, or addressed by the
Court.” Id. at n.3.
14
State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Suppress [hereinafter “State’s Resp. to Mot.”] at 8–10, 12 (D.I.
19).
4
pointed to the language “in accordance with Department procedures”—i.e., because
Procedure 7.19 authorizes warrantless searches of probationers’ homes and vehicles
as well as their persons, the statutory language authorizes such searches.15 The State
further relied upon Supreme Court precedent finding that Subsection 4321(d)
authorizes searches of probationers’ homes, as well as a bench decision of this Court
finding Subsection 4321(d) to be unambiguous in authorizing such searches.16
On September 20, 2023, the Court held oral argument on the Motion. At the
close of the argument, the Court shared with the parties its inclination to find
Subsection 4321(d) ambiguous and asked the parties to address, in supplemental
briefing, five questions germane to the interpretation of the statute: (1) an
explanation of the record of the committee vote on House Bill 524 (“HB 524”);17 (2)
what, if any, additional legislative history exists regarding HB 524; (3) whether the
fact that Subsection 4231(d) has been interpreted for over thirty years to authorize
searches of probationers’ residences, along with the fact that the General Assembly
has not amended it during that period, sheds light on the appropriate interpretation
of the provision; (4) the importance of committee reports as legislative history; and
(5) the relevance to this case, if any, of the Delaware Supreme Court decision in
State v. Barnes.18 On October 20, 2023, both parties submitted their supplemental
briefs.19

15
Id. at 4–8.
16
Id. at 8–10 (citing id. Ex. A (State v. McCary, I.D. No. 2005003004-MAA (Del. Super. Aug.
13, 2021) (TRANSCRIPT) (Bench Op. Tr.))).
17
Del. H.B. 524, 135th Gen. Assem. (1990). When HB 524 was enacted on Oct. 5, 1990, it deleted
the former 11 Del. C. § 4321 and substituted a revised Section 4321 in its place, including the
current Subsection 4321(d), which has since remained unaltered.
18
116 A.3d 883 (Del. 2015); Hr’g on Mot. to Suppress Sept. 20, 2023 [hereinafter “Hr’g Tr.”] at
37–40 (D.I. 23).
19
Suppl. to Mot. to Suppress [hereinafter “Def.’s Suppl.”] (D.I. 26); State’s Suppl. Resp. to Def.’s
Mot. to Suppress [hereinafter “State’s Suppl.”] (D.I. 27).
5
 DISCUSSION
To justify a warrantless search and seizure, the State must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the officer’s actions complied “with the
requirements of the United States Constitution, the Delaware Constitution, and any
applicable statutes.”20
By consenting to probationary supervision, offenders “sacrifice some of their
privacy rights in exchange for freedom from incarceration.”21 Our Supreme Court
has consistently held that probation officers have authorization to conduct
warrantless administrative searches of probationers’ homes.22 The Supreme Court
has also held that a probation officer needs only “a reasonable suspicion or
reasonable grounds to justify an administrative search of a residence or car,”23 and
that probation officers act “reasonably so long as they substantially comply with
[DOC] regulations.”24 DOC Procedure 7.19 was promulgated pursuant to statutory

20
State v. Garnett, 2021 WL 6109797, at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 23, 2021) (citations omitted).
21
Sierra, 958 A.2d at 832 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987); McAllister v.
State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Del. 2002)).
22
See, e.g., McAllister, 807 A.2d at 1124 (acknowledging that “[p]robation officers have authority
to detain probationers and execute searches of their persons or property only to the extent granted
to them by the General Assembly” but nonetheless finding administrative search of probationer’s
residence proper); Fuller v. State, 844 A.2d 290, 291 (Del. 2004) (holding administrative search
of probationer’s vehicle lawful although officers departed from departmental guidelines); Donald
v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 319 (Del. 2006) (holding administrative search of probationer’s residence
was reasonable); King v. State, 984 A.2d 1205, 1208–10 (Del. 2009) (affirming denial of motion
to suppress where probation officers substantially complied with Procedure 7.19’s requirements
for administrative search of probationer’s home); Pendleton v. State, 990 A.2d 417, 420 (Del.
2010) (holding that probation officer substantially complied with DOC procedures for warrantless
administrative search of probationer’s apartment); Jacklin, 2011 WL 809684, at *2–3 (upholding
administrative search of defendant’s home when probation officer exercised substantial
compliance with Procedure 7.19, which was adopted pursuant to Subsection 4321(d)); Gibson v.
State, 135 A.3d 78 2016 WL 943842, at *1–2 (Del. Mar. 11, 2016) (TABLE) (holding officers had
reasonable basis for searching defendant’s residence pursuant to administrative search warrant).
23
Murray v. State, 45 A.3d 670, 678 (Del. 2012). See also Lloyd v. State, 292 A.3d 100, 106 (Del.
2023) (“Administrative searches must be supported by reasonable suspicion to be in compliance
with Procedure 7.19.”).
24
Murray, 45 A.3d at 678.
6
 authority under Subsection 4321(d),25 and thus, lack of substantial compliance with
it is a statutory violation warranting exclusion of evidence.26
I. TITLE 11 DEL. C. § 4321(d) IS AMBIGUOUS.

When construing a statute, the Court must first examine its text to address
whether it is ambiguous.27 In doing so, the Court considers whether (1) the statute
is reasonably susceptible of different conclusions or interpretations, or (2) a literal
interpretation of its words would lead to “a result so unreasonable or absurd it could
not have been intended by the legislature.”28
If the Court finds that there is uncertainty, then “rules of statutory construction
are applied … [and] the statute must be viewed as a whole, and literal or perceived
interpretations which yield mischievous or absurd results are to be avoided.”29
Ambiguity is not found in a situation in which the parties merely disagree about the

25
King, 984 A.2d at 1208; see also Pendleton, 990 A.2d at 419–20 (“[Subs]ection 4321(d) of the
Delaware Code invests authority in probation and parole officers to conduct warrantless
searches[.]”).
26
See, e.g., Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 7 n.1 (Del. 2008) (“Because we find that probation officers
violated their clear statutory mandate, we do not reach any constitutional questions.” (citing Downs
v. Jacobs, 272 A.2d 706, 707 (Del. 1970))); Walker v. State, 205 A.3d 823, 826 (Del. 2019)
(explaining that failure to determine reasonable suspicion in accordance with Procedure 7.19 is a
statutory violation apart from the constitutional argument warranting suppression at a violation of
probation hearing); Lloyd, 292 A.3d at 105 (“Delaware statutory law governs the exercise of the
power of probation officers to search and arrest probationers without a warrant.”). See also State
v. Monroe, 2015 WL 721441, at *4 n.5, *6–7 (Del. Super. Feb. 18, 2015) (denying motion to
suppress because administrative search of probationer’s residence was reasonable due to
substantial compliance with Subsection 4321(d) and Procedure 7.19); State v. Holmes, 2018 WL
5078014, at *5 (Del. Super. Oct. 16, 2018) (denying motion to suppress because there was
reasonable suspicion and administrative search substantially complied with Procedure 7.19); State
v. Love, 2018 WL 4672904, at *2–5 (Del. Super. Sept. 27, 2018) (finding there was reasonable
suspicion and probation officer fully complied with Procedure 7.19; thus, administrative search of
residence was lawful); State v. Swiggett, 2019 WL 245292, at *4–5 (Del. Super. Jan. 15, 2019)
(finding there was reasonable suspicion, and thus evidence seized from probationer’s bedroom was
result of lawful administrative search).
27
Snyder v. Andrews, 708 A.2d 237, 241 (Del. 1998); Doroshow, Pasquale, Krawitz & Bhaya v.
Nanticoke Mem. Hosp., Inc., 36 A.3d 336, 342–43 (Del. 2012).
28
Snyder, 708 A.2d at 241.
29
Spielberg v. State, 558 A.2d 291, 293 (Del. 1989).
7
meaning of the statutory language.30 If the intent of the legislature is clearly reflected
by the unambiguous language in the statute, then there is no need for statutory
interpretation because the plain meaning of the words controls.31 “The legislative
body is presumed to have inserted every provision for some useful purpose and
construction[.]”32
Mr. Young argues that the language of 11 Del. C. § 4321(d) is unambiguous
in that it does not authorize administrative searches of anything beyond a
probationer’s person because (1) the terms “home” or “vehicle” are not expressly
included, but only “individual” is, and (2) the exclusion of “home” and “vehicle” is
important because these terms or their equivalents are included in other statutory or
constitutional provisions but not in Subsection 4321(d).33 Conversely, the State
argues that the language unambiguously allows searches of probationers’ homes,34
but that even if the Court finds the statute ambiguous, Subsection 4321(d) authorizes
administrative searches of probationers’ homes and vehicles because (1) the
legislative history of HB 524 makes clear the intent behind the legislature’s use of
the word “individual,” and (2) the statute has been judicially construed as such for

30
Ross v. State, 990 A.2d 424, 429 (Del. 2010) (citing Stop & Shop Cos., Inc. v. Gonzales, 619
A.2d 896, 899 (Del. 1993) (citing Centaur P’rs v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 927 (Del.
1990))).
31
Ingram v. Thorpe, 747 A.2d 545, 547 (Del. 2000); Spielberg, 558 A.2d at 293; LeVan v. Indep.
Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 933 (Del. 2007); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Del. Dept. of Ins., 2006 WL 3457623,
at *3 (Del. Super. Nov. 29, 2006) (“When the statute is unambiguous, the plain language of the
statute controls.” (citations omitted)).
32
Paul v. New Castle Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 1993 WL 485925, at *2 n.1 (Del. Super. Oct. 25,
1993) (citing C & T Assocs. v. Gov’t of New Castle, 408 A.2d 27, 29 (Del. Ch. 1979)).
33
Def.’s Mot. at 3. Although it is not explicitly referenced by Mr. Young, he appears to rely upon
the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a principle of statutory construction providing
that the “expression of one thing is the exclusion of another” and that “where a form of conduct,
the manner of its performance and operation, and the persons and things to which it refers are
affirmatively or negatively designated, there is an inference that all omissions were intended by
the legislature.” Brown v. State, 36 A.3d 321, 325 (Del. 2012) (citations omitted).
34
State’s Resp. to Mot. at 11–12.
8
decades with no amendment or change to it.35
The Court finds that Subsection 4321(d) is ambiguous because it is reasonably
susceptible of two different conclusions or interpretations. One is that “searches of
individuals” includes only searches of probationers’ persons, not their homes. The
second is that “searches of individuals” includes searches of probationers’ persons
and homes. For the following reasons, both interpretations are reasonable.
A. The Defense’s Interpretation
As to the first interpretation of Subsection 4321(d), it is a reasonable position
that “searches of individuals” on its face, and giving its express words their plain
meaning, includes only probationers’ persons, not their homes.
An “individual” is defined as (1) “a single human being or item as distinct
from a group” and (2) “a distinctive or original person.”36 It is therefore reasonable
to interpret “searches of individuals” to mean searches of individual probationers but
not their homes or vehicles. As Mr. Young argues, in 11 Del. C. § 2301, the
legislature expressly stated that “[n]o person shall search any person, house,
building, conveyance, place or other thing ….”37 The argument follows that had the
General Assembly intended for probationary searches to include residences,
vehicles, or other places in addition to probationers’ persons, the General Assembly
would have listed them, as it did in Section 2301.

35
Id. at 12–13; see generally State’s Suppl. at 2–13.
36
Individual, Concise Oxford English Dictionary (12th ed. 2011). Another definition provides that
an individual is “existing as an indivisible entity” and “of, relating to, or involving a single person
or thing, as opposed to a group.” Individual, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (cleaned up).
37
Def.’s Mot. at 5 (citing 11 Del. C. § 2301).
9
B. The State’s Interpretation
As mentioned supra, the General Assembly chose to list the various places
and entities subject to search in Section 2301: “person, house, building, conveyance,
place, or other thing.”38 Although Subsection 4321(d) does not similarly list the
subjects of a potential search, it is significant that the word “person,” which is used
in Section 2301, does not appear in Subsection 4321(d). The Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article 1 § 6 of the Delaware Constitution also
employ the term “person” (specifically, the plural form of that word) in describing
the places and entities subject to search.39 There is a plausible argument, therefore,
that if the General Assembly had intended to limit Subsection 4321(d) to searches
of individuals’ “persons” and not their houses, buildings, conveyances, places, or
things, then it would have employed the specific term “persons” rather than the
broader term “individuals.”
Because the Court finds that Subsection 4321(d) is susceptible of two
different, yet plausible, interpretations of the meaning of “searches of individuals,”
the Court must now engage in statutory interpretation.40 The Court begins with the
legislative history of HB 524.41

38
11 Del. C. § 2301.
39
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (emphasis supplied)); Del. Const.
art. I, § 6 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
thing, shall issue without describing them as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there be
probably cause supported by oath or affirmation.” (emphasis supplied)).
40
See Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2006 WL 3457623, at *3 (“[I]f the statute is ambiguous, then it is the role
of the judiciary to construe it in a manner that is consistent with the legislative intent.” (citations
omitted)).
41
See Noranda Aluminum Hldg. Corp. v. XL Ins. Am., Inc., 269 A.3d 974, 978 (Del. 2021) (“If
there is a legitimate ambiguity, we consult the canons of statutory construction and may consider
legislative history.”).
10
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY’S INTENT WAS TO AUTHORIZE SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUAL
PROBATIONERS’ HOMES AS WELL AS THEIR PERSONS.

“[T]he fundamental rule [of statutory construction] is to ascertain and to give
effect to the intent of the legislature.”42 In doing so, the Court can, and should, look
to legislative history.43 “Legislative history is defined . . . as the proceedings leading
to the enactment of a statute, including hearings, committee reports, and floor
debates.”44
Three items of legislative history have been provided by the parties to the
Court.45 The first is the minutes from the March 14, 1990, meeting of the House
Corrections Committee regarding HB 524 (the “Committee Minutes”).46 The second
is the Corrections Committee’s Report (the “Committee Report”), also dated March
14, 1990, releasing HB 524 to the full House.47 The third is an audio recording of
the House’s floor deliberation and vote on HB 524 (the “House Deliberation
Audio”); both the deliberation and vote occurred on March 27, 1990.48

42
State v. Ford, 1996 WL 190783, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 26, 1996) (citing Coastal Barge Corp.
v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control. Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Del. 1985)). See also Arnold v. State,
49 A.3d 1180, 1184 (Del. 2012) (“[T]he role of t[he Supreme] Court when construing a statute is
to give effect to the policy intended by the General Assembly.” (quoting State v. Fletcher, 974
A.2d 188, 196–97 (Del. 2009))).
43
Rubick v. Sec. Instrument Corp., 766 A.2d 15, 18 (Del. 2000).
44
Pizzadili P’rs, LLC v. Kent Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2016 WL 4502005, at *4 n.28 (Del. Super.
Aug. 26, 2016) (cleaned up), aff'd sub nom. LTR Props., LLC v. Pizzadili P’rs, LLC, 157 A.3d 757
(Del. 2017). The terms “floor debate” and “deliberations” are synonymous and are used
interchangeably hereinafter.
45
There is also, of course, the final written form of HB 524 and its synopsis. See State’s Resp. to
Mot. Ex. B, at 2 (Del. H.B. 524 syn., 135th Gen. Assem. (1990)). The synopsis refers generally
to “searches” and therefore sheds no light on the issue before the Court. Id.
46
State’s Suppl. Ex. A [hereinafter “Committee Minutes”].
47
Def.’s Mot. Ex. A [hereinafter “Committee Report”].
48
See generally State’s Suppl. Ex. B, HB 524 - House Audio [hereinafter “House Deliberation
Audio”]. See also State v. O’Dell, 2017 WL 923461, at *7 (Del. Super. Mar. 1, 2017) (using
legislative debates as part of the legislative record).
11
 Before the Court proceeds, some basic context about the life of a proposed
bill in the General Assembly is necessary. A bill begins in its chamber of origin
(e.g., House or Senate), but usually within a smaller committee of that chamber.49
A committee member who votes “favorable” for a proposed bill “recommends the
full Chamber pass the legislation.”50 A committee member who votes “on its merits”
for a bill “recommends the Chamber take action on the legislation, but … does not
take a position on what action should be taken.”51 “If a majority of the committee
members sign the original backer, [then] the legislation is released from committee”
to the full chamber.52 Once there, if passed, the bill proceeds to the other chamber
for approval.53 If the bill passes the second chamber, it makes its way to the
Governor’s desk to be signed into law.54

49
A committee is described as an “appointed group of legislators who meet to consider and make
recommendations concerning the disposition of legislation and conduct investigations on behalf
of the House or Senate.” Glossary of Legislative Terms, DEL. GEN. ASSEM.,
https://legis.delaware.gov/resources/glossaryofterms (last visited Jan. 30, 2024) [hereinafter
Legislative Glossary].
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
MARK J. CUTRONA, LEGIS. COUNCIL DIV. OF RSCH., DELAWARE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING
MANUAL 153 (Holly Vaughn Wagner ed., 4th ed. 2022). As a practical matter, how legislators
vote is inconsequential for releasing it to chamber; rather, “[l]egislation could conceivably be
released with a majority of the committee signing the backer and indicating an ‘Unfavorable’
opinion.” Id.
53
Id. at 155. A majority consists of 21 in the House and 11 in the Senate. Id.
54
Id. at 157.
12
A. The Committee Minutes55
Pursuant to the Committee Minutes, the Corrections Committee members
sought to codify “current practices such as [probation officers’] authority to search
individuals . . . .”56 In response to Representative Houghton’s concern over “the
granting of additional powers” to probation officers “given their adversarial
relationship with the probationers[,]” Representative Davis explained that “these are
powers currently in practice.”57 Representative Davis also requested “an attorney’s
opinion on the scope of the officer’s authority to search, making it clear that the
intent is not to permit searches of their premises.”58 Ultimately, the bill was released
from committee with one “favorable” vote and three “on its merit [sic].”59
B. The Committee Report60
Delaware courts have frequently cited to committee reports as persuasive
sources of legislative history,61 and they are generally given greater weight than any
other source of legislative history.62

55
Minutes are described as the “[r]ecord of the proceedings of a committee. These must include
the results of any committee votes and may include the reason for a member’s dissent from a
committee decision.” Legislative Glossary, supra note 49. Minutes “usually contain a list of those
in attendance at the meeting, the results of the committee votes taken, and comments from those
present.” CUTRONA, supra note 52, at 153.
56
Committee Minutes at 3.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
A Committee Report is “[t]he official release of legislation from a committee signed by the
members of the committee and indicating their opinions of the legislation[.]” Legislative Glossary,
supra note 49.
61
See, e.g., Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056, 1065 (Del. 1986) (using House
committee report to determine legislative history); Sternberg v. Nanticoke v. Mem’l Hosp., Inc.,
2009 WL 3531791, at *9 n.23 (Del. Super. Sept. 18, 2009) (“Consequently, the Court cites to the
committee report as have nearly all other courts who have addressed the considerable legislative
history of the HCQIA.”), aff’d, 15 A.3d 1225 (Del. 2011); Pizzadili P’rs, 2016 WL 4502005, at
*4 n.28 (noting usefulness of committee reports); Tilden v. Hayward, 1990 WL 131162, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 10, 1990) (using both House and Senate Committee reports for legislative history).
62
United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 7, 2004) (“The most
enlightening source of legislative history is generally a committee report … which we have
13
 Like the Committee Minutes, the Committee Report, which is also dated
March 14, 1990, indicates that the purpose of HB 524 was to “codify practices
currently in use,” including “searches of the individual.”63 Moreover, while the
Committee Minutes are not clear on this point, the Committee Report states that the
Committee as a whole “agreed that the [probation] officers should have the authority
to search the individual; not his or her premises.”64 Finally, while the Committee
Minutes indicated that an attorney’s opinion on the allowable scope of the search
was being requested, the Committee Report indicated that the opinion had already
been obtained: “Attorney opinion does not grant them authority to search
premises.”65
Thus, it appears that, at least at that point in time, Corrections Committee
members understood that HB 524 did not authorize probation officers to conduct
warrantless searches of probationers’ homes. Corrections Committee members may
also have understood that applicable legal authority prohibited officers from doing
so.
There is one additional inconsistency between the Committee Minutes and the
Committee Report: according to the Committee Report, the vote releasing HB 524
to the full chamber was one favorable and four on its merit, not one favorable and
three on its merit.66

identified as among ‘the most authoritative and reliable materials of legislative history.’” (citation
omitted)).
63
Committee Report.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Compare id. with Committee Minutes at 3.
14
C. The House Deliberation Audio67
Before there is a vote by the chamber, a period of time is allowed for floor
debate, which is also part of the legislative history.68 Despite the prominent position
of committee reports in legislative history, “[c]ommittee reports … do not embody
the law. [The legislature] votes on the statutory words, not on different expressions
packaged in committee reports.”69
The State argues that the House Deliberation Audio “makes clear” the intent
of the legislature behind HB 524 because “Rep. Houghton, likely Rep. Davis and …
the House as a whole, subsequently held a different understanding of probation
officers’ authority to search probationers’ residences in the moments leading up to
the vote,”70 whereas the Committee Report “reflects only the views of a small
number of House legislators at a particular point in time [i.e., prior to the vote].”71
The Court agrees.
It appears from the House Deliberation Audio that, by the time of the floor
debate on March 27, 1990, the understanding of key committee members regarding
both the scope and the purpose of HB 524 had changed.72 In response to a question
from Representative Brady about the propriety of probationer searches in relation to

67
The House Deliberation Audio constituted the third and final reading of HB 524. House
Deliberation Audio at 1:7–27.
68
O’Dell, 2017 WL 923461, at *4–5, *7. For HB 524, there was no substantive dialogue or
deliberation in the Senate that is worth noting other than the unanimous approval. See generally
State’s Suppl. Ex B., HB 524 - Senate Audio 3 [hereinafter “Senate Audio 3”]. In the State’s
supplemental briefing, it included the House Deliberation Audio and three Senate recordings as
part of its Exhibit B. Only Senate Audio 3 provides information pertinent to the Court’s analysis
of the relevant legislative history. It is referenced as Senate Audio 3 to avoid any confusion when
referencing State’s Exhibit B.
69
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
70
State’s Suppl. at 4.
71
Id. at 12.
72
The parties have not provided any sources of legislative history explaining key committee
members’ apparent change in understanding between March 14, 1990, and the House’s
deliberations and vote on March 27, 1990.
15
the probationers’ constitutional rights, Representative Davis responded:
Currently, they already are . . . conducting searches and there is case
law which has upheld the right of probation and parole officers to
conduct searches. This is simply putting into the Code . . . something
that is already being done under . . . rules and regulations . . . .73

Later in the deliberations, Representative Houghton explained the following
regarding probation officers’ then-current practices:
[I]f [probationers] don’t show up or they violate their probation in any
way, there is such a thing as a warrant that [probation officers] can sign
right there for the violation of probation, go to the house, get the person,
and take ‘em from the house . . . The Court has given them the power
to do that. So they actually can sign their own warrant, pick the person
up, search him or the premises while they’re there, bring the person in
to Court for a hearing on a violation of probation.74

In response to a question from Representative Brady about whether this
conduct by probation officers was “sanctioned by Code,” Representative Houghton
responded, “[T]hat’s why it’s being put in the Code . . . [I]t’s being done now, and
the Court has condoned it and given them the power to do this.”75
Thus, it is evident from the Deliberation Audio that Committee members
Houghton and Davis, at the time of the deliberations, (1) no longer believed that a
warrantless search of a probationer’s home by a probation officer was objectionable
per se on constitutional or other legal grounds, and (2) no longer believed that
allowing such a search was against legal advice.
In addition, the understanding expressed by Representatives Houghton and
Davis during the deliberations that HB 524 would codify then-existing probation
practices concerning searches of probationers, which included warrantless searches

73
House Deliberation Audio at 6:48–7:27.
74
Id. at 9:15–10:15 (emphasis supplied).
75
Id. at 10:18–39.
16
 of probationers’ homes as well as their persons, and their communication of that
understanding to the full House, is crucial in discerning legislative intent: when
“seeking the legislative intent, [the Court] give[s] due weight to the practices and
policies existing at the time [the statute] was enacted[.]”76 Finally, it is significant
that, during the deliberations, no member of the House expressed an opinion or belief
that the practice of searching probationers’ homes was unconstitutional, nor is there
any evidence that legal advice to that effect was ever provided to the full chamber.77
Following the House floor deliberation, the members present voted
unanimously for approval of HB 524.78 Subsequently, on September 25, 1990, HB
524 was unanimously approved by the Senate.79
Thus, the legislative history surrounding HB 524 clarifies any ambiguity
surrounding the phrase “searches of individuals” and demonstrates that the General
Assembly intended to authorize probation officers to conduct warrantless searches
of individual probationers’ homes as well as their persons.
III. STARE DECISIS ALSO SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT SUBSECTION 4321(d)
AUTHORIZES SEARCHES OF PROBATIONERS’ HOMES.

In addition to the clear legislative history discussed supra, the principle of
stare decisis also supports confirmation of the interpretation of Subsection 4321(d)
that the Delaware Supreme Court and other Delaware courts have followed for
decades, i.e., that the statute authorizes warrantless searches of probationers’ homes

76
Council 81, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. and Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO v. State, Dep’t of Fin., 293
A.2d 567, 571 (Del. 1972).
77
See generally House Deliberation Audio. In the Court’s view, mere inquiry about the
constitutionality of HB 524 is distinguishable from expressing an opinion that it is
unconstitutional.
78
The final vote was 39 “yes” and 2 “absent.” Id. at 17:3–8. Notably, Representative Houghton
voted to approve HB 524 after he received clarity about courts’ having approved of searches of
probationers in accordance with then-existing DOC practices. Id. at 12:35–13:56; id. at 16:3–6.
79
Senate Audio 3 at 3:2–9. This vote constituted the Senate’s final reading of HB 524. Id. at 0:42–
5.
17
in addition to their persons.80
Mr. Young argues that (1) the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
specific question raised regarding the meaning of Subsection 4321(d), and (2) the
reenactment canon of judicial interpretation is not at play because that applies only
to affirmative acts by the legislature, not inaction.81 The Court is not persuaded by
either argument.
The 2015 Delaware Supreme Court decision in State v. Barnes82 is instructive
and, in the Court’s view, controlling. In Barnes, the issue was whether provisions
of the Truth in Sentencing Act of 1989 (the “TIS Act”), which abolished parole for
Titles 11 and 16 of the Delaware Code, applied to felony DUI offenses under 21 Del.
C. § 4177.83 There, it was the State that attempted to overturn decades-long
precedent.84 Specifically, the State argued that, because the TIS Act applied to “all
crimes” committed after a certain date, and because under the TIS Act “[n]o sentence
to Level V incarceration imposed pursuant to this Section is subject to parole,” 85
felony DUI offenses, along with other felonies, were not subject to parole, despite
the fact that both the Superior Court and the Board of Parole had for many years
operated under the assumption that the provisions of the TIS Act statute eliminating
parole did not apply to felony DUI offenses.86

80
See, e.g., IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32 (2005) (“Considerations of stare decisis are
particularly forceful in the area of statutory construction, especially when a unanimous
interpretation of a statute has been accepted as settled law for several decades.”); Council 81, 293
A.2d at 571 (“ A long-standing, practical, and plausible administrative interpretation of a statute
of doubtful meaning will be accepted by this Court as indicative of legislative intent.” (citation
omitted)).
81
Def.’s Suppl. at 5.
82
116 A.3d 883 (Del. 2015).
83
Id. at 884.
84
Id. at 892.
85
Id. at 885 (alteration in original).
86
Id. at 888 & n.25.
18
 The Supreme Court disagreed and found for the defendant.87 As the Court
explained,
When a statute has been applied by courts and state agencies in a
consistent way for a period of years, that is strong evidence in favor of
that interpretation. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we must take
seriously the longstanding interpretation of a statute held by our
Superior Court, especially when it has been relied upon by the key
actors in our criminal justice system. The doctrine of stare decisis
exists to protect the settled expectations of citizens because, [sic]
elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should
have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their
conduct accordingly. The same principles also explain the weight given
to long-standing administrative interpretations that have been relied
upon by the public.88

Here, Mr. Young’s arguments cannot overcome the reasoning of the Barnes
Court. As the Supreme Court explained, a “fundamental canon of statutory
construction states that ‘[t]he longtime failure of [the legislature] to alter [a statute]
after it had been judicially construed … is persuasive of legislative recognition that
the judicial construction is the correct one.’”89 The Court so held despite its
acknowledgment that “[i]f one were interpreting the Code in 1995, shortly after the
adoption of felony DUIs, this Court might take the position that the better reading of
the statute is the one that the State now advances.”90
Similarly, here, the Supreme Court has judicially construed Subsection
4321(d) to authorize searches of probationers’ homes for an even longer period of
time than the Superior Court had construed the TIS Act in the manner being
challenged by the State in Barnes.91 Moreover, there has been no amendment or

87
Id. at 893.
88
Id. at 890–91 (cleaned up).
89
Id. at 892 (alterations in original) (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488
(1940)). See also Council 81, 293 A.2d at 571.
90
Barnes, 116 A.3d at 888.
91
Compare supra notes 21, 22 with Barnes, 116 A.3d at 889 & n.30.
19
material change to Subsection 4321(d) since its enactment in 1990.92 Just as in
Barnes, an advocate is now asking, “after years of acquiescence,” to “deem this
settled interpretation implausible under the plain language of the statute[.]”93 As the
Barnes Court explained, however, in a situation in which “the prior judicial
interpretation was subject to being overturned by the operation of the legislative
process and was not overturned, the justification for departing from stare decisis is
even more tenuous.”94
Mr. Young argues, however, that the principle of implicit legislative
acquiescence to a settled interpretation of a statute applies only where the legislature
acts to modify the statute during the period of settled interpretation but elects not to
clarify the interpretation.95 In support of this argument, Mr. Young points out that
one of the cases cited by the Barnes Court, Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,96 involved
subsequent enactments by Congress implicitly recognizing the disputed judicial
construction.97 The Barnes Court, however, did not limit its reliance upon the
principle of legislative acquiescence to those situations in which there have been
subsequent re-enactments or modifications of the statute. Moreover, in other cases
cited by the Barnes Court along with Apex, there was no indication that the
legislature had modified the statute in question during the period of settled
interpretation.98 Indeed, in those cases it was apparently the absence of any action

92
See, e.g., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (“[W]e must bear in mind that
considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress
is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation.”); Harvey v. City of Newark, 2010
WL 4240625, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2010) (“[I]t would seem rare indeed to discover that a
practical construction that had been relied upon for many years was based on an entirely
implausible reading of the text at issue.”).
93
Barnes, 116 A.3d at 892.
94
Id. (quoting Harvey, 2010 WL 4240625, at *7).
95
Def.’s Suppl. at 5–7.
96
310 U.S. 469 (1940).
97
Def.’s Suppl. at 6 (citing Apex, 310 U.S. at 488).
98
See Barnes, 116 A.3d at 892 n.44 (citing IBP, 546 U.S. at 32 (in holding that stare decisis is a
20
by the legislature to correct an allegedly erroneous interpretation, not an intervening
re-enactment or modification of the statute without clarifying the interpretation, that
was the key element in a finding of stare decisis.
In addition, it is significant that while Subsection 4321(d) has not been
amended or otherwise modified by the General Assembly since its enactment in
1990, other portions of 11 Del. C. § 4321 have been amended during that time
period.99 Therefore, while the General Assembly has been provided the opportunity
to consider modifications to Subsection 4321(d) as it has considered, and enacted,
other changes to Section 4321 as a whole, it has chosen not to do so, thus indicating
its acquiescence in the long-standing judicial and administrative interpretation of the
provision.
Finally, as a practical consideration, the principles of stare decisis underlying
this case are even stronger than in Barnes because, here, the Supreme Court itself
has impliedly, and consistently, interpreted Subsection 4321(d) to authorize searches
of probationers’ persons and homes.100 Moreover, in Barnes, the Supreme Court

compelling consideration with regard to statutory construction, the Court gave no indication that
there had been a re-enactment or modification of the statute during the period of interpretation in
question); Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 (in finding that principles of stare decisis weighed heavily in
guiding the Court in its statutory interpretation, the Court observed that Congress “is free to change
this Court’s interpretation of its legislation[,]” without indicating that Congress had previously re-
enacted or amended the statute in question); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202
(1991) (noting that Congress had had thirty years to correct the Court’s interpretation of a statute
in a previous case but had chosen not to do so)).
99
In 1999, the General Assembly created Subsection 4321(e). Del. S.B. 121, 140th Gen. Assem.,
72 Del. Laws ch. 108, § 1 (1999). In 2001, the General Assembly amended Subsection 4321(a).
Del. H.B. 133, 141st Gen. Assem., 73 Del. Laws ch. 60, § 1 (2001). In 2010, the General Assembly
added Subsection 4321(f). Del. H.B. 452, 145th Gen. Assem., 77 Del. Laws ch. 443, § 1 (2010).
In 2012, the General Assembly amended Subsection 4321(b)(2) and created Subsection 4321(g).
Del. S.B. 226, 146th Gen. Assem., 78 Del. Laws ch. 392, §§ 2–3 (2012). In 2014, the General
Assembly amended Subsection 4321(f). Del. H.B. 226, 147th Gen. Assem., 79 Del. Laws ch. 283,
§ 1 (2014). In 2021, the General Assembly created Subsection 4321(h). Del. H.B. 195, 151st Gen.
Assem., 83 Del. Laws ch. 83, § 1 (2021). Most recently, in 2023, the General Assembly amended
Subsection 4321(h). Del. H.B. 206, 152d Gen. Assem., 84 Del. Laws ch. 149, § 6 (2023).
100
See supra note 22 (collecting cases).
21
gave “great weight” to the longstanding interpretation by both this Court and the
Board of Parole of the relevant statute,101 reasoning that the long-standing
interpretation of the statute maintained by those bodies, “both composed of
sophisticated, repeat players in our criminal justice system, who grapple with the
Code on a daily basis,” was an important consideration in interpreting the statute.102
Similarly, the DOC, likewise a repeat player in the criminal justice system, is
entrusted to administer Procedure 7.19, and does so pursuant to an interpretation of
Subsection 4321(d) approved by our Supreme Court itself.103 For these reasons, the
Court sees no reason to depart from this well-settled interpretation.104
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court finds that the phrase “searches of individuals” contained in
11 Del. C. § 4321(d) is ambiguous because it is susceptible of two plausible
interpretations. The legislative history of House Bill 524, however, demonstrates
that the General Assembly intended for “searches of individuals” to include the then-
current practice, which authorized probation officers to search probationers’ homes
as well as their persons. That finding, coupled with the principles of stare decisis
reflected in a settled interpretation of Subsection 4321(d) followed for decades by
the Supreme Court and by the DOC, dictates the just and appropriate result on the

101
Barnes, 116 A.3d at 884.
102
Id. at 889.
103
See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We have
long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer[.]” (citations omitted)); State ex rel.
Zebley v. Mayor & Council of Wilm., 163 A.2d 258, 264 (Del. 1960) (“[W]here a statute is doubtful
or ambiguous in its terms, a practical administrative interpretation over a period of time, if founded
upon plausibility, will be accepted by the courts as indicative of legislative intent.” (citations
omitted)). See also supra note 22 (collecting cases).
104
Barnes, 116 A.2d at 891 (“The doctrine of stare decisis exists to protect the settled expectations
of citizens because ‘[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly.’” (quoting
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994))).
22
question before the Court.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant Devon Young’s
Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
Based on the Court’s prior ruling and the agreement of the parties, this denial
is without prejudice for Mr. Young to file a second motion to suppress based upon
the facts of the search itself.105 Any such motion must be filed no later than
February 14, 2024.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Via Email
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cc: Counsel of Record

105
Hr’g Tr. at 3.
23