NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1649-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL J. FIGUEROA,
a/k/a MICHAEL FIGUEROA,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Argued January 9, 2024 – Decided February 1, 2024
Before Judges Sumners and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Indictment No. 21-07-0552.
Zachary Gilbert Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Zachary Gilbert
Markarian, of counsel and on the briefs).
Tiffany M. Russo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Robert J. Carroll, Morris County
Prosecutor, attorney; Tiffany M. Russo, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a motor
vehicle stop, defendant Michael J. Figueroa pleaded guilty to second-degree
unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). Defendant appeals,
claiming the motion judge erred in denying his motion. Based upon our review
of the parties' arguments, the record, and applicable legal principles, we affirm.
I.
During the evening of February 21, 2021, Florham Park Police
Department Patrol Officer Christopher Heredia was in his stationary vehicle on
Columbia Turnpike when he observed a white van traveling eastbound in the
left lane. Heredia observed the driver, later identified as defendant, "decrease
his speed" and the van's "front bumper dip pretty harshly." When the van passed
Heredia, from approximately 150 feet away, he noticed the driver appeared
"very rigid" at the wheel and estimated the vehicle was traveling "below the
speed limit." There were few vehicles on the road. Heredia followed the vehicle
upon observing "there was some sort of flapping where the license plate would
be," and "[t]here was no illumination on the license plate at the time." Defendant
continued in the left lane at a decreased speed, which caused at least one car to
pass in the right lane.
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Heredia followed defendant approximately "a mile or two up the road" for
"maybe a minute or two." He paced behind the vehicle and ascertained
defendant was driving approximately thirty-five miles per hour, which was
substantially below the fifty-mile-per-hour speed limit. He determined the
speed by "set[ting] the cruise control on [his] vehicle." Once close to the
vehicle, Heredia could read the license plate with patrol car headlights
illuminating it. Heredia followed defendant to an intersection, where he turned
left and then "turned into the McDonald's parking lot." Heredia then activated
his emergency lights and mobile vehicle recorder (MVR) and effectuated a
motor vehicle stop.
A backup police officer arrived at the scene. As Heredia requested
defendant's documents, he smelled burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle
and, in plain view, observed "burnt marijuana cigarettes, or roaches" in an
ashtray in "the radio console area." Heredia requested a Sergeant respond to the
stop. Defendant relayed he was a security guard coming from Newark and was
going to McDonald's. Heredia commented it did not appear defendant was
coming from Newark, and defendant clarified he "went the wrong way." After
verifying defendant's information, Heredia asked him to exit the vehicle. Since
defendant identified himself as a security guard, Heredia asked if he had "any
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3
guns," and defendant responded "Yeah. No." Heredia advised defendant he
smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle and asked whether there was
"anything else illegal." 1 Defendant volunteered a small bag of marijuana from
his pocket and admitted he was smoking marijuana just before the stop. A search
under the driver's side seat yielded a loaded nine-millimeter Smith and Wesson
handgun.
The officers placed defendant under arrest and provided his Miranda2
rights. Defendant received motor vehicle summonses for: maintenance of
lamps, N.J.S.A. 39:3-66; delaying traffic, N.J.S.A. 39:4-56; and traffic on
marked lanes, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(a).
A Union County grand jury indicted defendant on charges of second-
degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); fourth-degree
1
On February 22, 2021, the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement
Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act, N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56, came
into effect, stating, "the odor of cannabis or burnt cannabis" cannot "constitute
reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c(a). However,
at the time defendant's motor vehicle was stopped, "New Jersey courts . . .
recognized that the smell of marijuana itself constitute[d] probable cause 'that a
criminal offense had been committed and that additional contraband might be
present.'" State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013) (quoting State v. Nishina,
175 N.J. 502, 516-17 (2003)).
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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4
unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j); and second-
degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence challenging the motor vehicle
stop. Defendant argued Heredia did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion
to initiate the stop; therefore, the subsequent search and seizure was unlawful.
At a one-day suppression hearing, Heredia and defendant testified. After
argument, the motion judge issued an oral decision and entered an order denying
the suppression motion, finding the State demonstrated a reasonable articulable
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. The judge also denied defendant's
reconsideration motion. Thereafter, in accordance with a plea agreement,
defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), and was sentenced to forty-two months with a forty-
two-month period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(c).
On appeal defendant raises the following points:
POINT I
THE MOTOR VEHICLE CODE UNAMBIGOUSLY
PERMITTED FIGUEROA TO DRIVE IN THE LEFT
LANE IN PREPARATION FOR A LEFT TURN AND
ILLUMINATE HIS LICENSE PLATE WITH TWO
WORKING TAIL LAMPS AND ONE LAMP ABOVE
HIS LICENSE PLATE.
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A. N.J.S.A 39:4-88[(a)] and 39:4-123
Authorized Figueroa's Driving in the Left
Lane in Preparation for a Left Turn.
B. N.J.S.A 39:3-61 Authorized Figueroa to
Drive With Two Working Taillights and
One Separate Lamp Illuminating His
License Plate.
II.
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, in almost identical language,
protect against unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Smart, 253 N.J.
156, 164 (2023) (quoting State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 527 (2022)). "A lawful
roadside stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure under both the Federal and
New Jersey Constitutions." State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 532 (2017). It is
well established, "[l]aw enforcement officers 'may stop motor vehicles where
they have a reasonable or articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation
has occurred.'" State v. Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. 509, 517 (App. Div. 2009)
(quoting State v. Murphy, 238 N.J. Super. 546, 553 (App. Div. 1990)). "To
establish reasonable suspicion, 'the officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant' the suspicion." State v. Pitcher, 379 N.J. Super. 308, 315
(App. Div. 2005) (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 21 (2004)). "To justify
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a stop, an 'officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver
. . . is committing a motor-vehicle violation' or some other offense." State v.
Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 524 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016)). The State bears the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that a motor vehicle stop is supported by a
reasonable and articulable suspicion the driver is committing a motor vehicle
violation. See State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433, 446 (2018).
In determining whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists, the
judge must consider "the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture."
State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 431 (2014). Further, "[t]he State need not prove
that the suspected motor vehicle violation has in fact occurred." Barrow, 408
N.J. Super. at 518 (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999)). Rather,
"[c]onstitutional precedent requires only reasonableness on the part of the
police, not legal perfection. Therefore, the State need prove only that the police
lawfully stopped the car, not that it could convict the driver of the motor -vehicle
offense." State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302, 304 (1994).
Our review of the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is
limited. We "must defer to the factual findings of the trial court on a motion to
suppress so long as its findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in
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the record." State v. Erazo, 254 N.J. 277, 297 (2023). We "defer[] to those
findings in recognition of the trial court's 'opportunity to hear and see the
witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot
enjoy.'" Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526 (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244
(2007)). "Our deference to a trial court's findings of fact is not limited only to
those based on live testimony presented at an evidentiary hearing," as we a lso
give deference to the "court's fact finding based on its review of video and
documentary evidence." State v. Nieves, 476 N.J. Super. 405, 418-19 (App.
Div. 2023). "The governing principle, then, is that '[a] trial court's findings
should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of
justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540,
551-52 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15
(2009)). By contrast, we review de novo "a trial court's interpretation of the
law" and the legal "consequences that flow from established facts." Gamble,
218 N.J. at 425.
III.
Defendant's contention that the judge erroneously found Heredia validly
stopped defendant's vehicle, based on a reasonable articulable suspicion
defendant committed motor vehicle violations, is without merit. Sufficient
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credible evidence in the record supports the judge's finding that Heredia lawfully
stopped defendant for delaying traffic and improper license plate illumination.
We reject defendant's argument the judge erred in finding a reasonable
articulable suspicion existed under N.J.S.A. 39:4-56, delaying traffic. The
statute provides: "No person shall drive or conduct a vehicle in such condition,
so constructed or so loaded, as to be likely to cause delay in traffic." N.J.S.A.
39:4-56. As the title and the plain language of the statute clearly indicate, the
statute provides a person shall not drive a vehicle in a manner to cause a delay.
"If the text of a law is clear, the 'court's task is complete.'" Carter, 247 N.J. at
513 (quoting State v. Lopez-Carrera, 245 N.J. 596, 613 (2021)).
The judge found Heredia had lawfully stopped defendant's vehicle
because "[h]e reasonably believed that defendant violated [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-56."
Specifically, the judge found Heredia's observations credible that the van's
"bumper dip[ped] harshly," and at least one vehicle in the left lane "had to move
into the right lane to pass . . . defendant" because he was estimated to be
traveling at least "[fifteen] miles per hour below the speed limit" for
"approximately one mile." We are unpersuaded by defendant's arguments that
N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(a) and N.J.S.A. 39:4-123 precluded Heredia from reasonably
perceiving his reduced driving speed for approximately a mile was a delaying
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traffic violation. "Based on the facts alleged in the testimony," the judge
concluded Heredia was "credible and that he testified truthfully to the best of
his knowledge." The judge's finding that Heredia had a reasonable articulable
suspicion is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
Further, defendant's contention that the State conceded N.J.S.A. 39:4-
97.1, which states "[n]o person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed
as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except
when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law,"
would have been a more appropriate summons is not dispositive.
We reject defendant's argument that the judge "did not rule on whether
[the] police had a reasonable suspicion" defendant violated N.J.S.A. 39:3 -66
because the record demonstrates otherwise. N.J.S.A. 39:3-66 requires "all
lamps, reflectors, and other illuminating devices . . . be kept clean and in good
working order." Relatedly, N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) requires a motor vehicle "be
equipped with adequate license plate illumination." Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3 -
61(k), an illuminated license plate "will be deemed . . . adequate when either a
tail lamp or a separate lamp is so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a
white light the rear license plate on a vehicle and render it clearly legible from
a distance of 50 feet to the rear." (Emphasis added). In his findings, the judge
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elucidated Heredia testified to observing "the rear license plate bulbs not
functioning," and that the license plate was flapping. The judge further found
Heredia credible on cross-examination when Heredia acknowledged in viewing
the MVR recording that it appeared only one license plate light bulb was not
working.
Heredia testified he "had to be very close to the vehicle in order to read
[the] license plate" and was only able to see the plate when he was approximately
ten feet away because the patrol vehicle's "headlights were illuminating the
license plate." The judge noted Heredia stated to defendant "your license plate
lamps [wer]en't illuminating," and inquired if he knew "they [were] not
working." In reviewing the testimony, the judge noted defendant's testimony
that the admitted photographs taken after his arrest depicted an operable "left
light bulb," and that the "license plate light [bulb] above the last two characters
. . . [wa]s not illuminated."
In finding a reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop based on the
suspected license plate illumination violation, the judge correctly rejected
defendant's argument that suppression was warranted because Heredia
committed a mistake of law in interpreting the unambiguous provisions in
N.J.S.A. 39:3-66. The judge found "[i]n this case[,] clearly the officer testified
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that the license plate was not illuminated for him to see," and there was no
"mistake of law." In finding the facts distinguishable from State v. Sutherland,
231 N.J. 429 (2018), the judge additionally noted the different statutory
applications. He observed Sutherland involved vehicle "lighting," but "[wa]s
certainly different than a finding of a violation of this statute." The judge
correctly observed the determination of whether the testimony "would support
the finding of fact . . . that there was a violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:3 -66 . . . [wa]s
not before [the c]ourt." Indeed, we observe the long-standing principle that the
State does not have the burden to prove the suspected violation occurred at the
suppression hearing. See Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. at 518.
We defer to the judge's finding that Heredia was "a credible witness"
based on his responsiveness in "answer[ing] questions," "not want[ing] to
estimate," and "calm" demeanor. See Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526. Sufficient
credible evidence in the record supports the judge's conclusion that "the totality
of the circumstances led to the reasonable suspicion of the motor vehicle stop."
We discern no reason to disturb the judge's well-reasoned decision.
Any arguments presented by defendant we have not addressed are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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