NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-765
DANIEL KNIGHT
vs.
ATTORNEY GENERAL.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Daniel Knight, filed a complaint in the
Superior Court seeking compensation from the Commonwealth for
wrongful convictions, pursuant to G. L. c. 258D. He claimed
that he was entitled to compensation because a judge ultimately
vacated his convictions and dismissed the underlying
indictments. A Superior Court judge allowed the Commonwealth's
motion to dismiss, a judgment of dismissal entered, and the
plaintiff appealed. We affirm.
Background. On May 24, 2006, the plaintiff pleaded guilty
to three indictments charging possession of a class A controlled
substance and two counts of distribution of a class A controlled
substance. A Superior Court judge sentenced him to eleven
months in the house of correction followed by two years of
probation. The plaintiff later violated his probation, and
another judge sentenced him to an additional year in the house
of correction.
Twelve years after the convictions, the Supreme Judicial
Court issued an opinion in the case of Committee for Pub.
Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 700, 704 (2018), that
resulted in the dismissal of thousands of convictions and
pending charges connected with the Amherst drug laboratory where
an employee tampered with evidence in criminal cases. In
accordance with that opinion, on November 2, 2018, a single
justice of the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the plaintiff's
convictions and dismissed the indictments with prejudice.
On April 15, 2021, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking
compensation pursuant to G. L. c. 258D. Following a hearing, a
judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. The judge
reasoned, "Nothing in the dismissal of the defendant's three
convictions, or the facts and circumstances underlying that
relief, tends to show that he was innocent. Therefore, the
plaintiff is not eligible to pursue a claim under G.L. c. 258D."
Discussion. "We review the allowance of a motion to
dismiss de novo" (citation omitted). Verveine Corp. v.
Strathmore Ins. Co., 489 Mass. 534, 538 (2022). "A motion to
dismiss will be granted unless the factual allegations in the
complaint are enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level based on the assumption that all the
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allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact)" (quotation and citation omitted). Id.
To recover damages against the Commonwealth for a wrongful
conviction, the plaintiff must initially establish that he is
within a "class of persons eligible to obtain relief." G. L.
c. c. 258D, § 1 (B). As relevant here, that class of persons
includes "those who have been granted judicial relief by a state
court of competent jurisdiction, on grounds which tend to
establish the innocence of the individual." G. L. c. 258D,
§ 1 (B) (ii). Such grounds must rest "upon facts and
circumstances probative of the proposition that the [plaintiff]
did not commit the crime" (citation omitted). Guzman v.
Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 354, 362 (2010). Put another way, "a
plaintiff must first show that the grounds for judicial relief
were probative of his innocence." Riley v. Commonwealth, 82
Mass. App. Ct. 209, 212 n.3 (2012).
Here, the judicial relief granted by the single justice was
unrelated to the question of the plaintiff's innocence.
According to the record, the single justice vacated the
plaintiff's convictions by "SJC order." The origin of that
referenced order comes from Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs.,
480 Mass. at 723, 729, where the Supreme Judicial Court
disclaimed a case-by-case adjudication and opted instead for a
global remedy involving thousands of cases impacted by
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improprieties at the Amherst drug laboratory. Thus, far from
being "probative of his innocence," Riley, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at
212 n.3, the order of the single justice was based solely on the
fact that the class A substances in the plaintiff's case
happened to be analyzed at the subject lab during a certain time
period. Nothing in the single justice's order suggests any
"facts and circumstances probative of the proposition that the
[plaintiff] did not commit the crime[s]" (citation omitted).
Guzman, 458 Mass. at 362. Therefore, the plaintiff did not
establish that he is within a "class of persons eligible to
obtain relief." G. L. c. 258D § 1 (B).
We disagree with the plaintiff's contention that the global
remedy provided by the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. inferentially established his
innocence. He contends that the dismissal of the indictments
and the absence of any evidence from the Amherst drug laboratory
logically indicate innocence. He reasons, "if the necessary
element of possession cannot be established, a presumptive
inference should be given to [the plaintiff] that no crime was
committed." The Supreme Judicial Court has rejected similar
arguments.
In Commonwealth v. Caliz, 486 Mass. 888, 892 (2021), the
court recognized the egregious misconduct related to the Amherst
drub laboratory but declined to equate "government misconduct"
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with "actual innocence." Also, a judicial remedy that results
in the absence of an opportunity for retrial due to "dismissal
or nolle prosequi of the underlying criminal charge[s]" does not
equate with innocence. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 434,
439 (2017). Judicial remedies for "'procedural or evidentiary
errors or structural deficiencies at . . . trial[] that could
well be "consistent" with innocence without any tendency to
establish it' would not meet the statutory definition." Irwin
v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 846 (2013), quoting Guzman, 458
Mass. at 358. Because the plaintiff's convictions were not
vacated on grounds tending to establish innocence, he is not
eligible for relief under G. L. c. 258D. Contrast Renaud v.
Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 315, 319 (2015) (grounds for relief
pertained to insufficient evidence of "the identity of the
defendant"); Drumgold v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 367, 378
(2010) (grounds for relief probative of "reliability of the
identification of [the defendant] as one of the shooters");
Guzman, 458 Mass. at 365 (grounds for judicial relief tend to
establish innocence where "erroneously omitted evidence was
probative of the conclusion that the culprit was someone else").
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Finally, based on the result we have reached, we need not
consider whether the length of the plaintiff's sentences
qualified for relief under G. L. c. 258D.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Shin, Brennan &
Hodgens, JJ. 1),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: April 10, 2024.
1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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