IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0499
Filed April 10, 2024
ATIBA A. SPELLMAN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Amy M. Moore, Judge.
Atiba Spellman appeals the grant of summary judgment and dismissal of
his application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Jesse A. Macro Jr. of Macro Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.
Atiba Spellman appeals the grant of summary judgment and dismissal of
his application for postconviction relief (PCR). Spellman contends the court should
have reached the merits of his claim that his PCR counsel was ineffective for failing
to “timely depose trial counsel.” Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In 2009, a jury found Spellman guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.
This court previously set forth the following facts surrounding the incident leading
to Spellman’s charges as follows:
On December 6, 2008, Spellman killed Shakena Varnell (also known
as Amy) and Michael Odikra by stabbing them several times with a
knife. Amy was Spellman’s common law wife, and they had been a
couple for approximately eight years. She had two children from a
previous relationship, and the children viewed Spellman as their
stepfather. Amy was having an affair with Odikra. Evidence at trial
indicated Spellman knew, or at least strongly suspected, that the
affair was going on several months prior to the night of the murders.
This evidence includes the testimony of various people who stated
Spellman told them he thought Odikra and Amy were having an affair
and that he wanted to harm Odikra.
At 6:30 p.m. on December 5, Spellman called Amy’s uncle,
David Varnell, and told David that Odikra and Amy were having an
affair. At 9:00 p.m. Spellman picked up Amy’s son at the movies.
They drove to Odikra’s residence, and Spellman told the boy to look
under the garage door to confirm Amy’s car was there. They then
waited outside the residence for approximately three hours, and
around midnight, Spellman drove Amy’s son home. Phone records
revealed Spellman called Amy’s phone approximately forty-one
times that night. He also called several people in an attempt to
contact Amy, and these witnesses testified Spellman seemed very
agitated. When Amy called her son’s phone Spellman spoke with
her and told her to “stop playing these games.”
Phone records further revealed that at approximately 12:30
a.m., Spellman called his supervisor at the Ames Tribune to report
that he would not be able to deliver the morning paper due to car
trouble and that he had broken down in Waterloo. At 2:07 a.m.,
Spellman spoke with an old friend, Levarn Davis, and said he was
driving to Waterloo. Davis then tried to reach Amy because he was
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afraid for Amy’s safety, but he got no answer. The records showed
Spellman was not truthful about his location and that he was actually
in Ames.
At approximately 2:15 a.m., Odikra’s body was discovered
outside Amy’s residence, and Amy was found inside the apartment
door. Both were unclothed. Blood from the two victims and
Spellman was found in the residence. Additionally, there were signs
of forced entry—the door had been dead bolted shut but had been
forced open, resulting in several splinters from the door frame
throughout the entryway. An autopsy showed Amy had a total of
thirteen stab wounds as well as blunt force trauma, and Odikra had
seven stab wounds, defensive wounds, and blunt force trauma.
A warrant was issued for Spellman’s arrest. At 10:30 a.m. on
December 6, Spellman called David, and David informed Spellman
the victims were dead. At 11:30 a.m., Spellman called Davis and
said that he was in Des Moines. Davis gave Spellman a phone
number for the authorities and told him he should call. On
December 7, Spellman called Special Agent Don Schnitker, who
informed him warrants had been issued. Spellman stated he was in
Des Moines and would turn himself in the following day; however, he
never arrived at the police station.
Phone records indicated Spellman was traveling around the
central and south eastern parts of United States during these two
days, and on December 8, he was in Raleigh, North Carolina. Iowa
authorities contacted the police in Wayne County, North Carolina
and requested they be on the lookout for Spellman’s car. The
morning of December 8, Spellman was apprehended by state police
in Wayne County and transported back to Iowa. After searching his
car, authorities discovered blood of both Amy and Odikra. It also
appeared the floor board had been scrubbed clean.
On December 29, 2008, Spellman was charged with two
counts of murder in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code
sections 707.1 and .2 (2007). A jury trial was held, and while
Spellman admitted he killed the victims, he argued he did so in the
heat of passion; therefore, he was only guilty of voluntary
manslaughter. On March 24, 2009, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty as to both counts of first-degree murder.
State v. Spellman, No. 13-1670, 2015 WL 799538, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 25,
2015).
This court affirmed Spellman’s convictions on direct appeal. Id. at *5.
Spellman filed his original pro se PCR application on December 15, 2015, which
was amended on March 24, 2018. The district court dismissed the petition, and
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Spellman appealed. This court found the sanction of dismissal was an abuse of
discretion under the facts and reinstated the case in 2019. Spellman v. State, No.
18-0852, 2019 WL 4302124, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). The State subsequently
filed a motion for summary judgment, which after arguments, was granted on
January 19, 2022. Spellman appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“We generally review a district court’s denial of an application for
postconviction relief for errors at law.” Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Iowa
2021). However, “our review is de novo ‘[w]hen the basis for relief implicates a
violation of a constitutional dimension,” including claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 142
(Iowa 2018)); see Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021).
III. Analysis
A. Summary Judgment for Postconviction Relief. Iowa Code section 822.6
(2021) governs disposition of a PCR application without a trial on the merits.
Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 559–60 (Iowa 2002). The goal “is to provide
a method of disposition once the case has been fully developed by both sides, but
before an actual trial.” Id. at 559 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). This “is
‘analogous to the summary judgment standard’ in Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure
237–40 (now rules 1.981–1.983).” Id. at 559–60 (citing Summage v. State, 579
N.W.2d 821, 822 (Iowa 1980)).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record shows no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). The State, as the moving party, bears the burden
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of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material facts. Sheffey v. State,
No. 22-1693, 2023 WL 5601836, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2023). The court
views the record in the light most favorable to Spellman and draws all legitimate
inferences from the record in his favor. Id.
When ruling, “the court does not weigh the evidence.” Linn v. State, 929
N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019) (citing Clinkscales v. Nelson Sec., Inc., 697 N.W.2d
836, 841 (Iowa 2005)). The court determines, faced with the evidence presented,
whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Clinkscales, 697 N.W.2d at 841. If, when taken as a whole, a rational trier of fact
could find for the nonmoving party, there is a genuine issue of material fact, and
the matter should proceed to trial. Linn, 929 N.W.2d at 730.
Spellman claims there is a genuine issue of fact regarding the strategy used
by his trial counsel during his underlying criminal case. He claims “[t]he
contradiction between [his] desires and the presentation made by his trial counsel
generates a genuine question of fact.” Spellman also argues he was “not properly
prepared for trial by his trial counsel.” As such he claims he “was not prepared to
answer the questions posed” and “his answers were not helpful to his defense.”
As the State properly points out, “The law is clear that questions of trial
strategy, including the defense or defenses to raise, is for counsel so long as
counsel’s strategic decision is a reasonable one.” See Forsyth v. State, No. 03-
1378, 2004 WL 1161614, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 26, 2004) (noting counsel
breached no essential duty by electing to pursue a fact-based defense rather than
a psychiatric defense; defense counsel’s trial strategy was reasonable under the
facts of the case and was “justifiable”). Additionally, the State correctly points out,
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“[Spellman’s] affidavit merely asserts that he and his attorney disagreed on trial
strategy and alleged that, if his attorney had filed a notice of self-defense,
additional evidence would have been admitted regarding prior violence by one of
the victims against Spellman.” The district court properly granted summary
judgment.
B. Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel. To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, Spellman must show (1) counsel breached an
essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). “We may affirm the district court’s rejection of an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim if either element is lacking.” Anfinson v. State, 758
N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2008).
Spellman argues his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to raise a
defense of justification to the charges of first-degree murder. He claims his PCR
attorney was ineffective for failing to depose trial counsel. However, as noted in
the State’s brief, this issue is being raised for the first time on appeal and “there is
no evidence in the record as to why Spellman’s postconviction attorney did not
dispose [his] trial attorney, Paul Rounds, or whether Mr. Rounds would have
testified that there was a conflict between Spellman and him on the issue of
whether to raise a justification defense.”
As such, Spellman’s claim for ineffective assistance of PCR counsel cannot
be resolved due to an inadequate record. See Brown v. State, No. 22-0459, 2023
WL 3335384, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 10, 2023) (noting in an appeal from the
denial of PCR, this court declined to reach the merits of Brown’s claim of ineffective
assistance of PCR counsel because the record was inadequate but also
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recognizing Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Iowa 2018) provides “a ‘narrow
exception’ allowing an appellate court to reach the merits of an unpreserved claim
that PCR trial counsel was ineffective if the existing record is sufficiently developed
to allow resolution”). As explained in Goode and Brown, Spellman would need
additional evidence to support his claim he received ineffective assistance of PCR
counsel. As a result, we cannot resolve this matter.
Spellman asks we remand the case for a new trial. He insists this remedy
is the only way he can receive the level of representation to which he is entitled.
But in Goode, our supreme court rejected the idea of a remand, finding it was
“contrary to the symmetry of our appellate process and our role as a court of
review.” See 920 N.W.2d at 526.
We need not decide whether a remand would be proper to resolve a claim
of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. It is enough to decide it is unnecessary
here. We only “preserve” claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel for future
proceedings when they meet the same standard of “stat[ing] the specific ways in
which counsel’s performance was inadequate and identify[ing] how competent
representation probably would have changed the outcome.” Dunbar v. State, 515
N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994). Spellman fails the Dunbar test. Spellman complains
about a failure to depose trial counsel regarding his claimed ongoing conflict about
his defense. Without more facts, we cannot determine if PCR counsel had a
material duty to depose trial counsel and what, if any, errors this caused. As in
Dunbar and Brown, Spellman’s claims are “too general in nature” to allow us to
preserve them for a second PCR proceeding. Dunbar, 515 N.W.2d at 15 (finding
“[f]or example, Dunbar does not propose what an investigation would have
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revealed or how anything discovered would have affected the result obtained
below”). In the end, we can neither address nor preserve the claim PCR counsel
was ineffective.
AFFIRMED.