Tugboat Invst. v. Helpful Homebuyers 2

J-A21002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

TUGBOAT INVESTMENTS, LLC : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LARES PROPERTIES, LLC, HELPFUL :
HOMEBUYERS 2, LLC :
: No. 2355 EDA 2022
:
APPEAL OF: HELPFUL HOMEBUYERS :
2, LLC :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 8, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 180602432

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2024

Appellant Helpful Homebuyers 2, LLC, appeals from the judgment

entered in this quiet title action filed by Appellee Tugboat Investments, LLC.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by concluding that both Appellant’s

deed to 2711 Parrish Street, Philadelphia, PA 19130 (the Property), and the

deed of its predecessor in interest were void, finding in Appellee’s favor on

Appellant’s counterclaim for an equitable lien, and by admitting certain

evidence at trial. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this case

as follows:

Appellee, a limited liability company duly registered to do business
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . [was] the rightful
owner[] of real property located at 2711 Parrish Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19130. Appellee was deeded over the relevant
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piece of property on October 29, 2014 and the deed was recorded
on March 3, 2015 Document ID No: 52891655 [(Appellee’s
Deed)]. On May 30, 2018, co-defendant Lares Properties, LLC
[(Lares)], . . . by and through its agents and/or its associates, as
well as with the participation of Mr. Kevin Dean, collectively
executed a scheme to defraud the Appellee, . . . and recorded a
deed with the Recorder of Deeds memorializing the alleged
purchase of the Property from Appellee. The deed conveying the
transaction of the Property from Appellee to Lares . . . was
recorded June 4, 2018 [(Lares Deed)]. After sixteen days Lares .
. ., on June 20[], 2018, then recorded a deed conveying a
transaction that deeded over the Property from Lares . . . to
Appellant [(Appellant’s Deed)].

After these events, the Appellee commenced this action on June
18, 2021 to quiet title after a letter was sent by the United States
Postal Service to the Appellee notifying the Appellee that the
address of the Appellee was changed. Appellant filed its answer
to Appellee’s complaint and thereafter filed two motions, which
were granted, to amend its answer to the complaint and add new
matters asserting affirmative defenses and an equitable lien on
the Property.

Trial Ct. Op., 2/7/23, at 1-2 (some formatting altered).

The trial court held a bench trial on nonconsecutive days on March 23,

2021 and May 20, 2021. The trial court summarized the ensuing procedural

history of this case:

Appellee moved to amend the pleadings on the first day of trial[,
March 23, 2021]. Appellee asserted that [it] should be allowed to
amend to change the cause of action from a quiet title action to
an ejectment action, since Appellee is out of possession. The
[trial] court denied Appellee’s motion, offering Appellee the
opportunity to discontinue the current action and bring another
action where Appellee files what [it] thinks is proper. Appellee
chose to continue with the [present] action. Appellee again
brought a motion for leave to amend the pleadings to conform to
an ejectment action on May 18, 2021. During trial on May 20,
2021, the [trial] court again denied Appellee’s motion to amend
to conform to the evidence. . . .

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* * *

At trial, [Appellee presented the deposition of Mr. Dean,1 in which]
Mr. Dean admitted to and detailed the scheme used to defraud
Appellee and remove Appellee’s right of possession to the
Property. . . . [On October 12, 2021, t]he trial court entered a
disposition in favor of the Appellee and against the Appellant. The
trial court ordered that:

1. [Judgment] is entered in favor of the Appellee, Tugboat
Investments, LLC and against the Appellant, Helpful
Homebuyers 2, LLC on Appellee’s claims against
Appellant;

2. The [Lares] Deed recorded on June 4, 2018 . . . (Doc Id:
53372580) was a fraudulent transaction;

3. The [Lares] Deed recorded on June 4, 2018 . . . (Doc Id:
53372580) is hereby stricken, voided, and canceled of
record;

4. [Appellant’s] Deed recorded on June 20, 2018. . . (Doc
Id: 53379798) is hereby stricken, voided, and canceled
of record;

5. Appellee Tugboat Investments, LLC shall have immediate
right of possession to the Property located at 2711
Parrish Street, Philadelphia PA, 19130 (the “Property”)
pursuant to [Appellee’s] Deed recorded on March 13,
2015 [(Doc Id: 52891655)];

6. Appellant, Helpful Homebuyers 2, LLC shall vacate the
Property immediately without causing further damages
thereto;

7. The Commissioner of the Department of Records of
Philadelphia shall record a deed of confirmation, with this
court’s order attached[], acknowledging Appellee,
Tugboat Investments, LLC as the owner of real property
located at 2711 Parrish Street, Philadelphia PA, 19130
pursuant to the [Appellee’s Deed];

____________________________________________

1 Mr. Dean failed to appear for the second day of trial. See N.T. Trial, 5/20/21,
at 9.

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8. Helpful Homebuyers 2, LLC is forever barred from
asserting any right, lien, title, or interest in real property
located at 2711 Parrish Street, Philadelphia PA, 19130;
and

9. [Judgment] is entered in favor of the Appellee, Tugboat
Investments, LLC and Against the Appellant, Helpful
Homebuyers 2, LLC on Appellant’s counterclaims against
Appellee[.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 6, 2-3.

Appellant filed a timely post-trial motion seeking judgment

notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or in the alternative, a new trial. Before

the trial court could rule on Appellant’s post-trial motion, Appellant filed a

notice of appeal. Subsequently, this Court granted Appellee’s motion to quash

the appeal as premature.2 See Order, 2342 EDA 2021, 2/14/22 (per curiam).

On September 8, 2022,3 Appellant filed a praecipe to enter judgment on

the trial court’s October 12, 2021 verdict. Appellant filed a timely notice of

____________________________________________

2 While Appellant’s appeal at 2342 EDA 2021 was pending, the trial court
entered an order purporting to deny Appellant’s post-trial motion as moot on
December 6, 2021. Once a party files a notice of appeal, the trial court
generally lacks jurisdiction to act further on the merits of the case. Pa.R.A.P.
1701(a); see also Ostrowski v. Pethick, 590 A.2d 1290, 1292 (Pa. Super.
1991) (explaining that the pendency of an appeal deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction to act on a pending post-trial motion). Therefore, the trial court’s
December 6, 2021 order was a nullity. See Ostrowski, 590 A.2d at 1292.

3 As previously stated, the trial court’s December 6, 2021 order purporting to

deny Appellant’s post-trial motion was a nullity. Nevertheless, Appellant’s
post-trial motion was denied by operation of law after the trial court failed to
rule on it within 120 days. See Kinney v. Lacey, 252 A.3d 644, 647 n.5 (Pa.
Super. 2021); Pa.R.C.P. 227.4(b). Therefore, judgment was properly entered
on September 8, 2022. Further, we have amended the caption to reflect the
date on which judgment was entered.

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appeal that same day. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following claims on appeal4:

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by admitting
testimonial and/or documentary evidence concerning
Appellant[’s] . . . title insurer, as it was contrary to
Pennsylvania law and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, thus
having unfairly prejudiced [Appellant]?

2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by admitting
testimonial and/or documentary evidence concerning
Appellant[’s] . . . agreement of sale for the subject premises,
as it was contrary to Pennsylvania law and the Pennsylvania
Rules of Evidence, thus unfairly prejudiced [Appellant]?

3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by admitting
testimonial and/or documentary evidence concerning bad acts
or prior criminal acts of Kevin Dean, purported representative
of [Appellee], as it was contrary to Pennsylvania law and the
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, thus having unfairly prejudiced
[Appellant]?

4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by treating the
first property deed from Appellee . . . to Lares . . . as a forgery
and thus void ab initio, rather than as fraudulent and thus
merely voidable and subject to Appellant’s claim of being a
bona fide purchaser of the subject premises?

5. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by treating the
second property deed from Lares . . . to Appellant . . . as a
forgery and thus void ab initio, rather than as fraudulent and
thus merely voidable and subject to [Appellant’s] claim of being
a bona fide purchaser of the subject premises?

6. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in entering
judgment in favor of Appellee . . . and against Appellant . . .
on its equitable lien counterclaim?

____________________________________________

4 Due to the number of issues involved, we have renumbered the issues from

the order Appellant has presented them in its brief for the ease of disposition.

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Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.

Form of the Action

Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, we first address the

form of the action, which this Court may raise sua sponte. See Sutton v.

Miller, 592 A.2d 83, 88-89 (Pa. Super. 1991) (holding that although the trial

court erred in failing to dismiss a quiet title action filed by an out-of-possession

plaintiff, the error was not fatal to the claim because this Court may sua sponte

amend the pleadings to include an action in ejectment).

An action to quiet title may be brought either to compel an adverse party

to commence an action of ejectment, or, where an action of ejectment will not

lie, to determine the interest in a title in the land. See Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(1)-

(2).

Ordinarily, the plaintiff in an action to quiet title must be in
possession of the land in controversy; if he is out of possession,
his sole remedy is an action in ejectment. An action to quiet
title may be brought only where an action in ejectment will not lie.
Ejectment, being a possessory action, can be maintained if the
plaintiff has a right to immediate possession with the concomitant
right to demand that the defendant vacate the land.

Plauchak v. Boling, 653 A.2d 671, 674 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations omitted

and emphasis added).

“Ejectment is an action filed by a plaintiff who does not possess the land

but has the right to possess it, against a defendant who has actual

possession.” Billig v. Skvarla, 853 A.2d 1042, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(citations omitted). “The purpose of an ejectment action as opposed to quiet

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title is not to determine the relative and respective rights of all potential title

holders, but rather the immediate rights between plaintiff and defendant

involved in that particular litigation.” Id. at 1049-50 (citations omitted).

This Court has explained that “[p]ermitting an out-of-possession

plaintiff to maintain an action to quiet title is impermissible because it

constitutes an enlargement of the plaintiff’s substantive rights as defined by

statute, and thus exceeds the court’s jurisdiction to proceed.” Plauchak, 653

A.2d at 674 (citation omitted). However, while it is procedurally improper for

an out-of-possession plaintiff to commence an action to quiet title, this Court

has stated that “[e]ven where a plaintiff mistakenly institutes an action to

quiet title instead of an action in ejectment, the appropriate remedy is to

permit the plaintiff to amend his or her pleadings to conform to the proper

action.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Moore v. Duran, 687 A.2d 822, 827

(Pa. Super. 1996) (stating that “[t]his Court has previously determined that,

even on appeal, we may amend the pleadings when necessary to conform to

the proper form of action as established by the evidence” (citations omitted));

Sutton, 592 A.2d at 88-89 (same).

As stated above, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to amend the

complaint to conform to an ejectment action during the trial. See Trial Ct.

Op. at 6. The trial court further explained:

[A]ppellee[’s] use of an incorrect form of action is not fatal to the
relief granted by the trial court. Even where a plaintiff mistakenly
institutes an action to quiet title instead of an action in ejectment,
the appropriate remedy is to permit the [plaintiff] to amend his or
her pleadings to conform to the proper action. In this case,

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J-A21002-23

Appellee[] actually maintained an action in ejectment, albeit
improperly in conjunction with an action to quiet title. Therefore,
for purposes of the instant appeal, the trial court views the claims
of the parties solely in the context of an action in ejectment. See
Sutton. . . , 592 A.2d at 89 (appellate court may sua sponte
amend pleadings to conform action to quiet title to proper request
for ejectment.)

Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8 (some citations omitted and some formatting altered).

Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that

because Appellee did not have actual possession of the disputed Property,

Appellee’s sole remedy was an action in ejectment and that the trial court’s

order denying Appellee’s motion to amend the complaint is not fatal. See

Plauchak, 653 A.2d at 674; Sutton, 592 A.2d at 88-89. Therefore, we will

consider the parties’ claims solely in the context of an action in ejectment.

See Moore, 687 A.2d at 827; Plauchak, 653 A.2d at 674; Sutton, 592 A.2d

at 88-89.

Evidentiary Issues

We first address Appellant’s three claims related to the trial court’s

evidentiary rulings.

With respect to evidentiary rulings, this Court has explained:

Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie within the
sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse the
court’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of
discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court
might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such
lack of support as to be clearly erroneous. In addition, to
constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be
erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining
party.

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J-A21002-23

Crespo v. Hughes, 167 A.3d 168, 177 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted

and formatting altered).

Additionally, the trial court, sitting as the fact-finder, is presumed to

have disregarded inadmissible evidence and considered only competent

evidence. See Conroy v. Rosenwald, 940 A.2d 409, 417 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Title Insurance

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of title

insurance. Appellant’s Brief at 27-29. Specifically, Appellant claims that when

Joshua Hertz, the managing member of Appellant, mentioned title insurance

during his response to a question by Appellee, Appellant’s counsel objected to

testimony about insurance coverage, and the trial court failed to rule on the

objection. Id. at 28. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting

testimony about Appellant’s title insurance because evidence of insurance

coverage is generally not admissible because “fact-finders should not be

tempted to render decisions based upon the extraneous consideration that an

insurance company will actually pay the bill.” Id. (quoting Paxton Nat’l Ins.

Co. v. Brickajlik, 522 A.2d 531, 533 (Pa. 1987)). Appellant further argues

that the “mere mention of insurance” is prejudicial and is grounds for a

mistrial. Id. (citations omitted).

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 411 provides:

Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is
not admissible to prove whether the person acted negligently or
otherwise wrongfully. But the court may admit this evidence for
another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice or
proving agency, ownership, or control.

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Pa.R.E. 411.

This Court has explained that “the general rule in Pennsylvania is that

evidence of insurance is irrelevant and prejudicial and justifies the grant of a

mistrial. However, the mere mention of the word insurance does not

necessitate a new trial unless the aggrieved party can demonstrate prejudice.”

Allied Elec. Supply Co. v. Roberts, 797 A.2d 362, 364 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(Allied) (citations omitted and formatting altered).

Here, following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the well-

reasoned conclusions of the trial court, we affirm on the basis of the trial

court’s analysis of this issue. See Trial Ct. Op. at 18-19. Specifically, we

agree with the trial court that this evidence was relevant to Appellant’s chain

of title and whether Appellant was a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the

property. See id. Evidence of insurance is not admissible for purpose of

proving a party “acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully[,]” but is admissible

for other purposes. See Pa.R.E. 411. Further, Appellant has failed to

demonstrate prejudice resulting from the Appellant’s principal mention of title

insurance by Appellant’s managing member who testified about how he

learned about the dispute over the Property and what actions he took as a

result. See N.T. Trial, 5/20/21, at 106; see also Allied, 797 A.2d at 364.

Lastly, we note that when a trial court sits as the fact-finder, it is presumed

to have disregarded inadmissible evidence and considered only competent

evidence. See Conroy, 940 A.2d at 417. Therefore, we discern no abuse of

discretion or error of law and Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

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Agreement of Sale

Appellant also claims that the trial court erred by admitting Appellant’s

agreement of sale with Lares for the Property. Appellant’s Brief at 29-32.

Appellant argues that the agreement was moot because an agreement of sale

for real property merges into the deed. Id. at 29-30 (citing In re Mihordin,

162 A.3d 1166 (Pa. Super. 2017)). Appellant further contends that the

admission of the agreement of sale was irrelevant and served “no purpose

other than to confuse the issues before the trial court,” and its admission

prejudiced Appellant. Id. at 31.

The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence state that unless “otherwise

provided by law,” “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,” while “[e]vidence

that is not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. “Evidence is relevant if:

(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be

without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the

action.” Pa.R.E. 401. However, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence

if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue

delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E.

403.

This Court has explained:

The general rule, in the absence of fraud or mistake, and of an
intent to the contrary, is that an antecedent contract for the
purchase of land is merged in the deed . . . upon the delivery and
acceptance of the deed, there exists a ‘prima facie presumption’
of merger. The law presumes that delivery and acceptance of a

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deed consummates the prior agreement and precludes the parties
from looking behind the conveyance to subjects of strife
suggested by their previous . . . contracts; this preclusion applies
to all parties in interest, even third parties. When a deed has been
executed in pursuance of a prior agreement, it is prima facie
evidence the latter has so merged that no action could be
maintained on any of its covenants[.]

Mihordin, 162 A.3d at 1171 (citations omitted, formatting altered, and

emphasis added).

In other words, under the merger doctrine, “a purchase is consummated

by the conveyance; after which the parties have no recourse to each other

except for imposition or fraud, or upon the covenants in the deed.” Id. at

1172 (citation omitted). In Mihordin, the petitioners sought to reform the

deed based on an alleged scrivener’s error that omitted a term from the deed

that was included in the parties’ agreement of sale. Id. at 1169. This Court

held that the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of a scrivener’s

error or mistake that would overcome the merger doctrine and support

reformation of the deed based on the language of their agreement of sale.

Id. at 1175-77.

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion or

error of law by the trial court in overruling Appellant’s merger objection.5 See

Crespo, 167 A.3d at 177. Specifically, we conclude that the merger doctrine

does not apply here because it does not apply in instances of fraud, and the
____________________________________________

5 The trial court did not address whether the merger doctrine barred the
admission of the agreement of sale between Lares and Appellant in its Rule
1925(a) opinion.

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trial court found that Appellee had established fraud by other competent

evidence. See Trial Ct. Op. at 8-12.6

As for Appellant’s argument that the agreement of sale between Lares

and Appellant was not relevant, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s

opinion. See id. at 18 (concluding that the agreement of sale was relevant

to Appellee’s claim of fraud). Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion or

error of law, and Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Kevin Dean’s Prior Bad Acts

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of

Kevin Dean’s prior bad acts, specifically that Dean had previously obtained a

false driver’s license and opened a bank account in Appellee’s name.

Appellant’s Brief at 32-35. Appellant argues that the admission of this

evidence of Dean’s actions violated Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1), which prohibits the

admission of an individual’s crimes or other bad acts to prove that individual

acted consistently with those crimes or acts. Id. at 32-33. Appellant contends

that Appellee did not cite any of the exceptions enumerated in Rule 404(b)(2)

that would permit admission of evidence of Dean’s prior bad acts. Id. at 33.

Additionally, Appellant claims that Dean’s prior bad acts were inadmissible

under Pa.R.E. 608(b). Id. at 33-34. Lastly, Appellant argues that even if

Dean’s prior bad acts were admissible under one of exceptions to Rule

404(b)(2), that evidence should have been excluded because the danger of
____________________________________________

6 Here, the trial court did not address whether the merger doctrine barred the

admission of the agreement of sale between Lares and Appellant.

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unfair prejudice and confusing the issues regarding title to the Property

outweighed its probative value. Id. at 34-35.

Before addressing the merits of this issue, we must determine whether

Appellant has preserved this claim for review. This Court may raise this issue

of waiver sua sponte. See Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa.

Super. 2007). “The issue of waiver presents a question of law, and, as such,

our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Trigg

v. Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. 2020)

(citation omitted).

“In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make

a timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of the proceedings

before the trial court. Failure to timely object to a basic and fundamental

error will result in waiver of that issue.” Thompson v. Thompson, 963 A.2d

474, 475-76 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted and formatting altered); see

also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). Further, a party

waives any grounds to the admissibility of evidence that the party did not raise

in an objection. See Brown v. Halpern, 202 A.3d 687, 708 (Pa. Super.

2019) (concluding that where the defendants only raised a hearsay objection

at trial, their arguments that the evidence was irrelevant were waived on

appeal). Similarly, this Court has held that “[a] new and different theory of

relief may not be successfully advanced for the first time on appeal.” PCS

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Chadaga v. Torres, 252 A.3d 1154, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations

omitted).

Here, Appellant objected to the relevance of testimony regarding Dean’s

criminal activities at trial. See N.T. Trial, 5/20/21, at 6 (Appellant’s counsel

stated “I’m mak[ing] a continuing objection to any mention of any crime Mr.

Dean has been charged with unless it’s proven that it is pertinent to the

allegations in this case”). However, Appellant did not argue that Dean’s

testimony should be excluded because the danger of unfair prejudice or its

tendency to confuse the issues outweighed its probative value. Further,

Appellant did not argue that evidence of Dean’s criminal activity was

inadmissible under Rules 404(b) or 608. Therefore, Appellant has waived

these arguments. See Chadaga, 252 A.3d at 1158; Brown, 202 A.3d at

708; Thompson, 963 A.2d at 475-76. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to

relief on this claim.7

The Deeds

Appellant’s next two issues relate to the trial court’s judgment cancelling

the Lares Deed and Appellant’s Deed. First, Appellant argues that the trial

court erred by concluding that that the Lares Deed was a forgery and void ab

initio. Appellant’s Brief at 17-21. Specifically, Appellant claims that there is

distinction between a forged deed, which is void ab initio, and a fraudulent

____________________________________________

7 Even if not waived, we would affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion

regarding the admission of Dean’s testimony. See Trial Ct. Op. at 20-21.

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deed, which is “merely voidable[.]” Id. at 17 (citations omitted). Appellant

contends that Dean’s signing of the Lares Deed on behalf of Appellee, even if

done in a deliberate attempt to defraud, was not a forgery. Id. at 19.

Appellant further argues that where the signature for the deed is acquired by

fraudulent means, the signature is not a forgery. Id. at 19-20 (citing Ford v.

Oliver, 176 A.3d 891, 901-02 (Pa. Super. 2017)). Appellant contends that

the trial court erred by relying on the definition of criminal forgery to conclude

that the Lares Deed was a forged deed rather than a fraudulent deed. Id. at

20-21 (citing Ford, 176 A.3d at 903). Therefore, Appellant concludes that

the trial court erred by concluding that the Lares Deed was void ab initio as

forgery instead of a voidable fraudulent deed.

Appellant’s other deed-related claim follows from its argument that the

Lares Deed was not void ab initio. Appellant argues that the trial court erred

in voiding Appellant’s Deed because Appellant was a subsequent bona fide

purchaser of the Property. Appellant’s Brief at 22-24. Appellant contends

that a fraudulent deed will be upheld if the subsequent grantee can show that

it was a bona fide purchaser of the real property. Id. At 22. Appellant claims

that it was a bona fide purchaser because it purchased the Property for

valuable consideration, did not have any knowledge or notice of another’s

interest in the Property, and acted in good faith. Id. at 23-24. Therefore,

Appellant concludes that the trial court erred by voiding Appellant’s Deed

because although the Lares Deed was fraudulent, Appellant was a bona fide

purchaser of the Property.

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Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is
to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported
by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed
error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial
judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the
verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court
only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence
in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law.
However, where the issue concerns a question of law, our scope
of review is plenary.

The trial court’s conclusions of law on appeal originating from a
non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court because it is
the appellate court’s duty to determine if the trial court correctly
applied the law to the facts of the case.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Bach, 159 A.3d 16, 19 (Pa. Super. 2017) (Bach)

(citation omitted).

When reviewing an order resolving a post-trial motion for JNOV, our

standard of review is as follows:

A judgment notwithstanding the verdict can be entered upon two
bases: (1) where the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law; and/or, (2) the evidence was such that no two reasonable
minds could disagree that the verdict should have been rendered
for the movant. When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we must consider all of
the evidence admitted to decide if there was sufficient competent
evidence to sustain the verdict. In so doing, we must also view
this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner,
giving the victorious party the benefit of every reasonable
inference arising from the evidence and rejecting all unfavorable
testimony and inference. Concerning any questions of law, our
scope of review is plenary. Concerning questions of credibility and
weight accorded the evidence at trial, we will not substitute our
judgment for that of the finder of fact. If any basis exists upon
which the [trial] court could have properly made its award, then
we must affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. A judgment notwithstanding the
verdict should be entered only in a clear case.

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Karden Constr. Servs., Inc. V. D’Amico, 219 A.3d 619, 627 (Pa. Super.

2019) (Karden) (citation omitted).

Our Supreme Court has explained that a judgment notwithstanding the

verdict

should only be entered in a clear case with any doubts resolved in
favor of the verdict winner. An appellate court “stands on a
different plane” than a trial court, and it is the trial court that has
the benefit of an “on-the-scene evaluation of the evidence.” As
such, while the appellate court may disagree with a verdict, it may
not grant a motion for JNOV simply because it would have come
to a different conclusion. Indeed, the verdict must stand unless
there is no legal basis for it.

Menkowitz v. Peerless Publications, Inc., 211 A.3d 797, 804 (Pa. 2019)

(citations omitted).

[T]o prevail in an ejectment action, the plaintiff must show title at
the commencement of the action and can recover, if at all, only
on the strength of his own title, not because of weakness or
deficiency of title in the defendant. If a plaintiff in ejectment has
presented at trial prima facie evidence that it has title to the
property at issue, the burden then shifts to the defendant, unless
the plaintiff’s proof necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s claim of title.
Conversely, if the plaintiff’s claimed chain of title is faulty, the
plaintiff has not shown a prima facie case, and the plaintiff’s
ejectment case fails.

Becker v. Wishard, 202 A.3d 718, 722 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and

footnote omitted, some formatting altered).

As a general rule, there is a presumption that deeds are valid “to rebut

the presumption of the due execution of a deed, one must prove forgery by

clear and convincing evidence.” Nebesho v. Brown, 846 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (citation omitted)). “Forgery is the fraudulent making or altering

- 18 -
J-A21002-23

of a writing to the prejudice of another’s right.” Ford, 176 A.3d at 901

(citation omitted); see also Smith v. Markland, 72 A. 1047, 1049 (Pa. 1909)

(the same); accord 18 Pa.C.S. § 4101(a)(1)-(2) (defining the crime of forgery

as “with intent to defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is

facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the actor . . . alters

any writing of another without his authority” or “makes, completes, executes,

authenticates, issues or transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act

of another who did not authorize that act”).8

“[A] forged, fraudulent and spurious instrument is not binding on any

person and is wholly inoperative to transfer any title or right to property

whether the holder is an innocent or guilty purchaser.” Harris v. Harris, 239

A.2d 783, 784 (Pa. 1968) (citations and footnote omitted). A forged deed is

“not merely a voidable instrument, it was void.” Smith, 72 A. at 1051

(citations omitted). A bona fide purchaser may not acquire title from a grantor

who possesses a forged deed. See id. at 1055-56 (stating that “the doctrine

of the rights of a bona fide purchaser has no place in [a case involving a forged

deed]. . . . Reliance on a forged deed, . . . may bring loss upon him who so

relies; but . . . such deed . . . can ever affect the owner of the property”);

____________________________________________

8 In Levy v. First Pennsylvania Bank N.A., 487 A.2d 857 (Pa. Super. 1985),

overruled on other grounds by Springfield Twp. v. Mellon PSFS Bank, 889
A.2d 1184 (Pa. 2005), this Court relied on 18 Pa.C.S. § 4101, among other
authority, to conclude that “forgery”, as used in the Uniform Commercial
Code, encompassed an unauthorized signature where the Uniform Commercial
Code did not contain a definition for forgery. Levy, 487 A.2d at 861 n.11.

- 19 -
J-A21002-23

Williamson v. Barrett, 24 A.2d 546, 548 (Pa. Super. 1942) (explaining that

a bona fide purchaser “may be entirely guiltless of wrongdoing, but the

plaintiff, on the other hand, is not to be the victim of a forged instrument and

thereby be deprived of his property no matter what may be the bona fides of

the party who claims under it. In the eye of the law, fraud spoils everything

it touches” (citations omitted and some formatting altered)).

In Ford, the plaintiffs claimed that they had agreed to sell one of two

parcels of real property to co-defendant Oliver, signed only the signature page

for a deed at closing, and subsequently learned that Oliver had recorded a

deed, containing that signature page, which conveyed both parcels from the

plaintiffs to Oliver. Ford, 176 A.3d at 894-95, 901-02. Nearly fourteen years

later, the plaintiffs sued Oliver, and others, seeking a declaratory judgment

that the deed from plaintiffs to Oliver, and all subsequent deeds, were void ab

initio. Id. at 896. The plaintiffs also argued that the statute of limitations did

not apply or had been tolled because the deed from the plaintiffs to Oliver was

a forgery, and therefore was void ab initio. Id. at 901-02.

On appeal, this Court observed that “not every fraud is a forgery.” Id.

at 901. The Ford Court concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief

because “[a]t most, the [plaintiffs] have alleged that they were induced into

signing the deed under a false pretense that the deed would include language

limiting the conveyance to only Parcel One. That is not forgery.” Id. at 902

(citation omitted); see also id. (stating that the plaintiffs “admit that their

signatures are genuine, and claim only that they were fraudulently induced

- 20 -
J-A21002-23

into signing the . . . [d]eed. . . . [Therefore, the d]eed would be voidable and

not, as the [plaintiffs] claim, void” (citation omitted)).9 Lastly, the Ford Court

explained that unlike prior decisions involving forged deeds, the plaintiffs had

legal authority to sell both parcels at issue. See id. at 903.

Here, the trial court thoroughly addressed Appellant’s claims and

concluded that the Lares Deed is a forgery, and therefore both it and

Appellant’s Deed are void ab initio. Following our review of the record, the

parties’ briefs, and the well-reasoned conclusions of the trial court, we affirm

on the basis of the trial court’s analysis of this issue. See Trial Ct. Op. at 8-

12.10 On this record, considering the facts in the light most favorable to

Appellee as the verdict winner, there is clear and convincing evidence that the

Lares Deed is a forgery. See Bach 159 A.3d at 19; Nebesho, 846 A.2d at

727. Specifically, Appellee presented evidence that Dean, who has never been

a member, employee, or agent of Appellee, worked with others to change the

____________________________________________

9 The Ford Court also concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief

based on the 18 Pa.C.S. § 4101 because the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to explain how
the definition of criminal forgery supports their argument that the conduct
they have alleged renders the” deed a forgery. Ford, 176 A.3d at 903.

10 We affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion except insofar as the trial

court cited to Kaiser Energy Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Resources, 535 A.2d 1255 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). See Trial Ct. Op. at 11. In
Roberts v. Estate of Pursley, 718 A.2d 837 (Pa. Super. 1998), this Court
declined to follow Kaiser Energy, explaining that the Commonwealth Court’s
conclusion that “[t]he bona fide purchaser concept applies only to purchasers
of legal title[]” was “inconsistent with the bona fide purchaser concept
contained within the recording statute of this Commonwealth.” Roberts, 718
A.2d at 841 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

- 21 -
J-A21002-23

address on his driver’s license to match Appellee’s business address, changed

official documents to make Dean appear to be the sole member of Appellee,

opened a bank account in Appellee’s name, and then signed the Lares Deed

purportedly on behalf of Appellee. See Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10; see also Ford,

176 A.3d at 901. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the Lares Deed

is a forgery because it was a writing that was fraudulently created to the

prejudice of Appellee’s right. See Smith, 72 A. at 1049; Ford, 176 A.3d at

901.11 As a forgery, the Lares Deed is void ab initio. See Harris, 239 A.2d

at 784; Smith, 72 A. at 1051; Williamson, 24 A.2d at 548. Therefore, even

if Appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value, Appellant could not acquire

title to the Property from Lares. See Smith, 72 A. at 1055-56; Williamson,

24 A.2d at 548.

We add that Appellant’s reliance on Ford is misplaced because the facts

of that case are distinguishable. In Ford, the plaintiffs were the owners of

the two parcels of real property at issue, agreed to sell one parcel to one of

the co-defendants, but the plaintiffs signed a deed conveying both parcels.

See Ford, 176 A.3d at 894, 901-02. The Ford Court held that
____________________________________________

11 We discern no error of law to the extent that the trial court relied in part on

the definition of forgery found in the Crimes Code in a civil matter. See, e.g.,
Levy, 487 A.2d at 861 n.11 (citing the definition of criminal forgery while
interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code). We note that in Ford, this Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the deed in that case was a forgery
citing the definition of criminal forgery because the plaintiffs failed to explain
how the Crimes Code definition supported their claim. See Ford, 176 A.3d at
903. The Ford Court did not state that the definition of criminal forgery could
not be applied in civil matters.

- 22 -
J-A21002-23

notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud surrounding the signing of

the deed, the deed was not a forgery. In contrast to the instant case, the

plaintiffs in Ford argued that the defendant had procured their signatures on

the deed by fraud, but they did not deny that they had signed the deed. See

id. at 901-03. Here, we agree with the trial court that the evidence has

established that the Lares Deed itself is a forgery, therefore it is void ab initio.

For these reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief on these claims.

Equitable Lien

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by finding in favor of

Appellee on Appellant’s counterclaim for an equitable lien. Appellant’s Brief

at 24-27. Specifically, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in relying

on Baranofsky v. Weiss, 182 A. 47 (Pa. Super. 1935) to conclude that there

must be security interest to impose an equitable lien. Id. at 24-25 (citing

Baranofsky, 182 A. at 48-49). Appellant claims that it is entitled to an

equitable lien on the Property because Appellee has been unjustly enriched by

the $44,000 Appellant spent on repairs and renovations to the Property.12 Id.

at 25-27 (citing, inter alia, N.T. Trial, 5/20/21, at 83).

“Unjust enrichment is essentially an equitable doctrine. It is well-

established that courts sitting in equity hold broad powers to grant relief that

will result in an equitable resolution of a dispute. In addition, a trial court
____________________________________________

12 Appellant notes that although it also paid real estate taxes and insurance

for the Property, Appellant is not seeking to have those amounts included in
its request for an equitable lien on the Property. Appellant’s Brief at 26 n.3.

- 23 -
J-A21002-23

must formulate an equitable remedy that is consistent with the relief

requested.” Gutteridge v. J3 Energy Grp., Inc., 165 A.3d 908, 916 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (en banc) (citations omitted and formatting altered).

Additionally, this Court has explained:

To sustain a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must show
that the party against whom recovery is sought either wrongfully
secured or passively received a benefit that it would be
unconscionable for [him] to retain. The application of the doctrine
depends on the particular factual circumstances of the case at
issue. In determining if the doctrine applies, our focus is not on
the intention of the parties, but rather the most critical element of
this equitable doctrine, which is whether the enrichment of the
defendant is unjust. The doctrine does not apply simply because
the defendant may have benefited as a result of the actions of the
plaintiff.

Id. at 917 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

This Court has explained that

where a bona fide purchaser of property makes improvements and
the real owner seeks equitable relief, the court will compel him to
pay for the improvements to the extent that they have enhanced
the value of the land. This includes payment for expenditures for
insurance and for improvements necessary to maintain the
property to the extent that the property was benefited thereby.

Nebesho, 846 A.2d at 729 (citations and quotation marks omitted and

emphasis in original); see also Karden, 219 A.3d at 628 (stating that “[i]n

assessing damages for unjust enrichment, however, enrichment is measured

by the value of the benefit to the owner, not by the value of the invoice

submitted by the subcontractor” (citation omitted)).

- 24 -
J-A21002-23

In Nebesho, the trial court entered a decree that cancelled a deed from

the plaintiff to co-defendant Milos after finding that co-defendant Brown (or

someone acting on his behalf) had forged the plaintiff’s signature on the deed

to Milos. Nebesho, 846 A.2d at 723-25. The trial court also ruled that the

plaintiff had to reimburse Milos for half of the mortgage payments that the

defendants made on the property and imposed a lien on the plaintiff’s interest

in the property in favor of Milos in that amount. Id. at 725. On appeal, Milos

argued that in addition to the mortgage payments she was also entitled to

reimbursement from the plaintiff for her expenditures to repair, maintain, and

improve the property. Id. at 729. This Court concluded that Milos was not

entitled to an equitable lien for the costs of repairs and improvements to the

property because the trial court did not find her evidence credible which

purported to prove that she had enhanced the value of the property. Id.

Here, the trial court explained, in relevant part:

On June 18, 2018, Appellant entered into an agreement with a
contractor, Razors Edge Construction, to perform renovation work
on the Property. According to the contract, the total price for the
agreed upon price was $125,000. As of May 20, 2021, the
contractor performed, according to Mr. Hertz, about half of the
work. Additionally, as of May 20, 2021, Appellant had paid the
contractor, according to Mr. Hertz, approximately $44,000 under
the contract. Therefore, Appellant seeks an equitable lien in the
amount of $44,000. Because Appellant only alleged its own loss
as the measure of recovery, i.e. the value of labor and materials
expended, and not how the Appellee had been benefitted or the
increased value of the [Property], Appellant is not entitled to
relief.

* * *

- 25 -
J-A21002-23

Appellee argues that an equitable lien is not determined by the
amount paid to a contractor, but how much the value of the land
has been enhanced. Conversely, Appellee claims that Appellant is
not entitled to reimbursement for any work performed on the
Property. This court shares the Appellee’s belief. In Nebesho v.
Brown, the Superior Court held that “where a bona fide purchaser
of property makes improvements and the real owner seeks
equitable relief, the court ‘will compel him to pay for the
improvements to the extent that they have enhanced the value of
the land.’ This includes payment for expenditures for insurance
and for improvements necessary to maintain the property ‘to the
extent that the[] property was benefited thereby.’” [Nebesho,
846 A.2d at 729]. Further, our Supreme Court has found that an
“appellant cannot merely allege its own loss as the measure of
recovery—i.e., the value of labor and materials expended—but
instead must demonstrate that appellee has in fact been
benefitted.” Meehan v. Cheltenham Twp., 189 A.2d 593 (Pa.
1963). “Enrichment is ‘measured by the value of the benefit to
the owner, not by the value of the invoice submitted by the
subcontractor.’” Karden Constr. Servs. v. D’Amico, 219 A.3d
619 628 (Pa. Super. 2019) [(citation omitted)]. . . . In this
matter, the Appellant is not entitled to its equitable lien, as the
Appellant failed to demonstrate how Appellant enhanced the value
of the land.

Trial Ct. Op. at 12-13, 16-17 (some citations omitted).

Based on our review of the record, we discern no error in the trial court’s

conclusion that Appellant is not entitled to an equitable lien because Appellant

failed to establish how its repairs and renovations enhanced the value of the

Property. See Karden, 219 A.3d at 627; Bach, 159 A.3d at 19. We agree

with the trial court that the correct measure of an equitable lien is the value

of the benefit that the improvements conferred on Appellee, not the amount

that Appellant spent on those improvements. See Karden, 219 A.3d at 628;

Nebesho, 846 A.2d at 729. Here, Appellant did not present any evidence

establishing that its improvements enhanced the Property’s value. Therefore,

- 26 -
J-A21002-23

Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. 13 See Nebesho, 846 A.2d at

729.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment entered in favor of Appellee.

Judgment affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 4/15/2024

____________________________________________

13 To the extent that Appellant argues that the trial court erred by relying on

Baranofsky to conclude that an equitable lien requires a security interest, we
conclude that this argument mischaracterizes the trial court’s conclusions.
The trial court concluded that Baranofsky was not applicable because it
involved an equitable lien on chattels leased to the defendant and not
improvements made to a property. See Trial Ct. Op. at 14. The trial court
also did not conclude that an equitable lien required a security interest.
Rather, the trial court noted that in Baranofsky, the amount of equitable lien
was equal to the security deposit the defendant had paid under the lease. See
id. Further, the trial court discussed the lack of a security interest when
distinguishing the facts of this case from those of Gladowski v. Felczak, 31
A.2d 718 (Pa. 1943). See id. at 13. We discern no error of law in the trial
court’s conclusions that Baranofsky and Gladowski are not applicable to
these facts.

- 27 -
0078_OPINION_FILED236_NOTICE_GIVEN
Circulated 03/19/2024 11:52 AM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL TRIAL DIVISON

TUGBOAT INVESTMENTS, LLC JUNE Term 2018
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NO. 2432 '._; :...
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Appellee l
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HELPFUL HOMEBUYERS 2, LLC COMMMONWEALrli~ot:fu_T ;_}
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Appeal of: Helpful Homebuyers 2, LLC
TRIAL COURT NO. 180602432

Appellant SUPERIOR COURT NO. 2355 EDA 2022

OPFLO-Tugboat Investments Lie Vs Lares Pmpertres Lie

OPINION
1111111111111111111111111111111
18060243200171

KENNEDY, J. February 7, 2023

Helpful Homebuyers 2, LLC (hereinafter "Appellant") appeals from the October 6th,

2021, order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Please, entering a judgement

in favor of Tugboat Investments, LLC (hereinafter "Appellee") and against Appellant, granting

Appellee immediate possession of the property located at 2711 Parrish Street, Philadelphia PA,

19130 (hereinafter the "Property"), that the Deeds recorded on June 4th, 2018 and June 20, 2018

respectfully were both void, stricken, and cancelled, and that Appellant vacate the Property

immediately. The relevant facts and procedural history follow below.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTROY

Appellee, a Limited Liability Company duly registered to do business in the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the entity number 4 2313 72 were the rightful owners of

real property located at 2711 Parrish Street, Philadelphia PA, 19130. Appellee was deeded over
the relevant piece of property on October 29, 2014 and the Deed was recorded on March 3, 2015

Document ID No: 52891655. On May 30, 2018, co-defendant Lares Properties, LLC, a Limited

Liability Company duly registered to do business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under

the entity number 6610767, by and through its agents and/or its associates, as well as with the

participation of Mr. Kevin Dean, collectively executed a scheme to defraud the Appellee,

Tugboat Investments, LLC and recorded a deed with the Recorder of Deeds memorializing the

alleged purchase of the Property from Appellee. The deed conveying the transaction of the

Property from Appellee to Lares Properties, LLC was recorded June 4, 2018. After, sixteen days,

Lares Properties LLC, on June 20 1h, 2018, then recorded a deed conveying a transaction that

deeded over the Property from Lares Properties, LLC to Appellant.

After these events, the Appellee commenced this action on June 18, 2021 to quiet title

after a letter was sent by the United States Postal Service to the Appellee notifying the Appellee

that the address of the Appellee was changed. Appellant filed its answer to Appellee's complaint

and thereafter filed two motions, which were granted, to amend its answer to the complaint and

add new matters asserting affirmative defenses and an equitable lien on the Property.

Appellant subsequently filed a Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings on October 5,

2020, which was subsequently denied with prejudice.

At Trial, Mr. Dean admitted to and detailed the scheme used to defraud Appellee and

remove Appellee's right of possession to the Property. After conducting a non-jury trial held on

May 20, 2021, as well as considering the Post Trial Memorandums filed by both parties, the

Trial Court entered a disposition in favor of the Appellee and against the Appellant. The Trial

Court ordered that:

2
 1. Judgement is entered in favor of the Appellee, Tugboat Investments, LLC and
Against the Appellant, Helpful Homebuyers 2, LLC on Appellee's claims
against Appellant;

2. The Deed recorded on June 4, 2018 from Tugboat Investments LLC to Lares
Properties LLC (Doc Id: 53372580) was a fraudulent transaction;

3. The Deed recorded on June 4, 2018 from Tugboat Investments, LLC to Lares
Properties LLC (Doc Id: 53372580) is hereby stricken, voided, and canceled
of record;

4. The Deed recorded on June 20, 2018 from Lares Properties, LLC to Helpful
Homebuyers 2, LLC (Doc Id: 53379798)) is hereby stricken, voided, and
canceled of record;

5. Appellee Tugboat Investments, LLC shall have immediate right of possession
to the Property located at 2711 Parrish Street, Philadelphia PA, 19130 (the
"Property") pursuant to the Deed recorded on March 13, 2015;

6. Appellant, Helpful Homebuyers 2, LLC shall vacate the Property immediately
without causing further damages thereto;

7. The Commissioner of the Department of Records of Philadelphia shall record
a Deed of Confirmation, with this Court's Order attached., acknowledging
Appellee, Tugboat Investments, LLC as the owner of real property located at
2711 Parrish Street, Philadelphia PA, 1913 0 pursuant to the above Deed (Doc
Id: ID No: 52891655);

8. Helpful Homebuyers 2, LLC is forever barred from asserting any right, lien,
title, or interest in real property located at 2711 Parrish Street, Philadelphia
PA, 19130; and

9. Judgement is entered in favor of the Appellee, Tugboat Investments, LLC and
Against the Appellant, Helpful Homebuyers 2, LLC on Appellant's
Counterclaims against Appellee;

Appellant then filed Motions for Post Trial Relief on October 22, 2021, which were

denied in its entry on December 6, 2021 as moot due to the Court no longer having jurisdiction

to rule on the merits because an appeal was made to the Superior Court. Appellant then filed a

Motion For Stay Pending Appeal on November 15, 2021 to preserve the status quo pending

appeal to the Superior Court, which was subsequently denied in its entry on December 30, 2021.

3
Appellant then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 10, 2021, which was also

subsequently denied in its entry on December 30, 2021.

Before this instant appeal, Appellant filed two Notices of Appeal to the Superior Court in

this case. The initial Notice of Appeal at 2342 EDA 2021, filed on November 10, 2021 was

quashed by the Superior Court as premature and was remanded back to this Court for disposition

of the Post-Trial Motions filed on October 22, 2021. The second Notice of Appeal at 293 EDA

2022 was also quashed as premature due to the Trial Court not ruling upon the Post-Trial

Motions since the acknowledgement of receipt ofremittal of the record at 2342 EDA 2021. On

October 3, 2022, Appellant filed with the Superior Court an Application to Withdrawal Appeal

for Appeal at 2262 EDA 2022. The Superior Court, on October 31, 2022 accepted as praecipe to

discontinue and the appeal was discontinued. Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal and timely

complied with the Trial Court's Order entered pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1925(b).

MATTERS RAISED ON APPEAL

Appellant Helpful Homebuyers 2, LLC raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the Appellee's error in bringing a quiet tile action instead of an ejectment

action is a fatal error that prevents the court from granting relief?

2. Whether the Court erred as a matter of law by treating the deed from Appellee to

Lares Properties, LLC for the subject premises as a forgery and thus void ab initio,

rather than as fraudulent and thus voidable and subject to HHB's claim of being a

bona fide purchaser of the subject premises?

3. Whether the Court erred as a matter of law in entering judgment in favor of Appellee

and against HHB on HHB's equitable lien counterclaim?

4
 4. Whether the Court's admission of testimonial and/or documentary evidence at trial

concerning Appellee's agreement of sale for the subject premises, was contrary to

Pennsylvania law and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, thus prejudicing HHB.

5. Whether the Court's admission of testimonial and/or documentary evidence at trial

concerning HHB's title insurer, was contrary to Pennsylvania law and the

Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, thus prejudicing HHB?

6. Whether the Court's admission of testimonial and/or documentary evidence at trial

concerning real estate other than the subject premises, was contrary to Pennsylvania

law and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, thus prejudicing HHB?

7. Whether the Court's admission of testimonial and/or documentary evidence at trial

concerning documentation allegedly from Bank of America, was contrary to

Pennsylvania law and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, thus prejudicing HHB?

8. Whether the Court's admission of testimonial and/or documentary evidence at trial

concerning prior bad or criminal acts of Kevin Dean, purported representative of

Appellee, was contrary to Pennsylvania law and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence,

thus prejudicing HHB?3

DISCUSSION

I. The Appellee bringing a quiet title action instead of an ejectment action,
is not a fatal error that prevents the Trial Court from granting a relief.

As a general matter, ejectment actions may be used by a party who is not in possession of

real property to obtain possession ofreal property under a claim of title that is superior to that of

the person in possession of the property. Conversely, quiet title actions are normally brought by a

party who is in current possession of real property to extinguish the rights of others which

interferes with the claimants title and could otherwise be used to challenge that title. Finally, an
5
action to quiet title may only be brought "where an action of ejectment will not lie." Pa. R.C.P.

1061 (b)(2).

In the instant case, Appellee moved to amend the pleadings on the first day of trial. Tugboat

Investments, LLC v. Helpful Homebuyers 2, LLC, 3/31/21, 12-16. Appellee asserted that they

should be allowed to amend to change the cause of action from a quiet title action to an

ejectment action, since Appellee is out of possession. The Court denied Appellee's motion,

offering Appellee the opportunity to discontinue the current action and bring another action

where Appellee files what he thinks is proper. Appellee chose to continue with the action.

Appellee again brought a Motion for Leave to Amend the Pleadings to conform to an ejectment

action on May 18, 2021. During trial on May 20, 2021, the Court again denied Appellee's motion

to amend to conform to the evidence. Tugboat Investments, LLC v. Helpful Homebuyers 2,

LLC, March 31, 2021, May 20, 2021, 65-66. 1.

A. Amendments Generally

Pennsylvania Law allows parties to make amendments to have the case be properly

adjudicated on its merits. Under Pa.R.C.P. 1033(a), "[a] party, either by filed consent of the

adverse party or by leave of court, may at any time change the form of action ... or otherwise

amend the pleading ... An amendment may be made to conform the pleading to the evidence

offered or admitted." A party's right to amend should be liberally granted at any stage of the

proceedings unless there is an error oflaw or resulting prejudice to an adverse party. Morrison

Informatics, Inc. v. Members 1st Fed. Credit Union, 97 A.3d 1233, 1240 (Pa. Super. 2014). The

policy underlying this rule of liberal leave to amend is to ensure that parties get to have their

cases decided on the substantive case presented, and not on legal formalities. Id. The right to

amend should not be withheld where there is some reasonable possibility that the amendment can

6
be accomplished successfully. Id. at 1240-41. Amendments should be allowed at any stage of the

adversary process to secure a decision of the case on its merits, unless unfair surprise or

prejudice to the other party would result or the proposed amendment is against a positive rule of

law." Viener v. Jacobs, 834 A.2d 546, 560 (Pa. Super. 2013). 2.

B. Amendments in Quiet Title/Ejectment Actions

A party who mistakenly brings an ejectment action instead of a quiet title action may amend

the action to receive proper adjudication. In a case directly on point, use of an incorrect form of

action in a quiet title/ejectment action is not fatal to the claims brought by the aggrieved party. In

Plauchak v. Boling, 653 A.2d 671, 674 (1995), the court held the following: It is procedurally

improper to simultaneously commence both an action in ejectment and an action to quiet title

regarding the same parcel of real estate. Ordinarily, the Appellee in an action to quiet title must

be in possession of the land in controversy; if he is out of possession, his sole remedy is an action

in ejectment. Grossman v. Hill, 122 A.2d 69, 71 (1956). An action to quiet title may be brought

only where an action in ejectment will not lie. Id.; Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(2). Ejectment, being a

possessory action, can be maintained if the Appellee has a right to immediate possession with the

concomitant right to demand that the Appellant vacate the land. Hill, 122 A.2d at 71. Permitting

an out-of-possession Appellee to maintain an action to quiet title is impermissible because it

constitutes an enlargement of the Appellee's substantive rights as defined by statute, and thus

exceeds the court's jurisdiction to proceed. Sutton v. Miller, 592 A.2d 83, 88-89 (1991).

Nevertheless, appellees 'use of an incorrect form of action is not fatal to the relief granted by

the trial court. Even where a plaintiff mistakenly institutes an action to quiet title instead of an

action in ejectment, the appropriate remedy is to permit the Appellee to amend his or her

pleadings to conform to the proper action. Sutton v. Miller, 592 A.2d at 89; see also Pa.R.C.P.

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103 3 (permitting a party to change the form of action at any time either by leave of court or with

consent of the adverse party). In this case, appellees actually maintained an action in ejectment,

albeit improperly in conjunction with an action to quiet title. Therefore, for purposes of the

instant appeal, the Trial Court views the claims of the parties solely in the context of an action in

ejectment. See Sutton v. Miller, 592 A.2d at 89 (appellate court may sua sponte amend pleadings

to conform action to quiet title to proper request for ejectment.)

II. Since the deed from Appellee to Lares Properties, LLC was a
forged/fraudulent document, the deed cannot serve as a binding
instrument and is wholly inoperative to transfer any right or legal title to
property. Thus, the Deed from Lares Properties, LLC to Appellant is
therefore invalid and the Appellee is therefore entitled to immediate
possession of its property.

A. Forged/Fraudulent Deed

In the case at bar, Appellee claims that because the Deed from Appellee to Lares was forged

and/or fraudulent, the Deed from Appellee to Lares is considered void. The Trial Court affirms

this statement and further asserts that because the initial Deed was considered void, the Deed

conveying the Property to Appellant is also void. To establish a common law claim of fraud, a

Appellee must prove: (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) scienter; (3) intention by the

declarant to induce action; (4) justifiable reliance by the party defrauded upon the

misrepresentation; and (5) damage to the party defrauded by the proximate result. Boehm v.

Riversource Life Ins. Co., 117 A.3d 308 (Pa. Super. 2015) (other citations omitted).

In the alternative, Appellee also claims that the deed from Appellee to Lares was forged.

Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. §4101, forgery is defined as: (a) Offense defined. -A person is guilty of

forgery if, with intent to defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a

fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the actor: (1) Alters any writing of another without

8
his authority; (2) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or transfers any writing so

that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act, or to have been executed at

a time or place in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an

original when no such original existed; or; (3) Utters any writing which he knows to be forged in

a manner specified in paragraphs (1) or (2) of this subsection. (b) Definition. -As used in this

section, the word "writing" includes printing or any other method of recording information,

money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, electronic signatures and

other symbols of value.

Appellee claims that it has rightful title to the Property and right to immediate possession of

the Property because they have proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Lares Deed was

a fraudulent/forged document. "A forged or fraudulent 'instrument is not binding on any person

and is wholly inoperative to transfer any title or right to property whether the holder is an

innocent or guilty purchaser."' Kensington Citizens Committee v. Glover, 2019 WL 6716178,

*1, *3 (Pa. Super. December 10, 2019); see also Harris v. Harris, 239 A.2d 783, 784 (Pa. 1968).

Moreover, in Reck v. Clapp, 1 Pennyp. 339, *1, *4 (Pa. 1881), the Court concluded that a forged

deed "was not merely a voidable instrument, it was void. It was called a forgery and treated as

such, and neither law nor equity would tolerate it even in the hands of an innocent purchaser." Id.

Where a Appellee's purported signature on a deed conveying realty to a party was forgery, a

court will not deprive the Appellee of his interest in realty on the ground that the Appellant was

an innocent grantee who took in good faith and had spent money in repairing a property.

Williamson v. Barrett, 24 A.2d 546 (Pa. Super. 1942). 2.

In the instant case, the forgery scheme that Mr. Dean shockingly admitted to during trial is a

complex one. First, Mr. Dean went to the DMV and changed his driver's license to reflect the

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address of the registered office of Appellee, i.e. 415 Garrison Way, Gulph Mills, PA 19428.

Thereafter, Mr. Dean and his associates, manipulated the Certificate of Organization of Appellee

to substitute Mr. Dean's name and signature for that of Appellee's true members on the original

document. With his name on the Articles, and an address identical to that of which appears for

Appellee, Mr. Dean had defrauded himself into owner of Tugboat.

Thereafter, Mr. Dean appeared at the real estate closing pretending to be the sole member of

Appellee, and signed a Deed as sole member of Appellee, transferring title from Appellee to

Lares Properties. Additionally, he opened a bank account under Appellee's name at Bank of

America in part under his name where the rewards of the scheme were funneled. Additionally,

Mr. Dean, or his two associates, also changed Appellee's address with the post office so that

Appellee would not receive notice of a Deed being filed for the Property, which occurs pursuant

to Philadelphia Code §2-202. In an attempt to circumvent this statute, Mr. Jan testified that he

had received a letter dated May 30, 2018 from the United States Postal Service stating that the

address of Appellee has been changed. Therefore, the protections afford by the statute (the

Department of Records sending notice by first-class mail to the owner within 30 days of

recording of any deed), were circumvented, as Appellee did not receive notice that its' deed was

transferred to a new owner. At trial, Attorney for Appellee stated that they do not know what

they changed the address to. The only reason Mr. Jan knows about this change was USPS letter

stating that Appellee's address had changed.

B. Appellant Cites inapplicable case law.

Appellant inaccurately tries to claim that because he was a subsequent bona fide purchaser

for value without notice of the fraud, he should be protected and entitled to possession of the

Property. This statement of the law is inapplicable to the current matter. Appellant cites the

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following cases in support of his argument, which shows the inapplicability of the subsequent

bona fide purchaser for value concept to the current matter. Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v.

Braddock, 597 A.2d 285, 287 (Pa. Commonw. 1991), refers to a case that centers around the

issue of whether a property owner was a bona fide purchaser of an easement when it purchased a

property with an unrecorded easement that the purchaser did not know about. MacKubbin v.

Rosedale Mem'l Park Inc., 257 A.2d 587, 589 (Pa. 1969): refers to a case brought by a holder of

a prior equitable claim. Kepler v. Kepler, 330 Pa. 441 (1938): refers to a mortgage and holds that

an innocent mortgagee for value is not bound by secret liens or equites even though the

mortgagor's title was obtained by fraud. In re Fowler, 425 B.R. 157 (E.D. Pa. Bank. 2010): refers

to the protections of bona fide purchasers for value without notice related to unrecorded interests.

Conversely, in Smith v. Markland, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that "[n]o man

can be deprived of his property by a forged deed or mortgage, no matter what may be the bona

fides of the party who claims under it." 72 A. 1047, 1056 (Pa. 1909). The Commonwealth Court

set forth the distinction in Kaiser Energy, Inc. v. Com., Dep't of Env't Res., 535 A.2d 1255

(1988) that it is axiomatic that a person cannot effectively convey property in which he has no

ownership rights. The bona fide purchaser concept applies only to purchasers of legal title.

As demonstrated earlier in this opinion, since we have determined that the [] grantors did not

possess legal title to the property which [grantors] purported to convey through a fraudulent and

forged instrument, the subsequent bona fide purchaser doctrine is inapplicable to the second

Deed from Lares Properties, LLC to Appellant and the overall case at bar. In other words, a

subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice concept only applies to purchasers who purchase

title from legal titleholders of record. The subsequent bona fide purchaser concept applies in

scenarios where an owner of real property deeds a property to a buyer who does not record the

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Deed, and the owner deeds the same property to a buyer for value who records the Deed. Here,

the second buyer, who recorded the deed, is a "subsequent bona fide purchaser" because he did

not have notice of the first buyer's claim and purchased the property for value. This concept,

however, only applies in a title contest between two buyers of the same property, not in a case

where title is obtained as a result of a fraudulent deed. In this case, Lares Properties acquired title

to the Property through the fraudulent scheme executed by Mr. Dean and fellow Lares

Properties, LLC associates and agents.

Due to the fraudulent acquisition of title through a forged document, Lares did not rightfully

purchase rights to the Property from Appellee and therefore did not possess legal title to the

Property for them to convey in a subsequent transaction. Thus, Lares Properties, LLC did not

have proper legal title to convey to Appellant in the second transaction from Lares Properties,

LLC to Helpful Home buyers 2, LLC. Therefore, it is the opinion of this court that the Deed from

Tugboat LLC to Lares Properties, LLC is void due to the deed being fraudulent and forged

through the scheme of Mr. Dean and Lares Propperties, LLC associates and rights to

immediately possess the Property rests solely with Appellee and not the Appellant since

Appellee did not legally part with its rights to the Property.

III. EQUITABLE LIEN

A. Appellant's counterclaim for an equitable lien on the Property in the amount of
$44,000, is without merit since the Appellant alleged his own loss under the contract
with the contractor and failed to quantify how much Appellee was unjustly enriched
through the improvements of the Property.

On June 18, 2018, Appellant entered into an agreement with a contractor, Razors Edge

Construction, to perform renovation work on the Property. According to the contract, the total

price for the agreed upon price was $125,000. As of May 20, 2021, the contractor performed,

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according to Mr. Hertz, about half of the work. Additionally, as of May 20, 2021, Appellant had

paid the contractor, according to Mr. Hertz, approximately $44,000 under the contract.

Therefore, Appellant seeks an equitable lien in the amount of $44,000. Because Appellant only

alleged its own loss as the measure ofrecovery, i.e. the value oflabor and materials expended,

and not how the Appellee had been benefitted or the increased value of the home, Appellant is

not entitled to relief.

B. Appellant cites case law that is not on point, and even if the case law were on point,
it fails to show how the equitable lien should be valued at $44,000.

Similar to the section above, the Appellant again applies inapplicable law to the instant case.

First, Appellant cites Gladowski v. Felczak, 31 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1943) for the proposition that

"where property of one person can by a proceeding in equity be reached by another as security

for a claim on the ground that otherwise the former would be unjustly enriched, an equitable lien

arises." This Supreme Court quote may very well be true. However, in Gladowski, the case

assured the Appellees the right of subrogation to the judgment lien of the bank and to recoup the

portion of money used for restoration of the building. Those are not the facts here and, therefore,

the case is not on point. In this case, the Appellant obtained title to the Property in a transaction

where the grantor did not have valid title to give due to the prior fraudulent transaction between

Appellee and Lares Properties, LLC. Moreover, the Appellant entered into a contract with

Razors Edge Construction and used its own money to pay Razors Edge Construction for the

work done on the Property. Appellant asserts no facts that indicate they had a security interest in

the Property, that the Appellee acquiesced to having such work done on the Property, nor that the

Appellee entered into an agreement with the Appellant where the Appellant would fund the work

done to the Property. Appellant essentially funded a venture to their own detriment. Further,

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Appellant fails to address that while an equitable lien may arise, Appellant fails to quantify the

amount that equitable lien should be. In Gladowski, the Appellees "won" an equitable lien in the

amount of $4,000, the remaining amount loaned from the Appellees to the owners of property for

the mortgage held by Appellee's on the property for improvements and to satisfy the lien from

the bank. Here, Appellant merely asserts that the money paid to the contractor is the amount the

equitable lien should be. Appellant fails to demonstrate how the Appellee was benefitted from

such improvements done to the property.

Next, Appellant cites Baranofsky v. Weiss, 182 A. 47, 48-49 (Pa. Super. 1935) for the

proposition that an equitable lien may arise "either from a ... contract which shows an intention to

charge some particular property with a debt or obligation, or [may be] implied and declared by a

court of equity out of general considerations of right and justice as applied to the relations of the

parties and the circumstances of their dealings." In Baranofsky, the Appellee leased a property to

the Appellant. Pursuant to the lease, the Appellant agreed to pay a $500 security deposit. A

mortgage on the leased premises was foreclosed on and the lease was thereby cancelled. The

Appellee brought an action of replevin for certain fixtures leased to the Appellant. The court

found in favor of the Appellee in regards to the chattels, but awarded judgment in favor of the

Appellant in the amount of $551, finding an equitable lien on the leased fixtures. Again, this case

is not on point. The court in Baranofsky found an equitable lien in regards to certain leased

fixtures, not in regards to improvements upon property. Further, the value of the equitable lien

was the value of the security deposit. Therefore, even ifthe case was on point, the Appellant fails

to reconcile to value of the equitable lien in Baranofsky and the case at hand, which was in

regards to amount paid to a contractor.

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 Finally, the Appellant cites Platter v. Platter, 82 Pa. D. & C. 123 (1951) for the proposition

that equitable liens have consistently been imposed where improvements and/or repairs have

been made to real estate by one other than the legal owner, to prevent such legal owner's unjust

enrichment. Specifically, Appellant claims that an equitable lien is appropriate " ... where the

improvements cannot be severed from the land and specific restitution is impossible and no

constructive trust arises and yet equity requires restitution to prevent unjust enrichment." In

Platter, a husband and wife were renting a property when they got a divorce. Some time later, the

owner of the property deeded the property to the wife only. While the former spouses tried to add

the husband to the deed, for reasons unnecessary to this disposition, he was not found to be an

owner. Since the husband paid most of the real estate taxes, furnished food, and purchased

furniture and in various ways expended his efforts and money, the court found an equitable lien

in his favor in the amount of $1,000. Like the previous cases, the case is not on point. Unlike our

present case, where a subsequent purchaser of property made improvements on property where

they did not have legal title to, this case involves a husband acting under the impression he was

co-owner of a property. Additionally, the court in Platter fails to mention what formula they used

to arrive at the $1,000 figure. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the case is not binding on

this court, as it is a case from Somerset County, Court of Common Pleas.

C. Taxes and Insurance

As explained previously, Appellant claims that they are entitled to a $44,000 equitable lien

for the expenditures paid to the contractor. As note above, this Court does not believe this is the

correct way to measure an equitable lien on the property. However, during trial, Appellant

claimed that they consistently paid real estate taxes on the Property, as well as keeping the

Property subject to insurance coverage. While Appellant claims they paid real estate taxes,

15
homeowner's insurance and both property and casualty insurance from their purchase of the

property in 2018 to around 2020, Appellant never offered proof of such. Instead, they seek

precisely $44,000, the amount they paid to Razors Edge Construction under the contract. As

such, there is no way for the court to have made a determination on these alleged damages.

Appellee argues that an equitable lien is not determined by the amount paid to a contractor,

but how much the value of the land has been enhanced. Conversely, Appellee claims that

Appellant is not entitled to reimbursement for any work performed on the Property. This Court

shares the Appellee's belief. In Nebesho v. Brown, the Superior Court held that "where a bona

fide purchaser of property makes improvements and the real owner seeks equitable relief, the

court 'will compel him to pay for the improvements to the extent that they have enhanced the

value of the land. 'This includes payment for expenditures for insurance and for improvements

necessary to maintain the property 'to the extent that they property was benefited thereby.'"

Nebesho v. Brown, 846 A.2d 721, 729 (citing Stanko v. Males, 135 A.2d 392, 395 (1957).

Further, our Supreme Court has found that an "appellant cannot merely allege its own loss as the

measure ofrecovery - i.e., the value oflabor and materials expended- but instead must

demonstrate that appellee has in fact been benefitted." Meehan v. Cheltenham Township, 189

A.2d 593 (Pa. 1963). "Enrichment is 'measured by the value of the benefit to the owner, not by

the value of the invoice submitted by the subcontractor."' Karden Constr. Servs. v. D'Amico,

219 A.3d 619 628 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing Ira G. Steffy & Son, Inc. v. Citizens Bank of

Pennsylvania, 7 A.3d 278, 283 (Pa Super. 2010)). First, as demonstrated above, Appellant does

not fall into the category of a subsequent bona fide purchaser. Appellant did not purchase the

Property from the true owner for value. Appellant purchased the Property from Lares Properties,

LLC who illegally obtained title to the Property through a forged and fraudulent deed from the

16
Appellee. In this matter, the Appellant is not entitled to its equitable lien, as the Appellant failed

to demonstrate how Appellant enhanced the value of the land. Appellant claims that Appellant's

mistake comes from their reliance solely on the amount paid to the contractor, and not showing

how the amount paid to the contractor enhanced the value of the land.

IV. EVIDENTIARY ERRORS

A. The Trial Court did not err and abuse its discretion with the admission of
certain pieces of evidence during trial since those pieces of evidence were
relevant and probative to prove elements as well as facts necessary to the
Appellee's cause of action and that the record does not support a finding that
such evidence of Mr. Dean's criminal background was admitted during trial.

Lastly, Appellant argues that the court erred and abused its discretion thus causing undue

prejudice to the Appellant when it admitted certain pieces of evidence during the bench trial.

This opinion will address these evidentiary concerns in tum.

Under Pennsylvania Law, relevant evidence is broadly defined. Under Pa.R.E §401,

evidence is relevant if: a) it has the tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would

without the evidence, and b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. See also

Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 533 Pa. 1, 617 A.2d 696, 699 (1992). Under Pa.R.E §402, all

relevant evidence is admissible except as provided by law. It is well established by Pennsylvania

law that "admission of evidence is a matter vested within the sound discretion of the trial court,

and such a decision shall be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its

discretion." See Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 .2d 1182 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) quoting

Commonwealth v. Reid, 571 Pa. I, 811 A.2d 530, 550 (2002). In this instance, the Appellant

argues that the admission of testimonial and/or documentary evidence of the Appellee's

purported agreement of sale for the subject premises, the Appellants title issuer, real estate other

than the subject premises, and the documentation allegedly from Bank of America, caused the

17
Appellant undue prejudice. This Court is of the belief that the Court did not err and abuse its

discretion and such evidence was properly admitted during trial.

First, as it pertains to the agreement of sale allegedly made by the Appellee and the

documentation from Bank of America, the admission of such agreement and documentation was

warranted to determine the probability of facts necessary to support the claim of fraud made by

the Appellee. In this case, the Appellee asserted a claim of fraud claiming that the Deed

evidencing the transaction between Appellee and Lares Properties, LLC was forged and

fraudulent and therefore void. When raising such a claim, the burden was on the Appellee to

prove the elements of both Fraud and Forgery, both stated in this opinion above, on a

preponderance of the evidence standard. Admission of the agreement as well as the

documentation from Bank of America was warranted to prove crucial steps of the fraudulent

scheme Mr. Dean and Lares Properties, LLC used to defraud the Appellee out of rightful

possession of the Property. The admission of such evidence showed that Mr. Dean forged his

name on the documents indicating he was acting as an agent of the Appellee and was authorized

to make such a transaction as the sole representative of Appellee. Moreover, the evidence further

helped this Court determine that Mr. Dean and Lares Properties, LLC together facilitated the sale

of the Property to Lares Properties, LLC and received wire proceeds from the transaction at a

Bank of America account. This evidence was crucial to help prove that more likely than not the

Appellee's claim of fraud had merit and helped prove more likely than not that such elements to

the Appellee's claim were met.

Similarly, the admission of testimony or documentary evidence of the Appellants title

issuer was warranted as well. During trial, Appellant's witness on cross-examination was asked

who they contacted after they found out about Appellee's lawsuit. This line of questioning was

18
used to determine if the Appellant witness discovered any issues with title to the Property prior

to the second transaction. Moreover, the evidence was deemed relevant in determining the proper

chain of title to the Property as well as if Appellant had rightful possession to the Property as a

subsequent bona fide purchaser. Further, the evidence was also admitted to determine if

Appellant had notice of the prior fraudulent transaction between Appellee and Lares Properties,

LLC.

Appellant also argues that the testimony of Appellant witness, Mr. Hertz, violated the

Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and prejudiced the Appellant. On cross-examination, witness

Mr. Hertz gave testimony in regards to previous properties of Appellant and Appellant's sister

companies. Appellant objected to such testimony regarding the other properties claiming such

evidence was irrelevant and this Court overruled such objections. The Court maintains the

position that such testimony as it pertains to the other properties was relevant and was properly

admitted. During trial, witness Mr. Hertz testified to his duties as it pertains to his real estate

investing companies. Mr. Hertz asserted that he was the managing partner of Helpful

Homebuyers 2 and that he had duties that ranged from buying properties, being in charge of

renovating the properties, and managing the business's financial records.

On cross examination, Appellee's counsel inquired about other properties that Appellant

had purchased. After Appellant counsel objected claiming the testimonial evidence was

irrelevant, this Court overruled the objection. Such testimonial evidence was deemed relevant by

this Court because such testimony allowed the Court to clarify the nature of the business of

Helpful Homebuyers 2 and the process the Appellant utilizes when purchasing and renovating a

property and if Appellant treated the Property in question similarly to the properties they

purchased in the past.

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 Lastly, under Pa.R.E §404(b)( 1), evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not

admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person

acted in accordance with the character. Under Pa.R.E §404(b )(2), evidence of any other crime,

wrong, or act may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. As it pertains to the admission of

testimonial or documentary evidence of Mr. Dean's prior bad or criminal acts, the record does

not show a finding that such evidence was admitted during trial. Appellant, during direct

examination of the Appellee witness, Mr. Jan, objected to the testimony regarding an

investigation done by the witness into the background of Mr. Dean. These objections were

sustained by this Court and such testimony was not given due to such evidence being declared

inadmissible hearsay. Se Pa.R.E §801 and §802. Moreover, this court struck the characterization

made by counsel of Appellee labeling the acts of Mr. Dean a heinous crime. Further, this court

advised both parties that evidence regarding the witness's criminal background was not relevant

in the instant matter and that evidence of crimen falsi may be relevant and admitted if properly

presented during trial.

Here, no such evidence of crimen falsi was offered bv either party. The record shows that

Mr. Dean at the time of trial had a complaint filed against him, however, no action was taken on

the complaint by the Police or the District Attorneys office. Therefore, Mr. Dean was not

formally charged with a crime as it related to this matter. Given, Mr. Deans involvement in the

matter, the nature of his testimony, and this Court being unaware of the rights, if any, provided to

Mr. Dean during Mr. Dean's deposition and before trial, Mr. Dean was advised by this Court that

he had a right to raise his Fifth Amendment rights to prevent him from incriminating himself

during trial. Further, this Court also advised Mr. Dean that he had the right to seek counsel and

20
instructed Appellate to assist Mr. Dean in locating affordable resources to help Mr. Dean retain

counsel. After this Court advised Mr. Dean of his rights, Mr. Dean decided on his own merits to

waive the rights he was advised of and proceeded to testify without representation and without

asserting his Fifth Amendment rights. Further, assuming arguendo that such evidence was

erroneously entered into evidence, the admission was harmless error and did not influence the

proceedings or this Honorable Courts decision in any way. Given that the record shows no

evidence of Mr. Dean's criminal background being admitted during trial and Mr. Dean being

advised of his rights before testifying in order to prevent self-incrimination, this Court did not

err.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, for the above stated reasons, the Appellee is entitled to immediate

possession of the Property because the Deed conveying such property was a fraudulent and

forged document and the Appellants claim of an equitable lien is without merit for the Appellee

failed to quantify the amount of the lien as well as show how the Appellee is unjustly enriched

rather than the Appellant alleging his own loss.

BY THE COURT:

21