Green Farms Seafood Joint Stock Co. v. United States

Slip Op. 24-46

UNITED STATES
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Court No. 22-00092 Court No. 22-00125
GREEN FARMS CATFISH FARMERS
SEAFOOD JOINT OF AMERICA and eight
STOCK COMPANY, of its individual
Plaintiff, members,
v. Plaintiffs,
UNITED STATES, v.
Defendant, UNITED STATES,
and Defendant,
CATFISH FARMERS and
OF AMERICA and eight NAM VIET
of its individual CORPORATION, NTSF
members, SEAFOODS JOINT
Defendant-Intervenors. STOCK COMPANY, and
GREEN FARMS
SEAFOOD JOINT
STOCK COMPANY,
Defendant-Intervenors.

Before: M. Miller Baker, Judge

OPINION

[In both cases, the court remands to Commerce for fur-
ther proceedings.]

Dated: April 17, 2024
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 2

Robert L. LaFrankie, Crowell & Moring LLP of Wash-
ington, DC, on the briefs for Green Farms Seafood
Joint Stock Company.

Nazak Nikakhtar, Maureen E. Thorson, and Stephanie
M. Bell, Wiley Rein LLP of Washington, DC, on the
briefs for Catfish Farmers of America and its mem-
bers.

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney General; Patricia M. McCarthy, Director; Re-
ginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant Director; and Kara M.
Westercamp, Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice of
Washington, DC, on the brief for the United States. Of
counsel for the United States was Hendricks Valen-
zuela, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforce-
ment & Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce of
Washington, DC.

Robert G. Gosselink and Jonathan M. Freed, Trade Pa-
cific PLLC of Washington, DC, on the brief for NTSF
Seafoods Joint Stock Company.

Matthew McConkey, Mayer Brown LLP of Washing-
ton, DC, on the brief for Nam Viet Corporation.

Baker, Judge: These overlapping cases arise out of
the Department of Commerce’s 17th administrative
review of its antidumping order on catfish imports
from Vietnam. In Case 22-92, Green Farms Seafood
Joint Stock Company—a Vietnamese fish producer
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 3

and exporter—argues that its tariff is too high. In Case
22-125, Catfish Farmers of America and several of its
constituent members contend that the tariff assigned
to another exporter—and by extension to Green
Farms—is too low. The government, caught in a cross-
fire in this latest skirmish in the enduring Twenty
Years’ Catfish War, asserts the Department reached
the Goldilocks solution—just right. For the reasons ex-
plained below, the court sends both cases back to the
agency’s drawing board.

I

In 2003, Commerce imposed an antidumping duty
order on catfish from Vietnam. See Notice of Anti-
dumping Duty Order: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 68 Fed. Reg. 47,909
(Dep’t Commerce Aug. 12, 2003). Because Vietnam has
a nonmarket economy, the order mandated specific
tariffs on entities that demonstrated independence
from the government and otherwise applied a single
country-wide rate. See id. at 47,909–10. 1 The order has
undergone many administrative reviews; the one here
covered August 1, 2019, through July 31, 2020. See In-
itiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Ad-
ministrative Reviews, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,081, 63,084–85
(Dep’t Commerce Oct. 6, 2020).

1 For the statutory and regulatory background, see Hung

Vuong Corp. v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1334–
41 (CIT 2020) (addressing issues from 14th review).
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 4

In that review, Commerce found that three compa-
nies demonstrated independence from the Vietnamese
government and thus were eligible for separate rates:
NTSF Seafoods Joint Stock Company, East Sea Sea-
foods Joint Stock Company, and Green Farms.
Appx1037. All other producers received the country-
wide rate of $2.39 per kilogram. Appx1094.

As mandatory respondents, NTSF and East Sea
were each individually investigated. Based on a com-
parison of the former’s reported data to costs of pro-
ducing fish in India—the surrogate market-economy
country chosen by Commerce over the objections of
Catfish Farmers—the Department found that NTSF
did not dump its catfish in the U.S. market and thus
assigned the company a zero margin. Appx1093.

East Sea, on the other hand, ceased cooperating
with the review after establishing its eligibility for a
separate rate, prompting Commerce to apply facts oth-
erwise available with an adverse inference. Id. That
resulted in the agency assigning the company a mar-
gin of $3.87 per kilogram. Id.

Finally, because Green Farms was not individually
investigated, the Department determined that com-
pany’s rate by averaging NTSF’s and East Sea’s mar-
gins, even though Green Farms contended that the lat-
ter should be excluded from the calculation.
Appx1069–1070. The consequence was that the agency
assigned Green Farms a tariff of $1.94 per kilogram.
Appx1070.
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 5

II

Invoking jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(c), Green Farms and Catfish Farmers both
sued under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and
(a)(2)(B)(iii) to challenge Commerce’s final determina-
tion. Case 22-92, ECF 9 (complaint); Case 22-125, ECF
9 (complaint). Each then intervened in the other case
on the side of the government. Case 22-92, ECF 16;
Case 22-125, ECF 30. Nam Viet Corporation and
NTSF also intervened in Catfish Farmers’ case to sup-
port the government. Case 22-125, ECF 20, 25.

After the court consolidated the cases for briefing,
the plaintiffs moved for judgment on the agency rec-
ord. Case 22-92, ECF 39; Case 22-125, ECF 49. The
government opposed, Case 22-92, ECF 44; Case
22-125, ECF 54, as did the intervenors, Case 22-92,
ECF 38; Case 22-125, ECF 51. The plaintiffs replied.
Case 22-92, ECF 40; Case 22-125, ECF 50. The court
decides the motions on the papers.

In § 1516a(a)(2) actions such as these, “[t]he court
shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or con-
clusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial ev-
idence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). That is, the
question is not whether the court would have reached
the same decision on the same record—rather, it is
whether the administrative record as a whole permits
Commerce’s conclusion.
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 6

Substantial evidence has been defined as more
than a mere scintilla, as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. To determine if substan-
tial evidence exists, we review the record as a
whole, including evidence that supports as well
as evidence that fairly detracts from the sub-
stantiality of the evidence.

Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).

In addition, the Department’s exercise of discretion
in § 1516a(a)(2) cases is subject to the default standard
of the Administrative Procedure Act, which authorizes
a reviewing court to “set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see SolarWorld Amer-
icas, Inc. v. United States, 962 F.3d 1351, 1359 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (explaining that in § 1516a cases
brought under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930,
APA “section 706 review applies since no law provides
otherwise”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2640(b)).

III

In Case 22-92, Green Farms raises two overarching
issues. First, it challenges Commerce’s determination
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 7

that East Sea is eligible for a separate rate.2 Second,
it asserts that even if East Sea is so eligible, the lat-
ter’s adverse-inference tariff should not affect the cal-
culation of Green Farms’s margin.

A

Green Farms maintains that the Department’s
grant of a separate rate to East Sea is both contrary to
law, ECF 39, at 15–32, and unsupported by sub-

2 Green Farms assumes that if Commerce denies East Sea

a separate rate on remand, the Department will then cal-
culate Green Farms’s margin using NTSF’s zero tariff, ei-
ther alone or in conjunction with calculated separate rates
in preceding administrative reviews. See ECF 39, at 51–52;
ECF 40, at 29–31. Catfish Farmers contest this assump-
tion, arguing that in this scenario Commerce would assign
the country-wide rate of $2.39 per kilogram to East Sea and
use only that to calculate Green Farms’s tariff. See ECF 38,
at 22–25. If that’s right, Green Farms would then be worse
off, as its current margin is only $1.94/kilogram.
Because the court reviews, not prophesies, agency action,
cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110
(2001) (“[T]his is a court of final review and not first view
. . . .”) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516
U.S. 367, 399 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)), it need not consider this hypothetical
question now. If on remand the Department finds East Sea
ineligible for a separate rate, Commerce can address this
dispute in the first instance, and any dissatisfied party can
then seek relief here.
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 8

stantial evidence, id. at 33–39. The court considers
those questions in turn.

1

Green Farms contends that Commerce has a “writ-
ten policy” requiring separate-rate applicants to re-
spond to “୻‘all parts of the questionnaire as mandatory
respondents’ to remain eligible for separate rate sta-
tus.” ECF 39, at 21 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Appx7674). The company contends that “[t]he policy is
clear. ‘All’ means ‘all.’ East Sea failed to answer ‘all’
parts of the questionnaire it received as a mandatory
respondent. Therefore, under Commerce’s written pol-
icy, it can ‘no longer be eligible for separate rate sta-
tus.’୻” Id. (quoting Appx7674).

The government responds that independence from
government control is a separate question from analy-
sis of sales and cost data. ECF 44, at 49 (quoting
Appx1061 and citing Nat’l Nail Corp. v. United States,
279 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1377 (CIT 2018)). The court
agrees. “This Court has consistently held that it is un-
reasonable for Commerce to impute the unreliability
of a company’s questionnaire responses and submis-
sions concerning its factors of production and/or U.S.
sales to its separate-rate responses when there is no
evidence on the record indicating that the latter were
false, incomplete, or otherwise deficient.” Yantai Xinke
Steel Structure Co. v. United States, 36 CIT 1035, 1054
(2012), superseded by statute on other grounds, Trade
Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27,
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 9

§ 502, 129 Stat. 362, 383–84 (2015), as recognized in
Deosen Biochem. Ltd. v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 3d
1364, 1372 (CIT 2018).

Moreover, even if the Department has the policy
that Green Farms ascribes to it, an agency can deviate
from its practices if it “show[s] that there are good rea-
sons” for doing so. Huvis Corp. v. United States, 570
F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009). As the government
argues, “Commerce provided both notice and explana-
tion for why it granted [East Sea] a separate rate.”
ECF 44, at 50 (citing Appx1010–1011, Appx1060–
1064).

The Department reasoned that because the Vi-
etnam-wide margin is lower than the adverse-infer-
ence tariff, denying East Sea a separate rate would
benefit the uncooperative company and allow respond-
ents to manipulate the investigation. Appx1062. The
agency noted that the Statement of Administrative Ac-
tion (SAA) accompanying the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act 3 allows for an adverse inference “to ensure
that the party does not obtain a more favorable result
by failing to cooperate than if it had cooperated fully.”

3 See H.R. Doc. No. 103–316, vol. 1 (1994), reprinted in 1994

U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040. Congress declared the SAA “an author-
itative expression by the United States concerning the in-
terpretation and application of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments and this Act in any judicial proceeding in which a
question arises concerning such interpretation or applica-
tion.” 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d).
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 10

Id. (quoting SAA, H.R. Doc. 103–316, at 870). Comply-
ing with the SAA and preventing respondents from
benefiting from a lack of cooperation are valid reasons
for a change in practice, if that’s what happened here.
The court therefore rejects Green Farms’s argument
that Commerce erred as a matter of law in granting
East Sea a separate rate.

2

Green Farms also contends that substantial evi-
dence does not support the Department’s finding that
East Sea is eligible for a separate rate. ECF 39, at 33–
39. The company advances three arguments.

First, Green Farms asserts that East Sea’s sepa-
rate-rate certification was deficient and did not in-
clude sufficient information to establish eligibility,
and it also contends that it was improper in any event
for East Sea to submit a “certification” instead of the
longer-form “application.” 4 ECF 39, at 33–35. The
court need not address these points because Com-
merce did not rely on the certification. Rather, the De-
partment noted that East Sea had also submitted a re-
sponse to Section A of the mandatory-respondent

4 The certification is a streamlined renewal form used by

companies that recently received separate rates, while the
application is for companies seeking such relief for the first
time or that lost a separate rate previously received. See
Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Ad-
ministrative Reviews, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,081, 63,082 & n.3
(Dep’t Commerce Oct. 6, 2020) (explaining process).
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 11

questionnaire that, taken together with the material
submitted in the certification, established eligibility.
Appx1011; Appx1061; see also Appx1061 n.175 (noting
Green Farms’s argument and stating that “it was un-
necessary to require [East Sea] to remedy this defi-
ciency because Commerce solicited extensive, similar
information in its Section A questionnaire”).

Second, the company maintains that the Depart-
ment disregarded Catfish Farmers’ comments about
alleged deficiencies in East Sea’s certification. ECF 39,
at 33–35. Catfish Farmers themselves make no such
argument, instead urging the court to sustain East
Sea’s separate rate. The government, meanwhile,
notes that Catfish Farmers submitted the comments
in question before Commerce issued its preliminary
determination. ECF 44, at 53.

The final determination, in turn, makes clear that
Catfish Farmers proffered no objection to the Depart-
ment’s preliminary conclusions. Appx1059–1060. In
other words, Catfish Farmers abandoned their argu-
ments. After the agency issues its preliminary deter-
mination, the parties have 50 days to file case briefs
that “must present all arguments that continue in the
submitter’s view to be relevant to the Secretary’s de-
termination or final results, including any arguments
presented before the date of publication of the prelim-
inary determination or preliminary results.” 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.309(c)(2). “Both Commerce and reviewing courts
normally find an argument not presented in a party’s
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 12

case brief to be waived unless the argument could not
have been raised in the case brief.” NTSF Seafoods
Joint Stock Co. v. United States, Ct. Nos. 20-00104, 20-
00105, Slip Op. 22-38, at 24, 2022 WL 1375140, at *8
(CIT Apr. 25, 2022).

Because Catfish Farmers elected not to include
their pre-preliminary arguments in their case brief,
Green Farms needed to assert them. It failed to do so;
instead, it now complains that “Commerce does not
even mention CFA’s deficiency comments, much less
consider them.” ECF 39, at 35. But that is what ordi-
narily happens when a party abandons its arguments:
The Department reasonably chose not to address Cat-
fish Farmers’ forsaken comments when Green Farms
declined to adopt them as its own.

Finally, Green Farms contends that Commerce did
not “adequately explain[ ] its decision, or how the evi-
dence supports its findings under each of the factors
relevant to determining the absence of both ‘de jure’
and ‘de facto’ control.” Id. at 37. The court agrees.

In its preliminary determination, the Department
simply said that East Sea’s evidence “supports a pre-
liminary finding that [it] is eligible for a separate rate”
and that it “provided an adequate response to Com-
merce’s questionnaire as it related to the company’s
independence from the Vietnamese Government and
separate rate eligibility.” Appx1011. The agency fur-
ther identified the relevant factors it considers in ex-
amining de jure and de facto independence, but in
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 13

finding those factors satisfied it merely repeated the
factors themselves and gave blanket citations to the
company’s separate-rate certification. Appx1010–1011
& nn.63, 66. 5 Merely reciting the legal standard, with-
out analysis, is not substantial evidence. Ninestar
Corp. v. United States, Ct. No. 23-00182, Slip Op. 24-
24, at 28, 2024 WL 864369, at *13 (CIT Feb. 27, 2024)
(citing Dickson v. Sec’y of Def., 68 F.3d 1396, 1405
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (“When an agency merely parrots the
language of a statute without providing an account of
how it reached its results, it has not adequately ex-
plained the basis for its decision.”)).

The final determination, in turn, simply listed the
broad categories of information East Sea provided and
then concluded, “We found no basis to determine that
the separate-rate information submitted was not reli-
able.” Appx1061. Later, Commerce repeated that East
Sea “did provide sufficient information necessary to
determine its independence from the Government of
Vietnam.” Appx1063. The final determination con-
tained no analysis of its own—rather, it said that the
Department “continue[d] to find” that East Sea had es-
tablished a right to a separate rate. Appx1060. But
Commerce’s preliminary discussion was conclusory.

In layman’s terms, the Department didn’t show its
work, and the requirement that it do so is “a ‘basic

5 The referenced footnotes merely cite “NTSF SRC; ESS

SRC; and Green Farms SRA.” Neither refers to specific
pages or material.
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 14

principle’ in administrative law that is ‘indispensable
to sound judicial review.’୻” Ninestar, Slip Op. 24-24, at
28, 2024 WL 864369, at *13 (quoting Amerijet Int’l,
Inc. v. Pistole, 743 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
The court therefore remands to provide Commerce
with the opportunity to “offer a fuller explanation of
the agency’s reasoning at the time of the agency ac-
tion.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (cleaned up).

B

Green Farms alternatively asserts that even if
Commerce properly granted East Sea a separate rate,
the Department nonetheless erred by using it to calcu-
late Green Farms’s tariff. ECF 39, at 39–53. The com-
pany contends that East Sea’s adverse-inference rate
is not reasonably reflective of economic reality or
Green Farms’s potential dumping margins. Id. at 39–
43.

Commerce observed that the statute instructs the
agency to ordinarily disregard any rates that are zero,
de minimis, or based entirely on facts available when
setting a separate rate for companies not individually
examined, such as Green Farms. Appx1011 (citing 19
U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(A)). 6 Here, however, the tariffs for

6 Neither the Tariff Act nor Commerce’s regulations ad-

dress how the Department should establish the separate
rate for companies not individually examined in an anti-
dumping investigation or administrative review of imports
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 15

the only companies individually examined—NTSF’s
zero margin and East Sea’s adverse-inference rate—
fell within those “disregard” categories. Appx1011.
The Department noted that in such situations, it “may
use ‘any reasonable method’ for assigning the rate to
all other respondents, including ‘averaging the esti-
mated weighted average dumping margins deter-
mined for the exporters and producers individually in-
vestigated.’୻” Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(B)).
Commerce therefore preliminarily calculated Green
Farms’s rate by taking the simple average 7 of NTSF’s
and East Sea’s margins. Id.

Green Farms argued that the Department should
disregard East Sea’s margin in that calculation be-
cause the agency’s “normal practice” is to exclude ad-
verse-inference rates. Appx1067. Instead, Green
Farms urged Commerce to simply assign it NTSF’s
zero margin. Id. The company also contended that the
inclusion of an adverse-inference rate meant the

from a nonmarket-economy country. In such cases, agency
practice is to use the statutory method for determining an
“all-others” rate in market-economy cases. See Am. Mfrs. of
Multilayered Wood Flooring v. United States, Ct. No. 21-
00595, Slip Op. 24-13, at 4 n.3, 2024 WL 489474, at *1 n.3
(CIT Feb. 8, 2024).
7 Commerce explained that it used a simple average, rather

than the weighted average specified in the statute, “be-
cause publicly ranged shipment data were not available
for” East Sea. Appx1069 n.222. No party challenges that
aspect of the decision.
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 16

calculated margin did not “reasonably reflect” its eco-
nomic reality. Id.

The Department found its methodology consistent
with the statutory command and noted that the SAA
states that “the expected method” when all individu-
ally examined respondents receive dumping margins
that are zero, de minimis, or based entirely on facts
available “will be to weight average the zero and de
minimis margins and margins determined pursuant to
facts available, provided that volume data is availa-
ble.” Appx1069 (emphasis in original). Commerce
noted that the statute permits the use of other “rea-
sonable methods” if the “expected method is not feasi-
ble,” but it found the “expected method”—as modified
to use a simple average—feasible here. Id. The Depart-
ment observed that Green Farms cited no evidence to
show otherwise and further found that relying solely
on NTSF’s rate would contradict the statutory instruc-
tion to use both mandatory respondents’ margins. Id.

Finally, Commerce explained that the margin it as-
signed—$1.94/kg—“is far more similar to Green
Farms’ cash deposit rate during the [period of review]
(i.e., $1.37 per kg) than any of the rates proposed by
Green Farms,” so the Department found “no basis to
conclude that the rate calculated in accordance with
[§ 1673d(c)(5)(B)] is not appropriate.” Appx1070.

The government and Catfish Farmers convincingly
argue that Commerce correctly followed the statutory
command and the SAA by averaging NTSF’s zero rate
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 17

and East Sea’s adverse-inference tariff. But that’s not
the end of the matter. Although the statute and the
SAA permit Commerce to “use a simple average meth-
odology to calculate the separate rate,” Yangzhou
Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United States, 716 F.3d
1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013), “୻‘it is possible for the ap-
plication of a particular methodology to be unreasona-
ble in a given case,’୻” id. (quoting Thai Pineapple Can-
ning Indus. Corp. v. United States, 273 F.3d 1077,
1085 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). “୻‘Form should be disregarded
for substance and the emphasis should be on economic
reality.’୻” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting United States
v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 317–18 (2009)).

Green Farms argues, among other things, that
Bestpak is “particularly instructive.” ECF 40, at 25.
The court agrees. In that case, there were likewise two
mandatory respondents, only one of which cooperated.
716 F.3d at 1374. Also as here, Commerce calculated
the margin for a non-investigated separate rate com-
pany, Bestpak, by averaging the cooperating respond-
ent’s zero margin with the non-cooperating respond-
ent’s adverse-inference tariff. Id. at 1375. The Federal
Circuit remanded because the record contained no in-
formation tying this rate to “Bestpak’s commercial ac-
tivity.” Id. at 1380. Assigning Bestpak half of the ad-
verse-inference rate “with no other information [was]
unjustifiably high and may amount to being punitive,
which is not permitted by the statute.” Id. at 1379.
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 18

Here, the Department’s only record-based justifica-
tion for assigning Green Farms a margin of $1.94/kg—
half the adverse-inference rate—is its similarity to the
company’s cash deposit tariff during the period of re-
view. See Appx1070. But as Green Farms argues, its
cash deposit rate “is irrelevant,” ECF 40, at 33, be-
cause “[t]he very point of the . . . review process (and
separate rate application) is to afford [the company]
the opportunity to update this cash deposit rate with
newer and updated data . . . . Otherwise there would
be no point in participating in [the] review.” Id. The
court agrees that Commerce’s use of the cash deposit
rate to justify Green Farms’s margin is “wholly circu-
lar and arbitrary.” Id. As in Bestpak, “a review of the
administrative record reveals a lack of substantial ev-
idence showing that” Green Farms’s tariff “reflects
economic reality.” 716 F.3d at 1378.

* * *

The court grants Green Farms’s motion for judg-
ment on the agency record. On remand, Commerce
must reconsider East Sea’s eligibility for a separate
rate. Insofar as the Department reaffirms that deter-
mination, it must then reconsider the calculation of
Green Farms’s margin.

IV

In Case 22-125, Catfish Farmers challenge Com-
merce’s use of India, rather than Indonesia, as the pri-
mary surrogate country to calculate NTSF’s rate, and
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 19

seek that margin’s recalculation; they relatedly ask
the court to remand Green Farms’s margin for recon-
sideration because it was based in part on NTSF’s tar-
iff. See ECF 49, at 10–36. 8

Catfish Farmers observe that a case from the 16th
administrative review involves “a substantively iden-
tical challenge to the agency’s economic comparability
analysis.” ECF 49, at 17. They are correct. Commerce’s
discussion of India versus Indonesia here repeats its
analysis in that case 9 and another involving the 15th
review, 10 and it is deficient for the same reason as in
those cases—the Department’s misapplication of the
statutory standard.

Despite having invited interested parties “to pro-
pose for consideration other countries [not on its ‘sur-
rogate country list’] that are at a level of economic de-
velopment comparable to Vietnam,” Appx7798

8 Catfish Farmers’ complaint asserts certain other claims

in Counts I, II, III, and V, but their motion fails to address
them. The government invokes waiver, see ECF 54, at 3
n.2, which Catfish Farmers do not dispute. The court there-
fore sustains the aspects of Commerce’s decision chal-
lenged in those counts.
9 See Catfish Farmers of Am. v. United States, Ct. No. 21-

00380, Slip Op. 23-97, 2023 WL 4560815 (CIT July 7,
2023).
10See Catfish Farmers of Am. v. United States, Ct. No.
20-00105, Slip Op. 24-23, 2024 WL 775181 (CIT Feb. 26,
2024).
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 20

(emphasis added), Commerce asserted that it need not
consider whether the Indonesian data are superior be-
cause “Indonesia is not at the same level of economic
development as Vietnam,” Appx1077 (emphasis
added). But the Department never considered whether
Indonesia is at a comparable level, as Catfish Farmers
contend. That omission invalidates the analysis be-
cause, as the court has explained, Commerce may not
ignore Catfish Farmers’ evidence and argument. See
NTSF, Slip Op. 22-38, at 39–40, 2022 WL 1375140, at
*13 (explaining that the finding that India is econom-
ically comparable to Vietnam “is irrelevant to
whether, as Catfish Farmers argued before the De-
partment, Indonesia is also economically comparable”)
(emphasis in original).

As the court has now twice before explained, the
Department’s discretion does not permit it to disre-
gard the statutory “comparable level of economic de-
velopment” standard. See Slip Op. 23-97, at 16–18,
2023 WL 4560815, at *6; Slip Op. 24-23, at 5–6, 2024
WL 775181, at *2 (noting that because the statute re-
quires the use of “comparable” countries, “[a] more de-
manding rule that excludes [them] is therefore not in
accordance with law”); see also 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(c)(4)(A) (requiring the use of price or cost data
from “one or more market economy countries that are
. . . at a level of economic development comparable to
that of the nonmarket economy country”) (emphasis
added). Because Catfish Farmers argue that Indonesia
is economically comparable to Vietnam, on remand
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 21

Commerce must either explain why it disagrees 11 or
else compare the two countries’ data to assess which
set is superior. Insofar as NTSF’s and (by extension)
Green Farms’s rates are based on Indian data, Com-
merce must recalculate them if it selects a different
primary surrogate country. 12

* * *

The court grants Catfish Farmers’ motion for judg-
ment on the agency record and remands for Commerce
to examine whether Indonesia is at a level of economic
development comparable to Vietnam and, if so, to an-
alyze whether India or Indonesia offers superior sur-
rogate data. The court also directs the Department to

11 The government argues, “Commerce reasonably deter-

mined that the record of this review did not demonstrate
that Indonesia was at a level of economic development com-
parable to Vietnam, regardless of surrogate country deci-
sions in past segments of this order.” ECF 54, at 30. That
statement mischaracterizes what the Department did.
Commerce made no finding about Indonesia’s economic
comparability to Vietnam—instead, the agency simply
claimed that because the former country is not on the “sur-
rogate country list,” it is not at the same level, without ref-
erence to whether it might still be comparable. Appx1077;
cf. Slip Op. 24-23, at 5, 2024 WL 775181, at *2 (noting that
“comparable” is “broader” than “same” because “it includes
the merely similar as well as the identical”).
12 While Catfish Farmers raise other challenges to specific

aspects of the Indian data Commerce used, it is unneces-
sary to address them in view of the court’s direction that
the Department reconsider its surrogate country selection.
Ct. Nos. 22-00092, 22-00125 Page 22

reconsider NTSF’s tariff because it is based on Indian
data. If that reconsideration results in a change to that
company’s margin, Commerce must then reconsider
Green Farms’s rate.

Dated: April 17, 2024 /s/ M. Miller Baker
New York, NY M. Miller Baker, Judge