Advocacy Organization for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Insurance

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:

Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

FILED MARCH 8, 2005

ADVOCACY ORGANIZATION FOR
PATIENTS & PROVIDERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v o. 124639
N

AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARMER’S INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, IMPERIAL MIDWEST
INSURANCE COMPANY, SECURA
INSURANCE MUTUAL COMPANY, STATE
FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE GROUP,
WOLVERINE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, LAHOUSSE-BARTLETT
DISABILITY, MANAGEABILITY, INC.,
MEDCHECK MEDICAL AUDIT SERVICES,
RECOVERY UNLIMITED, INC., and
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

_______________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This declaratory judgment action concerns obligations

under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., to pay
medical expenses. Plaintiffs are individual medical

providers, two guardians of catastrophically injured

victims of automobile accidents, and an organization of

health-care providers and patients that principally seeks

to protect the legal rights of both groups. Defendants are

either no-fault insurance companies that have issued

policies to Michigan motorists or the review companies

employed by one or more of those insurers to review medical

bills arising from automobile accidents.

MCL 500.3107(1)(a) requires that an insurer pay “all

reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary

products, services and accommodations for an injured

person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” MCL 500.3157

provides that a medical provider “may charge a reasonable

amount for the products, services and accommodations

rendered. The charge shall not exceed the amount the

person or institution customarily charges for like

products, services and accommodations in cases not

involving insurance.”

After a hearing on the parties’ respective motions for

summary disposition, the trial court ruled that defendants

were entitled to review any medical charges and pay only

those determined to be reasonable. The trial court further

ruled that even though a medical provider’s charge does not

2

exceed the amount that provider customarily charges in

cases not involving insurance, that fact alone does not

establish that the charge is reasonable.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. 257 Mich App 365; 670

NW2d 569 (2003). It ruled that it is for the trier of fact

to determine whether a medical charge, albeit “customary,”

is also reasonable. 257 Mich App 379.

Because we agree with the Court of Appeals resolution

of this issue, and the others presented to it, we affirm.

MCL 7.302(G)(1).

Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Stephen J. Markman

3

 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

ADVOCACY ORGANIZATION FOR
PATIENTS & PROVIDERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 124639

AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARMER’S INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, IMPERIAL MIDWEST
INSURANCE COMPANY, SECURA
INSURANCE MUTUAL COMPANY, STATE
FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE GROUP,
WOLVERINE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, LAHOUSSE-BARTLETT
DISABILITY, MANAGEABILITY, INC.,
MEDCHECK MEDICAL AUDIT SERVICES,
RECOVERY UNLIMITED, INC., and
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).

At oral argument it became very clear that defendants’

methodologies in determining reasonableness were never at

issue at the trial court level, which accounts for the

dearth of evidence regarding those methodologies. Counsel

for plaintiff admitted that the reason discovery was not

more directed toward illuminating the methodologies was
because no one asked plaintiffs before this Court’s leave

order to discuss how reasonableness should be assessed.

Although I agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that

“reasonable” and “customary” are two separate inquires, I

view its reference to the 80th percentile test, given this

record, as dicta. Given that the question of

reasonableness was not before the lower courts, and,

consequently, discovery did not center on the question, I

would be apprehensive about sanctioning any method without

knowing its full details. I agree also with the Court of

Appeals concurrence that urged our Legislature to address

this issue and implement some guidelines in this area, as

other no-fault states have done.

Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly

2

 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

ADVOCACY ORGANIZATION FOR
PATIENTS & PROVIDERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 124639

AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARMER’S INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, IMPERIAL MIDWEST
INSURANCE COMPANY, SECURA
INSURANCE MUTUAL COMPANY, STATE
FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE GROUP,
WOLVERINE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, LAHOUSSE-BARTLETT
DISABILITY, MANAGEABILITY, INC.,
MEDCHECK MEDICAL AUDIT SERVICES,
RECOVERY UNLIMITED, INC., and
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________

WEAVER, J. (concurring).

I join fully in Justice Cavanagh’s concurrence.

I write separately because this case is further

evidence that this Court needs to address and open for

public comment the specific procedures to be followed when

a justice decides whether or not to participate in a case,

and whether Const 1963, art 6, § 6 requires justices to
give written reasons for their decisions whether or not to

participate in a case.

When this Court entered its order granting leave to

appeal on June 25, 2004, Justice Young was shown as not

participating; he is also shown as not participating in

this memorandum opinion. No public or written explanation

for Justice Young’s decision not to participate in the case

has been given to the Court, the parties, or the public.

A justice’s nonparticipation in a case may arise in

one of two ways. A justice may decide, on his own

initiative, not to participate in a case, and be shown as

not participating. Alternatively, a party may request the

recusal of a justice from a case. Recusal is defined as

“[t]he process by which a judge is disqualified on

objection of either party (or disqualifies himself or

herself) from hearing a lawsuit because of self interest,

bias or prejudice.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed).

It is now clear to me that there is a right and an

expectation of the people of Michigan that a justice will

participate in every case unless there is a valid publicly

known reason why the justice should not participate in a

particular case. Traditionally, in this Court a justice’s

decision on whether to participate or not participate in a

case has been a secret matter, and justices have not made

2

public the reasons for that decision.1 But a justice’s

decision whether to participate or not participate in a

case and the reasons for that decision should not be

governed by tradition and secrecy; they should be governed

by the law, the Constitution, and the Michigan Court Rules

made in conformance with the Constitution; and they should

be made publicly and in writing for the record. This Court

should set the highest standards for clear, fair, orderly,

and public procedures.

The question whether a justice should participate or

1
From January 1, 1995, when I began serving on the
Michigan Supreme Court, until May 2003, when I first stated
that justices should publish in the record of the case the
reason(s) for the justice’s decision whether to participate
or not participate in a case, I was shown as not
participating approximately 251 times, with no explanation
given. In almost all these cases, I did not participate
because I had been on the Court of Appeals panels that
earlier decided the cases and I was informed that justices
“traditionally” did not participate in such cases. In
retrospect, I believe that reasons for my decisions not to
participate should have been made part of the Court’s
orders or opinions.

I filed a detailed explanation of my decision not to
participate in In re JK, 468 Mich 1239 (2003). In Gilbert
v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749; 685 NW2d 391 (2004),
reconsideration den 472 Mich 1201 (2005), the plaintiff’s
attorney moved to disqualify then-Chief Justice Corrigan
and Justices Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman. I
attached to the order denying that motion a written
explanation for my decision to participate in the case.
Similarly, in Graves v Warner Bros, 669 NW2d 552 (2003),
the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, asking
that then-Chief Justice Corrigan and Justices Weaver,
Taylor, Young, and Markman recuse themselves from
participating in the case. I filed a statement giving
reasons for my decision to participate in the case.

3

not participate in a case arises with regularity. Since

May 2003, when I proposed opening an administrative file on

the recusal procedure in In re JK, 468 Mich 1239 (2003), a

justice has been shown as not participating, with no reason

given, in at least 31 cases.2

The questions raised in this and any other case in

which a justice’s participation or nonparticipation arises

are:

1) Are individual justices bound by the
requirements of art 6, § 6 of the 1963 Michigan
Constitution that states, “Decisions of the
supreme court . . . shall be in writing and shall
contain a concise statement of the facts and
reasons for each decision . . .”?

2) Do the procedures regarding the
disqualification of judges set forth in Michigan
Court Rule 2.003 apply to Supreme Court justices?

Const 1963, art 6, § 6, which states that “Decisions

of the supreme court . . . shall be in writing and shall

contain a concise statement of the facts and reasons for

each decision . . .” requires that justices give written

reasons for each decision.3 There is no more fundamental

2
The list of cases in which the various justices were
shown as not participating is attached as Appendix A.
3
Art 6, § 6 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution states,
in full:
Decisions of the supreme court, including all
decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing
and shall contain a concise statement of the facts
and reasons for each decision and reasons for each

4

purpose for the requirement that the decisions of the Court

be in writing than for the decisions to be accessible to

the citizens of the state. Because a justice’s decision to

not participate in a case can, itself, change the outcome

of a case, the decision is a matter of public significance

and public access and understanding regarding a justice’s

participation or nonparticipation is vital to the public’s

ability to assess the performance of the Court and the

performance of the Court’s individual justices. Thus, the

highest and best reading of art 6, § 6 requires that a

justice’s self-initiated decision not to participate, or a

challenged justice’s decision to participate or not

participate, should be in writing and accessible to the

public.

Further, Michigan Court Rule 2.003, which regulates

the procedures for the disqualification of judges, applies

to Michigan Supreme Court justices.4 Michigan Court Rule

2.001 provides that the rules in chapter 2, which includes

MCR 2.003, apply to all courts established by the

Constitution and laws of the state of Michigan.5 The

denial of leave to appeal. When a judge dissents in
whole or in part he shall give in writing the
reasons for his dissent.
4
The full text of MCR 2.003 is attached as Appendix B.
5
MCR 2.001 states:

5

Michigan Supreme Court is a court established by the

Michigan Constitution. Thus, a plain reading of the court

rule shows that MCR 2.003 governs the procedures for the

disqualification of Michigan Supreme Court justices.

Almost two years ago, in May 2003, this Court’s

longstanding failure to follow and apply MCR 2.003 to

itself became apparent to me.6 As a result, I proposed an

amendment of MCR 2.003 that would clarify the applicability

of MCR 2.003 and bring MCR 2.003 into conformance with the

requirements of Const 1963, art 6, § 6. The amendment I

proposed requires a justice to publish in the record of the

case the reason(s) for the justice’s decision whether to

participate or not participate in a case.7 In response to

my recommendation that the Court open an administrative

file and take public comments on such a rule, the Court

opened an administrative file, ADM 2003-26, on May 20,

The rules in this chapter govern procedure
in all civil proceedings in all courts
established by the constitution and laws of the
State of Michigan, except where the limited
jurisdiction of a court makes a rule inherently
inapplicable or where a rule applicable to a
specific court or a specific type of proceeding
provides a different procedure.
6
In In re JK, 468 Mich 1239 (2003), my participation
in a case became an issue, which led me to research the
procedures governing the participation and disqualification
of justices.
7
See In re JK, 468 Mich 1239 (2003).

6

2003. But almost two years later, the Court has not yet

placed the proposed amendment or the issue on any of the

public hearing agendas on administrative matters held

during that time. There have been five such public

hearings since May 2003: September 23, 2003, January 29,

2004, May 27, 2004, September 15, 2004, and most recently

January 27, 2005. Nor has the Court taken any other action

regarding a clear, fair, orderly, and public procedure for

the participation or nonparticipation of justices of the

Supreme Court.

A justice’s decision whether to participate or not

participate in a case and the reasons for that decision

should not be governed by tradition and secrecy; they

should be governed by the law, the Constitution, and the

Michigan Court Rules made in conformance with the

Constitution; and they should be made publicly and in

writing for the record. This Court should set the highest

standards for clear, fair, orderly, and public procedures.

I continue to urge the Court to recognize, open for

public comment, and address this ongoing need to have

clear, fair, orderly, and public procedures concerning the

participation or nonparticipation of justices.

Elizabeth A. Weaver

7

 APPENDIX A

Chief Justice Taylor was shown as not participating in
two cases. Booker v Detroit, 469 Mich 892 (2003), and Neal
v Dep't of Corrections, 471 Mich 928 (2004).

Justice Cavanagh was shown as not participating in two
cases. Konieczka v Dep’t of Transportation, 468 Mich 912
(2003), and Herwig-Tucker v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 471
Mich 873 (2004).

Justice Kelly was shown as not participating in seven
cases. Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 1249 (2003),
Woodman v Miesel Sysco Food Service Co, 469 Mich 855
(2003), Grievance Administrator v Raaflaub, 668 NW2d 146
(2003), People v Wright, 469 Mich 880 (2003), People v
White, 469 Mich 877 (2003), Sonsynath v Dep’t of
Transportation, 668 NW2d 153 (2003), and People v Herbert,
470 Mich 857 (2004).

Justice Corrigan was shown as not participating in one
case. Shaya v Universal Standard Medical Laboratories,
Inc, 469 Mich 994 (2004).

Justice Young was shown as not participating in 8
cases. Bomarko, Inc v Mercy Health Services No 2, 468 Mich
915 (2003), Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Juncaj, 468 Mich 923
(2003), Brooks v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 469 Mich
874 (2003), Blamer v Guiang, 469 Mich 899 (2003), People v
Shook, 469 Mich 911 (2003), Fournier v Mercy Community
Health Care System-Port Huron, 469 Mich 921 (2003), Warber
v Trinity Health Corp, 469 Mich 1001 (2004), and Lawrence
v Battle Creek Health Systems, 469 Mich 1051 (2004).

Justice Markman was shown as not participating in
eleven cases. People v Nevers, 469 Mich 881 (2003),
People v Bahoda, 469 Mich 945 (2003), Shacket Developments,
Inc v Labana, 469 Mich 909 (2003), Shaya v Universal
Standard Medical Laboratories, Inc, 469 Mich 994 (2004),
Hughes v Hall, 469 Mich 1016 (2004), People v Harwell, 469
Mich 1017 (2004), Grievance Administrator v Zipser, 469
Mich 1307 (2004), People v Zakar, 470 Mich 854 (2004),
Landes v Equity Resource Environmental, 470 Mich 864
(2004), People v Nevers, 683 NW2d 674 (Mich, 2004), and
American Bumper and Mfg Co v Nat'l Union Fire Ins Co of
Pittsburgh, 471 Mich 948 (2004).

8

 APPENDIX B

MCR 2.003, Disqualification of Judge, provides:

(A) Who May Raise. A party may raise the
issue of a judge's disqualification by motion, or
the judge may raise it.

(B) Grounds. A judge is disqualified when
the judge cannot impartially hear a case,
including but not limited to instances in which:

(1) The judge is personally biased or
prejudiced for or against a party or attorney.

(2) The judge has personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding.

(3) The judge has been consulted or employed
as an attorney in the matter in controversy.

(4) The judge was a partner of a party,
attorney for a party, or a member of a law firm
representing a party within the preceding two
years.

(5) The judge knows that he or she,
individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's
spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any
other member of the judge's family residing in
the judge's household, has an economic interest
in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding or has any other more
than de minimis interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding.

(6) The judge or the judge's spouse, or a
person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

(a) is a party to the proceeding, or an
officer, director or trustee of a party;

(b) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(c) is known by the judge to have a more
than de minimis interest that could be

9

substantially affected by the proceeding;

(d) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be
a material witness in the proceeding.

A judge is not disqualified merely because
the judge's former law clerk is an attorney of
record for a party in an action that is before
the judge or is associated with a law firm
representing a party in an action that is before
the judge.

(C) Procedure.

(1) Time for Filing. To avoid delaying trial
and inconveniencing the witnesses, a motion to
disqualify must be filed within 14 days after the
moving party discovers the ground for
disqualification. If the discovery is made within
14 days of the trial date, the motion must be
made forthwith. If a motion is not timely filed,
untimeliness, including delay in waiving jury
trial, is a factor in deciding whether the motion
should be granted.

(2) All Grounds to be Included; Affidavit.
In any motion under this rule, the moving party
must include all grounds for disqualification
that are known at the time the motion is filed.
An affidavit must accompany the motion.

(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall
decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies
the motion,

(a) in a court having two or more judges, on
the request of a party, the challenged judge
shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who
shall decide the motion de novo;

(b) in a single-judge court, or if the
challenged judge is the chief judge, on the
request of a party, the challenged judge shall
refer the motion to the state court administrator
for assignment to another judge, who shall decide
the motion de novo.

(4) Motion Granted. When a judge is
disqualified, the action must be assigned to

10

another judge of the same court, or, if one is
not available, the state court administrator
shall assign another judge.

(D) Remittal of Disqualification. If it
appears that there may be grounds for
disqualification, the judge may ask the parties
and their lawyers to consider, out of the
presence of the judge, whether to waive
disqualification. If, following disclosure of any
basis for disqualification other than personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties
without participation by the judge, all agree
that the judge should not be disqualified, and
the judge is then willing to participate, the
judge may participate in the proceedings. The
agreement shall be in writing or placed on the
record.

11

 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

ADVOCACY ORGANIZATION FOR
PATIENTS & PROVIDERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 124639

AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARMER’S INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, IMPERIAL MIDWEST
INSURANCE COMPANY, SECURA
INSURANCE MUTUAL COMPANY, STATE
FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE GROUP,
WOLVERINE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, LAHOUSSE-BARTLETT
DISABILITY, MANAGEABILITY, INC.,
MEDCHECK MEDICAL AUDIT SERVICES,
RECOVERY UNLIMITED, INC., and
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________

CORRIGAN, J. (concurring).

I concur with the majority opinion in this case and

write separately to respond to Justice Weaver’s now-

familiar views regarding this Court’s recusal procedures.

(See In re JK, 468 Mich 1239 [2003]; Gilbert v

DaimlerChrysler Corp, 469 Mich 889 [2003].)
 All the members of this Court serve with the knowledge

that “[t]he Due Process Clause requires an unbiased and

impartial decisionmaker.” Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451

Mich 470, 497; 548 NW2d 210 (1996). It is therefore

standard practice for each justice of this Court to

voluntarily recuse himself or herself when the justice

cannot participate impartially.

In her concurring statement, Justice Weaver correctly

points out that a justice may choose whether to publish his

or her reasons for recusal. There is nothing secretive or

sinister in this tradition. Indeed, Justice Weaver

acknowledges that over an eight-year period she herself

declined to publish reasons for her nonparticipation in

approximately 251 cases.1

Like justices of the Michigan Supreme Court, the

justices of the United States Supreme Court sometimes do

and sometimes do not state their reasons for determining

whether to participate in a decision. See, e.g., Cheney v

United States Dist Court for the Dist of Columbia, ___ US

___; 124 S Ct 1391; 158 L Ed 2d 225 (2004); Intel Corp v

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, ___ US ___; 124 S Ct 2466; 159

L Ed 2d 355 (2004); United States v Hatter, 532 US 557; 121

1
Ante at 3 n 1.

2

S Ct 1782; 149 L Ed 2d 820 (2001); Fed Election Comm v NRA

Political Victory Fund, 513 US 88; 115 S Ct 537; 130 L Ed

2d 439 (1994); Arizona v United States Dist Court for the

Dist of Arizona, 459 US 1191; 103 S Ct 1173; 75 L Ed 2d 425

(1983); Laird v Tatum, 409 US 824; 93 S Ct 7; 34 L Ed 2d 50

(1972). Several of our sister states follow a similar

recusal procedure.2

Like Justice Weaver’s 251 pre-2003 recusal decisions

without explanation, the thirty-one recusal decisions by

the remaining six members of the Court over the past two

years comport with our Constitution3 and the Michigan Court

2
Much like Michigan, many states have adopted judicial
canons informed by the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See
Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct, Ch 24, Canon 3(C) and
(E); Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Ch 51, Canon 3(C) and
(D); Fla Stat Ann Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E) and
(F); New York Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E) and (F);
Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(G) and (H).
3
The recusal standards that Justice Weaver advances
rest on her interpretation of Const 1963, art 6, § 6.
Justice Weaver’s own prior positions are inconsistent in
this regard. For instance, in Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler
Corp, 469 Mich 883 (2003), she chose to not participate
with respect to other justices on motions for
disqualification because she felt it appropriate to decide
only whether she herself should participate, and not
whether other justices should do so. Such a posture can
only be understood as characterizing a denial of a motion
for disqualification as an individualized determination
made by each justice, and not as a “[d]ecision[] of the
supreme court” for purposes of art 6, § 6. Interestingly,
in a number of what are indisputably “[d]ecisions of the
supreme court,” Justice Weaver chose to offer no reasons or

3

Rules. Justice Weaver is, of course, entitled to now

disagree with our traditional recusal procedures, and as

she notes, ADM 2003-26 was opened on May 20, 2003, in

response to her concerns. That file is being considered by

this Court. The same is true for its predecessor, ADM

2003-24, which this Court opened on April 30, 2003, to

consider the disqualification rule when a justice

participated in a case at the Court of Appeals.

In addition, in now-closed administrative files, this

Court has already considered local judicial

disqualification rules, justices’ participation in cases,

and amending or interpreting MCR 2.003. See ADM 2002-41

(opened October 1, 2002, and closed April 2, 2003); ADM

1999-60 (opened November 30, 1999, and closed October 6,

2000); ADM 1999-28 (opened April 30, 1999, and closed

January 4, 2001; reopened May 1, 2001, and closed April 18,

2002); ADM 1992-18 (discussed June 4, 1992, and closed

September 1994); ADM 1991-22 (reported November 7, 1991,

explanation for her own positions. See, e.g., Taylor v
Gate Pharmaceuticals, 468 Mich 1, 19; 658 NW2d 127 (2003)
(Weaver, J., "concurred in the result only”); People v
Yost, 468 Mich 122, 134; 659 NW2d 604 (2003) (“concurred in
the result only”); Nemeth v Abonmarche Dev, Inc, 457 Mich
16, 44; 576 NW2d 641 (1998) (“concurred only in the
result”); People v Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich 495, 521; 566
NW2d 530 (1997) (“concurred only in the result”).

4

and closed September 1, 1995). In short, like Justice

Weaver, the rest of this Court is cognizant of the “need to

have clear, fair, orderly, and public procedures” in place

with respect to the administration of justice.4

Maura D. Corrigan

YOUNG, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

4
Ante at 7.

5