United States Court of
Appeals
Fifth Circuit
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT June 23, 2006
_________________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-50382
_________________________
ANDREW GARCIA,
Petitioner-Appellee,
versus
NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellant.
__________________________________________________
Appeal from the Unites States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(No. 7:04-CR-23-3)
__________________________________________________
Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge.
In this habeas corpus action, the district court granted the petitioner relief. For the reasons
that follow, we reverse.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Andrew Garcia (“Garcia”) and his brother, Alejandro Garcia (“Alejandro”), entered the car
of a young woman while she was stopped at a traffic light in San Antonio, Texas. The Garcia
brothers told the woman, at gun point, to drive to a secluded area and forced her to engage in various
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sex acts with both Alejandro and Garcia. In addition, the Garcia brothers used the victim’s debit card
to withdraw funds from her account and forced her to purchase merchandise, which they kept.
Eventually, the Garcia brothers released the victim.
Garcia and Alejandro, each represented by separate counsel, were charged with aggravated
sexual assault, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping. Both pleaded not guilty, and they
were prosecuted in a single trial. The victim testified as the prosecution’s primary witness. Each
brother also testified on his own behalf, with each implicating the other.1
Garcia essentially confirmed the victim’s version of events, except where her testimony
implicated his willingness to commit the acts. Garcia’s theory of defense was that, while he
committed the specific criminal acts alleged, he should not be convicted because he acted under
duress. In support of this defense, Garcia testified that Alejandro threatened to kill Garcia and that
“something would happen” to Garcia and his family if he did not cooperate with Alejandro.
The jury was given two wholly-separate jury charges. Each charge was complete and self-
contained on separate documents, and each charge was identified as applicable to each respective
defendant.2 Over the objection of the prosecution and Alejandro’s counsel, the trial judge included
an accomplice-witness instruction in both Alejandro’s and Garcia’s jury charges.3 The accomplice-
1
Testifying in narrative form, Alejandro contended that the victim had consented to
engage in the sexual acts with him. He also stated that the victim had allowed him to withdraw the
money and had purchased the merchandise willingly in exchange for marijuana. Alejandro denied the
presence of any firearm in the vehicle and claimed that Garcia forced the victim to perform similar
acts on Garcia because she had performed them on Alejandro.
2
In addition, there were separate verdict forms (also on separate documents) as to each
defendant.
3
Garcia’s attorney argued in favor of including the accomplice-witness instruction.
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witness instruction, given in Alejandro’s charge, described Garcia as an accomplice to Alejandro.
And Garcia’s jury charge, in a similar instruction, described Alejandro as an accomplice to Garcia.
Garcia’s jury charge also included instructions related to his duress defense. Garcia’s challenge is
limited to the accomplice-witness instruction included in Alejandro’s jury charge.
The jury convicted both Garcia and Alejandro on all counts. Garcia was sentenced to
concurrent terms of sixty years for aggravated sexual assault, twenty years for aggravated robbery,
and thirty-five years for aggravated kidnapping. Alejandro was sentenced to concurrent terms of
seventy-five years for aggravated sexual assault, thirty-five years for aggravated robbery, and sixty
years for aggravated kidnapping. Both Garcia and Alejandro appealed their convictions.4
On direct appeal, Garcia raised only two issues, arguing that the trial court erred (1) by
omitting Garcia’s requested jury instruction on the issue of the voluntariness of his conduct and (2)
in restricting his cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses. The Texas court of appeals
affirmed Garcia’s conviction. See Garcia v. State, No. 04-99-832-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Aug. 30, 2000). Garcia did not pursue any further direct review.
Garcia filed a habeas petition in state court, alleging four grounds of error: (1) that his
conviction was obtained pursuant to a constitutionally prohibited jury instruction; (2) that the jury
instruction was harmful; (3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (4) that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal . The state trial court recommended granting
habeas relief, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed and, without opinion, denied
Garcia’s petition.
4
Alejandro’s conviction was overturned on direct appeal because of the inclusion of
the accomplice-witness instruction. See Garcia v. State, No. 04-99-897-CR (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Oct. 18, 2000).
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Garcia next filed a habeas petition in federal court. Garcia’s petition focused on three issues:
(1) that the inclusion of the accomplice-witness instructions in Alejandro’s jury charge violated the
Fourteenth Amendment; (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (3) that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. The district court initially dismissed Garcia’s
petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). On reconsideration, the district court equitably
tolled the one-year statute of limitations and addressed the petition’s merits.5 The district court
concluded that Garcia’s conviction had been obtained pursuant to constitutionally prohibited jury
instructions and that the state court’s denial of Garcia’s writ of habeas corpus was contrary to clearly
established federal law as established by the Supreme Court. As a result, the district court granted
relief by ordering Garcia’s convictions reversed and remanding to the state trial court for a new trial
within 120 days of the district court’s order. The Director of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice (the “Director”), appeals.6
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“‘In a habeas corpus appeal, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and
review its conclusions of law de novo, applying the same standard of review to the state court’s
decision as the district court.’” Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 237 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Thompson v. Cain, 161 F.3d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 1998)). If the issue is a mixed question of law and
5
In addition to the appeal on the merits, the Director also appeals the district court’s
decision to equitably toll the statute of limitations. Because we deny the habeas petition, we do not
address the issue of tolling except to note that in this circuit an error of law, however reasonable it
might be, “‘is not an extraordinary circumstance such that equitable tolling is justified.’” United
States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 849
(5th Cir. 2002)).
6
The district court granted the Director’s motion to stay judgment pending the
outcome of this appeal.
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fact, such as the assessment of harmless error, we review the district court’s determination de novo.
Robertson v. Cain, 324 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Jones v. Cain, 227 F.3d 228, 230 (5th
Cir. 2000)).
Garcia filed his habeas petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). As a result, the petition is subject to the procedures and standards
imposed by AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Under AEDPA, “[a] federal
court’s collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts
in our federal system.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Moreover, our circuit
precedent provides that “‘a federal habeas court is authorized by Section 2254(d) to review only a
state court’s ‘decision,’ and not the written opinion explaining that decision.’” Pondexter v. Dretke,
346 F.3d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en
banc)). See also Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The statute compels
federal courts to review for reasonableness the state court’s ultimate decision, not every jot of its
reasoning.”).
A. Findings of Fact
A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct.” Hughes v. Dretke, 412 F.3d
582, 589 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). Before a federal court, “a petitioner has the burden of
rebutting this presumption with clear and convincing evidence.” Id. This deference extends not only
to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings of the state court. Summers v. Dretke, 431
F.3d 861, 876 (5th Cir. 2005); Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 2004).
B. Conclusions of Law
Our review of a state court’s conclusions of law is also deferential. The Supreme Court has
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determined that § 2254(d)(1) “affords a petitioner two avenues, ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable
application,’” by which to challenge a state court’s legal conclusions. Summers, 431 F.3d at 868–69
(discussing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)). A state court’s conclusion of law is
“contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” under two
conditions:
(1) “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law
set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,” or (2) “the state court
confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result
different from [Supreme Court] precedent.”
Foster v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766, 776 (5th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Williams, 529
U.S. at 405–06).
With respect to the second avenue, “a state court decision is an unreasonable application of
clearly established Supreme Court precedent if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal
rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” Summers, 431 F.3d at
869 (internal quotations omitted). Federal habeas courts must heed the Supreme Court’s explanation
that “‘unreasonable’ does not mean merely ‘incorrect;’” rather, “an application of clearly established
Supreme Court precedent must be incorrect and unreasonable to warrant federal habeas relief.” Id.
(quoting Foster, 293 F.3d at 776). “Only if a state court’s application of federal constitutional law
fits within this paradigm may this court grant relief.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The accomplice-witness instruction
Garcia contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury in violation of Sandstrom
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v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).7 The accomplice-witness instruction in Alejandro’s jury charge,
Garcia maintains, directed the jury to apply a mandatory conclusive presumption on an essential
element of Garcia’s charged crime.8 The instruction in Alejandro’s jury charge provided:
You are instructed that an accomplice witness, as the term is
hereinafter used, means any person connected with the crime charged,
as a party thereto, and includes all persons who are connected with the
crime, as such parties, by unlawful act or omission on their part
transpiring either before or during the time of the commission of the
offense and whether or not they were present and participated in the
commission of the crime.
...
The witness, Andrew Garcia, is an accomplice, if an offense
was committed, and you cannot convict [Alejandro] upon [Garcia’s]
testimony unless you first believe that [Garcia’s] testimony is true and
shows that [Alejandro] is guilty as charged, and then you cannot
convict [Alejandro] upon said testimony unless you further believe
that there is other testimony in the case, outside of the evidence of the
said Andrew Garcia tending to connect [Alejandro] with the offense
committed, if you find that an offense was committed, and the
corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the
offense, but it must tend to connect [Alejandro] with its commission,
and then from all of the evidence you must believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that [Alejandro] is guilty of the offense charged
against him.
Because the instruction defined Garcia as an accomplice, the argument continues, the trial
judge negated the presumption of innocence and permitted the jury to convict Garcia without proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to every element of his charged crime. The district court
agreed with Garcia and granted habeas relief.
7
Garcia also cites Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989), Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307 (1985), and Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983) (plurality), in support of his
claim.
8
We assume without deciding that Alejandro’s jurycharge can be prejudicial to Garcia.
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On appeal, the Director does not contest that the jury charge violated Sandstrom. Rather, the
Director contends that a federal habeas court should review the trial court’s error for harmless error
and that the district court erred in granting habeas relief without considering whether the Sandstrom
error was harmless. We address each issue in turn.
(1) Brecht harmless-error review is appropriate
The Supreme Court has recognized two categories of constitutional violations, “trial error”
and “structural defects.” See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991). The former class
is made up of those errors that “may be ‘quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence
presented.’” Myers v. Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1337 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S.
at 308). Harmless error review is appropriate for the former class of errors but not the latter class.
Id. Because the error alleged by Garcia falls into the former class, the error is subject to harmless
error analysis. See Robertson, 324 F.3d at 304 n.3 (“A Sandstrom-type error has been held to be a
‘trial error’ to which the harmless error rule applies.”).
Holding, as we do, that the complained-of error is subject to harmless error analysis does not
complete our inquiry. In Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 634–38 (1993), the Supreme Court
declined to apply the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard from Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967), on habeas review of a state-court conviction. Rather,“[r]ecognizing the
distinction between direct and collateral review,” the Court adopted the standard announced in
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635, 638. Under this
Brecht harmless-error standard, the relevant question is whether the state court’s error “‘had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id. at 637 (quoting
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776).
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Following the enactment of AEDPA, some courts questioned whether federal habeas courts
should continue to apply the Brecht harmless-error standard or whether the proper role was to review
the state court’s application of the Chapman harmless-error standard under AEDPA.9 In this
circuit—at least when the state court did not perform its own harmless-error review—we simply
apply the Brecht harmless-error analysis. Robertson, 324 F.3d at 306 (“We hold that AEDPA’s
restrictions on federal review of state habeas decisions do not alter Brecht’s mandate for harmless
error analysis by federal courts when state courts have failed to address the question of harmless
error.”).10 Cf. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795–96 (2001) (applying the Brecht harmless-error
analysis in a post-AEDPA habeas proceeding where the state court found no error and, therefore, did
9
Compare Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2004) (declining to
apply Brecht “when a state court explicitly conducts harmless error review of a constitutional error
[because] a habeas court must evaluate whether the state unreasonably applied Chapman”), with
Webber v. Scott, 390 F.3d 1169, 1177 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying Brecht when the state court did not
applythe Chapman harmless-error standard), with Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th
Cir. 2005) (holding that a federal habeas court must perform both an AEDPA-based review of the
state court’s Chapman harmless-error analysis and a Brecht harmless-error review of the original
error as a precondition to granting habeas relief).
10
In the time since Robertson was decided, the Supreme Court has not addressed the
specific question of whether federal habeas courts are to apply Brecht after AEDPA’s enactment.
However, in Mitchell v. Esparza, the Supreme Court, on habeas review, considered the state court’s
harmless-error review under AEDPA’s standard of review: “We may not grant respondent’s habeas
petition, however, if the state court simply erred in concluding that the State’s errors were harmless;
rather, habeas relief is appropriate only if the [state court] applied harmless-error review in an
‘objectively unreasonable’ manner.” 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003) (per curiam) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 75–77 (2003)). The Second Circuit has read Mitchell as implicitly rejecting Brecht, at
least when the state court has made a harmless-error determination. Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d
300, 306 (2d Cir. 2004). But even if we read Mitchell as the Second Circuit does, our precedent in
Robertson remains unaffected because Robertson speaks directly to the situation where the state
court did not perform a harmless-error review. Nor does our adherence to Robertson signal a
rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s two-step harmless-error habeas review; under that analysis, a finding
against the petitioner on either step precludes habeas relief. See Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d
1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005).
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not conduct a harmless-error inquiry).11 And because here the state court did not perform a harmless-
error analysis, it is enough for our purposes to follow Robertson.
(2) The Sandstrom error was harmless
The district court held that Garcia’s “Due Process rights were violated” because the
“instructions relieved the State of its burden of proving by evidence Petitioner’s guilt in the alleged
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” In reaching this conclusion, the district court noted that the state
trial habeas court recommended granting relief. In addition, after pointing out that Alejandro’s
conviction had been overturned on direct review because of the erroneous inclusion of the
accomplice-witness instruction in his jury charge, the district court stated “that [Garcia] should be
given the exact same treatment as his brother.” But the district court never assessed whether the
Sandstorm error was harmless on the facts of Garcia’s conviction.
The Supreme Court has had occasion to consider the application of harmless-error review to
Sandstrom error. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983) (plurality). The Johnson plurality
makes clear that, if a defendant concedes the issue on which the erroneous instruction wrongfully
instructs the jury, Sandstrom error may be harmless. See Johnson, 460 U.S. at 87. Even the
narrowest view, that of the Johnson plurality, described an example in which Sandstrom error would
be harmless: “In presenting a defense such as alibi, insanity, or self-defense, a defendant may in some
11
At oral argument, the Director suggested that state courts first should apply the
Brecht harmless-error analysis, which federal habeas courts would then review under AEDPA’s
deferential standard. We disagree. Brecht’s less-stringent standard of harmless-error review is
predicated on a federal habeas court’s respect for comity, finality, and federalism. Congress
addressed these same principles in enacting AEDPA. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 436 (“AEDPA’s
purpose [is] to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.”). Brecht’s existence does
not relieve a state court of its duty to apply Chapman’s harmless-error analysis where it is required
to do so under Supreme Court precedents.
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cases admit that the act alleged by the prosecution was intentional, thereby sufficiently reducing the
likelihood that the jury applied the erroneous instruction as to permit the appellate court to consider
the error harmless.” Id.
In the Director’s view, Garcia’s case parallels Johnson’s example because Garcia’s entire
defense was that, while he committed the specific acts alleged, he did so under duress. As such, the
Director contends, the Sandstrom error was harmless. The Director also points out that the duress
instructions, which were included in each count’s instructions for Garcia, ameliorate any persistant
concern that the improper accomplice-witness instruction had a substantial and injurious effect on the
jury’s verdict. We agree.
At worst, the jury was instructed that Garcia was “connected with the crime charged, as a
party thereto, . . . by unlawful act or omission.” But Garcia admitted as much in establishing his own
defense. By admitting his participation in the criminal acts, Garcia rendered the accomplice-witness
instruction error harmless. Moreover, the accomplice-witness instruction did not affect Garcia’s
duress defense adversely.
The additional instruction given to the jury regarding Garcia’s duress defense eliminates any
residual doubt as to the potential harm from the accomplice-witness instruction. The jury charge
addressed the nature of Garcia’s defense:
A defense set up by [Garcia] in this case is what is known as
duress. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor
engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so
by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or
another.
Compulsion within the meaning of this section exists only if
the force or threat of force would render a person of reasonable
firmness incapable of resisting the pressure. . . .
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Appearing in three separate sections of Garcia’s jury charge—one for each count against him—was
an instruction on the application of Garcia’s duress defense:
[I]f you find from the evidence . . . that [Garcia] did commit
the offense . . . as alleged in the indictment and hereinbefore defined
in this charge, but you further find . . . that Alejandro Garcia did hold
a firearm to the head of Andrew Garcia while threatening the said
Andrew Garcia to commit the offense . . . and that the threats of
Alejandro Garcia were such threats of force as would render a person
of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure, and that
[Garcia] was in fear of imminent loss of life or serious bodily injury at
the hands of Alejandro Garcia if he did not participate therein, then
you will acquit [Garcia] and say by your verdict “not guilty.”
Viewing the jury instructions as a whole, as we must, see United States v. Young, 282 F.3d
349, 353 (5th Cir. 2002), the resolution of the harmless error inquiry is clear. In error, the trial court
instructed the jury that Garcia had performed the acts alleged. But the trial court correctly instructed
the jury that it could not convict Garcia—even if he had engaged in the proscribed conduct—if the
jury found he committed the acts under duress. The initial error was rendered harmless by the nature
of Garcia’s duress defense. And the duress instructions properly stated Garcia’s defense. Garcia’s
defense, which he reduced to the single question of duress, was rejected by the jury. Accordingly,
we hold that the initial Sandstrom error did not have a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury’s verdict.’”12 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776).
See also Harris v. Warden, La. State Penitentiary, 152 F.3d 430, 439–40 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding,
in a pre-AEDPA case, erroneous jury instructions harmless under Brecht because the evidence and
12
In the alternative, we hold that the state habeas court’s rejection of Garcia’s post-
conviction challenge was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
Given the similarities between the record before us and the example in Johnson, it would not be
unreasonable for the state habeas court to conclude that the Sandstrom error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
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defense presented related to an issue unaffected by the error).
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel
In addition to the Sandstrom error claim, Garcia also asserted that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel both at trial and on appeal under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).13 Garcia contends that counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance (1) at trial by
arguing in favor of the erroneous accomplice-witness instruction and (2) on appeal by failing to raise
the Sandstrom error.
These same Strickland claims were asserted in Garcia’s state habeas petition and summarily
rejected by the state habeas court. And, though the state habeas court denied relief without comment,
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we review only the state court’s ultimate decision. See Neal, 286 F.3d
at 246. Our task then is to determine whether the state habeas court’s rejection of Garcia’s
Strickland claim is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
Before the state habeas court, Garcia was required to show (1) “that counsel’s performance
was deficient” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687. To substantiate the deficient performance claim, Garcia was required to show that counsel’s
actions “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. And to establish that
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense, Garcia had to “show ‘that counsel’s errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Lockhart
v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
Our AEDPA review of the state habeas court’s rejection of these claims is simplified by our
13
The district court did not grant habeas relief based on the Strickland claim.
Nevertheless, the district court determined that Garcia received ineffective assistance of counsel in
relation to another issue below.
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prior determination that the Sandstrom error was harmless with respect to Garcia. The state habeas
court’s rejection of Garcia’s Strickland claim was not unreasonable under Strickland because the
allegedly deficient performance of counsel at trial produced no harm to Garcia’s cause. See Gochicoa
v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding no Strickland prejudice where counsel’s error
was harmless); Mayabb v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding no Strickland
prejudice where the argued-for “jury charge did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury’s verdict”); Harris, 152 F.3d at 440 (finding no Strickland prejudice based
on the court’s earlier conclusion that the erroneous jury instructions were harmless under Brecht).
Nor is counsel’s failure to raise the Sandstrom error on appeal constitutionally deficient: “When we
do not find prejudice from the trial error, by extension, we cannot find prejudice from an appellate
error predicated on the same issue.” Mayabb v, 168 F.3d at 869 (citing Ricalday v. Procunier, 736
F.2d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1984)).
Moreover, contrasting the dissimilar results between Garcia and Alejandro does not establish
prejudice. To the contrary, the disparity supports our analysis because Garcia, unlike Alejandro,
conceded that he committed criminal acts. By contrast, Alejandro argued that the victim was a
willing participant. It comes, then, as no surprise that the accomplice-witness instruction could be
harmful—even reversible—error as to Alejandro but not as to Garcia. Accordingly, we hold that the
state habeas court’s rejection of Garcia’s Strickland claim was neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the district court’s grant of habeas relief and RENDER judgment in favor
of the Director.
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Garcia v. Quarterman
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date filed: 2006-06-23
Citations: 454 F.3d 441
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