FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 19, 2009
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
RONNIE LEE GARDNER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 07-4104
HANK GALETKA, Warden of the
Utah State Prison,
Respondent-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. NO. 2:95-CV-846-TC)
Andrew Parnes and W. Keith Goody, Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant.
Thomas B. Brunker, Assistant Attorney General (Erin Riley, Assistant Attorney
General, and Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General with him on the briefs), Salt
Lake City, Utah, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before McCONNELL, TYMKOVICH and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
While Petitioner-Appellant Ronnie Lee Gardner was being escorted from
prison to the state district court in Salt Lake City in 1985 for a hearing on a charge
of second degree murder, an accomplice handed him a gun. At point-blank range,
Mr. Gardner shot Michael Burdell, an attorney standing inside the court’s archives
room. Mr. Burdell died, and Mr. Gardner was convicted of first degree capital
murder and sentenced to death.
I. BACKGROUND
Our recitation of the facts and lengthy case history is based largely on
United State Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba’s thorough Report and
Recommendation, which was adopted with only slight modifications by the Utah
District Court in Gardner v. Galetka, No. 2:95-CV-846-TC, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25643 (D. Utah Apr. 5, 2007); see also State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273
(Utah 1989) (Gardner I) (summarizing the facts of this case).
A. The Crime
On April 2, 1985, guards transported Mr. Gardner from the maximum
security unit of the Utah State Prison to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt
Lake City to appear at a hearing on a second degree murder charge. As he entered
the basement lobby of the courthouse, a female accomplice handed him a gun. Mr.
Gardner pointed the gun at his guards, who quickly retreated to the parking lot.
During this encounter, he exchanged gunfire with one of the guards and was shot,
apparently in the chest.
Looking for a way out of the building, a wounded Mr. Gardner entered the
archives room. A court clerk, a prison officer, and three attorneys were inside.
Mr. Gardner said he had been shot, then walked back out of the archives room.
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When Mr. Gardner went back into the lobby, two of the attorneys, Michael Burdell
and Robert Macri, attempted to hide behind the open door to the archives room.
Mr. Gardner reentered the archives room with his gun held in front of him. He
saw the two attorneys hiding behind the door and stopped in front of them.
Standing about one-and-a-half to two feet in front of Mr. Macri, Mr. Gardner
tightened his grip on the gun and pointed it at him. Mr. Burdell said, “Oh, my
God.” Mr. Gardner said, “Oh Fu–” and then moved the gun away from Mr. Macri
to Mr. Burdell. Mr. Macri fled out into the lobby and Mr. Gardner fatally shot Mr.
Burdell in the head after what one witness described as a “definite pause.” Vol.
XLVII, State Ct. Tr. 942. Mr. Gardner then fired at Mr. Burdell a second time.
Mr. Gardner forced the prison officer in the archives room to accompany
him out to a stairwell leading to the second floor. While Mr. Gardner crossed the
lobby, a uniformed bailiff, Nick Kirk, came down the stairs to investigate the
commotion. Mr. Gardner shot and seriously wounded Mr. Kirk and then
proceeded up the stairs. On the next floor, Mr. Gardner forced a vending machine
serviceman to accompany him outside of the building. As soon as Mr. Gardner
was outside, the serviceman broke free and dived through a teller’s window inside
the building. In the parking lot and surrounded by police, Mr. Gardner threw
down his gun and surrendered.
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B. Trial Proceedings and Direct Appeal
In 1985, Mr. Gardner was tried before a jury in the Third Judicial District
Court in Salt Lake County, Utah. The jury convicted Mr. Gardner of first degree
murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated kidnaping, escape, and
possession of a dangerous weapon by an incarcerated person. Only the first of
these convictions is now at issue. The sole theory of the defense as to this charge
was that he lacked the intent to kill Mr. Burdell–that the killing was either an
accident, or at most, done with reckless disregard to human life.
On direct appeal, Mr. Gardner made the following claims of error: (1) the
district court judge abused his discretion in denying him a change of venue, (2) the
judge should have recused himself, (3) the death penalty laws in Utah are
unconstitutional, (4) the use of his prior felony as an aggravating circumstance
violated his due process rights, (5) he was improperly denied a challenge for
cause, (6) excessive security in the courtroom denied his right to a fair trial, (7)
the judge violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when he cut off his
recross-examination of a witness, (8) corrections officer Wayne Jorgensen testified
about statements taken in violation of Miranda and Massiah, (9) the district court
gave an erroneous jury instruction on manslaughter, (10) the district court gave an
erroneous oral instruction to the jury regarding the order it should consider the
various offenses, (11) the district court improperly denied his motion for directed
verdict, (12) the district court erred in admitting evidence of a previous homicide
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he had committed as an aggravating factor, (13) his sentence was disproportionate
compared to those given in similar cases, (14) the government engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct, and (15) his counsel was ineffective in failing to object
to the testimony of Officer Jorgensen, Dr. Heinbecker, and Mr. Fuchs. The Utah
Supreme Court denied relief on all claims, Gardner I, 789 P.2d at 276, and the
United States Supreme Court denied Mr. Gardner’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
C. State Post-Conviction Proceedings
Mr. Gardner then sought post-conviction relief in state court. The Utah
district court addressed all of his claims on the merits, and ruled that Mr. Gardner
had been denied effective assistance of counsel both during the penalty phase and
on appeal. Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 617, 619 (Utah 1994) (Gardner II).
According to the court, trial counsel did not give a defense psychiatrist enough
time to test and evaluate Mr. Gardner, and appellate counsel did not act as
independent counsel and failed to adequately research and brief issues on appeal.
Id. at 619, 620. The court held that these deficiencies required a new penalty
hearing and a new appeal. It rejected Mr. Gardner’s other claims. Both parties
appealed.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the district court’s holding that Mr.
Gardner received ineffective assistance of counsel, and affirmed its rejection of
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Mr. Gardner’s other claims. Gardner II, 888 P.2d 608. First, the court rejected
six claims that could have been raised on direct appeal but were not:
(1) error by the trial court in admitting hypnotically enhanced
testimony; (2) error by the trial court in not advising Gardner of his
right to remain silent and not testify; (3) violation of Gardner’s right
to be present at all the hearings in his case; (4) consideration by the
jury of impermissible information about the victim; (5) failure to
instruct the jury on all the statutory mitigating circumstances in the
penalty phase; and (6) failure to instruct the jury in the penalty phase
that the existence of aggravating factors had to be found beyond a
reasonable doubt before they could be considered in deciding to
impose the death penalty.
Id. at 614.
The court summarily rejected four of Mr. Gardner’s claims of
ineffective assistance during the guilt phase. First, the court held that Mr.
Gardner’s claim that counsel were ineffective because he was coerced to
testify was addressed, in essence, on direct appeal when the court rejected
Mr. Gardner’s assertion that admitting his prior inconsistent statements
violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Id. at
615. Second, Mr. Gardner’s claim that his counsel were ineffective because
they elicited testimony from him about his past convictions of violent
crimes was disposed of when the court held on direct appeal that it was error
to admit the evidence of his other violent crimes but not prejudicial. Id. at
616. Third, Mr. Gardner’s claim that counsel were ineffective in failing to
request a bifurcated trial was essentially the same as the claim raised and
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addressed on direct appeal: whether it was error not to hold a bifurcated
hearing. Id. Finally, the court held that Mr. Gardner’s claim that trial
counsel were ineffective because they failed to clarify for the jury that Mr.
Gardner was shot in the chest and lung rather than in the shoulder was
frivolous. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed Mr. Gardner’s remaining claims on the
merits. The court reversed the district court’s holding as to ineffective assistance
of trial counsel at the penalty phase, holding that Mr. Gardner was not prejudiced
by counsel’s failure to give Dr. Heinbecker, a defense psychologist, enough time
to prepare before the penalty phase. Id. at 619. While the district court ruled that
trial counsel had a conflict of interest but that Mr. Gardner waived his right to
raise any such conflict, the Utah Supreme Court held that he was not denied
effective assistance on account of any conflicts of interest with his trial attorneys.
Id. at 620–621. The Utah Supreme Court also reversed the district court’s holding
that appellate counsel had failed to research and investigate the trial record for
appealable issues, concluding that “habeas counsel . . . apprised [the court] of no
issues that should have been raised on the first appeal.” Id. at 620. The court held
that it did not condone appellate counsel’s preparation techniques, but no prejudice
resulted therefrom. Id. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that Mr.
Gardner’s appellate counsel lacked any conflicts of interest in representing him.
The court also rejected Mr. Gardner’s claim that the trial court’s failure to appoint
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expert witnesses and an investigator at the state’s expense violated his right to
effective assistance of counsel, due process, meaningful access to the courts, and
equal protection. Id. at 622–23.
Again, the United States Supreme Court denied review. 516 U.S. 828
(1995). Ten years had passed since Mr. Gardner’s crime and conviction.
D. Federal Habeas Proceedings
In 1997, Mr. Gardner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah. Two years after filing his habeas
petition, Mr. Gardner sought to amend his petition to raise a new ineffective
assistance claim based on appellate counsel’s failure to object to the jury
instruction that defined the meaning of the term “knowingly.” As discussed
below, this instruction was incorrect because it addressed elements of the
definition in the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive. This claim had not been
raised in state court on direct appeal or during the state post-conviction
proceedings. The district court allowed Mr. Gardner to amend his petition, but
held the added claim in abeyance until he had exhausted state avenues for relief on
the claim. Accordingly, Mr. Gardner filed a second petition for post-conviction
relief in state court.
While the jury instruction claim proceeded in state court, in 2003 the
magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation addressing and rejecting Mr.
Gardner’s other habeas claims. The district court adopted the recommendation
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with slight modifications. The court rejected all of Mr. Gardner’s ineffective
assistance claims on various grounds. The court did not address the deficiency
prong of Mr. Gardner’s ineffective assistance claims based on his counsel’s failure
to object to Officer Jorgensen’s testimony and failure to fully prepare and present
mental health evidence at the guilt phase, instead holding there was no prejudice.
The court held that Mr. Gardner failed to establish that his trial counsel had a
conflict of interest. Moreover, it was not unreasonable for counsel to have Mr.
Gardner testify at the guilt phase, nor was it unreasonable for counsel to rely on
Mr. Barton’s examination of the gun. Finally, the court rejected as unsupported
Mr. Gardner’s claims of ineffective assistance for stipulating to his prior
convictions and failing to request a bifurcated proceeding.
As to his counsel’s performance at the penalty phase, the court held that
they acted deficiently in failing to prepare and present mental health evidence, but
that no prejudice resulted. The court also rejected Mr. Gardner’s ineffective
appellate counsel claim, finding that there was no conflict of interest and that none
of the issues they failed to raise were meritorious.
The court then addressed Mr. Gardner’s remaining claims. The court held
that Mr. Gardner failed to establish prejudice resulting from the judge’s denial of
his motion to change venue, the admission of Mr. Macri’s post-hypnosis
testimony, or the decision not to bifurcate the trial. The court also rejected Mr.
Gardner’s claims concerning judicial recusal, excessive security, prosecutorial
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misconduct, limitation of cross-examination, notification of the right not to testify,
a lesser included offense instruction, exclusion of mitigating evidence during the
penalty phase, a jury instruction about mitigating circumstances and aggravation
proof, the alleged presumption of death, and the alleged failure to narrow the class
of people eligible for the death penalty.
Back in state court, the Utah district court held that Mr. Gardner’s belated
claim of appellate ineffectiveness based on the faulty jury instruction was
procedurally barred. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed. Gardner v. Galetka, 94
P.3d 263 (Utah 2004) (Gardner III). On return to federal court, the district court
disagreed, holding that the claim was not procedurally barred; however, the court
denied this claim for lack of prejudice. Gardner, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25651, at
*30-31. Mr. Gardner timely appealed both the order rejecting his claim of
appellate ineffectiveness based on the faulty jury instruction and the order
rejecting all other claims. At this point, twenty-two years had passed since his
1985 crime and conviction.
II. DISCUSSION
Since Congress’s 1986 revision of the standards applicable to federal habeas
review of state court convictions, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (“AEDPA”), the role of the federal courts has become that of a back-stop or
safety net to ensure that state courts applied the constitutional standards in effect
at the time (as enunciated by the Supreme Court) and did so reasonably. Habeas
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review is no longer an occasion for refinement or modification of constitutional
principles or for federal court second-guessing of state court application of
constitutional law, so long as the state court addressed the merits of any properly
presented federal constitutional claim, applied correct standards, and reached a
decision that is within the zone of reasonableness. Under this statutory
framework, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas review is entitled to relief only
if he can demonstrate that the state adjudication on the merits “(1) resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). Unless otherwise stated below, we review Mr.
Gardner’s claims under this standard of review. Our review of decisions by the
federal district court on questions of law is de novo; our review of factual
findings, if any, is for clear error. United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 960 (10th
Cir. 2005).
A. Ineffective Assistance at Guilt Phase
Mr. Gardner’s sole defense at the guilt phase was that he lacked the intent to
kill Mr. Burdell. He argued that the killing was either an accident, or at most,
done with reckless disregard to human life. He now contends that his counsel was
unconstitutionally deficient in four areas in making this argument at trial.
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1. Failure to Adequately Investigate Mr. Gardner’s Mental Health
Prior to the guilt phase of the trial, defense counsel engaged a psychologist,
Dr. Rindflesh, to examine Mr. Gardner. The examination took an hour and a half.
See Mag. Rep. 63. Dr. Rindflesh’s subsequent report indicated that there were no
signs of a major psychological disorder now or in the past, suggesting further
investigation would be fruitless. Id. at 73. But see id. at 74 (noting that Dr.
Rindflesh wrote in his report, “Perhaps an interview in a more open setting will be
possible in the future,” suggesting that another examination might have been
preferable). Mr. Gardner argues that trial counsel failed to undertake a sufficient
investigation of his mental health issues to support his lack of intent defense.
In his state post-conviction petition, Mr. Gardner argued that his counsel
failed to adequately investigate and present evidence that he had been shot in the
chest rather than in the shoulder, and to present evidence of the wound’s potential
effect on his mental state. Gardner II, 888 P.2d at 616. The court rejected this
claim as frivolous. Id. In his federal habeas petition, Mr. Gardner argued that his
counsel was ineffective for inadequately investigating both ballistics and mental
health evidence in preparation for the guilt phase. The magistrate judge rejected
his argument, finding that defense counsel’s reliance on Mr. Barton’s examination
of the gun was not deficient, and even if counsel’s failure to investigate Mr.
Gardner’s mental health more fully was deficient, it was not prejudicial. Mr.
Gardner objected to the magistrate judge’s finding that his counsel at the guilt
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phase adequately investigated the defense that Mr. Gardner did not intend to kill
Mr. Burdell. This objection to the magistrate judge’s report, however, focused
solely on his counsel’s failure to adequately investigate the murder weapon. Thus,
Mr. Gardner did not object to his counsel’s failure to investigate his mental health
in preparation for the guilt phase. Because Mr. Gardner failed to make this
objection to the magistrate judge’s report, this claim has been waived and will not
be considered. See Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008)
(applying the firm waiver rule).
Even if Mr. Gardner had properly raised this issue in district court, we
would conclude that his counsel was not constitutionally deficient. After all, a
psychologist did evaluate Mr. Gardner, albeit for a short time, and his report
indicated that he suffered from no major psychiatric disorder. Mag. Rep. 73; see
Bell v. Thompson, 545 U.S. 794, 809–10 (2005) (stating it would be an “uphill
battle” for a defendant to show the need for further mental health investigation
when two experts had concluded he was not mentally ill); Wilson v. Sirmons, 536
F.3d 1064, 1089 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n many situations, the expert will know
better than counsel what evidence is pertinent to mental health diagnoses and will
be more equipped to determine what avenues of investigation are likely to result in
fruitful information”). Nothing in Dr. Rindflesh's report indicated that further
evaluation would result in evidence supporting Mr. Gardner's insanity defense.
While Dr. Rindflesh suggested the possibility of “an interview in a more open
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setting” sometime in the future, he indicated that any additional interviews would
help him better understand only Mr. Gardner's impulsiveness and ability to feel
remorse, neither of which would shed light on whether Mr. Gardner understood
what he was doing when he shot Mr. Burdell. Under these circumstances, we
cannot regard counsel’s failure to pursue this course as so “completely
unreasonable,” Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1083, as to be constitutionally deficient. After
all, there were substantial strategic reasons not to pursue this line of defense
before the jury: it would have opened the door to damaging evidence regarding the
violent acts he engaged in during prior offenses while uncontestedly in control of
his faculties. This suggests that defense counsel made an objectively reasonable
strategic decision in not investigating further or presenting psychological evidence
at trial.
Moreover, even if defense counsel were deficient in not having a more
elaborate evaluation conducted, no prejudice resulted from his failure to
investigate further. A psychologist who later examined Mr. Gardner, Dr.
Heinbecker, testified that Mr. Gardner’s psychological state might lead him to act
on “automatic pilot” during stressful situations. Mag. Rep. 69. Such testimony
might support an irresistible impulse defense, but Utah does not recognize such a
defense. See State v. Herrera, 993 P.2d 854, 861–62 (Utah 1999) (noting that a
mental disorder serves as a defense to a murder only if it prevents a person from
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understanding that he is killing a human being). Thus, under these circumstances,
defense counsel likely was not deficient, and even if he was, no prejudice resulted.
2. Failure to Present Ballistics Evidence
Mr. Gardner claimed in the state court post-conviction proceedings that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to offer evidence that would have cast doubt on
whether he had intended to kill Mr. Burdell. His theory was that at the time he
pulled the trigger on Mr. Burdell, he was in shock as a result of having been shot
by one of the courthouse guards. Trial counsel was ineffective, he argued, because
counsel implied to the jury that Mr. Gardner had been shot in the shoulder, when
in fact he suffered much more serious wounds to his chest and lungs. Mr.
Gardener contended that an accurate account of his injuries would have better
shown the jury the shock that he was experiencing, and that this would have a
bearing on his mens rea. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this claim as frivolous.
Gardner II, 888 P.2d at 616.
In his federal habeas petition and on appeal, Mr. Gardner similarly argued
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer evidence that would have cast
doubt on whether he had intended to kill Mr. Burdell, but the basis for that
argument has shifted from misdescription of his wound to counsel’s failure to
undertake a thorough investigation of the murder weapon. He claims that counsel
failed to engage a forensic laboratory to investigate the inner workings of the gun.
A subsequent investigation, in 1999, found that the gun had a faulty safety device.
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Mr. Gardner contends that if counsel had properly investigated the weapon at the
time, he could have used this evidence to support an inference that the gun went
off accidentally, or upon such slight finger pressure that the firing was not
intentional.
Contrary to Mr. Gardner’s argument, this claim is not substantially the same
as the one he raised in state court, but is based on an entirely different factual
predicate. The failure to investigate the murder weapon is not the same as the
failure to present evidence to the jury regarding the nature of his wounds. Because
this claim could have been raised in state court and was not, Mr. Gardner is now
procedurally barred from raising it at this late stage. See Magar v. Parker, 490
F.3d 816, 818 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that habeas petitioners seeking relief in
federal court must first exhaust all available state court remedies); Cf. Duffield,
545 F.3d at 1238 (discussing importance of raising issues in a timely manner to
avoid waiver).
Even if we were to hold that this claim was not procedurally barred, Mr.
Gardner would still not be entitled to relief. First, defense counsel did not act
deficiently. In addition to reviewing the examination of the weapon conducted by
the Utah State Crime Laboratory, Mr. Gardner’s lawyers had the gun examined by
Edward Barton, a defense investigator with ballistics expertise. He concluded that
it took two pounds of pressure to pull the trigger, and reported that this was
average for a single action handgun. The gun would “not be classified as having a
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hair trigger.” He also stated that the hammer had three stop positions, all in good
working order. Mr. Gardner does not explain why his counsel acted deficiently in
relying on Mr. Barton’s investigation. Nothing in Mr. Barton’s report suggested
that counsel should have had the gun analyzed further.
Moreover, no prejudice resulted from any alleged deficiencies. At trial, the
state’s expert testified that the gun had to be cocked before it could be fired. The
post-trial examination of the gun did not indicate it was faulty in any material
way. A ballistics expert testifying in the 1999 federal hearing confirmed that the
gun did not have a hair trigger. He indicated that he could not get the gun to fire
accidentally through “drop tests.” Collectively, this evidence strongly suggests
that the gun did not go off accidentally, but rather was intentionally cocked and
fired twice at Mr. Burdell. While the 1999 expert testified that the gun had a
malfunctioning safety device that could have caused the gun to fire if Mr. Gardner
had pulled the trigger and released it before the hammer actually fell, Mr. Gardner
has put forth no evidence to show that he tried to release the trigger after pulling
it. In other words, even if defense counsel had consulted another investigator
before trial, the elicited information would not have materially assisted Mr.
Gardner’s defense.
3. Failure to Object to Officer Jorgensen’s Testimony
Mr. Gardner also contends that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt
phase by failing to object to testimony by Officer Wayne Jorgensen, presented on
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rebuttal, regarding incriminating statements Mr. Gardner made to him while in the
hospital. According to Officer Jorgensen, he guarded Mr. Gardner while he was in
the hospital on two occasions. On the first night, Mr. Gardner initiated a
conversation with him and volunteered information about Mr. Burdell’s murder.
He kept talking until Officer Jorgensen cut him off. On the second occasion, Mr.
Gardner again initiated conversation with Officer Jorgensen and they “got talking”
about Mr. Burdell’s murder. Officer Jorgensen asked if Mr. Gardner would have
shot him [i.e., Officer Jorgensen], to which Mr. Gardner responded, “Hell, man, I
had to get away, I didn’t care who it was,” and “Hey, I had to do what I had to
do.” When Officer Jorgensen asked Mr. Gardner why he shot Mr. Burdell, Mr.
Gardner said it was because he thought Mr. Burdell was going to “jump on [him]
and stop [him].” Officer Jorgensen filed no incident reports about these
statements, and Mr. Gardner later denied ever making them.
Mr. Gardner claims that his counsel should have moved to suppress Mr.
Jorgensen’s testimony about Mr. Gardner’s alleged statements because they were
involuntary under Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978), unreliable, and
elicited in violation of Miranda and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
On direct appeal, the Utah Supreme Court did not address whether trial counsel
was deficient for failing to challenge the testimony, but held that no prejudice
resulted because there was overwhelming evidence of Mr. Gardner’s intent to
shoot Mr. Burdell. Gardner I, 789 P.2d at 288. We do not regard this conclusion
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as unreasonable, and therefore hold, under AEDPA’s deferential standard, that this
claim does not warrant federal habeas relief.
The Utah Supreme Court correctly found that there was ample evidence,
wholly apart from Officer Jorgensen’s testimony, that Mr. Gardner’s killing of Mr.
Burdell was intentional. Mr. Gardner himself admitted asking for a loaded gun
because an unloaded gun was useless; a witness testified that he saw him pause
before shooting Mr. Burdell; another witness testified that Mr. Gardner had
pointed the gun at him but then turned the gun and shot Mr. Burdell instead; and
Mr. Gardner fired at Mr. Burdell twice, which required him to both cock the gun
and pull the trigger twice. This overwhelming evidence of guilt would have come
in and would have necessitated a finding of intent, even if Officer Jorgensen’s
statements had been suppressed. Thus, no prejudice resulted.
Even if we were to find that the court acted unreasonably in finding that no
prejudice resulted for the alleged deficiencies, defense counsel did not act
deficiently in any of the four ways Mr. Gardner suggests. As we discuss below,
the statements did not violate Miranda or Massiah, counsel could not prove the
statements were given involuntarily, the statements were reliable, and counsel
acted reasonably in calling Mr. Gardner to the stand. In reaching those
conclusions, we bear in mind that a reviewing court must be “highly deferential”
to counsel’s decisions. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). “To
prove deficient performance, petitioner must overcome the presumption that
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counsel's conduct was not constitutionally defective.” Wallace v. Ward, 191 F.3d
1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999). “Counsel’s performance must be ‘completely
unreasonable’ to be constitutionally ineffective, not ‘merely wrong.’” Wilson, 536
F.3d at 1083 (quoting Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 1997)).
a. Miranda and Massiah Violations
Mr. Gardner claims his counsel acted deficiently in failing to object to
Officer Jorgensen’s statements on Miranda or Massiah grounds. Those cases
stand for the proposition that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments afford individuals
the right to counsel before and after indictment while being questioned by
government officials. It is evident that admission of Officer Jorgensen’s
testimony, on rebuttal, did not violate those principles.
First, it is not clear that Officer Jorgensen initiated the conversations with
Mr. Gardner. The officer testified that the two men “got talking,” and Mr.
Gardner, who is the only other person present at the time, does not testify that
Officer Jorgensen initiated the conversation. Instead, Mr. Gardner claims that the
conversations did not take place at all. If Mr. Gardner volunteered the information
to Officer Jorgensen without any action on the part of the state, there would be no
constitutional violation in introducing it into evidence. See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (explaining that Miranda applies only where questioning
is initiated by law enforcement); see also Pickens v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 988, 994–95
(10th Cir. 2000) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible
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where defendant re-initiated communication). We are reluctant to rely entirely on
this ground, however, because no lower court has reached any factual finding
regarding Officer Jorgensen’s credibility; Mr. Gardner does not confirm or admit
that the officer did not initiate the conversation; and there is evidence in the record
that casts doubt on Officer Jorgensen’s testimony, including the fact that he filed
no incident report at the time.
Quite apart from whether the state initiated the conversations, however,
introduction of the testimony could not have violated Miranda and Massiah
because these decisions apply only to the introduction of evidence as part of the
prosecution’s case in chief and do not prevent statements that are otherwise
inadmissible from being admitted to contradict a witness’ testimony on rebuttal.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971). As the Supreme Court held in
Harris, Miranda and Massiah prevent the affirmative use of uncounseled
statements but do not license a defendant to perjure himself without threat of
refutation using his prior statements. Id. at 226; see also Kansas v. Ventris, 07-
1356, — U.S. —, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 3299, at *14 (2009) (holding that testimony
elicited in violation of Sixth Amendment is admissible to impeach). Here, where
Mr. Gardner testified that he did not know what was happening when he killed Mr.
Burdell, the jury was entitled to learn of his statements to Officer Jorgensen that
he “had to get away,” that he did “what I had to do,” and that he shot Mr. Burdell
because he thought Mr. Burdell was going to “jump on [him] and stop [him].” To
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be sure, the jury might have disbelieved Officer Jorgensen’s account, but that does
not make the testimony inadmissible under Miranda and Massiah.
Even assuming the statements were admissible on rebuttal, Mr. Gardner
argues that his counsel had a duty to request an instruction limiting the use of the
testimony to the issue of credibility. On direct appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
rejected this argument, stating that the failure to request the instruction was not
“manifest error.” Gardner I, 789 P.2d at 282. Not requesting a limiting
instruction could have been a reasonable tactical decision to keep the damaging
statement from being reiterated to the jury, and thus not objectively unreasonable.
Accordingly, Mr. Gardner’s counsel did not act deficiently in failing to
object to Officer Jorgensen’s testimony on Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds.
b. Voluntariness
Mr. Gardner next claims his statements were inadmissible because he was
under medication at the time and the statements were therefore not given
voluntarily. The Utah Supreme Court did not address this claim, but after
conducting an evidentiary hearing the federal district court concluded that it was
reasonable for trial counsel not to have raised this objection. At the 1999 federal
hearing, a psychiatrist testified that Mr. Gardner was on Halcion, a short term
treatment for insomnia, on the night he supposedly made the statements. Mag.
Rep. 44. The psychiatrist testified that the drug could cause amnesia, but that
there was only a remote chance it caused Mr. Gardner to forget making the
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statement. If the statement had been made while under the influence of Halcion,
he would not have been fully awake or conscious of what he was doing, and the
combination of Halcion and anti-anxiety medication could have loosened up Mr.
Gardner’s inhibitions. Another psychiatrist testified that the dose of Halcion
administered to Mr. Gardner was very unlikely to have caused amnesia.
We conclude that counsel acted reasonably in concluding the statements to
Officer Jorgensen were voluntary. A statement is inadmissible if it is not “the
product of a rational intellect and free will.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398. Mr.
Gardner’s own testimony suggests his mental capacity was not significantly
affected by Halcion. He claims to remember the night clearly. He remembers
being in the hospital, that Officer Jorgensen was guarding him in the room, and
that he did not make the statement. Moreover, Officer Jorgensen testified that Mr.
Gardner did not appear to be medicated when he gave the statements. Taken
together, the district court concluded that this evidence could have led counsel
reasonably to believe that the statement could not be suppressed as involuntary.
There is a significant factual component to that conclusion, which is not
plainly erroneous and must therefore guide this court’s analysis of the issue. In
light of the facts as found by the district court, and bearing in mind the
presumption that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally defective, we
agree with that court that counsel acted reasonably in not raising the voluntariness
objection to Officer Jorgensen’s testimony.
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c. Unreliability
Mr. Gardner argues that, at the very least, Officer Jorgensen’s testimony
about his alleged statements was so unreliable that his counsel should have
objected under Utah Rule of Evidence 403. Under Rule 403, evidence can be
excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” This particular
objection was not raised in state court, but was raised in his federal habeas
petition. There is no apparent reason why Mr. Gardner could not have raised his
Rule 403 argument in state court, so Mr. Gardner is procedurally barred from
raising the issue now. Magar, 490 F.3d at 818.
Even if we were to address this issue, however, we would agree with the
decision of the magistrate judge and the district court to reject the argument. As
the magistrate judge noted, “Rule 403 is not to be used to exclude testimony that a
trial judge does not find credible because credibility questions are the prerogative
of a jury.” Mag. Rep. 50. We defer to the factfinder’s credibility determinations,
as it is in the best position to evaluate such matters. United States v. Barron-
Cabrera, 119 F.3d 1454, 1457 (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, defense counsel did not act
unreasonably in failing to object on Rule 403 grounds.
4. Counsel’s Decision to Encourage Mr. Gardner to Testify
Finally, Mr. Gardner contends that trial counsel was ineffective because he
encouraged Mr. Gardner to take the stand, which proved injurious to his defense.
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In the state post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Gardner argued that his counsel was
ineffective for coercing him to testify. The court dismissed the claim, holding that
the issue had been addressed, in essence, on direct appeal when the court rejected
Mr. Gardner’s assertion that admitting his prior inconsistent statements violated
his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Gardner II, 888 P.2d at
615. Mr. Gardner argued in his federal habeas petition that his counsel was
ineffective in calling him to testify. The district court disagreed, finding counsel’s
performance was not deficient. We affirm and hold that counsel’s decision on this
point was within the reasonable range of effective trial strategy.
The theory of the defense was that Mr. Gardner had planned only to
escape, not to kill anyone; once he was shot, he did not know what was going on,
and while in a dazed state, saw movement in the archives room and his gun
discharged unintentionally. Mr. Gardner argues that his counsel acted
unreasonably in calling him to testify because his testimony did not support this
theory and that calling him opened the door for Officer Jorgensen’s testimony on
rebuttal. He also claims that his counsel knew he would say that he could not
remember the immediate circumstances surrounding Mr. Burdell’s death and that
he would refuse to name his accomplice.
After full examination of the record, we agree with the district court that
defense counsel did not act unreasonably in calling Mr. Gardner to the stand.
Apart from Mr. Gardner’s own testimony, the defense had little evidence to
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support its theory. As already discussed, there was little evidence to support a
major psychological disorder that could have prevented Mr. Gardner from having
the requisite intent, and there was also little evidence suggesting that the gun went
off accidentally. Thus, even if Mr. Gardner’s own testimony contained a few
damaging statements, a reasonable attorney could easily conclude that it was, on
balance, the best hope of providing evidence that could support a verdict of
acquittal.
5. Cumulative Effect
Though none of these alleged errors itself warrants reversal, we are required
to look at the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors. Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d
982, 992 (10th Cir. 2002). “A cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates all the
errors that individually have been found to be harmless, and therefore not
reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the
trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.”
United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
The harmlessness inquiry for cumulative error is the same as the inquiry for
individual error: were the defendant’s substantial rights affected? Id. at 1470. We
hold that even if any of the claims of ineffective assistance during the guilt phase
have merit, the strong evidence of Mr. Gardner’s intent to shoot Mr. Burdell would
have still convinced the jury of his guilt. Mr. Gardner had an extensive history of
violence and had previously attempted to escape from an industrial school and
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state prison facilities. No expert testimony supported the argument that Mr.
Gardner’s mental condition prevented him from understanding his actions and
their intended result. No evidence was presented that established the gun was
faulty in any material way. In addition, Mr. Gardner shot Mr. Burdell twice and
later admitted that he asked for a loaded gun because an unloaded gun would have
been useless. All of these facts strongly suggest he had the intent to kill Mr.
Burdell. Thus, reversal is not warranted on the cumulative effect of counsel’s
errors.
B. Ineffective Assistance at Penalty Phase
Mr. Gardner argues that his counsel acted deficiently in failing to
adequately investigate and present evidence of Mr. Gardner’s social and mental
history during the penalty phase. The state district court during post-conviction
proceedings addressed a version of this argument, holding that Mr. Gardner was
denied effective assistance when his counsel failed to give the defense
psychiatrist, Dr. Heinbecker, more time to prepare for the penalty phase. The Utah
Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mr. Gardner was not prejudiced by his
counsel’s failure to give the psychiatrist more time to prepare. Gardner II, 888
P.2d at 619. The court noted that Dr. Heinbecker had not indicated that more
preparation time would have led to more information favoring Mr. Gardner. Id.
In federal court, the magistrate judge similarly concluded that counsel was
deficient at the penalty phase but that no prejudice resulted. Unlike the magistrate
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judge, the district court did not address the deficiency issue, concluding that there
was no prejudice.
1. Standard of Review
Typically we would address the prejudice issue under deferential AEDPA
standards because the issue was addressed on the merits by the Utah Supreme
Court. Oddly, however, in oral argument the state asserted, against its interest,
that the issue should be reviewed de novo. Aple. Br. 3. The state reached this
conclusion by applying Utah Code Annotated §§ 78B-9-109 and -202(2), as well
as our decision in Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2008). Section
78B-9-109(1) provides that “the court may, upon the request of an indigent
petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the petitioner in the
post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal.” In determining whether to
appoint counsel, the court is to consider “whether the petition or the appeal
contains factual allegations that will require an evidentiary hearing,” and “whether
the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance
of counsel for proper adjudication.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-109(2). Utah Rule
of Criminal Procedure 8(e) sets forth the requirements of counsel appointed in
these circumstances.
The state relies on our reasoning in Wilson and the rule laid out above in
conceding that AEDPA deference does not apply. We stated in Wilson that “when
a state court's disposition of a mixed question of law and fact, including a claim of
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ineffective assistance, is based on an incomplete factual record, through no fault of
the defendant, and the complete factual record has since been developed and is
before this Court, we apply de novo review to our evaluation of the underlying
claim.” 536 F.3d at 1079. Here, the state assumed that where the defendant did
not have the resources to develop a full factual record on this issue, it was “no
fault of the defendant” that an incomplete factual record existed at the state court
level. As a result, the state argues that we should apply de novo review.
There is a key difference, however, between Wilson and this case. In
Wilson, the prisoner had a federal right to an evidentiary hearing, which was
denied by the state court despite his diligence in pursuing the right. 1 Here,
however, any right Mr. Gardner may have had to funding to develop a factual
record is a product of state law, not federal law. Federal habeas review is
confined to denials of federal rights, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), and it is therefore
irrelevant at this stage whether or not Mr. Gardner was denied the rights to which
1
Specifically, the prisoner had a right to an evidentiary hearing if he could
show that his “allegations, if true and not contravened by the existing factual
record, would entitle him to habeas relief.” Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1081. Under
Oklahoma procedure rules, however, a defendant raising an ineffective assistance
claim based on non-record evidence has a right to an evidentiary hearing only if
he can show by “clear and convincing evidence there is a strong possibility trial
counsel was ineffective.” Id. at 1080. Because the state court denied the prisoner
an evidentiary hearing on the latter standard, the Wilson court held that he was
denied a federal right. That holding is presently under review by the en banc
court. See Wilson v. Sirmons, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27448 (10th Cir. Dec. 2,
2008). The result of that rehearing proceeding cannot affect this case, however,
because whether or not Wilson was denied a federal right, there is no argument
that Mr. Gardner was.
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he may have been entitled under state law. Our decision in Wilson therefore does
not have the implications for our standard of review in this case that the state
seems to think.
The state’s candid (if unwarranted) concession raises a related issue: can the
congressionally mandated deferential standard of review be waived by counsel? In
other words, should this court apply a standard of review more searching than that
dictated by ADEPA on account of the fact that the state’s appellate lawyers
mistakenly believed that the more searching standard applies?
It is well established that states may waive some of AEDPA’s provisions.
See, e.g., Boston v. Weber, 525 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that if a
state intelligently chooses to waive a statute of limitations defense in a habeas
case, a district court is not at liberty to disregard that choice); Torres v. Senkowski,
316 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a state cannot waive AEDPA’s
requirement that circuit courts rather than district courts must authorize successive
habeas motions or applications because the requirement is jurisdictional); see also
Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under the
New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1868, 1871 n.26 (1997) (explaining that
AEDPA requires “federal courts to find an express waiver of exhaustion [by the
state] before taking jurisdiction over an incompletely exhausted state appeal”).
This court has apparently never addressed whether the state can waive the standard
of review under AEDPA. Other courts of appeal have, however, done so, and all
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have concluded that the standard of review under AEDPA cannot be waived by the
parties. Brown v. Smith, 551 F.3d 424, 428 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008); Eze v. Senkowski,
321 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2003); Worth v. Tyler, 276 F.3d 249, 262 n.4 (7th Cir.
2001).
We agree with our sibling circuits that the correct standard of review under
AEDPA is not waivable. It is, unlike exhaustion, an unavoidable legal question
we must ask, and answer, in every case. See Eze, 321 F.3d at 121 (“AEDPA's
standard of review . . . is not a procedural defense, but a standard of general
applicability for all petitions filed by state prisoners after the statute's effective
date presenting claims that have been adjudicated on the merits by a state court.”).
Congress set forth the standard in “unequivocally mandatory language.” Id. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (instructing that a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding”) (emphasis added). It is one thing to allow parties to forfeit claims,
defenses, or lines of argument; it would be quite another to allow parties to
stipulate or bind us to application of an incorrect legal standard, contrary to the
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congressional purpose. We therefore will review this claim under AEDPA’s
deferential standard.
2. Ineffectiveness at Penalty Phase
To determine the appropriateness of the death penalty, “evidence about the
defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held
by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to
disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less
culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.” California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 545 (1987). Thus, in a capital case, defense counsel’s duty to
investigate “includes investigating petitioner’s background” for such mitigating
circumstances. Smith v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 454, 463 (10th Cir. 1999). In Utah, a
jury must find unanimously that the aggravation outweighs the mitigation beyond
a reasonable doubt in order to impose the death penalty. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
207. Reversing the death penalty is appropriate where there is a reasonable
likelihood that the sentencing jury would not have sentenced the defendant to
death if it had considered the mitigating evidence counsel failed to present.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 391 (2000); see, e.g., Wilson v Sirmons, 536 F.3d
1064 (10th Cir. 2008); Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942 (10th Cir. 2004).
Prior to trial, defense counsel arranged for a psychiatrist, Dr. Rindflesh, to
meet with Mr. Gardner and prepare a report of his mental health. During trial,
counsel contacted several other psychologists, none of whom were willing to meet
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with Mr. Gardner. Before the penalty phase, defense counsel enlisted the help of
Dr. Heinbecker, who was contacted only after the guilty verdict was rendered, just
two days before the penalty phase began. Dr. Heinbecker did not review Mr.
Gardner’s juvenile and institutional records until the day before he testified at the
penalty phase. Defense counsel said that Dr. Heinbecker spent most of the day
reviewing documents and then met with counsel in the evening. Dr. Heinbecker,
who had testified in three other capital cases, stated, I “had never been in a case
like this where I wasn’t given adequate records . . . or adequate time to review the
records.” Aplt. Br. 27.
It is undisputed that Mr. Gardner’s childhood was troubled in many respects.
According to his submission on appeal, if the full, accurate picture of Mr.
Gardner’s background had been presented at the penalty phase, the jury would not
have sentenced him to death. He argues that this evidence would have shown,
inter alia, the following: he grew up in a dysfunctional family, the product of a
broken home; he lived in a condemned house for some time, then lived with
various foster families and was in and out of detention facilities; his step-father
exposed him to criminal activity; the children in his family were sexually and
emotionally abused; he was hospitalized for meningitis as a child, which could
have caused organic brain damage; he had been sniffing gasoline since he was six
years old, which could have caused brain damage; he was introduced to LSD by
age ten; also by age ten he had been charged with public intoxication, shoplifting,
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petty larceny, grand larceny, gas sniffing, and violence against fellow students and
his sister; at age eleven he spent one year in a locked facility at Utah State
Hospital where he was introduced to pot and acid; psychological tests at the State
Hospital revealed evidence of possible brain impairment; he scored a forty-seven
on the Halstead Reitan Battery of tests, indicating moderate brain damage with
possible implications on judgment; he was placed in a state industrial school at age
fourteen; he has a tic, which could suggest brain illness; and, he has a history of
“being immature, acting on impulse without any internal controls.” Aplt. Br. 30.
The Utah Supreme Court, overturning the conclusion of the state district
court, held that counsel’s failure to give Dr. Heinbecker more time to prepare for
trial was insufficiently prejudicial to warrant habeas relief. Petitioner has not
suggested that the Utah court failed to apply the proper constitutional standard.
Applying AEDPA deference, we hold that the Utah Supreme Court’s conclusion
was not an “unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Notwithstanding the abbreviated period he was given to prepare, Dr.
Heinbecker did testify to most of the above-summarized background information.
He testified that Mr. Gardner had an unstable upbringing, the product of a broken
home. His mother had difficulty disciplining her nine kids, his step-father was
incarcerated, his family had lengthy criminal and substance abuse histories, and
his mother was charged with parental neglect when Mr. Gardner was two and five.
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Dr. Heinbecker further testified that Mr. Gardner was in and out of state
institutions for most of his life, and tests revealed some evidence of organic brain
damage.
The information Dr. Heinbecker could have discovered and presented if
given more time would likely only have added color to what Dr. Heinbecker
actually did testify to at the penalty phase. Knowing of his difficult upbringing
and possible brain damage did not convince a jury to forego the death penalty. It
is not likely that further detail about Mr. Gardner’s youthful drug use, criminal
history, and scores on various mental tests would have changed the outcome.
Additional evidence along these lines could even have a double-edged effect, to
the extent that it could increase the jury’s perception of Mr. Gardner’s
dangerousness. The greater the dysfunction in his family, the less likely it is that
Mr. Gardner’s violence would subside if ever released.
Moreover, specific evidence designed to show that Mr. Gardner was not
fully in control of his actions could have opened the door to extensive and
damaging rebuttal evidence. The jury had not been informed of a number of
violent acts Mr. Gardner committed in the past, which appeared to be calculated
and controlled. Had the defense presented evidence to show that Mr. Burdell’s
killing was a product of Mr. Gardner’s upbringing, the prosecution probably could
have introduced this damaging evidence in rebuttal. The prosecution also could
have introduced expert testimony that Mr. Gardner’s anti-social personality
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disorder would not impair his volition. Indeed, Mr. Gardner’s own 1999 experts
testified that he performs well under stress and always manages to stop when his
life is threatened. In addition, the prosecution could have introduced Mr.
Gardner’s own statement that one of the motivating factors behind his attempted
escape was his desire to return to drug use. Finally, the prosecution could have
admitted evidence that his anti-social personality disorder was brought on in large
part by his own actions, including extensive drug use.
Reasonable minds may differ on the likely impact on the jury of more
thoroughly researched mental health testimony, as the differing assessments of the
state judges demonstrates. The question before us, however, is not whether the
Utah Supreme Court was correct but whether its judgment was unreasonable.
Based on our review of the arguments and record evidence, it was not.
Mr. Gardner tries to compare this case to Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510
(2003). In Wiggins, a 77-year old woman was murdered by being drowned in her
bathtub and sprayed with insect killer. The Supreme Court held that defense
counsel acted deficiently in not adequately investigating and presenting evidence
of the defendant’s troubled family and social history at sentencing. Though
defense counsel had one psychologist run tests on the defendant and examined his
social services records, Mr. Wiggins’ attorneys claimed to have made a strategic
decision not to investigate further or to present this evidence to the jury. Id. at
553 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court held this was an insufficient investigation
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into possible mitigating circumstances. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534-35. What
defense counsel had found in its limited investigation showed a long history of
foster care and abuse, and “any reasonably competent attorney would have realized
that pursuing these leads was necessary to making an informed choice among
possible defenses.” Id. at 525.
This case, however, differs from Wiggins in two key respects. First, in
Wiggins there was no apparent risk of opening the door to damaging evidence by
introducing the potential mitigating circumstances of Mr. Wiggins’ difficult
childhood. Here, as outlined above, the prosecution could have presented
extensive damaging evidence in rebuttal. Thus, it is much more likely in this case
than in Wiggins that defense counsel made a reasonable, strategic decision in not
introducing more specific evidence about Mr. Gardner’s past.
Second, during the sentencing phase of Wiggins, defense counsel
“introduced no evidence of Wiggins’ life history.” Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
Here, Dr. Heinbecker testified about Mr. Gardner’s difficult upbringing at the
sentencing phase and his possible brain impairment. While there is a reasonable
probability that one juror would have avoided the death penalty upon hearing of
Mr. Wiggins’ difficult background for the first time, Mr. Gardner’s jury heard
about his unfortunate life history and decided to sentence him to death anyway.
The specifics of his past would not likely have made a significant difference, so no
prejudice resulted.
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In his Reply Brief, Mr. Gardner also relies on the lead opinion in Wilson v.
Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2008), in support of his view that counsel’s
insufficient preparation and presentation of mental health evidence was
prejudicial. 2 This case is similar to Wilson in that trial counsel was ineffective in
conducting only a limited investigation into the defendant’s mental health and not
offering available diagnoses at the penalty phase of trial. 536 F.3d at 1085-86.
But there are significant differences in degree and context, which render that
decision distinguishable. Indeed, even in Wilson, the court did not hold that
counsel’s inadequate preparation and presentation of mental health evidence was
necessarily prejudicial, but instead remanded to the district court for an
evidentiary hearing on prejudice. Id. at 1096.
First, according to the expert in Wilson, the difference between his
testimony at trial and what he could have said if he had more time for preparation
was “enormous[].” Id. at 1077. Prior to his testimony, the expert administered
tests that suggested a diagnosis of schizophrenia, but the tests were not valid and
had to be readministered. The expert therefore could testify only to diagnoses of
bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 1075.
After trial, on retesting and examination of additional information from other
sources, the expert concluded that the defendant suffered from schizophrenia,
2
Wilson is currently under en banc review, but not with regard to the issue
of prejudice. See Wilson v. Sirmons, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27448 (10th Cir.
Dec. 2, 2008).
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paranoid type, and that it was possible that he was delusional at the time of the
crime. Id. at 1077. The difference between Dr. Heinbecker’s trial testimony and
what he could have given after further investigation, by contrast, was purely a
matter of degree. To be sure, Dr. Heinbecker could have provided more detailed
testimony, but it would not have supported a different diagnosis.
Second, according to the lead opinion in Wilson, the evidence that could
have been presented was far more likely to influence the jury than that in this case.
According to the lead opinion, schizophrenia is likely to be regarded as more
mitigating than generalized personality disorders because the latter are inseparable
from personal identity and often untreatable. Id. at 1094 (“Diagnoses of specific
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia or bipolar, which are associated with
abnormalities of the brain and can be treated with appropriate medication, are
likely to be regarded by a jury as more mitigating than generalized personality
disorders, which are diagnosed on the basis of reported behavior, are generally
inseparable from personal identity, and are often untreatable through medical or
neurological means.”). Here, by contrast, even after full investigation the defense
expert uncovered no diagnoses that were this potent a form of mitigation. Mr.
Gardner did not suffer from hallucinations or delusions. There was only evidence
of moderate brain damage, most of which was caused by his own drug use, and Dr.
Heinbecker testified with regard to these impairments.
-39-
Third, in Wilson counsel did not even provide his expert witness an
opportunity to testify regarding the diagnoses he had reached, or to explain the
significance of those diagnoses to the jury, leading to a disastrous cross-
examination in which the defendant was successfully portrayed as a “psychopath,”
without effective response from the defense. Id. at 1076. Nothing of that sort
occurred here. Despite the limitations under which he was operating, Dr.
Heinbecker did an effective job of conveying mitigating evidence regarding Mr.
Gardner’s family history, possible organic brain damage, and social circumstances.
Finally, in Wilson our standard of review was de novo, and the state
provided only a skeletal argument regarding the issue of prejudice. Id. at 1079,
1093–95. Here, the Utah Supreme Court decided the prejudice issue on the merits,
and the state has fully briefed the prejudice issue.
Thus, in contrast to the result in Wilson, we conclude that the Utah Supreme
Court’s decision that Mr. Gardner was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to
provide Dr. Heinbecker with more time to prepare was not unreasonable.
C. Ineffective Assistance on Appeal
We turn now to Mr. Gardner’s claim of ineffective assistance by appellate
counsel, which is based on counsel’s failure to challenge on appeal a faulty jury
instruction defining the mens rea element for first degree murder. The court gave
the following instruction:
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A person engages in conduct: (1) “Intentionally” when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the result; or (2)
“Knowingly” when he is aware of the nature of his conduct, or the
existing circumstances, or is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.
Aplt. Br. 37 (emphasis added). Defense counsel did not object to the proposed
instruction, but offered their own alternative instruction that was rejected.
Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25651, at *7–8. The government has
conceded that, read in isolation, the “knowingly” definition was erroneous in that
it did not require the jury to find that Mr. Gardner acted knowingly with respect to
his conduct and the result. See State v. Standiford 769 P.2d 254, 260 n.3 (Utah
1998) (describing the mental state for first degree murder as the “purpose to kill”).
The government argues, however, that no prejudice resulted. Mr. Gardner claims
his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by not raising this issue on
appeal.
Because this issue was not raised in state court on direct appeal or on
application for post-conviction relief, the district court held the claim in abeyance
while Mr. Gardner exhausted the claim in state courts. The Utah Supreme Court
held that the claim was procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct
appeal. Gardner v. Galetka, 94 P.3d 263 (Utah 2004) [Gardner III]. In reaching
this conclusion, the state court applied Utah’s 1996 Post-Conviction Remedies Act
(PCRA). Id. at 268. Mr. Gardner, however, filed his initial state post-conviction
petition in 1990, before the 1996 Post-Conviction Remedies Act was enacted.
-41-
Accordingly, the federal district court certified the following question to the Utah
Supreme Court: “If Mr. Gardner had raised the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim at issue in Gardner v. Galetka, 94 P.3d 263 [Gardner III], in state court in a
successive petition in 1990, would the petition have been procedurally barred?”
The Utah Supreme Court responded affirmatively. Gardner v. Galetka, 151 P.3d
968 (Utah 2007) (Gardner IV). According to the Gardner IV court, the court
would have dismissed the claim in 1990 based on the determination that Mr.
Gardner’s claim “could have been raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding”
and that it did not fall within the common law “good cause” exception because it
was “facially implausible” or “frivolous.” Id. at 973-74. “There is no ‘good
cause’ that justifies bringing before a court a frivolous post-conviction claim.
Indeed, there is no ‘fundamental unfairness’ in dismissing a frivolous claim.” Id.
at 974. The Utah Supreme Court characterized this rule as “procedural” because
the bar was based on the successive nature of the petition.
The federal district court disagreed. The court reasoned that a threshold
finding of frivolousness is “interwoven with federal law.” Gardner, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25651, at *17. Thus, the court concluded that such a threshold
finding required an examination of the merits, which precludes finding that the
claim is procedurally barred under federal law. However, without addressing the
deficiency prong, the court dismissed his claim because Mr. Gardner had failed to
establish prejudice. Id.
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We do not agree with the district court that the Utah Supreme Court’s
dismissal of the appellate ineffectiveness claim cannot be regarded as a procedural
bar to federal habeas review. To be sure, the Utah court’s frivolousness
determination itself involves the merits of his jury instruction claim. See
Backstrom Family Ltd. P’ship v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(the frivolousness inquiry requires a court to determine if a claim is “without
reasonable legal or factual basis”). But the frivolousness inquiry is not the bar; it
is an element of the exception to the bar. The reason the Utah court would not
entertain Mr. Gardner’s claim based on the jury instruction is that he failed to raise
it as part of his first post-conviction petition, even though he could have done so.
This is undoubtedly procedural. We do not think that a state’s decision to allow
exceptions to its procedural bar in the interest of preventing “fundamental
unfairness,” which requires an examination of the merits, makes the underlying bar
any less procedural. If this were so, any procedural bar with an exception based
on avoiding a fundamental miscarriage of justice would lose its character as an
independent procedural ground under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
But we need not resolve this question, because we agree with the district court that
Mr. Gardner’s claim that the faulty jury instruction was harmful error fails on the
merits.
“A misstatement of an element in jury instructions is subject to harmless
error analysis on habeas review.” Scoggin v. Kaiser, 186 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th
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Cir. 1999). Error is harmless if it “appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The Utah
Supreme Court concluded that it was “absurd” to suggest that any reasonable juror
could reach a different verdict based on a proper jury instruction. 151 P.3d at 974.
Because, as we have said, the Utah Supreme Court’s frivolousness determination
was a decision on the merits of the jury instruction claim, it warrants AEDPA
deference. Under the circumstances here, we agree with the Utah Supreme Court
that the faulty instruction could have had no effect on the outcome.
When returning the verdict, the jury foreman stated that the jury
unanimously found Mr. Gardner had killed Mr. Burdell “for the purpose of
effecting [his] escape . . . from lawful custody.” Vol. XLIX, 2598. Thus, the jury
must have concluded that Mr. Gardner intentionally shot Mr. Burdell, knowing
that it would allow him to escape. Mr. Gardner does not dispute this conclusion.
He argues, however, that in light of the instruction, it is not clear whether the jury
found that he was “aware that his conduct [was] reasonably certain to cause the
result,” that is, Mr. Burdell’s death. In other words, given the disjunctive
formulation of the instruction, the jury could have found that Mr. Gardner fired the
bullet at Mr. Burdell for the purpose of effectuating an escape, but without
intending or even knowing that the result would be Mr. Burdell’s death.
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Even if there was such an ambiguity, we agree with the district court that no
reasonable juror “would find, given the totality of the evidence, that Mr. Gardner
was aware of his conduct but was not reasonably certain that firing a loaded .22
caliber handgun directly into Mr. Burdell’s head at point-blank range would result
in Mr. Burdell’s death.” Gardner, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25651, at *29. The jury
unquestionably found that Mr. Gardner intended to pull the trigger. Under the
circumstances, death was reasonably certain to result. Thus, the state court was
not unreasonable in finding that the erroneous jury instruction resulted in harmless
error.
D. Conflict of Interest Claim
Mr. Gardner next alleges that his representation suffered from a conflict of
interest that deprived him of a fair trial. At trial, Mr. Gardner was represented by
two brothers, Andrew and James Valdez. On the day of the courthouse shooting,
each brother arrived separately at the scene. Having heard that Mr. Gardner had
killed an unnamed attorney, each was fearful that the other might have been the
victim. When each of them encountered Mr. Gardner, he inquired after the
whereabouts of his brother.
Before the district court, Mr. Gardner asserted the existence of a conflict of
interest on the basis of a variety of factual allegations, see Mag. Rep. 21. On
appeal, however, he argues only that the conflict of interest stemmed from “the
victimization of the Valdez brothers.” Aplt. Br. 78. Mr. Gardner alleges that this
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“victimization” occurred because of the Valdez brothers’ fear for each other’s
safety after the courthouse shooting, as well as the fact that the Valdezes were
familiar with some witnesses to and victims of the event. 3 See id. The Utah
Supreme Court rejected these arguments on the merits, in large part because Mr.
Gardner could not demonstrate the existence of any deleterious impact on his
representation. See Gardner II, 888 P.2d at 621–22. The district court concluded
that the Utah Supreme Court’s conclusion was a reasonable application of federal
constitutional standards. Mag. Rep. 26–31. We agree.
The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment includes the right
to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. United States v. Bowie,
892 F.2d 1494, 1500 (10th Cir. 1990). “In the context of a conflict of interest
claim where there was no objection at trial . . . the client must demonstrate an
actual conflict of interest which adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.”
United States v. Alvarez, 137 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
If the client can establish the conflict actually affected the adequacy of his
representation, prejudice is presumed. Id. The client has the burden of showing
3
The government argues that this claim was not raised before the district
court and therefore is waived. There is some evidence, however, that the
substance of this claim was raised before the district court. See, e.g., Vol. XIV,
Doc. 607 at 5 (elaborating on idea that “the Valdez brothers themselves were
victims of the crime”). Because we conclude that this claim fails on the merits,
we need not resolve whether it was waived.
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specific instances to support his contentions of an actual conflict adverse to his
interests. Id.
Mr. Gardner primarily points to Andrew Valdez’s closing statement at his
trial as evidence of the alleged conflict of interest. During his closing statement,
Mr. Valdez described his personal fear on the day of the shooting, when he was
anxious for his brother’s whereabouts and safety. See Vol. L 2880 (Trial Tr. 1661)
(“I got this fear because I hadn’t seen my brother . . . and I was so fearful at that
point. And I went looking for [James] in the crowd. I didn’t know it, but he had
done the same thing. He had gotten there and had asked, ‘Where is Andy?’ He
thought I had been killed. We found each other and rejoiced in each other’s
safety, and the fear subsided.”) Mr. Gardner argues that this suggests that trial
counsel was unable to zealously advocate for him. But this ignores the thrust of
Mr. Valdez’s argument, by which he was attempting to convince the jury to set
aside its fear when sentencing Mr. Gardner, just as he had set aside his fear and
determined to continue representing Mr. Gardner because he “believe[d] in saving
his life.” Id. at 2881 (Trial Tr. 1662). In other words, Mr. Valdez was arguing to
the jury that just as he himself had been able to put aside his fear, the jury should
and must do so in order to make a rational sentencing judgment. See id. at
2880–81 (Trial Tr. 1661–62) (“[I]f, in fact, you fall for the fear tactic, I would
submit to you that that is not a rational basis to kill this man.”).
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In context, Mr. Valdez’s argument does not support the claim that his ability
to represent Mr. Gardner was adversely affected by the impact of the courthouse
shooting. If anything, it indicates that Mr. Valdez was attempting to use his
experience to convince the jury to sentence Mr. Gardner to life imprisonment,
rather than death. Because Mr. Gardner has failed to demonstrate any adverse
effect from his attorneys’ representation, he cannot prevail on his conflict of
interest claim.
Mr. Gardner separately argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing on this potential conflict of interest when the issue arose.
Even assuming the trial court knew or reasonably should have known about the
existence of a conflict, however, Mr. Gardner still would have to show that the
conflict of interest “adversely affected his counsel’s performance” in order to
obtain habeas relief. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174 (2002). As he has
failed to make this showing, this claim also fails. 4
4
Because we conclude that Mr. Gardner is unable to demonstrate the
existence of a conflict of interest sufficient to warrant habeas relief, we need not
evaluate whether the district court was correct to conclude that he waived any
conflict that might have existed. Nevertheless, we note that a client may
generally waive his right to conflict-free representation, when done voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 n.16 (1981).
The original trial record implies that such a waiver occurred in this case. See
Vol. L. 2881 (Trial. Tr. 1661) (“[The defendant] still, in spite of the possible
conflicts, wanted us to defend him because we believe in saving his life.”).
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E. Change of Venue
Before trial, Mr. Gardner moved for a change of venue, arguing that the
pretrial publicity about his attempted escape and the shooting made it impossible
for him to receive a fair trial in Salt Lake City. In support of his motion, Mr.
Gardner submitted several dozen newspaper articles and videotapes of local
broadcasts typifying the publicity. Mr. Gardner also relied on a survey,
commissioned by his counsel, of approximately four hundred registered voters in
Salt Lake City, concerning their knowledge of and reaction to the crime. See
Aple. Br. 87–88. The survey purported to show that ninety percent of respondents
thought that the defendant was either “guilty” or “probably guilty.” Gardner I,
789 P.2d at 277. Mr. Gardner finally took issue with the fact that his trial was
held in the county courthouse, across the street from the building where the
shooting had taken place.
The trial court denied Mr. Gardner’s initial motion for a change of venue
based on pretrial publicity, but left open the opportunity to renew the motion.
Aple. Br. 89. The trial judge then conducted five days of voir dire, during which
he asked the prospective jurors about their ability to remain impartial, asked them
to explain any outside information that they had learned about the case, and
allowed both prosecution and defense to conduct further examination. Id. After
the jury was selected, Mr. Gardner renewed his motion for a change of venue and
it was again denied.
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Mr. Gardner raised the venue issue on direct appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court, which affirmed the trial court. Gardner I, 789 P.2d at 277–78. Although
the court acknowledged that many prospective jurors had been exposed to the
basic facts of the courthouse shooting, it determined that this exposure did not
warrant a presumption of prejudice. It noted first that a venire’s exposure to the
fundamental facts of an incident does not presumptively deprive a defendant of
due process. See id. at 277 (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975)).
Second, it pointed out deficiencies in the survey conducted by Mr. Gardner, which
diminished the inferences that might be taken from its results. See id. In
particular, the court noted—and Mr. Gardner acknowledged—that when asked
whether the defendant was “guilty,” the survey taker gave no explanation of what
crime the defendant was charged with or what burden of proof the state was
required to meet. Id. As a result, the Utah Supreme Court found that “any lay
opinion as to guilt [indicated by the survey] was merely an affirmation that [Mr.
Gardner] was the person involved in the incident, a fact conceded by the defense.”
Id. Finally, the court explained that Mr. Gardner had not alleged any specific
prejudice from the proximity of his trial to the courthouse where the shooting had
taken place. For all these reasons, it concluded that the trial court had not abused
its discretion in concluding that prejudice could not be presumed, and therefore
denying the request for change of venue. Id. at 278. The federal district court
found that the Utah Supreme Court’s decision did not represent an unreasonable
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application of clearly established Supreme Court law. See Mag. Rep. 151;
Gardner, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25643, at *13. We agree.
This court’s precedents are not entirely consistent with regard to the
standard of review to apply to a state court’s decision regarding jury impartiality.
Compare Goss v. Nelson, 439 F.3d 621, 627 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that only
when a manifest error occurs can a federal habeas court overturn a state court’s
finding regarding jury impartiality as a whole), with Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d
1298, 1331 (10th Cir. 2000) (asking whether state supreme court’s finding that
trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting change of venue was an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent); see also Patton v. Yount,
467 U.S. 1025, 1031 n.7 (1984) (declining to decide whether it is appropriate for a
reviewing court to apply a “manifest error” standard or to follow the ordinary level
of deference afforded state supreme court decisions on habeas relief). In this case,
because we find that the same result would follow from either standard, we need
not resolve which standard is appropriate.
The Sixth Amendment, applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,
ensures that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a .
. . trial[] by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Due process may require a change of
venue stemming from the “presumed prejudice” following from pretrial publicity
in two related contexts. First, where pretrial publicity is so pervasive and
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prejudicial that a court could not expect to find an unbiased jury pool in the
community, it should “presume prejudice,” necessitating a venue change. Goss,
439 F.3d at 628. Second, change of venue may be required where the effect of
pretrial publicity manifested at jury selection is substantial enough to indicate the
existence of prejudice within the jury pool. Id.
We consider first Mr. Gardner’s claim that the pretrial publicity alone raised
a presumption of prejudice. This is rarely the case. See United States v. Abello-
Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1177 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Presumed prejudice is rarely
invoked and only in extreme situations.”), abrogated on other grounds by United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). “[P]rejudice will only be presumed where
publicity ‘created either a circus atmosphere in the court room or a lynch mob
mentality such that it would be impossible to receive a fair trial.’” Goss, 439 F.3d
at 628 (quoting Hale, 227 F.3d at 1332). “Simply showing that all the jurors knew
about the case and that there was extensive pretrial publicity will not suffice . . . .”
Hale, 227 F.3d at 1332 (quoting Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1567 (10th Cir.
1994)).
The Supreme Court has presumed prejudice from pretrial publicity alone
only in exceptional settings—where the trial became “a hollow formality” or when
the courthouse proceedings were overrun by the press “to accommodate the public
appetite for carnival.” Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966) (massive publicity insisted that defendant was guilty;
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veniremen’s names were published and prospective jurors were inundated by calls
and letters); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (circus atmosphere created when
pretrial hearings were broadcast live to community and at least twelve cameramen
took motion or still pictures throughout the proceedings); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723 (1963) (sheriff videotaped defendant’s detailed jailhouse
confession—taken during “kangaroo court” proceedings without lawyer
present—and assisted in broadcasting it numerous times to relatively small
community).
Although the courthouse shooting generated significant pretrial publicity,
Mr. Gardner points to nothing that suggests his trial devolved into a “circus.”
Both the pretrial publicity and the survey conducted by the defense illustrated only
that it was widely known that Mr. Gardner was involved in the courthouse
shooting—a fact already conceded by the defense. See Gardner I, 789 P.2d at
277. It did not indicate that members of the venire had developed a fixed opinion
as to whether Mr. Gardner’s actions satisfied the legal standard for first degree
murder. Nor was there any harassment of veniremen or indication that the media
had so pervaded the proceedings as to create a carnival-like atmosphere.
As we have previously explained, “[P]re-trial publicity in topical criminal
cases is inevitable.” Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1176. If we were to require the
relocation of every trial following a crime about which multiple stories were
broadcast or published, the local trial of newsworthy cases would become the
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exception rather than the rule. Here, Mr. Gardner points to no circumstances so
exceptional as to suggest that Mr. Gardner was unable to obtain a fair trial in Salt
Lake City. Therefore, we cannot say that the Utah Supreme Court unreasonably
concluded that a change of venue on the basis of pretrial publicity alone was
unnecessary.
Mr. Gardner also fails to demonstrate that jury selection manifested such
prejudice as to deprive him of a fair trial. A change of venue is warranted when
“the jurors demonstrated actual partiality or hostility that [could] not be laid
aside.” Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1189 (10th Cir. 1993). “We review [for
prejudice based on jury selection] by examining the totality of the circumstances,”
Stafford, 34 F.3d at 1567, bearing in mind that “[t]he trial court has broad
discretion in gauging the effects of allegedly prejudicial publicity and in taking
measures to insure a fair trial.” Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1177. We may consider
both the jury’s responses to voir dire, as well as the nature and extent of the
questions asked by the judge to ensure an impartial jury. See id. at 1177–78.
Evidence of community sentiment at jury selection has been used to
invalidate a conviction in the rare situation when voir dire indicates that the
pretrial publicity had such a pervasive effect that a fair jury could not be seated.
In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), for instance, the Supreme Court invalidated
a conviction where (1) the trial court had excused over half of the venire for cause
due to fixed opinions as to the defendant’s guilt, (2) ninety percent of jurors
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entertained some opinion as to guilt, and (3) eight of twelve jurors actually seated
“thought defendant was guilty.” See Goss, 439 F.3d at 629 (describing Irvin).
In recent years, the Supreme Court has made clear, however, that
community prejudice should be inferred from voir dire only in exceptional cases.
Thus, in Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984), the court found there was no
manifest error in refusing to change venue even though (1) pretrial publicity
revealed inadmissible information such as defendant’s prior conviction for murder
and confession; (2) seventy-seven percent of jurors admitted they had an opinion
about defendant’s guilt; and (3) eight of the fourteen jurors and alternates actually
sat had an opinion as to guilt. See Goss, 439 F.3d at 629 (describing Patton).
In this case, although roughly fifty-five percent of jurors professed that they
had formed an opinion about Mr. Gardner’s guilt, Aplt. Br. 83, only four of twelve
actually seated jurors indicated that they had formed an opinion to guilt—even
fewer than in Patton. Of equal importance is the conscientiousness with which the
trial judge worked to seat an impartial jury. “Voir dire examination serves the
dual purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting
counsel in exercising peremptory challenges.” Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,
431 (1991). The trial judge ably advanced both these goals through his conduct of
voir dire in this case. Over five days, the trial court examined each of the
prospective jurors personally about their knowledge of the facts of the case, as
well as their ability to set aside pre-formed opinions and try the case solely on the
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evidence introduced at trial. The judge also inquired into the source and content
of media information to which the venire had been exposed. Finally, he allowed
counsel for both the prosecution and the defense to further question prospective
jurors about their exposure to pretrial publicity. As a result, every member of the
venire ultimately placed on the jury had assured the trial court that he or she could
decide the case on the presented evidence alone.
The inference of actual prejudice here is no stronger than in other cases
where we have rejected such claims. See, e.g., Hale, 227 F.3d at 1333 (affirming
finding of no actual prejudice where trial occurred five to six months after crime,
half of seated jury had opinions as to guilt or innocence, and trial judge asked only
twice whether there were any jurors who felt they could not be impartial). Given
the extent of the trial court’s inquiry, as well as the nature of jurors’ responses to
those questions, we cannot say that the “high hurdle” necessary to establish the
presence of prejudice has been met in this case. Goss, 439 F.3d at 630.
Consequently, the facts do not establish either manifest error or that the Utah
Supreme Court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent by rejecting claims
of actual prejudice on the basis of jury selection.
F. Security Measures and Shackling
Mr. Gardner also argues that the security measures taken during his
trial—including the presence of four security officers wearing bulletproof vests,
electronic screening devices at the courtroom entrance, escorts for the jurors to get
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to their cars after dark, and, most importantly, visible shackles—violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial by labeling him in the jurors’ eyes as particularly
dangerous. To determine whether the presence of security measures in the
courtroom violates the Sixth Amendment, we normally ask “whether what [the
jurors] saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to
defendant’s right to a fair trial; if the challenged practice is not found inherently
prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show actual prejudice, the inquiry is over.”
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572 (1986). Shackling, however, is deemed
inherently prejudicial, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), and should be
allowed only if “there are compelling reasons which would justify the use of
physical restraints” such that the Sixth Amendment rights “yield to the competing
interests of the courtroom participants for the safe conduct and orderly progress of
the trial.” United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1986).
In Hack, we held that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it
shackled two defendants who were on trial for attempting to forcibly hijack a
prison transport plane and effect their escape. Id. at 867–68. Mr. Gardner posed a
nearly identical situation. He not only had a history of violence, but was on trial
for a murder committed while attempting to escape from a courthouse. The judge
was justified in taking precautions to prevent another attempt. Mr. Gardner
nonetheless attempts to distinguish Hack by noting that the judge in that case had
“weighed all relevant factors based on the uncontroverted information available to
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him in considering the most appropriate precautionary measures” and his reasons
were “sufficiently documented.” Id. at 868. Here, in contrast, the only record of
the trial court considering what security measures would be appropriate arose
when, mid-trial, Mr. Gardner objected to the presence of security guards within the
courtroom and the court took steps to limit their visibility. We do not take the
lack of detailed findings to mean that the court had abdicated its duty to weigh the
need for precautions against the costs to Mr. Gardner, though, or to mean that the
court was unjustified in allowing these extreme security measures. More likely it
is the result of Mr. Gardner’s not objecting to the security until the trial was well
underway, and even then to object to only one particular measure, which the court
immediately addressed. As Mr. Gardner had a history of violent escape attempts,
the court had compelling reasons that justified these security precautions, and Mr.
Gardner’s Sixth Amendment rights had to yield to the competing interest of
ensuring the safety of the trial participants.
G. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony
Unbeknownst to both Mr. Gardner and the prosecution, Mr. Macri, one of
the witnesses to the shooting in the archive room, underwent hypnosis between
testifying at the preliminary hearing and testifying at trial. Mr. Gardner argues
that Mr. Macri’s post-hypnotic testimony violated his rights under both the Due
Process and Confrontation Clauses. We have rejected the per se constitutional
invalidity of hypnotically-refreshed testimony, Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d
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1501, 1508 (10th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Gibson,
239 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2001), but we have also said that “[a] reviewing court
must determine whether safeguards have been employed to insure reliability of the
testimony to make it admissible.” Id.; see also id. at 1508, n.8 (identifying some
of the safeguards that had been present, such as making a record of the hypnotic
session and performing the hypnosis in a manner designed to “minimize the danger
of contamination”). This case, however, is quite different from the usual instances
of hypnotically-refreshed testimony, as the hypnosis was not undertaken at the
behest of the state but at the witness’s own initiative, without the state’s
knowledge and without its ability to ensure safeguards.
The Utah Supreme Court did not address whether the hypnosis amounted to
a constitutional error, but instead found that Mr. Gardner was not prejudiced by
any error that might have occurred, as Mr. Macri’s testimony “went only to a
collateral issue that was, at most, marginally related to Gardner’s defense.”
Gardner II, 888 P.2d at 614. We agree. At the preliminary hearing, before
undergoing hypnosis, Mr. Macri testified that he was standing behind a door when
Mr. Gardner entered the archives room, and that he fled by going around the door.
He testified, somewhat uncertainly, that as the door closed behind him, the gun
went off, and that the events occurred simultaneously. At trial, after undergoing
hypnosis, Mr. Macri testified with much more certainty that “simultaneous doesn’t
quite describe the motion.” Mr. Gardner contends that this change in testimony
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was prejudicial because the pre-hypnosis testimony supported the theory that the
door slammed shut before the gun went off, suggesting that he fired because he
was startled by Mr. Macri rushing out the door. Pre-hypnosis, Mr. Macri was a bit
uncertain about the order of events but testified that his running out the door and
hearing the gunshot all happened at about the same time, whereas after hypnosis
he was more certain that the gun went off before the door closed behind him. In
both versions, though, the door had already started to close before Mr. Gardner
fired the gun, and both supported Mr. Gardner’s startle theory and his own
testimony that he had seen “a blur in front of [his] eyes” (i.e., Mr. Macri) and
heard “another explosion.” Whether or not the use of post-hypnotic testimony was
a constitutional violation, the slight difference in testimony the hypnosis may have
produced was not enough to prejudice Mr. Gardner.
H. Witness Tampering
Mr. Gardner claims that the other eyewitness to the shooting, Kenneth
Seamons, was “manipulated” by the prosecutor into altering his testimony during
trial. An examination of what actually happened, however, belies any inference of
prosecutorial indiscretion. At trial, Mr. Seamons testified that Mr. Gardner had
pointed the gun at Mr. Burdell, and that “[t]he gun went off.” The trial then
recessed for lunch. At lunch, the prosecutor told Mr. Seamons that he was “being
too polite” in saying that the gun went off, and that “either [Gardner] did or he
didn’t” pull the trigger. He did not instruct Mr. Seamons to lie or even to change
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his testimony, but only instructed him to tell how it happened. After lunch, Mr.
Seamons then clarified that “Gardner shot Burdell”—testimony that was not
inconsistent with his earlier testimony. Showing a witness how his phrasing could
be misinterpreted and then instructing that witness to “tell how it happened” is not
witness tampering, but being a good lawyer.
I. Bifurcation
Utah law provides that aggravated murder can be a capital felony. One way
in which a murder can be aggravated is if “the actor was previously convicted of”
certain crimes. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(j). Mr. Gardner argues that the
failure to have a bifurcated trial for his aggravating circumstances—two prior
robbery convictions—prejudiced him. He cites State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 557
(Utah 1989), which held that “[w]hen the underlying crime is charged, and
enhancing circumstances involving other crimes . . . are also charged for the
purpose of increasing the severity of the punishment for the underlying crime, the
trial court must divide the trial into separate segments.” (emphasis added) (citing
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 498 (Utah 1988)). Admitting prior crimes is
“presumed prejudicial” to the defendant. Id. at 557.
Mr. Gardner says that the failure to bifurcate violated his “fundamental
rights and constitutional guarantee of not having his death sentence imposed in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.” Aplt. Br. 104. Mr. Gardner cites no direct
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authority tying the right established in James (decided after Mr. Gardner’s trial) to
a federal right.
In the state supreme court, concurrences by Justices Stewart and
Zimmerman asserted that, in allowing the evidence of Mr. Gardner’s two prior
robberies, the trial court erred. Gardner I, 789 P.2d at 289. Justice Zimmerman,
however, reasoned that the error was harmless. First, Justice Zimmerman stated
that the prosecutor referred to the two robberies “only as necessary to demonstrate
that the State had proven the aggravating element of first degree murder.” Id. at
290 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). Second, Justice Zimmerman noted that Mr.
Gardner referred to his past crimes when he was on the stand. Id. Mr. Gardner
“took the stand and disclosed his extensive criminal record, which included other
convictions that were more prejudicial than the two robberies.” Id. Evidence of
Mr. Gardner’s prior crimes were thus admissible in order to impeach Mr. Gardner,
as his counsel concedes. Aplt. Br. 105. The defendant shrugs this off as the
product of ineffective assistance of counsel, but we have rejected that claim above.
See supra at 25-26.
Both of these reasons echoed ones given by the majority. Gardner I, 789
P.2d at 279–80. In addition, the majority claimed that “because defendant’s guilt
was manifest by overwhelming direct evidence” there was no risk that the
inclusion of his prior convictions would have had any prejudicial effect on the
conduct or outcome of the trial. Id. at 279.
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We find these three reasons persuasive and conclude that the failure to
bifurcate the trial did not unfairly prejudice Mr. Gardner.
J. Failure to Instruct on All Statutory Mitigating Factors
Mr. Gardner makes the strained argument that the jury should have been
instructed that he may have “acted under extreme duress.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-208(2)(c) (1990). Mr. Gardner says the jurors could have concluded that Mr.
Gardner “was in a state of physical duress,” Aplt. Br. 107, as a result of his
gunshot wound and his general panic. This is not a convincing argument.
First, the statutory factor would seem to apply only to cases where a person
is acting under the duress placed on him or her by another, not when any abstract
“force” (such as pain or disorientation) is working on the person. Mr. Gardner
cites the unpublished case, Horton v. Massie, 203 F.3d 835 (Table), 2000 WL
107386 (10th Cir. 2000), in which a person was threatened with death or physical
injury by another. This, however, seems the classic instance of duress
contemplated by the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(c) (mitigating
circumstance if “[t]he defendant acted under extreme duress or under the
substantial domination of another person.” (emphasis added)). Physical duress by
gunshot wound, in contrast, is a stretch. No one forced or coerced Mr. Gardner
into firing a shot.
Second, the instruction to the jurors allowed them to consider “any other
fact in mitigation of the penalty.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(g). They
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certainly could have considered Mr. Gardner’s extreme physical duress, especially
if this was a central theme of his defense, as he alleges. Aplt. Br. 107. The court
also instructed the jury that the mitigating factors it listed were merely examples
and not exclusive. Aple. Br. at 119 (quoting R. 613–17). This is all that was
required of it. See Bryson v. Ward, 187 F.3d 1193, 1209–10 (10th Cir. 1999). We
see no error.
K. Presumption of Death
The judge instructed the jury in this case that: “When in the course of your
deliberations you either reach a unanimous verdict of death, or you become
reasonably satisfied that such a unanimous verdict will not be rendered, you will
notify the bailiff that you are ready to report to the Court.” Vol. LIX, Additional
Instructions, 6. The instruction also said:
Your verdicts must be either:
We the jury impaneled in the above case having heretofore found the
defendant guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree,
Count I of the Information, unanimously render a verdict of death; or
We the jury impaneled in the above case, Count I of the Information
find that our deliberations have been concluded and we are reasonably
satisfied that we will not reach a unanimous verdict of death.
The foreman will sign the appropriate verdict, and not the other, and
bring both verdict forms back into the Court.
Id. at 7. Mr. Gardner claims that the jury instructions could reasonably have been
read as requiring unanimity for the jury to decide not to impose the death penalty,
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and that this amounts to a constitutional violation. Aplt. Br. 110 (citing McKoy v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442–43 (1990)). Mr. Gardner contends that the
jurors should have been told that an individual juror could exercise his own
judgement and give full effect to a mitigating circumstance, even though other
jurors did not.
The magistrate judge found that there was nothing in the jury instructions
indicating that “the jury must unanimously find mitigating circumstances to exist.”
Mag. Rep. 227. Moreover, the jury instructions above are clear that unanimity is
only required for the death penalty to be imposed; if the jury is not unanimous on
that point, then they will reach the alternative verdict (a life sentence). Indeed, as
the magistrate judge explained, “[t]he only time the instructions provide that the
jury must be unanimous is in their explanation of how the jury could impose a
sentence of death.” Mag. Rep. 227–28. The district court adopted the reasoning
of the magistrate judge, and we agree that no reasonable juror could have
construed the instructions to require the jury to be unanimous in order not to
impose a sentence of death.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
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Gardner v. Galetka
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2009-06-19
Citations: 568 F.3d 862
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion