F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 14 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT WESLEY KNIGHTON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 00-6442
MIKE MULLIN, * Warden, Oklahoma
State Penitentiary,
Respondent-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. CIV-98-459-T)
John M. Stuart of Stuart, Frieda & Hammond, P.C., Duncan, Oklahoma (Don J.
Gutteridge, Jr., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), for Petitioner-
Appellant.
Robert L. Whittaker, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (W.A. Drew
Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, with him on the brief), Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and
BRISCOE , Circuit Judge.
*
Mike Mullin replaced Gary Gibson as Warden of the Oklahoma State
Penitentiary effective March 25, 2002.
BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge.
Robert Wesley Knighton appeals the denial of habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, from two Oklahoma first degree murder convictions and death sentences.
A jury convicted Knighton of shooting to death Richard and Virginia Denney
during Knighton’s multi-state crime spree. Knighton claims 1) the trial court’s
admitting evidence of the many other crimes Knighton committed during his
four-day crime spree resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial; 2) prosecutors’
belated disclosure of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963), material prejudiced
his defense; and 3) trial counsel’s representation at sentencing was
constitutionally ineffective. We affirm.
I. FACTS
In January 1990, Knighton left a Kansas City, Missouri halfway house and
embarked on a four-day crime spree. Accompanying the forty-eight year old
Knighton was his twenty year old girlfriend, Rene Williams, and his seventeen
year old friend, Lawrence Brittain. Two days after leaving Kansas City and
needing money and a new vehicle, Knighton and Brittain approached the
Denneys’ isolated rural Oklahoma home. Knighton then shot the couple to death
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and took the couple’s truck. Texas police arrested the trio the next day, still
driving the Denneys’ truck.
Before Knighton’s trial, Brittain pled guilty to two counts of first degree
murder and received two concurrent life sentences. And Williams pled guilty to
being an accessory after the fact, receiving concurrent fifteen year prison
sentences. Both then testified against Knighton at his trial. The jury convicted
Knighton of two counts of first degree murder, based on alternate theories of
malice aforethought and felony murder.
During the capital sentencing proceeding, the jury found three aggravating
factors: Knighton had suffered prior violent felony convictions, had created a
great risk of death to more than one person, and was a continuing threat to
society. The jury declined to find that Knighton had killed the Denneys to avoid
his arrest or prosecution for robbing them. After considering Knighton’s
mitigating evidence, the jury imposed two death sentences. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed Knighton’s convictions and death sentences, see
Knighton v. State , 912 P.2d 878 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied , 519 U.S. 841
(1996), and denied post-conviction relief in an unpublished decision.
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II. STANDARDS OR REVIEW
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), Knighton will be entitled to habeas relief only if he can establish that
the state courts’ resolution of his claims “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established” Supreme Court precedent, or was
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We presume
correct any state-court factual finding, absent clear and convincing proof to the
contrary. See id. , § 2254(e)(1). If, instead, the state courts did not address
Knighton’s habeas claim’s merit, we will review the district court’s legal
determinations de novo , and any factual finding for clear error. See, e.g., Romano
v. Gibson , 278 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2002).
III. ISSUES
A. Admitting evidence of other crimes. Knighton challenges the trial
court’s admitting evidence of the other crimes and bad acts he committed during
this four-day crime spree. In fact, the trial court, during the trial’s first stage,
admitted evidence that, when Knighton and Williams discovered that Brittain was
going to be sent to prison, they convinced him to flee instead; Knighton told
Williams and Brittain, before they fled, that there might be murders and robberies
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along the way; Knighton stole a van; Knighton shot and killed two men in
Clinton, Missouri; the group then stole money, weapons and a radio from the two
murdered Missouri men; while traveling across Oklahoma, the trio tried
unsuccessfully to steal a car from a parking lot, and to abduct and kill a motorist
and steal her car; planned to rob a convenience store and kill the clerk; broke into
a vacant rural home, stealing a pair of boots and an empty wallet; sought another
residence, in addition to the Denneys’ home, to “take over”--that is, to kill the
occupants and take what they wanted; Knighton’s reaching for his gun in an effort
to kill a mechanic who had unnecessarily replaced a fuel pump on the Denneys’
truck; looking, in Texas, for still another home to “take over;” and again reaching
for his gun when a deputy sheriff stopped them.
In denying relief on direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
applied only state evidentiary rules. See Knighton , 912 P.2d at 888-90 (applying
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 2403, 2404). The question presented in these habeas
proceedings, however, is not whether this evidence was admissible under state
law, but instead whether, considered in light of the entire record, its admission
resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S.
62, 67-68, 70 (1991); Smallwood v. Gibson , 191 F.3d 1257, 1277 (10th Cir.
1999). “[W]e will not disturb a state court’s admission of evidence of prior
crimes, wrongs or acts unless the probative value of such evidence is so greatly
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outweighed by the prejudice flowing from its admission that the admission denies
defendant due process of law.” Duvall v. Reynolds , 139 F.3d 768, 787 (10th Cir.
1998) (further quotation omitted) (pre-AEDPA). Although Knighton did raise
this constitutional due process argument on direct appeal, the Oklahoma appellate
court did not specifically address it. We, therefore, review this habeas claim de
novo. See Romano , 278 F.3d at 1150.
The trial court admitted this other-crimes evidence, holding it was
“extremely probative of [Knighton’s] motive, intent, plans, schemes, and course
of events . . . leading” to the Denneys’ murders. Tr. Oct. 15, 1990 hr’g at 2-3.
See generally Hale v. Gibson , 227 F.3d 1298, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals “has repeatedly allowed the admission of
evidence of other crimes to prove motive, common scheme, identity, plan,
knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident”), cert. denied , 533 U.S. 957
(2001). Admitting this evidence of Knighton’s other crimes and bad acts did not
result in a fundamentally unfair trial. Rather, this evidence was relevant to
explain the facts surrounding the Denneys’ murders. See McGuire , 502 U.S. at
68-69 (reviewing evidence’s relevancy in determining whether trial court’s
admitting evidence of prior injuries resulted in fundamentally unfair trial); cf.
Chase v. Crisp , 523 F.2d 595, 600 n.4 (10th Cir. 1975) (noting “[w]here all of the
acts are connected to the chain of events” that includes the crime charged, “all are
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admissible even though the full story tends to show the commission of other
offenses”).
Furthermore, this evidence also tended to establish Knighton’s intent and
motive. Because the State had charged Knighton alternately with malice
aforethought and felony murder, the State had to establish either that Knighton
had deliberately intended unlawfully to kill the Denneys, or at least that he
intended to rob them at gunpoint. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.7(A, B).
Evidence of the other crimes he committed during this crime spree tended to
establish that Knighton possessed both these intentions when he approached the
Denneys’ home.
Lastly, this evidence of Knighton’s other crimes helped establish
Knighton’s role as the group’s leader and triggerman. This was particularly
relevant in light of the defense’s argument that it was actually Brittain who killed
the Denneys and then, with Williams, concocted a plot to blame the murders on
Knighton. Cf. Hopkinson v. Shillinger , 866 F.2d 1185, 1198 (10th Cir. 1989)
(determining introducing evidence of other crimes did not warrant habeas relief
where such evidence was relevant to relationship between petitioner and
acquaintance to whom petitioner might have turned to help him murder victim).
Moreover, the trial court limited jurors’ consideration of this other-crimes
evidence, instructing them that
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EVIDENCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT THE
DEFENDANT HAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OFFENSES
OTHER THAN THAT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION. YOU
MAY NOT CONSIDER THIS EVIDENCE AS IN ANY WAY
TENDING TO PROVE THE GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF THE
DEFENDANT(S) OF THE SPECIFIC OFFENSE CHARGED IN
THE INFORMATION. THIS EVIDENCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED
SOLELY ON THE ISSUE OF THE DEFENDANT[’S] ALLEGED
MOTIVE AND/OR OPPORTUNITY, INTENT AND/OR
PREPARATION AND/OR PLAN AND/OR KNOWLEDGE. THIS
EVIDENCE IS TO BE CONSIDERED BY YOU ONLY FOR THE
LIMITED PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS RECEIVED.
O.R. at 294 (first-stage instruction 14). The court also gave this instruction at the
beginning of the trial and referred to it throughout the proceedings. See
Smallwood , 191 F.3d at 1277 (noting proper jury instruction can cure error in
admitting evidence of defendant’s prior crimes or bad acts); see also Hopkinson ,
866 F.2d at 1199.
Knighton further argues that admitting this other-crimes evidence also
resulted in a fundamentally unfair capital sentencing proceeding. The
Constitution, however, does not preclude a capital sentencer from considering
unadjudicated bad acts. See, e.g., Smith v. Gibson , 197 F.3d 454, 460 (10th Cir.
1999); Smallwood , 191 F.3d at 1276.
B. Brady claims. Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), provides
that the State’s suppression of “evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” See also
Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1995). This is so irrespective of the
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prosecution’s good or bad faith. See Brady , 373 U.S. at 87. Thus, to establish a
Brady violation, a habeas petitioner must show that “(1) the prosecutor
suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant as
exculpatory or impeachment evidence; and (3) the evidence was material.”
Gonzales v. McKune , 247 F.3d 1066, 1075 (10th Cir. 2001), vacated in part on
other grounds , 279 F.3d 922, 924 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc), petition for cert.
filed , (U.S. May 7, 2002) (No. 01-10243). Generally, evidence is material if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Kyles , 514 U.S. at
434.
Here, however, defense counsel discovered the prosecution’s failure to
disclose Brady material at the beginning of trial, while cross-examining only the
State’s third witness. The trial judge then went through the State’s files and
turned over to the defense a significant amount of additional Brady material. The
trial court also continued trial from October 23 until November 1, to give the
defense an opportunity to review this new material. On November 1, the defense
announced it was ready to continue with the trial. See Trial tr. vol. 1 at 1-3. 1
1
The defense did, later that day, unsuccessfully renew its request for an
additional continuance. See id. at 1-34.
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The materiality question presented here, then, is instead whether there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of either trial stage would have been
different had the State disclosed this information earlier. See United States v.
Young , 45 F.3d 1405, 1408 (10th Cir. 1995) 2
(direct criminal appeal); see also
Gonzalez-Montoya , 161 F.3d at 649-50 (considering whether government’s late
disclosure of impeachment evidence affected trial’s result); Scarborough , 128
F.3d at 1376 (holding no Brady violation where government makes Brady
material available during trial, “[a]s long as ultimate disclosure is made before it
is too late for the defendant[] to make use of any benefits of the evidence.”)
(further quotation omitted). We make this determination in light of the record as
a whole. See, e.g, Rojem v. Gibson , 245 F.3d 1130, 1139, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001).
We ultimately measure the materiality of the belatedly disclosed information
collectively. See Kyles , 514 U.S. at 421, 436-37 & 436 n.10.
Knighton asserts that the State’s delay in disclosing Brady material in this
case prejudiced his efforts to suppress his custodial statements, his opportunity to
2
In Young , this court assumed, without deciding, that the government’s
disclosure of favorable evidence to the defense at trial could violate Brady . See
45 F.3d at 1408 n.2. Neither party here argues to the contrary. Furthermore, this
court has, since Young , analyzed claims challenging the government’s delayed
disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused under Brady . See, e.g., United
States v. Gonzales-Montoya , 161 F.3d 643, 649-50 (10th Cir. 1998) (direct
criminal appeal); United States v. Woodlee , 136 F.3d 1399, 1411 (10th Cir. 1998)
(direct criminal appeal); United States v. Scarborough , 128 F.3d 1373, 1376 (10th
Cir. 1997) (direct criminal appeal).
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develop an insanity defense, and his defense generally during both the trial’s guilt
and capital sentencing stages. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
however, denied relief, holding instead that the “trial court [had] acted swiftly
and appropriately to cure this egregious error,” and that the undisclosed evidence
was ultimately not material. Knighton , 912 P.2d at 891, 892-94. For the
following reasons, that determination was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
application of, Brady . See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also, e.g., Moore v.
Gibson , 195 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999) (reviewing, under § 2254(d)(1),
state court’s decision resolving Brady claim).
1. Motion to suppress.
a. Initial stop and arrest. A Texas deputy sheriff, Douglas
Tennent, stopped Knighton, Brittain and Williams the day following the Denneys’
murders, after a citizen in Canadien, Texas, reported seeing them driving several
times very slowly around the same residential block, looking through the houses.
Shortly thereafter, Sheriff Billy Bowen arrived on the scene and arrested
Knighton, Brittain and Williams, after discovering two firearms in the Denneys’
truck, in violation of Texas law.
Prior to trial, Knighton unsuccessfully challenged the validity of this stop
and his subsequent arrest. Nonetheless, after receiving the belatedly produced
Brady materials, see Defendant’s ex. 7A, 65A, 66A, defense counsel had the
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opportunity to review that information and was able to cross-examine Deputy
Tennent and Sheriff Bowen at trial about this stop and arrest. In fact, defense
counsel used these reports to cross-examine these witnesses. Knighton then
renewed his suppression motion. The trial court took that motion under
advisement, and ultimately denied it at the close of the first-stage evidence.
Knighton fails to establish here that, had the State disclosed this Brady
information earlier, there was a reasonable probability that Knighton could have
prevailed on his suppression motion. See Gonzalez-Montoya , 161 F.3d at 649-50
(holding government’s late disclosure did not affect trial’s outcome, where
defense counsel had opportunity to review belatedly produced information and
cross-examine witness about it at trial); see also Woodlee , 136 F.3d at 1411.
b. State’s presentation of perjured testimony. Knighton also
asserts that these same belatedly produced documents, Defendant’s ex. 7A, 65A
and 66A, further establish that Deputy Tennent and Sheriff Bowen lied during
their preliminary hearing testimony. The prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured
testimony, or the knowing failure to disclose that testimony used to obtain a
conviction was false, requires the reversal of a conviction if there is any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s
decision. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).
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Knighton, however, fails to establish that such a claim warrants habeas relief in
this case.
The only discrepancy between Deputy Tennent’s testimony and his earlier
interview, see Defendant’s ex. 65A, involved the front license plate on the
Denneys’ truck. At the preliminary hearing and at trial Tennent testified that,
although the police dispatcher had notified him to look for a truck with Oklahoma
license plates, when he first saw the truck Knighton was driving, the deputy saw
an unidentified front license plate that was not from Texas. In his January 1990
interview, however, Deputy Tennent asserted, instead, that the truck “had no front
license plate, state wise.” Defense Ex. 65A at 1. That hardly contradicts his trial
testimony. See United States v. Wolny , 133 F.3d 758, 763 (10th Cir. 1998) (direct
criminal appeal). In any event, “‘[c]ontradictions and changes in a witness’s
testimony alone do not constitute perjury and do not create an inference, let alone
prove, that the prosecutor knowingly presented perjured testimony.’” Id. (quoting
Tapia v. Tansy , 926 F.2d 1554, 1563 (10th Cir. 1991)). Moreover, defense
counsel had a copy of Deputy Tennent’s interview at trial and was able to explore,
during cross-examination, any inconsistencies between that interview and
Tennent’s trial testimony. See United States v. Vaziri , 164 F.3d 556, 564 (10th
Cir. 1999); Tapia , 926 F.2d at 1563.
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In any event, this discrepancy is not material under either Giglio or Brady .
Deputy Tennent consistently asserted that he stopped Knighton because of the
reports of this vehicle’s suspicious activity, and not for any traffic violation
involving the truck’s front license plate.
Nor is there any discrepancy warranting habeas relief between Sheriff
Bowen’s testimony and his reports to Oklahoma law enforcement officials,
see Defendant’s ex. 7A, 66A. Sheriff Bowen’s assertion that he detained
Knighton, Brittain and Williams until their stories could be checked out, see
Defendant’s ex. 7A at 4, does not directly contradict his trial testimony that he
arrested these three suspects for Texas firearms violations. See Wolny , 133 F.3d
at 763. Further, in light of Sheriff Bowen’s finding the first firearm in the truck,
in violation of Texas law, any discrepancy between Sheriff Bowen’s testimony
and his reports concerning the circumstances surrounding his finding a second
such weapon, see Defendant’s ex. 66A at 2, are not material to the validity of
Knighton’s arrest.
2. Guilt-stage defense. Knighton’s defense at trial was that it was
actually Brittain, and not Knighton, who shot the Denneys. In support of this
theory, defense counsel had planned to bring out at trial Brittain’s fledgling
connection with the Aryan Brotherhood, and his possible desire to gain status
with that group, to explain why Brittain might have killed the Denneys. Knighton
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now argues his attorney had to abandon that aspect of his defense after the State
belatedly turned over a document indicating Knighton had made a post-arrest
statement acknowledging his own active membership in that group. See
Defendant’s ex. 2A at 1-2.
That alone, however, is not sufficient to warrant habeas relief. See
Scarborough , 128 F.3d at 1375-76 (holding there was no Brady violation where
government disclosed evidence during trial, at time when it was not too late for
defense to make use of that evidence, notwithstanding that earlier disclosure
might have changed defense strategy). The State’s delayed disclosure did not
deprive Knighton of a defense he otherwise would have had. Cf.
Gonzalez-Montoya , 161 F.3d at 650 (denying Brady claim, noting that, even if
defense counsel had had additional time to prepare, counsel’s concern that
introducing belatedly produced evidence would implicate defendant would not
have abated). Nor had defense counsel, prior to the State’s disclosure of this
information, argued to the jury during her opening argument concerning either
Brittain’s or Knighton’s Aryan Brotherhood membership.
More importantly, as Knighton acknowledges, his membership in the Aryan
Brotherhood did not come as a surprise to defense counsel. Rather, the pretrial
record is replete with references to Knighton’s membership in that organization.
At the case’s outset, Knighton’s membership in at least one white supremacist
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group was the basis for additional security during his initial appearance. And,
during the preliminary hearing, Jailer Duroy, Investigator Ham and Undersheriff
Busby all testified to Knighton’s extensive comments to them about the Aryan
Brotherhood, as well as Knighton’s corresponding hatred for African-Americans.
“There can be no suppression by the state of evidence already known by and
available to [the defendant] prior to trial.” McGregor v. Gibson , 219 F.3d 1245,
1253-54 (10th Cir. 2000) (further quotation omitted), overruled on other grounds,
248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc); see also, e.g., United States v.
Quintanilla , 193 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
In addition to this information concerning the Aryan Brotherhood,
Knighton also argues that he could have used the following belatedly disclosed
documents to bolster his defense theory that it was really Brittain who shot the
Denneys: at the preliminary hearing, a jailer overheard Knighton tell Brittain to
say that Knighton had committed the murders, see Defendant’s ex. 3A; a report
indicated Knighton had five .22 caliber bullets on him when he was arrested, see
Defendant’s ex. 29A at 3, instead of .38 caliber ammunition used to kill the
Denneys; and Brittain’s written statement indicated it was Williams, and not
Knighton, who first suggested stopping at the Denneys’ home, see Defendant’s
ex. 33A at 10. Knighton, however, had this information shortly after the trial
began and was able to present this evidence in his defense. Knighton fails to
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establish how the State’s earlier disclosure of these documents would have better
enabled him to present his defense such that there was a reasonable probability
the jury would have acquitted him.
Lastly, Knighton asserts that the State’s belated disclosure of Knighton’s
own statements to law enforcement officials prejudiced his trial defense. He
fails, however, to identify specifically the statements to which he refers and the
particular harm their belated disclosure caused his defense. See United States v.
Green , 178 F.3d 1099, 1109 (10th Cir. 1999) (denying Brady claim where, among
other things, defendant failed to identify any particular exculpatory evidence
government failed to disclose).
3. Insanity defense/second-stage mitigating evidence. Knighton
contends that there were “many, many references to Mr. Knighton being crazy,”
Trial tr. vol. VIII at 1475, in the belatedly produced documents that might have
supported an insanity defense, or at least prompted defense counsel to investigate
pursuing such a defense, and that otherwise could have been used as mitigation
evidence during the capital sentencing proceeding. Knighton, however, had this
information, in some form, prior to trial and was able to present it in his defense.
Knighton specifically points to the State’s delay in disclosing a transcript
of a statement he made to Texas officials after his arrest which, according to
Knighton, would have supported his claim that his untreated high blood pressure
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influenced his actions during this crime spree. See Defendant’s ex. 1A at 5.
Knighton, however, never further explains how this information may have
affected his culpability for these murders, nor how it might otherwise have been a
mitigating factor. Moreover, defense counsel had other information, prior to trial,
indicating that Knighton suffered from high blood pressure and took medication
for that condition, but that he did not have that medication during this crime
spree. Again, “[t]here can be no suppression by the state of evidence already
known by and available to [the defendant] prior to trial.” McGregor , 219 F.3d at
1253-54 (further quotation omitted); see also, e.g., Quintanilla , 193 F.3d at 1149.
Additionally, Brittain did testify at trial that Knighton had searched through
the Missouri victim’s home looking for medication to “relieve” his “blood
pressure condition.” Trial tr. vol. 4 at 4-53, 4-105. This information, therefore,
was before the jury. Knighton fails to assert how the State’s earlier disclosure of
Defendant’s ex. 1A would have enabled him to make better use of this
information such that there is a reasonable probability that the result of either trial
stage would have been different.
Knighton also challenges the State’s delayed disclosure of Defendant’s ex.
2A, in which Undersheriff Busby noted that Knighton had told him:
this shouldn’t of happened. I tried to get them to send me back to the
joint, but they wouldn’t. I think I have a real mental problem. I
controlled it for a long time cause I was taking valium. I told em not
to take me off the valium but they wouldn’t listen. I was taking
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about eight a day when I was in the joint, but they cut me off when I
went to the halfway house on parole. They started weaning me off of
it. I told em to sen[d] me back to the joint but they wouldn’t do it[]
so I tried to get my parole revoked. I went out and got drunk three
times, but they wouldn’t revoke me. Sometimes I can’t control
myself and I know it. They did too, but wouldn’t keep me on the
valium. I wouldn’t be where I’m at today and none of this would
have happened if they would have listened to me. He stated he was
sorry those people had died and he knew that he would have to die
because of it. Said he felt real bad about the old people and then he
said oh well, let’s drop it.
Defendant’s ex. 2A at 2. This information, however, was the focus of Knighton’s
second-stage defense and he presented this information in great detail at
sentencing. The defense clearly possessed this information prior to trial. And, in
fact, the State provided this same information during the preliminary hearing. See
United States v. Hernandez-Muniz , 170 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir. 1999); see
also, e.g., United States v. McElhiney , 275 F.3d 928, 933 (10th Cir. 2001);
McGregor , 219 F.3d at1253-54; Quintanilla , 193 F.3d at 1149. In light of this,
we cannot conclude that, if the State had disclosed this particular document
earlier, there is a reasonable probability the result of either trial stage would have
been different.
In addition, Defendant’s ex. 4A, a summary of Undersheriff Busby’s
testimony, indicated he overheard Knighton’s conversation with Williams in
which Knighton suggested that, since he was “going to die for this” anyway, he
should just kill himself. One of Knighton’s psychiatric experts, however, did
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testify at trial concerning Knighton’s several previous suicide attempts. And
Williams herself had previously testified, at the preliminary hearing, about
Knighton’s two apparent suicide attempts occurring during the four-day crime
spree. There was also similar testimony at trial. Defendant’s ex. 4A, therefore,
was merely cumulative to the other evidence that the defense possessed prior to
trial indicating that Knighton was suicidal. Thus, this belatedly disclosed
document would have added only marginal, additional support to Knighton’s
defense. It was, therefore, not material. See United States v. Trujillo , 136 F.3d
1388, 1394 (10th Cir. 1998).
Lastly, Knighton challenges the State’s delay in disclosing Williams’
transcribed verbal statement to Texas authorities, see Defendant’s ex. 9A, as well
as her written statement, see Defendant’s ex. 42A, and a Texas Ranger’s report
summarizing Williams’ statements, see Defendant’s ex. 31A. These documents
included Williams’ description of Knighton’s hysterical reaction to the murders.
Knighton, however, was aware of this same information prior to trial, following
the preliminary hearing. See Hernandez-Muniz , 170 F.3d at 1011. Further,
Williams testified to this at trial. See, e.g., McElhiney , 275 F.3d at 933;
McGregor , 219 F.3d at 1253-54; Quintanilla , 193 F.3d at 1149. The State’s
belated disclosure of these documents, therefore, did not preclude Knighton from
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timely using this information to investigate a possible insanity defense or as
mitigating evidence.
4. Cumulative effect. Because Knighton had most all of this
belatedly disclosed information in some form prior to trial and defense counsel
was, in any event, able to use this belatedly produced Brady material during trial,
we cannot conclude that, had the State disclosed these additional documents
earlier, there is a reasonable probability either trial stage would have resulted in a
different outcome. Considering the cumulative effect of the State’s belated
disclosure of this information, then, we conclude the Oklahoma appellate court’s
decision denying relief was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,
Brady . See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
C. Ineffective representation at sentencing. Lastly, Knighton asserts
that his trial attorney should have obtained neuropsychological tests on Knighton
and presented those test results during the capital sentencing proceeding. 3
Although the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held Knighton had
3
Knighton, in passing in his brief to this court, also suggests his
direct-appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on appeal, see
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 44; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 21, and that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to obtain and present other additional mitigating
evidence, see Appellant’s Opening Br. at 41. We need not address these claims,
however, in light of the conclusory manner in which Knighton asserts them. See,
e.g., Romano , 278 F.3d at 1155. And, in any event, our review of the record
convinces us that these claims would not otherwise warrant habeas relief.
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procedurally defaulted this claim, the State does not reassert that affirmative
defense to this court. See, e.g., Hooks v. Ward , 184 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir.
1999). We, therefore, address this claim’s merit de novo . See, e.g., James v.
Gibson , 211 F.3d 543, 557 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Romano , 278 F.3d at 1150.
To obtain habeas relief, Knighton must establish both that trial counsel’s
performance was constitutionally deficient and that his defense was thereby
prejudiced. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Here, we
need only address Strickland ’s prejudice inquiry. See id. at 697. To establish the
requisite prejudice during a capital sentencing proceeding, Knighton must show
that “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 695. In making this
determination, we consider the strength of the State’s case and the number of
aggravating factors the jury found to exist, as well as the mitigating evidence the
defense did offer and any additional mitigating evidence it could have offered.
See, e.g., Neill v. Gibson , 278 F.3d 1044, 1062 (10th Cir. 2001), petition for cert.
filed , (U.S. May 6, 2002) (No. 01-10121).
Here, the State’s case against Knighton, in both trial stages, was strong.
During the capital sentencing stage, the jury found the existence of three
aggravating factors: Knighton had suffered prior violent felony convictions, he
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had created a great risk of death to more than one person, and he was a continuing
threat to society. And the record well supported these factors. In addition to
incorporating the first stage evidence, the State offered proof that Knighton had
previously suffered violent felony convictions for manslaughter, first degree
robbery, armed robbery and kidnapping. Several of those convictions resulted
from an earlier crime spree during which Knighton, armed with a handgun, took
drugs and money from a pharmacy. The next day, Knighton shot and killed a
“well known” criminal, Trial tr. vol. 6 at 6-33, after that victim purportedly
threatened Knighton with a weapon. During this same altercation, Knighton also
wounded the victim’s father. Knighton then broke into a nearby home and waited
there until the residents, a couple and their six year old daughter, returned home.
Knighton then took them hostage. He drugged the father with medication stolen
from the pharmacy and then took these three hostages to a rural area, where he
locked them in a shed. Later, Knighton, heavily armed, drove the hostages across
Missouri. Eventually, the hostages escaped, after the kidnapped woman attacked
Knighton in a restaurant with a steak knife. In addition to these crimes, the State
also presented evidence that, while in jail, Knighton had threatened to kill one of
his cellmates.
In mitigation, the defense then presented the testimony of Knighton’s drug
rehabilitation counselor and two mental health experts, Dr. William Logan, M.D.,
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a psychiatrist, and Dr. R. Lee Evans, a psychopharmacologist. Both Drs. Logan
and Evans interviewed Knighton for several hours prior to trial, in addition to
reviewing numerous documents, prison records and medical reports. These
witnesses testified to Knighton’s abusive, tumultuous and deprived childhood; his
academic struggles; the failure of his marriage following the death of his son; and
his being incarcerated for all but two of the thirty years preceding the Denneys’
murders. These defense witnesses also offered a great deal of psychiatric
evidence, including testifying to Knighton’s depression and substance abuse; his
several suicide attempts and suicidal ideation; his lengthy treatment with
psychiatric medications during his incarceration; his mental commitments while in
prison; and his documented difficulties with memory loss, periods of amnesia,
fairly severe chronic depression, and perhaps some organic brain damage.
These witnesses also testified to Knighton’s significant anxiety at being
released from prison, prior to the Denneys’ murders. Dr. Logan noted that
Knighton “clearly had to have some very clear, set routine, and this is
occasionally the case for those who are very anxious or who even may have some
cognitive difficulties, doing a set pattern of activities, doing a certain thing at a
certain time every day.” Id. at 6-142. In fact, on a number of prior occasions,
prison officials had transferred Knighton to prisons with less security, only to
have him request to return to the maximum security prison, with its more
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regimented lifestyle. In 1989, just a few months before the Denneys’ murders,
Knighton had become extremely anxious because his prison sentence was nearing
its end. When prison officials released Knighton to a halfway house, he became
fearful he would be killed or he would harm someone else. Part of his high
anxiety stemmed from suppressing those thoughts. Further, he feared he would be
unable to control his impulses. In fact, Dr. Lee testified that he believed
Knighton “has had almost lifelong thoughts about hurting people, which he has
expended a fair amount of energy suppressing.” Id. at 6-92. Upon releasing him
to a halfway house, prison officials tried to wean Knighton quickly from the
heavy doses of psychiatric medications with which they had been treating him
while he had been incarcerated. Those medications actually weakened Knighton’s
ability to control his violent impulses, once that medication was withdrawn.
Dr. Lee believed that Knighton’s anxiety could still be controlled through
medication and that “the recurring impulsive thoughts that he has could possibly
be controlled.” Id. at 6-95. Dr. Lee also indicated that Knighton seemed
“incredibly remorseful for his crimes.” Id. at 6-93.
Defense counsel, then, did present a great deal of psychiatric evidence at
sentencing, although the defense did not do so under the rubric of organic brain
damage. See generally Humphreys v. Gibson , 261 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (10th Cir.
2001) (rejecting claim that defense counsel should have presented additional
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psychiatric evidence, where defense counsel did put forth psychiatric evidence at
sentencing and there was no reasonable probability that, had counsel put on
evidence of additional diagnoses, jury would have declined to impose death
sentence). Knighton now submits the report of Dr. Philip Murphy, Ph.D., who,
post-trial, administered a number of psychological tests to Knighton. Dr. Murphy
concluded Knighton had “significant organic brain damage present, with a likely
psychotic condition with auditory and visual hallucinations which were
mood-congruent with a deeply depressed man.” Post-conviction application app.
N at 4. The report otherwise reiterates psychiatric information similar to that
already presented to the jury during sentencing. See Humphreys , 261 F.3d at
1021, and cases cited therein (holding evidence which is essentially cumulative to
that already presented to jury will not be sufficient to establish reasonable
probability jury would have reached different result).
And, while evidence that Knighton suffered from organic brain damage
would have been legitimate mitigating evidence, see Bryan v. Gibson , 276 F.3d
1163, 1178 (10th Cir. 2001), reh’g en banc granted , this court has, “on numerous
occasions determined that . . . evidence of low I.Q. and/or organic brain damage
does not outweigh evidence supporting . . . multiple aggravating circumstances,”
Smith , 197 F.3d at 463 (further quotation omitted). That is also true here. We
cannot conclude, therefore, that Knighton’s second-stage defense was prejudiced
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by the lack of any neurological testing. There is not a reasonable probability that,
had defense counsel presented Dr. Murphy’s post-trial finding that Knighton has
organic brain damage, the jury would have imposed a sentence less than death.
See, e.g., Neill , 278 F.3d at 1063; McCracken v. Gibson , 268 F.3d 970, 979-80
(10th Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed , (U.S. May 17, 2002) (No. 01-10302);
Humphreys , 261 F.3d at 1021, and cases cited therein.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision denying
Knighton habeas relief.
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Knighton v. Gibson
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2002-06-14
Citations: 293 F.3d 1165
Copy Citations