[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
_____________________________U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 27, 2007
No. 06-14479
_____________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-00100-CV-KD-M
BENTLEY WEST,
JERRY RAINEY
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
JACK TILLMAN,
MS. STEPHENS,
BRIDGETTE S. GOODE,
TIFFANY DAVIS,
ESTER L. MITCHELL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
LAKETA A. WALLACE,
Defendant.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________________________
(August 27, 2007)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, HULL, Circuit Judge and FORRESTER,*
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
In this civil rights action, Plaintiffs Bentley West and Jerry Rainey
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Defendants Jack Tillman, Sheriff of Mobile County; James E. Owens, Deputy
Warden of Mobile County Metro Jail (the “Jail”); Lt. Esther Mitchell, Supervisor
of the Jail’s Records Division; Bridgette Goode, Corrections Officer at the Jail;
and Tiffany Davis, Linda Whitton, and Laketa Wallace, all Records Specialists at
the Jail (collectively, “Defendants”). We have discovered no reversible error; we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal calls into question the adequacy of the Jail’s procedures for
processing court orders relating to the Jail’s inmates. The record shows that the
Jail receives anywhere from 5,000 to 12,000 different court orders per month,
sometimes with a volume of up to 2,000 to 3,000 documents per week. Sometime
*
Honorable J. Owen Forrester, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia,
sitting by designation.
2
in 2000, the records department staff at the Jail was downsized from six people to
two or three people.1 As a result, the records department staff worked overtime;
and other Jail employees familiar with the records procedure were called in to
assist with the workload. When Capt. Ronnie Phillips took over as acting warden
in 2001, he immediately began making efforts to increase the staffing levels at the
Jail, including in the records room. When a new warden took over in April 2003,
the Jail was almost fully staffed at its authorized levels, with six people staffing
the records room.2
West was incarcerated at the Jail on a charge of marijuana possession on 2
November 2002. Despite a 4 December court order reducing his bond amount and
allowing him to execute a signature bond on his own behalf, West remained in
custody until 27 December. According to standard procedures, when the court
sent the order to the Jail, the order should have been entered into the Jail’s
computer system; and the “jail card” should have been delivered to the docket
department to accomplish West’s release. Instead, Defendant Whitton, who
1
The record contains testimony that this change in staffing came in the midst of changes in the
administration of the Jail, which included the loss of the warden. The Jail was then without a warden
until February 2001, when Steven Ellisor was hired. Ellisor left the position within one year; and
Capt. Phillips became acting warden until April 2003, sharing responsibility for day-to-day
operations of the Jail with Defendant Owens.
2
The “authorized levels” of staffing at the Jail were set by the Mobile County governing authority
according to its funding levels.
3
received the 4 December order, only partially entered the order3 and failed to
deliver the jail card to docketing.
At different times throughout his detention, West asked Jail officials about
his release. For example, West asked Defendant Goode to check on his release on
at least two occasions.4 In response to one request on or before 19 December,
Goode called the records department to inquire about West’s release. Defendant
Davis, a records specialist, requested another copy of the order from the court and
entered that order into the system; but again, the jail card did not reach the docket
room.5 On 27 December, in response to another inquiry by West, Goode consulted
the system and told West he should have been released on 19 December. West
was released on 27 December.
Rainey was incarcerated on 31 October 2002, on robbery charges. The
grand jury no-billed him on 27 March 2003, and the court order for his release was
3
Whitton entered the reduction of the bond amount but failed to include that West could sign his
own bond.
4
West claims that he complained about his continued detention to various officers, including
Goode, in early December. Goode only recalled West inquiring into his status once, on 27
December. But, the record indicates that Goode asked Davis about West on 19 December.
Construed in the light most favorable to West, he inquired into his status with Goode on or before
19 December.
5
During the investigation into West’s prolonged detention, Davis reported that she “sent” the jail
card to docketing; that the card did not reach the docketing room is undisputed. Veberly Green,
Davis’s supervisor at the time, testified that Davis “made a mistake” and “inadvertently” did not take
the card to the docketing room, the same mistake made by Whitton.
4
sent to the Jail that day. A records specialist -- “thought” to be Defendant Wallace
-- entered the order into the system but failed to deliver the jail card. Although
Rainey allegedly asked Jail officials about his release from time to time, he was
not released until 24 May 2003.
Plaintiffs filed this joint suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Tillman
in his official and individual capacities and against the remaining Defendants in
their individual capacities, alleging – among other things6 – that (1) Goode, Davis,
Whitton, and Wallace (the “Nonsupervisory Defendants”) were deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when they
failed to bring about Plaintiffs’ release from custody; (2) Lt. Mitchell, Sheriff
Tillman, and Deputy Warden Owens (the “Supervisory Defendants”) were liable
for the violation because they failed to staff adequately, supervise, and train the
records staff at the Jail; and (3) Sheriff Tillman’s release policies (or lack thereof)
were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Plaintiffs failed
to present sufficient evidence that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
6
Plaintiffs also named other Jail personnel as defendants, but the claims against those other
defendants are not before us at this time. Plaintiffs did not name Mobile County or its governing
authority as a defendant.
5
Plaintiffs’ rights.7 In the order, the district court noted that a page in one of
Plaintiffs’ affidavits was missing from the record. Plaintiffs moved to alter or to
amend the court’s order and requested permission to supplement the record with
the complete affidavit. The district court denied the motion. Plaintiffs now appeal
the district court’s grant of summary judgment and the court’s denial of Plaintiffs’
motion to alter or amend the judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court’s disposition of a summary judgment
motion based on qualified immunity, resolving all issues of material fact in favor
of Plaintiffs and then answering the legal question of whether Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity under that version of the facts. Lee v. Ferraro, 284
F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002). We review the denial of a motion to amend the
judgment for abuse of discretion. Armstead v. Coler, 914 F.2d 1464, 1466 (11th
Cir. 1990).
7
The district court also granted summary judgment to Sheriff Tillman on the official capacity
claims, in accord with our case law on Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Lancaster v.
Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997). To the extent Plaintiffs challenge this ruling
on appeal, we conclude no error exists in the district court’s determination.
6
III. DISCUSSION
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials performing
discretionary functions may not be held individually liable for civil damages so
long as their conduct does not violate “‘clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Lassiter
v. Alabama A &M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982)). In determining whether
Defendants have satisfied this standard, we first address whether, in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs, the record shows that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’
federal rights. See Saucier v. Katz, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001). If we conclude
that such a violation occurred, we must then determine “whether the right was
clearly established” at the pertinent time by the pre-existing law. Id.
Plaintiffs assert that their over-detention resulted in a violation of their
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to be free from continued detention after
the state should have known that they were entitled to release. See Cannon v.
Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1562-63 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish such a
violation, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference
to Plaintiffs’ due process rights. Id. at 1563. Human error does not equal
7
deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs must show that Defendants had “(1) subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm; [and] (2) disregard[ed] . . . that risk; (3) by
conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Cagle v. Southerland, 334 F.3d 980,
987 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in
original). The deliberate indifference standard is “a difficult burden for a plaintiff
to meet,” Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1990); and
we are competent to decide as a matter of law whether Plaintiffs have carried their
burden. See, e.g., Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 352 (5th Cir. 2006)
(concluding “as a matter of law” that, while “trier of fact might find negligence”
based on the evidence, a finding of “deliberate indifference . . . could not be
sustained”); Pietrafeso v. Lawrence County, 452 F.3d 978, 983-84 (8th Cir. 2006)
(reviewing district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law for defendants and
concluding that, at most, plaintiff had presented evidence of negligence, not
deliberate indifference); cf. Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1368-69 (11th Cir.
1999) (rejecting expert testimony as valid evidence of defendant’s subjective
knowledge where record did not otherwise create genuine issue of fact on that
element and distinguishing other cases where “the egregious facts and
circumstances . . . created the requisite factual issue of deliberate indifference or
wanton conduct” (emphasis added)).
8
A. Nonsupervisory Defendants
Here, nothing evidences that the Nonsupervisory Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ right to timely release. For West, the
evidence shows – at most – that Defendants Whitton, Davis, and Goode were
negligent in failing to carry out their responsibilities. At the time of West’s over-
detention, Defendant Whitton had been employed at the Jail for only a few weeks.
She entered some of the relevant information into the computer system but failed
to deliver the jail card to the docketing room. West has pointed to no evidence
showing that Whitton subjectively knew that her acts would lead to West’s over-
detention or that she disregarded any such risk.
And, although Defendant Davis was an experienced records specialist and
testified that she understood the risks associated with her duties, nothing
evidences that her failure to ensure that West’s jail card reached the docket room
resulted from anything more than negligence. Davis testified that the West release
papers simply “fell between the gaps” because of the volume of work in the
records room, and testimony from other Jail staff supports her assertion. That
Davis may have been “on notice” of Whitton’s earlier mistake does not indicate
that Davis deliberately disregarded West’s rights by failing to ensure that the jail
9
card was delivered to the docket room; Plaintiffs have offered no testimony to
rebut Defendants’ evidence that Davis’s mistake was an “oversight” and “human
error” caused by the heavy workload – in other words, that Davis was, at most,
negligent in carrying out her duties.
As for Defendant Goode, although West contends that he complained to her
in writing about his over-detention in early December, he offered no specific
details about such communications or copies of the written complaints.8
Furthermore, the record shows that Goode did investigate West’s status on at least
two separate occasions and arranged for his immediate release once it became
clear that he was due to be released. At most, Goode may be faulted for
negligently failing to follow up on West’s earlier inquiries; such negligence is
insufficient to show a violation of West’s due process rights. Cf. Longoria v.
Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[R]esponding to an inmate's
complaints by referring the matter for further investigation . . . fulfills an official's
protective duties under the Eighth Amendment,” which also employs a deliberate
indifference standard (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
8
The record indicates that a copy of an inmate complaint is filed with the classification
department and that a copy is also returned to the inmate.
10
Rainey’s allegations are even weaker, as he alleges that either Defendant
Whitton or Defendant Wallace (who did not join the summary judgment motion)
failed to deliver his jail card in a timely fashion. He introduced no evidence that
Whitton – as opposed to Wallace – was responsible for erroneously handling his
release order;9 thus, the district court properly granted Whitton’s motion for
summary judgment. See Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“At the summary judgment stage, general factual allegations of injury will not
suffice; rather, the plaintiff must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific
facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be
true.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
B. Supervisory Defendants
Plaintiffs also allege that the Supervisory Defendants unconstitutionally
delayed Plaintiffs’ release from the Jail by failing to staff properly, supervise
properly, and train properly the Jail records staff. “It is well established in this
Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the
9
In fact, the only evidence supporting Rainey’s allegations was Green’s testimony that she
“thought” Wallace was responsible for Rainey’s over-detention.
11
unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or
vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the Supervisory Defendants
are liable only if they personally participated in the allegedly unconstitutional
conduct or if there is “a causal connection between [their] actions . . . and the
alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id.
Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Supervisory Defendants were personally
involved in their over-detentions. Therefore, to survive Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiffs must present sufficient evidence of either (1) a
“custom or policy [that] result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights
or . . . facts [that] support an inference that the supervisor[s] directed the
subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully
and failed to stop them from doing so;” or (2) “a history of widespread abuse [that]
put[] the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, and he fails to do so.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (second alteration in original). “The deprivations that constitute
widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious,
flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.”
Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks
12
and citation omitted). We agree with the district court that Plaintiffs have failed to
meet the “extremely rigorous” standard for supervisory liability. Cottone, 326
F.3d at 1360.
1. Failure to Staff
Plaintiffs submitted evidence that the Supervisory Defendants were aware
of serious understaffing problems at the Jail. Several Jail employees testified they
were dissatisfied with their resulting workload, overtime, and stress level; some of
them complained to their supervisors. Testimony exists describing instances of
over-detention due to paperwork backlogs, computer system problems, and failure
to deliver jail cards.10 One former Jail official said the Jail received about ten
10
For example, Plaintiffs point to six other instances, occurring after West’s over-detention and
involving Defendant Whitton, in which inmates were over-detained for one or two days for these
reasons. And Plaintiffs alleged a 13-day overstay experienced by an inmate named Samuel Dixon
in early 2000 – over two years before the events in this case – who filed a similar suit against Sheriff
Tillman in July 2001 and therefore allegedly put the Sheriff on notice of the over-detention problems
at the Jail. Plaintiffs also introduced an affidavit written by Rebecca Ludlam, who heads the
pertinent Alabama District Court Criminal Division. Ludlam averred that the Jail’s record room
consistently failed to process court orders, resulting in many inmates being detained beyond their
release dates. But because the third page of the affidavit was missing from the record, the district
court could not discern the time to which Ludlam was referring and noted that “the evidentiary value
of the affidavit [was] limited.”
After granting summary judgment to Defendants, Plaintiffs moved to alter or amend the order
in part because of the third page of Ludlum’s affidavit, which they attached to the motion. Plaintiffs
said they mistakenly omitted the third page when they scanned the affidavit into the electronic filing
system. Nevertheless, the district court denied the motion, keeping the record “as it was when the
13
complaints per month from inmates’ families about prolonged detentions, but
nothing indicates why those over-detentions occurred or that the complaints were
meritorious. See Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1987)
(“Brooks never demonstrated that past complaints of police misconduct had any
merit. Indeed, the number of complaints bears no relation to their validity.”). And
although Sheriff Tillman could not state that he was aware of specific instances of
over-detention, he did testify that he recognized that there could be problems with
over-detention as a result of the “paperwork flow.” In addition, both Deputy
Warden Owens and Lt. Mitchell testified that they were aware of a handful of
incidents of over-detention in the five years before Plaintiffs’ over-detentions.
Thus, construing the evidence favorably to Plaintiffs, the record shows that (1) the
Jail had an understaffing problem that resulted in the prolonged detention of some
inmates, and (2) the Supervisory Defendants were aware of the understaffing
problem and its potential consequences for the inmates.
court issued its ruling on defendants’ motion for summary judgment.” Plaintiffs argue this decision
was an abuse of the court’s discretion. We disagree. The missing page of the affidavit contains no
information probative of Plaintiffs’ claims of liability. Ludlum’s statements continue without
reference to any dates, except for the last few sentences, which only refer to West’s incarceration.
14
But the record also reflects that the Supervisory Defendants did not fail to
act correctively to address the problem.11 When Sheriff Tillman was elected in
1995, court documents were handled almost exclusively by hand. Since then,
Sheriff Tillman has overseen the installation and upgrade of the computer systems
at the Jail. In response to some of the paperwork problems, he has been actively
involved in an initiative to integrate the Jail system with the court’s computer
system. Sheriff Tillman also took steps to address the understaffing problem: he
asked existing staff to work overtime, he temporarily brought in employees from
other departments, and he hired new employees in 2002 and 2003, including
Whitton and Wallace.12 Thus, the evidence does not show that Sheriff Tillman
was deliberately indifferent to the understaffing problem at the Jail.
Deputy Warden Owens oversaw day-to-day operations at the Jail. Although
he contended that he only knew of a handful of prolonged detentions in his
11
Plaintiffs have pointed to no evidence that Lt. Mitchell had staffing responsibilities within the
records department at the Jail. The record does show, however, that Lt. Mitchell was aware of the
staffing shortage in the records room and reported it to Deputy Warden Owens.
12
That the understaffing problem was originally caused by the downsizing of the records
department staff does not – by itself – show deliberate indifference. The evidence indicates that
when the Jail administration later recognized that additional staff was needed, steps were taken to
increase the staff levels. For example, Green testified that “[t]hat office was originally a six-man
office and they – for whatever reason . . . – they down-sized that office and realized that didn’t work
and tried to upscale that office again.” Capt. Phillips also testified that, when he took over as acting
warden in 2001, he recognized the need for additional staff and worked with the Sheriff’s office to
hire approximately 75 new staff members over the next two years.
15
eighteen years of service, he conceded that, when Plaintiffs were over-detained,
the Jail was understaffed and that the records room “never had enough people.”
He complained of the problems to the personnel director and to Lt. Mitchell. By
the end of April 2003, when Owens retired, the records room was fully staffed at
its maximum authorization of six people. No evidence suggests that Deputy
Warden Owens was deliberately indifferent to the staffing problems or that he
failed to take corrective action.
2. Failure to Train
Plaintiffs also contend that the lack of formal training led to their over-
detention. The record shows that, at the time of Plaintiffs’ over-detention, the
records department staff participated in no formalized training program and that at
least some members of the staff were unaware of certain purported Standard
Operating Procedures for their duties. But Plaintiffs have not shown that the on-
the-job training the records specialists receive is constitutionally inadequate for
their duties; the specialists are responsible for receiving court orders, entering
information into the computer system, and pulling jail cards and delivering them to
docketing. None of the duties require complex technical knowledge or skills.
16
Evidence that the Jail staff occasionally erred and failed to fulfill their duties as
instructed is insufficient to satisfy the high standard for supervisory liability.13
See Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[P]lainly,
adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says
little about the training program or the legal basis for holding the city liable.”
(emphasis omitted)). And although the record indicates that the records personnel
may have benefited from more training, it mainly contains testimony that the
mistakes made by the records room staff were, in context, isolated and caused by
overwork, stress, and fatigue – circumstances that arise directly from the
understaffing problem and the large volume of orders received every day.14
13
That Defendant Whitton was a trainee when she improperly entered the information on West’s
release does not provide sufficient support for Plaintiffs’ lack of training claim. Although Green
testified that Whitton did not realize that the order called for West’s release, there was no testimony
that Whitton had not been told or instructed on how to process West’s mittimus order.
14
Defendant Wallace testified that she “could have used more” training but did not indicate that
she had ever communicated her desire for more training to any of her supervisors. She also said that
she left her position as a records specialist before her probationary period was over because of the
stress associated with the position due to the heavy workload.
Whitton similarly testified that if “more time had been taken and set aside where each
individual task had been explained on a daily basis, I think I would have understood things a lot
better” and suggested that she may have made fewer mistakes if she had received further training or
instruction. She also indicated that different variables could affect the complexity of an individual
order. But she also testified that she never asked for more training; that, at first, she “kind of went
by what I had been shown”; and that, over time, she learned how to deal with various situations by
actually handling different kinds of orders and asking for help when she needed it.
17
Even assuming that the Supervisory Defendants were aware that the lack of
sufficient training of the records room staff could result in mistakes, no evidence
exists that they were aware of the need for a different kind of training or that the
training problem – instead of the staffing problem -- actually led regularly to over-
detention of inmates.15 See Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1351-52 (11th
Cir. 1998) (rejecting plaintiff’s theory of supervisory liability for failure to train
when no pattern of incidents put City on notice of a need to train, in spite of
plaintiff’s contention that need for training was “obvious”).16 In any event, the
record does not support Plaintiffs’ contention that the Supervisory Defendants
ignored a need for further training; it shows that the Supervisory Defendants did
15
Lt. Mitchell testified that, during the time of West’s over-detention, she did not notice that any
of her staff had difficulties in understanding or carrying out their duties, although she did state that
Defendant Whitton was a trainee at the time.
Deputy Warden Owens testified that he was never informed of problems with the on-the-job
training in the docket and records departments. Green testified, however, that – at some point –
Owens was aware of the staffing and training problems in the records department. Green stated that,
due to the repeated turnovers in the records office, she and the other specialists “trained
[them]selves” and learned as they went. Although she indicated that she reported to the authorities
that “this [wa]s a disaster waiting to happen,” she did not testify that inmates were regularly over-
detained because the records room staff was inadequately trained. In fact, Green testified that the
“real problem” in Plaintiffs’ cases was that the records office was “overworked and understaffed.”
16
In Gold, we noted that the Supreme Court has never done more than “hypothesize[]” that some
“narrow range of circumstances” might exist in which a failure to train claim could succeed without
any evidence of prior incidents because the need for training is “obvious” given the constitutional
implications of a recurring situation. See Gold, 151 F.3d at 1352 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). We also recognized that any such “obvious need” claim must be based on a
“particular glaring omission in a training regimen” and not merely on “possible imperfections” in
a training program. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
18
respond to over-detention mistakes by providing more on-the-job training for the
records room staff and by adjusting procedures.17 Moreover, given the on-the-job
format of the records room training program, the lack of additional training is
more properly viewed as a function of the understaffing problem – a circumstance
the Supervisory Defendants undertook to correct. For these reasons, we cannot
say sufficient evidence supports the idea that the Supervisory Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by failing to establish
formal training.
3. Failure to Supervise
Plaintiffs next contend that the Supervisory Defendants were deliberately
indifferent for failing to provide adequate supervision to the records room staff.
But this contention is not supported by the record. The record does not show that,
before Plaintiffs’ over-detentions, the Supervisory Defendants were aware of
17
For example, Lt. Mitchell – who supervised the records division at the Jail during the relevant
time – testified that she responded to errors made by her staff with more on-the-job training and
counseling. Lt. Mitchell’s testimony is corroborated by that of Defendant Whitton, who testified
that, after the West incident, she allegedly made other mistakes that were discovered by supervisors
and that she was “written up” for the errors.
Both Defendant Davis and Green testified that, since the West and Rainey incidents, some
procedures have been altered to reduce the chance that an error would occur.
19
regular, as opposed to occasional, instances of inmate over-detention or that the
Supervisory Defendants should have recognized that those instances were a result
of inadequate supervision.
In any event, the record does not show that the Supervisory Defendants
provided inadequate supervision or that the chain of command was “out of touch”
with the problems at the Jail. That Sheriff Tillman was unaware of specific
problems with the records department or of specific over-detentions does not show
that he ignored his supervisory responsibilities; he has over 600 employees and
has delegated daily responsibility of the Jail to a warden. And Deputy Warden
Owens testified that he was aware of the problems in the records department and
discussed those problems with the records supervisors, including Lt. Mitchell.
As for Lt. Mitchell, she testified that, while Defendant Whitton was a
trainee, Lt. Mitchell assigned Defendant Davis to supervise Whitton’s work.
Whitton also testified that, when she first began working there, Lt. Mitchell
“would come in pretty regularly and see how everything was going.” And once
Lt. Mitchell was made aware of mistakes by her staff, she counseled her
subordinates on the importance of rechecking their work. The record also shows
that record specialists were disciplined for mistakes. Therefore, we say the
20
evidence is insufficient to support the conclusion that the Supervisory Defendants
were deliberately indifferent towards or ignored their supervisory responsibilities.
4. Lack of Release Policy
Last, Plaintiffs contend that the lack of a formal release policy and the lack
of a system for verifying releases is an unconstitutional “custom or policy” for
which Sheriff Tillman should be held liable. Again, the record does not support
Plaintiffs’ claim. The evidence shows that, at the pertinent time, the Jail did have
a written policy covering the basic procedures for intake and release of inmates.
The record also contains testimony that it would be difficult to have a standard
procedure to “cover all of the issues that might come up because there’s a lot of
irregularities. . . .” When coupled with the evidence that the Supervisory
Defendants were aware of only a few instances of over-detention – which they
testified stemmed from “oversights” or “mistakes” by the Jail staff, rather than
from a lack of proper procedure – insufficient evidence exists to support Plaintiffs’
contention that the Supervisory Defendants were on notice that the Jail’s release
policy was inadequate.
21
And, contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the Jail did have a system for
verifying inmate release dates. Deputy Warden Owens, Lt. Mitchell, and Green all
testified that, upon request, the corrections officers provided inmates with forms
by which the inmate could request information on his court appearance or release
date. These requests would then be passed along by the officers to the docket or
records departments, where the staff would look into the situation and respond “as
soon as possible.” This “back-up” procedure precludes a determination that the
Supervisory Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ rights. See
Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 579 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that a
similar “complaint procedure saved the will call system [similar to the “no-bill”
system in this case] from being deliberately indifferent”). That the inmate
complaint system was imperfect18 does not alter our conclusion, especially given
the evidence that Sheriff Tillman recognized the need for a better system and
undertook to integrate the Jail computer system with the area courts in an effort to
18
Deputy Warden Owens stated that some inmate requests never reach the proper department and
that some corrections officers do not follow up on the requests as they should. But although
Plaintiffs have claimed that Defendants failed to investigate Plaintiffs’ “repeated” claims of over-
detention, they have not presented evidence that the corrections officers refused to allow Plaintiffs
to submit inmate request forms and that such refusals constituted the “policy” or “custom” of the
Jail. Cf. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 579, 568 (concluding that plaintiff had presented “facts establishing
that the Jail had either a policy or custom of refusing to accept complaint forms from detainees
requesting information on their will call status” after noting that, “[c]rucially, the guards actually
refused to accept [plaintiff’s complaint] form”).
22
automate the booking and release procedures and reduce the likelihood of human
error.
IV. CONCLUSION
That Plaintiffs were not released in a timely fashion from the Jail is bad.
Mistakes were made. But no one is entitled to an error-free bureaucracy; and
deliberate indifference – the federal constitutional standard -- is a high standard.
As a matter of law, the record does not show that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiffs’ right to be released as ordered; instead, the evidence
indicates that the errors that led to Plaintiffs’ over-detentions were caused by – at
worst – the Nonsupervisory Defendants’ unfortunate lapses, which were mainly
caused by the cuts in staff and budget for the Jail: a problem which the
Supervisory Defendants did not ignore but undertook to address during the
pertinent time.
AFFIRMED.
23
West v. Tillman
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date filed: 2007-08-27
Citations: 496 F.3d 1321
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