PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PIRATE INVESTOR LLC; FRANK
PORTER STANSBERRY,
Defendants - Appellants, No. 08-1037
and
AGORA, INCORPORATED,
Defendant,
JAMES DALE DAVIDSON,
Intervenor/Defendant.
2 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
FORBES, LLC; HEARST
CORPORATION; TRIBUNE COMPANY
(including the Baltimore Sun);
EAGLE FINANCIAL, INCORPORATED;
INVESTORPLACE MEDIA, LLC;
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER
EDITORS; CALIFORNIA FIRST
AMENDMENT COALITION;
RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS
ASSOCIATION; REPORTERS
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS; SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL
JOURNALISTS; THOMAS JEFFERSON
CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF
FREE EXPRESSION,
Amici Supporting Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge.
(1:03-cv-01042-MJG)
Argued: December 2, 2008
Decided: September 15, 2009
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge,* and NIEMEYER and
MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
*Chief Judge Williams heard oral argument in this case but did not par-
ticipate in the decision. The decision is filed by a quorum of the panel pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 3
Affirmed by published per curiam opinion.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Bruce D. Brown, BAKER & HOSTETLER,
L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Michael Conley,
UNITED STATES SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Bruce
W. Sanford, Lee T. Ellis, Jr., Laurie A. Babinski, BAKER &
HOSTETLER, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; Matthew J. Turner,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Brian G. Cartwright,
General Counsel, Andrew N. Vollmer, Deputy General Coun-
sel, Jacob H. Stillman, Solicitor, Mark Pennington, Assistant
General Counsel, Rada L. Potts, Senior Litigation Counsel,
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Washington,
D.C., for Appellee. Walter Dellinger, Mark S. Davies, Allison
Orr Larsen, O’MELVENY & MYERS, L.L.P., Washington,
D.C.; Kai Falkenberg, Editorial Counsel, FORBES, L.L.C.,
New York, New York; Eve Burton, Jonathan Donnellan, THE
HEARST CORPORATION, New York, New York; David S.
Bralow, Assistant General Counsel, TRIBUNE COMPANY,
East Coast Publishing, New York, New York; Lucy A. Dal-
glish, Gregg P. Leslie, THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Arlington, Virginia;
Kevin M. Goldberg, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPA-
PER EDITORS, Arlington, Virginia; Kathleen A. Kirby, THE
RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS ASSOCIA-
TION, Washington, D.C.; Robert M. O’Neil, Josh Wheeler,
THE THOMAS JEFFERSON CENTER FOR THE PRO-
TECTION OF FREE EXPRESSION, Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia, for Amici Supporting Appellants.
4 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Frank Porter Stansberry and Pirate Investor LLC (collec-
tively, "Appellants") offered and sold an e-mail stock tip. The
offer and the tip contained representations that information in
both documents was the product of conversations with a
senior executive inside the company that was the focus of the
tip. After conducting a bench trial, the district court concluded
that the representations concerning the source of information
in the e-mail stock tip were false, and it determined that
Appellants had violated Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2009), and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2008), by offering and selling the stock tip. The district court
ordered disgorgement of Appellants’ profits from the sales of
the stock tip, imposed civil penalties, and issued an injunction
against future violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.1
Appellants argue that the facts of this case do not support the
district court’s finding of liability, and that the injunction
against future violations of § 10(b) is overbroad. For the fol-
lowing reasons, we affirm.
I.
Pirate Investor LLC is a Maryland limited liability com-
pany that publishes investment newsletters.2 Pirate also pro-
vides an e-mail service to its subscribers called the "Blast."
Pirate is wholly owned by Agora, Inc., a Maryland corpora-
1
"The scope of Rule 10b-5 is coextensive with the coverage of § 10(b)."
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 816 n.1 (2002). Accordingly, we will use
"§ 10(b)" to refer to both the statute and the rule. See SEC v. Wolfson, 539
F.3d 1249, 1256 n.11 (10th Cir. 2008).
2
We view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below, in this case the SEC. See Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int’l
Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 590 (2001); Taylor v. First Union Corp.,
857 F.2d 240, 245 (4th Cir. 1988).
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 5
tion that publishes books, magazines, and newsletters cover-
ing a wide range of topics.3 Stansberry is the editor-in-chief
of Pirate, and in this capacity he writes and publishes invest-
ment newsletters.
Sometime in April 2002, Stansberry became aware of a
company called USEC, Inc. USEC is a provider of urani-
um-enrichment services that began as an arm of the United
States government.4 The company currently is the executive
agent of the United States government under a disarmament
pact that was signed between the United States and Russia in
1993. Under the pact, known as "Megatons to Megawatts,"
Russia sells uranium that was formerly used in Soviet nuclear
warheads to the United States for use as fuel in nuclear power
plants. The pact further requires USEC and OAO Techsna-
bexport ("Tenex"), its Russian counterpart, to periodically
renegotiate the price of the uranium. Any new pricing agree-
ment is subject to approval by both the United States and Rus-
sian governments. The pricing agreement between USEC and
Tenex expired at the end of 2001, and the two companies
negotiated a new agreement in February of 2002. Neither the
Russian nor the United States governments had approved this
new agreement as of May 2002, however, and USEC
requested that the United States government place the pricing
agreement on the agenda for a summit between President
George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin that
was planned for that month.
After becoming aware of the circumstances surrounding
USEC’s pricing agreement, Stansberry contacted Steven
Wingfield, USEC’s Director of Investor Relations, and on
May 2, 2002, conducted a telephone interview with Wing-
3
Along with Stansberry and Pirate, Agora was an original defendant in
the SEC’s action. The district court rejected the SEC’s theory that Agora,
as the parent company of Pirate, was also liable for any wrongdoing com-
mitted by Stansberry and Pirate, and the SEC has not appealed that ruling.
4
USEC was privatized in July of 1998.
6 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
field. This case revolves around two communications — a
special report on USEC ("USEC Special Report") and a solic-
itation hawking that report ("Super Insider Tip E-mail") —
that Stansberry prepared following that telephone conversa-
tion.
The Super Insider Tip E-mail was a promotional document
calling on investors to "DOUBLE YOUR MONEY ON MAY
22ND WITH THIS ‘SUPER INSIDER’ TIP." (J.A. at 2972.)
Specifically, the document purported to contain information
obtained from "a senior company executive" that would allow
investors to know exactly when "a major international agree-
ment between the United States and Russia" would be con-
cluded, resulting in substantial profits for a particular U.S.
company. (J.A. at 2972.) The document identified May 22 as
the day the deal would close and inveigled investors with
assurances that "[t]his is the kind of insider information that
could make you a lot of money." (J.A. at 2972-73.)
The Super Insider Tip E-mail also included some back-
ground on the company, as well as details of how the upcom-
ing deal would benefit the company.5 The document did not
5
The e-mail also contained several flippant remarks. The e-mail’s com-
mentary on the nature of politics is particularly noteworthy:
See how this works? It’s a total insider deal. Money and favors
in exchange for a fat deal with the Russians. Hey, I know it’s
dirty. But I don’t make the rules and I don’t run the company or
involve myself in politics. On the other hand, I see nothing wrong
with profiting from my insider knowledge of this deal and I don’t
think you should be ashamed to do so either.
....
And guess what? The deal with the Russians has ALREADY
BEEN SIGNED. That’s right. It’s all done, locked up. Finished.
The only thing that both sides are waiting on is the proper media
event to announce this commercial cooperation between the Rus-
kies and us. It’s a feel good thing. It’s PR for the politicians. You
know how the game works.
(J.A. at 2974-75.) Despite the tip’s suggestion that the author was also
profiting from the information, "[a]t no time relevant to this case did Stan-
sberry, Pirate Investor, or Agora own or trade in the stock of USEC." (J.A.
at 124.)
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 7
provide the name of the company. For that nugget of informa-
tion, investors were told that they would have to pay $1,000.
Stansberry signed the e-mail under the pseudonym "Jay McDan-
iel."6
Those who responded to the Super Insider Tip E-mail and
paid $1,000 would receive the USEC Special Report. This
communication identified USEC as the company referenced
in the Super Insider Tip E-mail. The USEC Special Report
engaged in a financial analysis of USEC’s fundamentals and
discussed its role as the United States’ agent under the 1993
disarmament pact. It observed that USEC had reached an
agreement with its Russian partner regarding a market-based
pricing agreement for nuclear fuel, but cautioned that "imple-
mentation of the agreement is subject to review and approval
by the U.S. and Russian governments." (J.A. at 3111.) The
USEC Special Report then repeated the claim made in the
Super Insider Tip E-mail that: "A USEC senior executive has
assured me that the new Russian agreement will be approved
prior to the upcoming Bush-Putin summit. In fact, he said
‘watch the stock on May 22nd.’" (J.A. at 3111.)
On May 13, 2002, Stansberry sent the Super Insider Tip
E-mail to the Pirate Investor Blast Database, a list of e-mail
addresses of subscribers to Pirate products. After an initial
favorable response,7 Stansberry caused the Super Insider Tip
E-mail to be sent to numerous other electronic databases asso-
ciated with Agora products, as well as at least one database
that had no affiliation with Agora. Ultimately, over 800,000
individuals received the Super Insider Tip E-mail. Investors
purchased 1,217 copies of the USEC Special Report, resulting
6
In fact, "Jay McDaniel" was the pen name of Raymond Madron, an
independent contractor for Pirate who wrote a weekly promotional piece
advertising Agora products or services.
7
One hundred seven USEC Special Reports were sold in the initial 24
hours after submission of the Super Insider Tip E-mail to the Pirate Inves-
tor Blast database.
8 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
in net proceeds of $1,005,000. Pirate received $626,500 of
that sum.
Of course, what investors did not know, and what became
the focus of the SEC’s case against Stansberry and Pirate, was
that Wingfield had never told Stansberry that approval of the
USEC-Tenex pricing agreement would be announced on May
22.8 Indeed, nothing was announced on May 22, and the pric-
ing agreement was ultimately announced on June 19, 2002.
On April 18, 2003, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") filed a civil complaint charging Agora,
Pirate, and Stansberry with securities fraud under § 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Following a bench trial,
the district court concluded that Appellants violated § 10(b)
by falsely claiming that a company insider provided the infor-
mation in the Super Insider Tip E-mail and the USEC Special
Report. Appellants were held jointly and severally liable for
disgorgement of the profits of the scheme, plus prejudgment
interest. Civil penalties were also imposed on Appellants, and
the district court entered a permanent injunction enjoining
them from further violations of § 10(b).9 Appellants timely
appealed, raising three issues: (1) whether the conduct in this
case constituted a violation of § 10(b); (2) whether, if the con-
duct here does fall within the purview of § 10(b), the First
Amendment entitles Appellants to the heightened protections
it affords the media in other contexts; and (3) whether the per-
manent injunction entered by the district court is an improper
prior restraint on speech.
8
In the proceedings before the district court, Stansberry adhered to his
claim that Wingfield did, in fact, suggest that approval of the pricing
agreement would be announced on May 22. The district court found, how-
ever, that Wingfield made no such statements. Stansberry and Pirate do
not challenge this particular factual finding on appeal.
9
By order dated February 28, 2008, a panel of this court stayed the
injunction pending appeal.
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 9
II.
We begin with Appellants’ claim that their conduct did not
constitute a violation of § 10(b). In a civil enforcement action
under § 10(b), the SEC must establish that the defendant "(1)
made a false statement or omission (2) of material fact (3)
with scienter (4) in connection with the purchase or sale of secur-
ities."10 McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir.
2006). The SEC bears the burden of establishing each element
by a preponderance of the evidence. Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-91 (1983) (preponderance of
the evidence standard applies to § 10(b) actions). We address
each element in turn.
A.
Section 10(b) requires that a defendant act deceptively in
order to fall within the coverage of the statute. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) ("The lan-
guage of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to
prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or decep-
tion."). Deceptive acts include misstatements, omissions by
those with a duty to disclose, manipulative trading practices,
and deceptive courses of conduct. Stoneridge Inv. Partners,
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008).
The facts of this case easily satisfy this element. The district
court found that Wingfield never told Stansberry that approval
of the pricing agreement would be announced on May 22, and
the Appellants do not challenge that finding on appeal. Thus,
Appellants’ representations that they based their predictions
10
Unlike private litigants, the SEC need not prove the additional ele-
ments of reliance or loss causation. See SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8
F.3d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The SEC need not prove reliance in its
action for injunctive relief on the basis of violations of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5."); SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Unlike
private litigants seeking damages, the Commission is not required to prove
that any investor actually relied on the misrepresentations or that the mis-
representations caused any investor to lose money.").
10 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
on information obtained from a source within USEC were
misstatements of fact.11
B.
It is not enough, however, for the SEC to point to a false
statement — the misrepresentation must concern a material
fact. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) ("It
is not enough that a statement is false or incomplete, if the
misrepresented fact is otherwise insignificant."); Greenhouse
v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 656 (4th Cir. 2004)
("The plain language of Rule 10b-5 . . . requires any success-
ful securities-fraud suit to allege a fact that is both untrue and
material."). We have adopted the following standard for
addressing materiality:
[A] fact stated or omitted is material if there is a sub-
11
On this point, we believe that the concerns raised by the amici are
entirely illusory. The amici suggest that the district court premised its find-
ing of liability on Appellants’ claim that USEC’s stock price would rise
on a particular day — May 22 — and that such a prediction about a stock
price change "is not an ‘actual fact’ but an ‘opinion’ that can never be a
‘false’ statement for purposes of the securities laws." (Amici Br. at 20.)
This argument ignores the plain language of the district court’s opinion,
which clearly shows that the district court based its liability determination,
not on the prediction itself, but on Appellants’ claims that the prediction
was the result of a conversation with a company insider:
The Court finds that the SEC has established that the Super
Insider Solicitation and the Special Report include actionable
false statements — to the effect that the author was basing his
statement as to a May 22, 2002 rise in stock price upon state-
ments made to him by a senior executive of USEC in a position
to know when the price agreement would be approved.
(J.A. at 158.) Claims regarding the source of information are not expres-
sions of subjective opinion, but are representations of an objectively veri-
fiable fact. Cf. Miller v. Asensio & Co., 364 F.3d 223, 228 n.3 (4th Cir.
2004) ("The statements cannot be dismissed as unverifiable opinion; they
set forth or were grounded in actual past or present facts, which Plaintiffs
demonstrated to be false." (internal citation marks omitted)).
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 11
stantial likelihood that a reasonable purchaser or
seller of a security (1) would consider the fact
important in deciding whether to buy or sell the
security or (2) would have viewed the total mix of
information made available to be significantly
altered by disclosure of the fact.
Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 683 (4th Cir.
1999). Determining whether the facts of a particular case meet
this standard "requires delicate assessments of the inferences
a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given set of
facts and the significance of those inferences to him, and
these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact."
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
Accordingly, we review for clear error the district court’s
determination, made after a bench trial, that Appellants’ mis-
representations were material. See Miller v. Thane Int’l, Inc.,
519 F.3d 879, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing district court’s
findings on materiality for clear error); SEC v. Merchant Cap-
ital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 754 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); Lawton
v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30, 42 (1st Cir. 2003) (same); SEC v.
Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (same).
Applying that standard, we see no clear error in the district
court’s finding of materiality. Appellants promised investors
that the information they were receiving was the product of a
conversation with a company insider. The materiality determi-
nation thus turns on whether the reasonable investor would
treat a particular stock recommendation differently depending
on whether or not the recommender was acting on inside
information. We fail to see any clear error in the district
court’s determination that an investor would consider this
question important in deciding whether to purchase the rec-
ommended security.12 Cf. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,
12
Appellants’ arguments on appeal fail to address this point. Rather,
they attempt to find error in the district court’s consideration of stock price
evidence to support its materiality finding, because there was an abun-
12 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
501 U.S. 1083, 1090-91 (1991) (noting that statements by
directors raise "no serious question" of materiality because
directors "usually have knowledge and expertness far exceed-
ing the normal investor’s resources"). Moreover, purchasers
of the USEC Special Report testified that it was important to
them that the information conveyed in the report came from
a source inside USEC, and that this characteristic influenced
them to purchase the report and, subsequently, USEC stock.
See Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 366-67 (5th Cir.
1986) (finding no error in jury determination of materiality
where the jury heard testimony from various purchasers and
market experts); Alton Box Board Co. v. Goldman, Sachs &
Co., 560 F.2d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting the relevance
of "testimony from sophisticated institutional purchasers that
[omitted] facts would have been important to them"). In short,
we find no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that
the misstatements in this case concerned material facts.
C.
Next, we consider whether Appellants acted with the requi-
site intent, or scienter. "[T]he term ‘scienter’ refers to a men-
dance of positive information about USEC on the market during the time
period that Appellants circulated the solicitation e-mail and special report.
According to Appellants, it was the positive media attention that USEC
was receiving that led to an increase in USEC’s share price, not securities
purchases by purchasers of the USEC Special Report. Thus, the argument
goes, the district court should not have relied on this stock price evidence
to conclude that the misrepresentations were material.
This argument misconstrues the district court’s opinion. The district
court’s materiality finding was not premised on market data; the district
court only looked to the market data surrounding USEC as an additional
way of confirming that the statements were material. Even if the district
court should not have attributed the increase in trading volume and share
price of USEC stock after May 14 to Appellants’ communications, given
the self-evident materiality of a claim that one possesses inside informa-
tion, the district court’s ultimate conclusion still would not amount to clear
error.
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 13
tal state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
The SEC meets its burden of proving scienter by establishing
that the speaker acted intentionally or recklessly; the negligent
speaker, however, avoids liability. Ottmann v. Hanger Ortho-
pedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343-44 (4th Cir. 2003).
Here, the district court determined that the SEC met its bur-
den of proving that Stansberry acted with the requisite intent,
and the court imputed Stansberry’s scienter to Pirate.13
i.
In challenging the district court’s scienter determination,
Appellants contend that the First Amendment protections rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), apply to this case. They claim that
the SEC needed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that they acted with "actual malice." To support this claim,
they direct us to Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), a case involving the appli-
cation of the New York Times standard to a product disparage-
ment action.
In Bose, the Supreme Court was concerned with determin-
ing the proper standard of review for courts of appeals to
apply when confronted with a district court finding that a par-
ticular statement was made with the "actual malice" required
by New York Times. After determining that the Constitution
requires independent appellate review of "[t]he question
whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of
the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First
Amendment protection," id. at 510-11, the Bose Court moved
13
Specifically, the court held that "Stansberry’s scienter is imputed to
Pirate because he effectively controlled Pirate and made the statements at
issue on behalf of Pirate as an agent of Pirate, within the scope of his
agency." (J.A. at 170.) Pirate and Stansberry do not challenge this aspect
of the district court’s decision.
14 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
on to a review of the facts of that case and noted that "the
only evidence of actual malice on which the District Court
relied was the fact that the statement was an inaccurate
description of what [the defendant] had actually perceived,"
id. at 512. The Bose Court then held that the defendant’s
statement fell within the protections afforded by the First
Amendment. Id. at 513.
Relying on the Bose Court’s statement that "there is a sig-
nificant difference between proof of actual malice and mere
proof of falsity," id. at 511, Appellants argue that we cannot
uphold the district court’s resolution of the scienter issue
because the district court "confused proof of falsity with proof
of fault." (Appellants’ Br. at 48.) They claim that there is no
evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding
of scienter, absent the falsity of the claim that an insider pro-
vided the information on which they based the tip, and
implore us to follow Bose’s lead by holding that an absence
of additional evidence of intent necessarily means that the
clear and convincing evidence standard mandated by New
York Times has not been satisfied.
As we discuss elsewhere in this opinion, see infra Part III,
we do not believe that the New York Times standard is appli-
cable to this case. Thus, we reject Appellants’ argument inso-
far as it relies on the mistaken belief that the SEC needed to
prove intent by clear and convincing evidence, rather than
under the preponderance of the evidence standard typically
applicable to civil enforcement actions under § 10(b). Simi-
larly, we reject the notion that independent appellate review
of the district court’s scienter determination is necessary
under Bose and instead review the district court’s finding that
Appellants acted with scienter for clear error. See Merchant
Capital, 483 F.3d at 766 (questions of scienter are reviewable
under the clearly erroneous rule); see also Healey v. Chelsea
Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Matters of mis-
representation, knowledge, reliance, causation, and scienter
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 15
are questions of fact, and the trial court’s findings as to those
facts may not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.").
ii.
After reviewing the record, we are convinced that the dis-
trict court’s conclusion that Appellants acted with scienter
was not clearly erroneous. The district court rested its conclu-
sion on the circumstances surrounding the phone call between
Stansberry and Wingfield. Having concluded that Wingfield
did not, in fact, disclose to Stansberry that approval of the
pricing agreement would be announced on May 22, the dis-
trict court simply inferred that Stansberry, having been a party
to that conversation, must have known that his claim that he
had heard from a senior USEC executive that the announce-
ment would occur on May 22 was false. The district court sur-
mised that Stansberry "could not possibly have had a belief
that the information he provided in the Super Insider Solicita-
tion and Special Report was correct in all material respects"
because he "knew full well that Wingfield had not told him
that the pricing agreement would be announced on May 22."
(J.A. at 170.)
We see nothing clearly erroneous about this conclusion.
The district court did not premise its finding on the falsity of
the statements, but on the fact that Stansberry was in a posi-
tion to know whether or not his statements were true. As other
courts have recognized, the fact that a defendant publishes
statements when in possession of facts suggesting that the
statements are false is "classic evidence of scienter." Aldridge
v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72, 83 (1st Cir. 2002); see also
Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d
645, 665 (8th Cir. 2001) ("One of the classic fact patterns giv-
ing rise to a strong inference of scienter is that defendants
published statements when they knew facts or had access to
information suggesting that their public statements were
materially inaccurate."). Stansberry, having conducted the
interview with Wingfield, would have known whether or not
16 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
Wingfield told him to "watch the stock on May 22nd." Once
the district court found that Wingfield never made such a
statement, there is nothing controversial in drawing the logi-
cal conclusion — that Stansberry would know that his claim
was false.14
In addition, it would take an act of willful blindness to
ignore the fact that Appellants profited from the false state-
ments. Appellants surely knew that absent claims of insider
knowledge, it is highly unlikely that investors would pay
$1,000 for a stock recommendation. This inference is borne
out by the emphasis that the solicitation e-mail placed on the
"inside" nature of the tip as it encouraged investors to pur-
chase the USEC Special Report. Given such a clear financial
motive for the misrepresentations, the district court’s conclu-
sion that they were made with scienter is hardly surprising.
The clear error standard of review demands something much
more egregious than what confronts us here. Parts & Elec.
Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th
Cir. 1988) ("To be clearly erroneous, a decision must . . .
strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrig-
erated dead fish.").
D.
Finally, we turn to § 10(b)’s fourth requirement, the "in
connection with" requirement. Appellants claim that the fraud
in this case did not make the necessary connection to securi-
14
Appellants’ only rejoinder to this point is to beat a retreat to more
First Amendment case law by directing us to defamation cases where
courts have been unwilling to find actual malice because the finding
would depend on the resolution of a dispute between a source and a writer
about what was said in a conversation. We do not find these cases rele-
vant, however, as they appear to rest their holdings on the higher burden
of proof applicable to defamation actions. The court in Long v. Arcell, 618
F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1980), for example, admitted that "[i]f the applicable
burden of proof had been a preponderance of the evidence, a jury verdict
either way would have to stand." Id. at 1148.
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 17
ties transactions because Appellants did not trade in USEC
stock or breach any fiduciary duties. We disagree, and for the
reasons discussed below we find no error in the district
court’s determination that Appellants committed fraud "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of securities.
"The Supreme Court has consistently embraced an expan-
sive reading of § 10(b)’s ‘in connection with’ requirement."
SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1262 (10th Cir. 2008); see
also SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) ("In its role
enforcing the Act, the SEC has consistently adopted a broad
reading of the phrase ‘in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.’"). We construe the statute "not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses." Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Under Supreme Court case law, fraudulent activity
meets the "in connection with" requirement of § 10(b) when-
ever it "touches" or "coincides" with a securities transaction.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547
U.S. 71, 85 (2006) ("Under our precedents, it is enough that
the fraud alleged ‘coincide’ with a securities transac-
tion—whether by the plaintiff or by someone else."); Superin-
tendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 12-13 (1971) (holding "in connection with" requirement
satisfied where injury occurred "as a result of deceptive prac-
tices touching [a] sale of securities").
Of course, to say that a fraud is "in connection with" a
securities transaction whenever it "coincides" with that trans-
action hardly clarifies the matter. We find direction in several
factors that other courts have considered relevant when deter-
mining whether the "in connection with" requirement has
been satisfied in a particular case. These factors include, but
are not limited to: (1) whether a securities sale was necessary
to the completion of the fraudulent scheme, Zandford, 535
U.S. at 820-21; (2) whether the parties’ relationship was such
that it would necessarily involve trading in securities, Rowin-
ski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 302-03 (3d
18 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
Cir. 2005); (3) whether the defendant intended to induce a
securities transaction, United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf
(Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1221 (10th Cir. 2000), aff’d,
532 U.S. 588 (2001); and (4) whether material misrepresenta-
tions were "disseminated to the public in a medium upon
which a reasonable investor would rely," Semerenko v. Cen-
dant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). Importantly,
these factors are not mandatory requirements that a fraud
must satisfy in order to meet § 10(b)’s "in connection with"
requirement. They exist merely to guide the inquiry, and we
do not presume to exclude other factors that could help distin-
guish between fraud in the securities industry and common
law fraud that happens to involve securities. See Zandford,
535 U.S at 820; see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 128 S. Ct.
at 771 ("Though § 10(b) is not limited to preserving the integ-
rity of the securities markets, it does not reach all commercial
transactions that are fraudulent and affect the price of a secur-
ity in some attenuated way." (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted)). Moreover, a fraud need not satisfy all of the
factors to be "in connection with" a securities transaction; a
close fit with one factor may well be enough for a fraud to
result in § 10(b) liability. The application of the factors should
be rooted in the understanding that the "in connection with"
requirement is a flexible one and that questions concerning its
scope are best examined on a case-by-case basis. See
Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 175 (noting that "the scope of the ‘in
connection with’ requirement must be determined on a
case-by-case basis"); Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
726 F.2d 930, 942 (2d Cir. 1984) ("In cases near the border-
line, courts have warned that ‘[i]t is important that the stan-
dard be fleshed out by a cautious case-by-case approach.’"
(quoting Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 595
(5th Cir. 1974))).
i.
We first consider whether a securities transaction was nec-
essary to the completion of the fraudulent scheme. In Zand-
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 19
ford, for example, the Supreme Court noted that the stock
sales in that case were a fundamental component of the defen-
dant’s fraudulent scheme:
[E]ach sale was made to further respondent’s fraudu-
lent scheme; each was deceptive because it was nei-
ther authorized by, nor disclosed to, the Woods.
With regard to the sales of shares in the Woods’
mutual fund, respondent initiated these transactions
by writing a check to himself from that account,
knowing that redeeming the check would require the
sale of securities.
Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820-21. See also Alley v. Miramon, 614
F.2d 1372, 1378 n.11 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he ‘in connection
with’ test . . . is satisfied when the proscribed conduct and the
sale are part of the same fraudulent scheme."); In re Franklin
Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 451, 472 (D.N.J.
2005) ("[T]he only way for this scheme to succeed was for
investors to purchase securities (shares of the defendant
mutual funds).").
Appellants argue that the fraud in this case was complete
when investors purchased the USEC Special Report because
the $1,000 purchase price was the only material benefit that
Appellants received. Under this theory of the case, Appellants
derived no benefit from the purchasers’ securities trading.
They claim:
[T]he alleged fraud was consummated and con-
cluded when the Report was sold and the reader paid
$1000. If there was a fraudulent scheme, no subse-
quent securities transactions were necessary to it, as
neither the Publisher nor the Author derived any
benefit from such trading. Indeed, the defendants
would have committed fraud if not a single pur-
chaser of the Report bought USEC shares, or if the
Report named a fictitious company with a fictitious
20 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
ticker symbol, because they still would have
‘defrauded’ readers of the cost of the publication.
(Reply Br. at 9.) We believe that this is a rather short-sighted
view of the fraudulent scheme and, taking the facts in the light
most favorable to the SEC, we conclude that Appellants did
benefit from securities trading by purchasers of the USEC
Special Report.
First, Appellants’ characterization of the fraud fails to rec-
ognize that Appellants used stock purchases by early purchas-
ers of the USEC Special Report as a way of enhancing the
credibility of the report. Over 800,000 investors received the
Super Insider Tip E-mail that offered the USEC Special
Report for sale, but they did not receive the solicitation at the
same time. Rather, Appellants sent out the solicitation in
waves to various groups of investors. And, later versions of
the solicitation pointed to a rise in USEC’s stock price —
which the district court determined was the result of pur-
chases by early recipients of the solicitation and special report
— as supporting the trustworthiness of the tip.
When Stansberry first circulated the solicitation to the
Pirate Investor Blast Database, on May 13, the solicitation
noted that the stock was "only a $7.00 stock." (J.A. at 2979.)
On May 17, however, Stansberry edited the solicitation e-mail
to reflect a change in the stock’s price. Future versions of the
e-mail reflected the stock’s updated price of $9.00 a share.
Moreover, and most importantly, future versions of the solici-
tation e-mail used this jump in price as a selling point. The
e-mail pointed out that the stock in question "has jumped this
week and looks poised to go much higher," and quickly fol-
lowed with an offer to sell the identity of the company for
$1,000. (J.A. at 3034.) Thus, the rising stock was important
to the success of the scheme because it served to motivate
later purchasers to part with their requisite $1,000 payment.
The fraud was not complete when investors paid $1,000 to
learn the identity of the company in question; Appellants also
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 21
needed those investors to purchase the stock thereby increas-
ing the stock price so as to boost the credibility of the solicita-
tion e-mail to obtain more $1,000 payments.
These facts are similar to those that the Third Circuit faced
in Rowinski. In that case, Salomon Smith Barney, a stock bro-
kerage and investment firm, allegedly provided "research
[that] was unlawfully biased in favor of the firm’s investment
banking clients, to the detriment of its retail brokerage cus-
tomers." Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 296. Specifically, the plaintiffs
alleged that Salomon Smith Barney systematically misrepre-
sented the value of securities to investors who used the firm’s
retail brokerage services in order to "curry favor with invest-
ment banking clients and reap hundreds of millions of dollars
in investment banking fees." Id. at 296-97. Seeking to avoid
the provisions of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"), which provides for the removal and
federal preemption of certain state court class actions alleging
"a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a covered security," 15
U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (West 2009), the plaintiffs argued
that the fraud in that case did not occur "in connection with
the purchase or sale of a covered security."15
Much like Appellants’ argument that the conduct in this
case sounds in common law fraud, the plaintiffs in Rowinski
argued that their complaint stated a "straightforward breach of
contract claim, i.e., Salomon Smith Barney agreed to provide
15
While in Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294 (3d
Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit was considering the "in connection with"
requirement in the context of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"), its interpretation was tied to existing doctrine
under § 10(b). Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 299; see also Instituto de Prevision
Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2008) ("‘[I]n con-
nection with the purchase or sale’ of a security under SLUSA covers the
same range of activities that the SEC could prosecute as violations of
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."); Siepel v. Bank of Am., N.A., 526 F.3d 1122,
1127 (8th Cir. 2008) (same).
22 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
unbiased investment research and failed to provide it." Rowin-
ski, 398 F.3d at 300. The Third Circuit disagreed, observing:
For this purported scheme to work, investors must
purchase the misrepresented securities. Absent pur-
chases by "duped" investors and a corresponding
inflation in the share price, Salomon Smith Barney’s
biased analysis would fail to benefit its banking cli-
ents and, in turn, would fail to yield hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in investment banking fees. The
scheme, in other words, necessarily "coincides" with
the purchase or sale of securities.
Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 302. In other words, the alleged fraud
was not confined to the firm’s representations to individual
investors — the court realized that the stock purchases of
investors who acted on that advice would lead to third parties,
the companies, providing a benefit to the firm. Likewise, in
this case Appellants used the inflation in the stock price
caused by investors who purchased USEC stock in reliance on
early versions of the USEC Special Report to influence third
parties — investors who received the updated versions of the
solicitation — to purchase copies of the USEC Special
Report. Thus, securities transactions helped Appellants to
maximize the profitability of their scheme.
In addition, the record shows that Appellants were not only
relying on the rise in USEC’s stock price to boost the credibil-
ity of this particular stock recommendation. They expected
that the rise in USEC’s price would lead to a general increase
in Appellants’ reputation as trusted purveyors of internet
investment advice. The fraud’s ultimate success involved not
only the $1,000 purchase price, but also the boost in reputa-
tion that would accrue with those who purchased stock in reli-
ance on the report — a reputational gain that would lead to
future purchases of future reports on different companies. As
Stansberry noted in an e-mail, "[i]f we’re able to sell this to
250 people and it works, we’ll be able to charge almost what-
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 23
ever we want next time." (J.A. at 3143) (emphasis added). In
effect, Appellants’ own definition of success depended on
people purchasing securities in reliance on the report.
ii.
The next factor that we consider — whether the parties’
relationship was such that it would necessarily involve trading
in securities — weighs in favor of Appellants. Appellants sold
investment advice; ultimately, the decision to purchase securi-
ties rested squarely with those who received the solicitation
and USEC Special Report. In this respect, Appellants differ
from the defendant in Zandford. In that case the defendant, a
broker, possessed a general power of attorney — granted by
his victims — allowing him to engage in securities transac-
tions on their behalf. 535 U.S. at 815. The very purpose of the
broker/investor relationship is trading in securities. Rowinski,
398 F.3d at 303. No such relationship existed in this case.
Indeed, we believe that the lack of a trading relationship
serves to distinguish this case from one of the cases relied on
by the SEC and the district court, SEC v. Terry’s Tips, Inc.,
409 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D. Vt. 2006). Like Appellants, the
defendant in Terry’s Tips was an online financial advisor who
made trading recommendations. Id. at 529. Significantly,
however, the SEC’s case against the defendant in Terry’s Tips
revolved around misrepresentations relating to the defendant’s
provision of auto-trading services. In an auto-trading arrange-
ment, subscribers authorize an online financial adviser to
direct trades on their behalf — the customers often are not
aware of the trades until after they have already occurred.16 In
16
As explained by the court in that case:
Auto-trading is an investment vehicle in which subscribers to
online investment newsletters open auto-trading accounts with
brokerage firms, and authorize the online adviser to direct the
trades in the subscribers’ accounts. Auto-trading services are typ-
ically offered as an additional service provided by online finan-
24 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
such a scenario, the adviser is no longer merely a purveyor of
information to investors who can choose to invest or not
invest. Rather, in such a relationship investors explicitly dele-
gate their decision-making authority to the online investment
advisor; the parties’ relationship becomes one that would nec-
essarily contemplate trading in securities. The parties in this
case contemplated no such arrangement.
iii.
The third factor we consider is whether Appellants made
their misrepresentations with the intent to induce a securities
transaction. Compare United Int’l Holdings, Inc., 210 F.3d at
1221 (representations made with the purpose of inducing the
purchase of an option are made "in connection with" the pur-
chase or sale of a security), and SEC v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d
675, 679 (7th Cir. 1998) (statements made directly to the
issuer in order to induce the issuer to accept an offer to pur-
chase satisfy the "in connection with" requirement), with
Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1028 (3d Cir. 1977) ("in
connection with" requirement unsatisfied where the purpose
of the deception was not to cause a securities transaction). See
also Zandford, 535 U.S. at 823-24 (noting defendant’s secret
cial newsletters. The financial newsletters usually require
subscribers to pay a fee to auto-trade in addition to the subscrip-
tion fee paid to receive the general newsletter. The online adviser
has arrangements with one or more broker-dealers that accept the
adviser’s auto-trading customers. The auto-trading customer sets
up a brokerage account with a broker-dealer and executes a
power of attorney or trading authorization authorizing the bro-
ker-dealer to automatically execute trades in the customer’s
account on instructions from the online adviser. Once the broker-
age account is established, the online adviser sends specific trad-
ing instructions by e-mail or facsimile to the broker-dealer. These
instructions are timed to take advantage of market events, and the
customer usually learns of the trades only after they have been
executed by the broker-dealer.
SEC v. Terry’s Tips, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529-30 (D. Vt. 2006).
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 25
intent to keep the proceeds from sales of his client’s stock);
SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir.
1993) (noting that defendant "intended to affect the market for
[the] stock"). On this point we find no error in the district
court’s conclusion that "[t]he very essence of the fraudulent
scheme was to induce its victims to purchase USEC stock
prior to May 22, 2002 . . . ." (J.A. at 174.) We have already
discussed how securities purchases by recipients of the mis-
representations would inure to the benefit of Appellants, and
we believe that the text of the USEC Special Report itself
forecloses any argument that Appellants did not intend for
investors to purchase securities in reliance on the false state-
ments.
The USEC Special Report, which, it bears repeating,
Appellants sent to investors after those investors had parted
with their $1,000, repeated the false claim that "[a] USEC
senior executive has assured me that the new Russian agree-
ment will be approved prior to the upcoming Bush-Putin sum-
mit. In fact, he said ‘watch the stock on May 22nd.’" (J.A. at
3111.) The report also called upon investors to "call your bro-
ker now and tell him to buy shares of USEC." (J.A. at 3109.)
This raises the question: If, as Appellants claim, the misrepre-
sentations were only intended to induce investors to purchase
the USEC Special Report, why were they repeated in the
report itself, which directly called investors to action? The
record evidence compels the conclusion that Appellants
intended the recipients of the solicitation and the USEC Spe-
cial Report to trade in securities.
iv.
Finally, we turn to the factor that the district court primarily
relied on in making its determination that the fraud satisfied
the "in connection with" requirement — whether Appellants
utilized a device "that would cause reasonable investors to
rely thereon" and "so relying, cause them to purchase or sell
a corporation’s securities." In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec.
26 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations
omitted). This standard is derived from a Second Circuit opin-
ion, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc). In Texas Gulf, the Second Circuit held that
"Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are made . . . in
a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing
public . . . ." Id. at 862. Subsequent decisions have refined
Texas Gulf, and several circuits now agree that:
Where the fraud alleged involves public dissemina-
tion in a document such as a press release, annual
report, investment prospectus or other such docu-
ment on which an investor would presumably rely,
the "in connection with" requirement is generally
met by proof of the means of dissemination and the
materiality of the misrepresentation or omission.
Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d at 1362; see also Wolfson, 539
F.3d at 1262; Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176.
Under the Texas Gulf standard, the SEC must establish two
distinct elements: (1) the misrepresentations in question were
disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a reason-
able investor would rely and (2) they were material when dis-
seminated. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176. We have already
considered whether the misrepresentations in this case were
material. Here, we focus our attention on the first element of
Texas Gulf. The SEC must show that reasonable investors
would base their investment decisions on the types of commu-
nications at issue in this case — mass e-mails from a purveyor
of internet investment advice.17
(Text continued on page 28)
17
Appellants claim that the Texas Gulf standard only is relevant when
evaluating communications occurring in a particular context — specifi-
cally, statements made in corporate communications from issuers to inves-
tors. They argue: "The reasonableness standard of Texas Gulf is tied to
fiduciary duty." (Reply Br. at 11.) And, because they claim that no fidu-
ciary duty runs between a publisher of an investment newsletter and its
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 27
readers, Appellants submit that the Texas Gulf standard cannot properly
apply to this case.
Courts, however, have not applied Texas Gulf so narrowly. In Rana
Research, Inc., for example, an individual interested in acquiring a pub-
licly traded company disseminated a press release falsely claiming that
there was a "firm offer" to purchase the company’s shares at a certain
price, even though the company’s president, who was also a major stock-
holder, had communicated that the company had no interest in being
acquired in a buyout. 8 F.3d at 1360. The potential purchaser had hoped
to use the press release as a way of pressuring the company’s president to
present the offer to the board of directors. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that
those facts satisfied the "in connection with" requirement, though the
potential purchaser owed no fiduciary duty to shareholders of the com-
pany. Id. at 1362-63.
Similarly, in Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000),
the Third Circuit applied Texas Gulf to statements made by one company
that affect the stock price of a different company. In that case American
Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. was the subject of competing tender offers
by AIG and Cendant Corp., and Cendant overstated its income in forms
it filed with the SEC in conjunction with its tender offer. Id. at 170. The
Third Circuit held that the Texas Gulf standard applied to claims that pur-
chasers of ABI stock brought against Cendant. Id. at 176. Texas Gulf
applied even though Cendant owed no fiduciary duties to purchasers of
ABI stock. Accordingly, we see no requirement that we limit application
of the Texas Gulf standard only to statements made in the context of a
fiduciary relationship.
We do believe, however, that whether such a relationship exists is rele-
vant to the question of whether a particular communication meets the
Texas Gulf standard in a particular case. The standard does ask, after all,
whether misrepresentations have been disseminated in a medium upon
which a reasonable investor would rely, and we think it rather self-evident
that documents created and dispersed by fiduciaries are more likely to
meet the Texas Gulf threshold, and thus satisfy the "in connection with"
element of § 10(b), than those that are not. On this point we agree with the
following observation by the Second Circuit:
[W]hen the fraud alleged is that the plaintiff bought or sold a
security in reliance on misrepresentations as to its value, made by
a defendant whose position made it reasonable for the plaintiff to
rely on the representation and imposed some duty on the defen-
28 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
At first glance, we question whether any reasonable inves-
tor would rely on the Super Insider Tip E-mail.18 As we noted
above, the Texas Gulf standard encompasses "press release[s],
annual report[s], investment prospectus[es] or other such
document[s]." Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d at 1362. Courts
have applied this standard, for example, when misrepresenta-
tions are disseminated in investment research reports from a
reputable broker, see Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 302; prospectuses,
see In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 407 F. Supp. 2d
616, 628 (D.N.J. 2005); the sales and marketing materials at
brokerage houses and other points of sale, In re Dreyfus Mut.
Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 342, 355 (W.D. Pa. 2005);
SEC filings, In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., No.
02-266-B, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20733, at *15-16 (D.N.H.
2004); and detailed drug advertisements published in sophisti-
cated medical journals, In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
150 F.3d at 156. Clearly, the communications at issue in the
dant to be honest or to disclose information, then whatever prob-
lems there may be with the case, a connection between the fraud
and the transaction should not be one of them.
In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 967 (2d Cir.
1993).
18
The record contains scant evidence on this point, but what little infor-
mation is in the record suggests that reasonable investors would not rely
on the communication at issue. For example, the SEC cross-examined one
of Stansberry’s experts, David Nelson, regarding one of the texts that Nel-
son relied on when preparing his report. The SEC presented the following
excerpt:
Essentially critics of the investment letters have argued that the
advisers are ignorant, they may have no formal experience or
education in investment, incompetent, their investment record
can be bad, dishonest, they can lie about their records, jerks, all
of which can be true.
(J.A. at 1212.) Other statements from the text that the SEC pointed to
include "Investors newsletters accurate as a coin flip" and "Their advice
was no better than throwing a dart at the stock quotes page of the Wall
Street Journal and buying whatever it hits." (J.A. at 1215-16.)
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 29
present case have little in common with the types of commu-
nications that have heretofore led to liability under the Texas
Gulf standard. Cf. SEC v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1131
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (registration statements and annual and quar-
terly reports are clearly the types of documents that investors
rely on). In fact, we feel confident that a reasonable investor
would not base investment decisions on mass e-mail commu-
nications such as these — which the SEC’s attorney charac-
terized as SPAM during oral argument — that purport to offer
a stock tip based on insider information.
Thus, at first blush, it would appear that this factor weighs
in favor of Appellants’ arguments. We fear, however, that
applying the Texas Gulf standard to remove Appellants’ fraud
from coverage under § 10(b) would neglect the reasoning
behind the Texas Gulf standard. At its core, the Texas Gulf
standard is about notice — attaching liability under the securi-
ties laws for statements made in any medium, no matter how
tangentially related to the securities markets, would run the
risk of roping in speakers who had no idea that their conduct
might implicate Section 10(b). Thus, by requiring that mis-
statements be communicated in a medium upon which a rea-
sonable investor would rely, the Texas Gulf standard protects
these unknowing speakers from liability and ensures that there
is a sufficient nexus between the misrepresentations and the
securities sales that they induce to satisfy the Supreme
Court’s command that the fraud and securities sales "coin-
cide."
This case simply does not implicate the notice concerns
that animate the Texas Gulf standard. To the contrary, Appel-
lants knew that recipients of the solicitation and USEC Spe-
cial Report would rely on them when making their investment
decisions. After all, Appellants did not target the public at
large when they circulated the solicitation e-mail. Rather,
Appellants circulated the e-mail solicitation to investors on
the specific subscriber lists of internet investment newsletters.
These were investors who trusted internet investment advice
30 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
— Appellants certainly should not have been shocked to learn
that their fraudulent statements induced securities transaction.
Under these circumstances, an application of the Texas Gulf
standard to exclude the communications would run contrary
to § 10(b)’s core purpose — "to protect investors, to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in
securities transactions generally." 3 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. §
900.65 (perm. ed. 2002). Although ordinary reasonable inves-
tors might well have taken one look at Appellants’ solicitation
and marked it for the SPAM box, Appellants knew that they
were directing their misstatements to particular investors who
did rely on internet investment advice. We believe that this
knowledge supports finding that the misstatements occurred
"in connection with" securities transactions.19 See SEC v.
19
On this point we take direction from the common law’s treatment of
the materiality standard. Under the common law, a representation may be
material, even if a reasonable man would disregard it, if "the maker of the
representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is
likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of
action." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538(2)(b) (1977). As the com-
ments to the Restatement explain:
Even though the matter misrepresented is one to which a reason-
able man would not attach any importance in determining his
course of action in the transaction in hand, it is nevertheless
material if the maker knows that the recipient, because of his own
peculiarities, is likely to attach importance to it. There are many
persons whose judgment, even in important transactions, is likely
to be determined by considerations that the normal man would
regard as altogether trivial or even ridiculous. One who practices
upon another’s known idiosyncrasies cannot complain if he is
held liable when he is successful in what he is endeavoring to
accomplish.
Id. cmt. f (emphasis added). While we do not suggest that the Restate-
ment’s treatment of materiality controls our analysis of § 10(b)’s "in con-
nection with" requirement, we do note that the Supreme Court often turns
to the Restatement to inform its jurisprudence on these issues. See Dura
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005); Wharf (Holdings) Ltd.,
532 U.S. at 596. Moreover, and more importantly, we believe the above
principle to be a sound one — Appellants have little room to complain that
their conduct has implicated § 10(b) when they knew that readers would
rely on the communications and they actively encouraged them to do so.
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 31
Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("[F]raud in
the sale of investment advice may qualify as ‘in connection’
with the sale of securities when it is expected that the advisees
will act on the advice." (citing R&W Technical Servs. Ltd. v.
CFTC, 205 F.3d 165, 172-73 (5th Cir. 2000)).20
v.
As our previous discussion shows, there are at least three
reasons to conclude that the fraud in this case occurred "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of securities. First,
record evidence supports a conclusion that securities pur-
chases were necessary to complete Appellants’ fraudulent
scheme. Second, such evidence supports the district court’s
finding that Appellants made their misrepresentations with the
intent to induce securities transactions. And, third, Appellants
directed the misrepresentations to investors that they knew
were likely to rely on them. Given these characteristics, the
application of § 10(b) is not barred by the fact that there was
no securities trading relationship between the Appellants and
the recipients of the e-mail misrepresentations.
Appellants, however, joined by amici, argue that our treat-
ment of the "in connection with" requirement raises First
Amendment issues: "As applied in the way the SEC now
urges, § 10(b) would not be restricted to the statements of
fiduciaries or those who trade in stocks, but would cover all
statements about securities by anyone who cared to speak to
anyone who cared to listen." (Appellants’ Br. at 33.) The great
concern is that publishers of financial news and commentary
will face potential liability under § 10(b) and that this will
20
Our conclusion here does not imply that an individual investor in this
case would be able to demonstrate that he "justifiably relied" on the Super
Insider Tip E-mail as required to establish a securities violation in a pri-
vate suit. See Miller v. Arsenio & Co., Inc., 364 F.3d 223, 227 (4th Cir.
2004). Although the two types of reliance may share some similarities, it
would not be appropriate to import wholesale our "reasonable reliance"
analysis into a "justifiable reliance" analysis required in a private suit.
32 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
chill publishers’ attempts to report on financial matters. The
amici, in particular, point out that financial news and com-
mentary is especially important because so many Americans
are actively involved in trading in the securities markets and
there is a high demand for information about investment
opportunities. Appellants and the amici argue that these con-
stitutional concerns require that we interpret § 10(b)’s "in
connection with" requirement narrowly, and they suggest that
we can do so by recognizing an exception from the coverage
of § 10(b) for publishers of nonpersonalized financial news
and commentary who do not possess a financial interest in the
securities that they discuss.
To support this claim, Appellants direct us to Lowe v. SEC,
472 U.S. 181 (1985). In Lowe, the Supreme Court faced the
question of whether the petitioner, who had been convicted of
various offenses involving securities, could be permanently
enjoined from publishing securities newsletters because he
had not registered as an investment adviser under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940. That Act defines an investment
adviser as, and thus requires registration for, "any person
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as
to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing
in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation
and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analy-
ses or reports concerning securities . . . ." 15 U.S.C.A. §
80b-2(a)(11) (West 2009). The Court conceded that the peti-
tioner’s activities fell within this definition, but noted that
Congress, expressing its recognition of the serious First
Amendment problems implicated by a law requiring registra-
tion of the press, see Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938), included a statutory exception for "the publisher of
any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or
financial publication of general and regular circulation," §
80b-2(a)(11)(D). Lowe, 472 U.S. at 203-05. The Court, noting
that First Amendment concerns "support[ed] a broad reading
of the exclusion for publishers," concluded that the petition-
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 33
er’s newsletters were "described by the plain language of the
exclusion" and were thus exempt from coverage under the
Investment Advisers Act. Id. at 205-06, 211.
Appellants argue that the canon of constitutional avoidance,
which compelled the Supreme Court to read broadly the
exception for publishers in the Investment Advisers Act, like-
wise requires that we create a new exception for disinterested
publishers from the coverage of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
The district court rejected this argument by reasoning that,
even if there were an exception from § 10(b) for such publish-
ers, Appellants could not invoke the exception because the
Super Insider Solicitation and the Special Report were not
publications "of regular and general circulation," as the Lowe
Court interpreted those terms. While we do not agree with its
reasoning, we do agree with the district court’s ultimate con-
clusion — that Appellants fall within the coverage of § 10(b).21
The district court’s ultimate conclusion was correct because,
quite simply, the text and purpose of § 10(b) admit of no
exclusion for "disinterested publishers" of financial news and
commentary, thus rendering constitutional avoidance argu-
ments irrelevant.
The canon of constitutional avoidance is "a tool for choos-
ing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory
text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did
not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional
doubts." Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005). The
21
The "regular and general" requirement relied upon by the district court
is a statutory requirement for exclusion under the Investment Advisers Act
— it is a representation of how Congress chose to accommodate First
Amendment concerns with respect to that particular Act. Appellants argue
that, in the § 10(b) context, First Amendment concerns compel an exemp-
tion for disinterested publishers regardless of whether the publications are
"regular and general." By holding that Appellants were not entitled to an
exemption because the publications were not "of regular and general cir-
culation," the district court failed to recognize that such regular and gen-
eral circulation is not a requirement for the exemption Appellants seek.
34 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
canon is a tool of limited purpose, however. As the Court
quite recently explained: "The canon of constitutional avoid-
ance does not supplant traditional modes of statutory interpre-
tation. We cannot ignore the text and purpose of a statute in
order to save it." Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2271
(2008) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we utilize the canon
"only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis,
the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one con-
struction; and the canon functions as a means of choosing
between them." Clark, 543 U.S. at 385. If traditional modes
of statutory construction sufficiently resolve the issue, then,
there is no need to reach deeper into our toolbox. And, in this
case, we believe that ordinary principles of statutory construc-
tion foreclose the argument that we can interpret § 10(b) to
include an exception for disinterested publishers.
The first step in any case of statutory interpretation is to
consider the language of the statute in order "to determine
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case."
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)
(quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340
(1997)). "When the words of a statute are unambiguous, . . .
this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’"
Id. at 462 (quoting Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249, 254 (1992)). Thus, we must first consider the text
of § 10(b), and Appellants direct us to the "in connection
with" requirement, claiming that the requirement is "exactly
the sort of loose, ambiguous language that must be confined
to avoid constitutional concerns." (Appellant’s Br. at 34.)
We are mindful, however, that "statutes are not read as a
collection of isolated phrases." Abuelhawa v. United States,
173 L. Ed. 2d 982, 987 (2009). Looking to the entire statute,
§ 10(b), by its plain language, applies to any person. In this
respect, § 10(b) is wholly different from the statute the
Supreme Court interpreted in Lowe, where the Supreme Court
used First Amendment concerns in interpreting an already
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 35
existing exception broadly. Section 10(b) excepts no one from
its reach, and the Lowe Court recognized that the statute con-
stitutes a backstop against fraudulent activity — even those
publishers otherwise excepted from the provisions of the
Investment Advisers Act remained subject to the coverage of
§ 10(b). See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 209 n.56. Thus, we find
Appellants’ reliance on Lowe unpersuasive, because § 10(b)
includes no exceptive language of the type that the Supreme
Court interpreted in that case.
Even if we focus solely on § 10(b)’s "in connection with"
language, we note that Congress intended the requirement to
be flexible. Indeed, the Supreme Court has described § 10(b)
as "a catchall clause to enable the Commission to deal with
new manipulative or cunning devices." Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
at 203 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see
also United States v. Russo, 74 F.3d 1383, 1390 (2d Cir.
1996) ("The purpose of the Section and its implementing reg-
ulations is to prevent fraud, whether it is ‘a garden type vari-
ety of fraud, or present[s] a unique form of deception. Novel
or atypical methods should not provide immunity from the
securities laws.’" (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
at 11 n.7)). It necessarily must be applied to radically different
and ever-evolving sets of facts, and that goal is accomplished
by interpreting the statute flexibly.22 Thus, Appellants’ reli-
ance on any ambiguity in the phrase "in connection with" as
a reason to employ the canon of constitutional avoidance fails
22
For example, while originally directed at preventing buyers and sellers
of securities from deliberately misleading each other for the purpose of
inducing a transaction, see SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 122 n.20 (1st
Cir. 2008), § 10(b) now covers a variety of fraudulent activity, including
insider trading, see, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29
(1980); a broker’s theft of the proceeds from sales of his clients’ securi-
ties, Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822; misstatements by accountants who know
that their communications will be communicated to investors, see Anixter
v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225-27 (10th Cir. 1996); and
even a company’s false advertisements in medical journals, In re Car-
ter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1998).
36 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
in light of the statute’s purpose — providing a flexible regime
for addressing new, perhaps unforeseen, types of fraud. Creat-
ing a blanket exception for "disinterested publishers" hardly
seems consistent with this purpose, and the Supreme Court
has required that we avoid "technical[ ] and restrictive[ ]"
interpretations of the statute. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
E.
To conclude our discussion of § 10(b), we find the district
court correctly found that Appellants’ conduct constituted a
violation of the statute. Appellants made misrepresentations
of a material fact — whether an insider had provided the
information in the stock tip — and Appellants did so with the
requisite scienter. Moreover, the misrepresentations were "in
connection with" securities transactions because securities
transactions were necessary to maximize the fraudulent
scheme, Appellants made their misrepresentations with the
intent that investors would rely on them, and Appellants knew
that investors would so rely. This conduct violates § 10(b),
and Appellants cannot avoid application of the statute by
invoking constitutional concerns because the text and purpose
of § 10(b) admit of no exception for "disinterested publish-
ers."
III.
We next consider Appellants’ argument that, even if their
conduct fell within the coverage of § 10(b), the Super Insider
Tip E-mail and USEC Special Report constitute speech enti-
tled to some measure of First Amendment protection. Admit-
tedly, our conclusion that constitutional concerns do not
compel an exclusion from § 10(b) for Appellants’ conduct
does not answer this question. The canon of constitutional
avoidance is a method of statutory interpretation, not a way
of adjudicating constitutional issues. Defendants remain free
to bring constitutional challenges to a statute as applied to
SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR 37
their conduct, and in this case Appellants argue that the dis-
trict court should have found that the Super Insider Tip E-mail
and USEC Special Report were entitled to the heightened pro-
tections for expression that the Supreme Court recognized in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, because the SEC sought to
impose liability on the basis of "pure expression" — Appel-
lants’ recommendation of USEC stock. Under this theory the
SEC should have borne the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the statements were published with
"actual malice," and we would have to engage in an indepen-
dent review of the record in order to ensure that the SEC met
that burden. According to Appellants, the Constitution
requires that we recognize these protections whenever we
impose liability on the alleged falsity of a publication.
We cannot agree with Appellants. Punishing fraud, whether
it be common law fraud or securities fraud, simply does not
violate the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit has articu-
lated this principle in Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC,
233 F.3d 981, 992 (7th Cir. 2000), explaining: "Laws directly
punishing fraudulent speech survive constitutional scrutiny
even where applied to pure, fully protected speech." The
Supreme Court has stated the principle almost as directly:
"[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud." Illinois ex
rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600,
612 (2003). Of course, the government cannot label certain
speech as fraudulent so as to deprive it of its constitutional
protections, id. at 617, but we need not worry about such stra-
tegic labeling here because § 10(b) clearly forbids actual
fraud. Thus, Appellants’ First Amendment argument fails.
IV.
For this same reason, Appellants’ challenge to the district
court’s issuance of an injunction permanently enjoining them
from violating § 10(b) also fails. The injunction does not con-
stitute an unlawful prior restraint because it only enjoins
38 SEC v. PIRATE INVESTOR
Appellants from engaging in securities fraud, which we have
held is unprotected speech.23
V.
In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, the judgment of
the district court is
AFFIRMED.
23
Appellants also argue — but only in their reply brief — that the
injunction is a disfavored "obey the law" injunction, because the injunc-
tion merely tracks the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in describing
the prohibited conduct. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) requires that
injunctions "describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or
required," and several circuits have relied on Rule 65(d) to require that
injunctions do more than instruct a defendant to "obey the law." See, e.g.,
Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999);
Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1978). Ordi-
narily we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply
brief, and we find no reason to depart from that rule in this case. See A
Helping Hand LLC v. Balt. County, 515 F.3d 356, 369 (4th Cir. 2008).