PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and
Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J.
BARBARA MEEKS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 062452 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
November 2, 2007
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal, the defendant, Barbara Meeks, challenges
her conviction for credit card theft, contending that the
evidence was insufficient to prove venue in the City of
Alexandria.
I
Meeks was charged in a two-count indictment in the Circuit
Court of the City of Alexandria with felony credit card theft,
in violation of Code § 18.2-192, and with misdemeanor credit
card fraud, in violation of Code § 18.2-195. Only the
conviction for credit card theft is the subject of this appeal.
A jury found Meeks guilty of credit card theft, and, in
accordance with the jury's verdict, the trial court sentenced
her to 30 days in jail. The trial court, however, suspended the
sentence.
Meeks appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of
Appeals, alleging, inter alia, that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that venue was proper in the City of
Alexandria. A judge of the Court of Appeals, in a per curiam
order, denied the appeal. Meeks v. Commonwealth, Record No.
2773-05-4 (May 10, 2006). Thereafter, a three-judge panel of
the Court of Appeals also denied the appeal. Meeks v.
Commonwealth, Record No. 2773-05-4 (Oct. 23, 2006). We awarded
Meeks this appeal.
II
Pursuant to well-established authority, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
prevailing party at trial. On May 27, 2005, Cheryl Ghauri, a
mental health supervisor with the Fairfax County Community
Service Board, was working in a group home in Fairfax County
when she discovered that her wallet was missing. Ghauri's
wallet contained several credit cards, including a Visa card
issued by SunTrust Bank. Ghauri reported her missing wallet to
the Fairfax County Police Department.
Also on May 27, 2005, Meeks was visiting her son at the
group home. During a portion of her visit, Meeks and her son
were alone on the home's first floor where Ghauri had left her
purse containing her wallet.
Later that day, Meeks registered for a room under Ghauri's
name at a Holiday Inn in Alexandria, using Ghauri's Visa card as
payment. She also obtained $20 in cash from the hotel, using
the card. The next day, the police found Meeks in a room in the
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hotel. Ghauri had not given Meeks permission to have or use her
Visa card.
At trial, a hotel desk clerk identified Meeks as the person
who had used Ghauri's credit card to pay for the room. The
clerk previously had identified Meeks in a police photo spread.
III
A
Code § 18.2-192 defines credit card theft, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of credit card or credit
card number theft when:
(a) He takes, obtains or withholds a credit card
or credit card number from the person, possession,
custody or control of another without the cardholder's
consent or who, with knowledge that it has been so
taken, obtained or withheld, receives the credit card
or credit card number with intent to use it or sell
it, or to transfer it to a person other than the
issuer or the cardholder.
Code § 18.2-198.1 provides, in pertinent part, that "a
prosecution for a violation of this article [for offenses
relating to credit cards] may be had in any county or city in
which (i) any act in furtherance of the crime was committed or
(ii) an issuer or acquirer, or an agent of either, sustained a
financial loss as a result of the offense."
Meeks contends that her conviction for credit card theft
should be reversed because the Commonwealth failed to prove that
venue was proper in the City of Alexandria. She asserts that
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any theft of the credit card occurred and was completed in
Fairfax County. She further states that, because the theft was
completed in Fairfax County, her conduct in Alexandria "could
not, as a matter of law, have been 'in furtherance' of the crime
of credit card theft." (Footnote omitted.)
The Commonwealth contends, on the other hand, that a person
who retains a credit card with intent to unlawfully use or
transfer it is guilty of withholding the card and, therefore, of
credit card theft. The Commonwealth further asserts that,
"[w]hen there is a strong presumption that such person has
committed an act in furtherance of the crime in a particular
city or county, prosecution of the credit card offense is proper
in that jurisdiction."
B
When an issue of statutory construction is involved, the
"[s]tatutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and
is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court."
Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310,
313 (2006). Therefore, this Court must "determine the General
Assembly's intent from the words contained in [the] statute."
Id.
In doing so, "the general rule of statutory construction is
to infer the legislature's intent from the plain meaning of the
language used." Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. Partnership, 255 Va.
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335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998). Thus, "[a]n undefined
term must be 'given its ordinary meaning, given the context in
which it is used.' " Sansom v. Board of Supervisors, 257 Va.
589, 594-95, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999) (quoting Department of
Taxation v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 658,
261 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1980)). Furthermore, "[t]he plain,
obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred
over any curious, narrow, or strained construction,"
Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609
(1998), and a statute should never be construed in a way that
leads to absurd results, Washington, 272 Va. at 455, 634 S.E.2d
at 313.
In deciding whether venue in a particular jurisdiction was
proved, a court must determine whether the evidence, when viewed
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, gave rise to a
"'strong presumption' that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court." Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26,
36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990) (quoting Pollard v. Commonwealth,
220 Va. 723, 725, 261 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1980)). This may be
accomplished by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id.
IV
As previously noted, a prosecution for credit card theft
"may be had in any county or city in which . . . any act in
furtherance of the crime was committed." Code § 18.2-198.1(i).
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In the present case, therefore, in order to establish venue in
the City of Alexandria, the Commonwealth was required to produce
evidence that established a "strong presumption" that an act in
furtherance of credit card theft occurred in Alexandria.
In Cheatham v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 286, 208 S.E.2d 760
(1974), we addressed the crime committed when an individual
"withholds" a credit card.∗ In Cheatham, the defendant was found
in possession of a credit card that had been stolen in a robbery
eleven days earlier. Id. at 287, 208 S.E.2d at 761. There was
no evidence that the defendant had used or attempted to use the
card. Id. at 290, 208 S.E.2d at 763. We stated the following:
So far as we can ascertain the word "withhold,"
as used in the context of the credit card theft
statute, has never been construed. It must, however,
import something more than mere retention, for mere
retention could be consistent with innocent intent.
The retention must be accompanied by an intent to
deprive the owner of possession and to use the card,
or to sell it, or to transfer it to a person other
than the issuer or the cardholder. . . . But in the
present case there is no evidence to show how long
Cheatham had the credit card . . . or that he had any
intent to use it, sell it, or transfer it.
Id.
We now conclude that Cheatham wrongly added the element of
retention to credit card theft. Credit card theft and credit
∗
In Cheatham, we interpreted the predecessor statute, former
Code § 18.1-125.3 (Supp. 1974). Code § 18.2-192 contains the
additional phrase, "or credit card number," but is otherwise not
materially different from former Code § 18.1-125.3.
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card fraud are different offenses. If retention of a credit
card may be prosecuted as credit card theft, the distinction
between the two offenses is not made. Under the holding of
Cheatham, a person could be charged with credit card theft in
every jurisdiction entered while still in possession of the
stolen credit card or number with the intent to use it. We hold
that credit card theft is completed where the card or number is
unlawfully taken from its rightful owner or is received with
knowledge that it has been taken and with the intent to use it,
sell it, or transfer it. To the extent that Cheatham is to the
contrary, it is overruled. Venue in this case was, therefore,
not proper in the City of Alexandria because the credit card
theft was completed in Fairfax County. Accordingly, we will
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the
indictment.
Reversed and dismissed.
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