PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee,
JJ., and Compton, S.J.
ANTHONY BERNARD JUNIPER
OPINION BY
v. Record Nos. 051423 and 051424 JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE
March 3, 2006
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge
In these consolidated appeals, we consider the four capital
murder convictions and death sentences imposed upon Anthony
Bernard Juniper by the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk,
along with his convictions for statutory burglary and use of a
firearm during the commission of a felony.
In the first stage of a bifurcated trial conducted under
Code § 19.2-264.3, a jury convicted Juniper of capital murder
for each of the four killings, statutory burglary while armed
with a deadly weapon, and four counts of use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony. In the penalty phase of the trial the
jury “found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt” that
Juniper “would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society” and that his
conduct in committing the offenses involved either “depravity of
mind and/or aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum
necessary to accomplish the act of murder.”1 The jury fixed
1
The jury found both depravity of mind and aggravated
battery in three of the murders (Keshia Stephens, Rueben
Juniper’s punishment at death for each capital murder
conviction, life imprisonment for statutory burglary while armed
with a deadly weapon, and one three-year and three five-year
terms for the convictions for use of a firearm in the commission
of a felony. After reviewing the post-sentence report required
by Code § 19.2-264.5, the trial court sentenced Juniper in
accordance with the jury verdicts.
Juniper appealed his convictions for the crimes other than
capital murder to the Court of Appeals. We certified that
appeal (Record No.051424) to this Court under the provisions of
Code § 17.1-409 for consolidation with the appeal of Juniper’s
capital murder convictions (Record No. 051423) and the review of
his death sentence mandated by Code § 17.1-313(A).
After consideration of Juniper’s assignments of error, the
record, the arguments of counsel, and the review required by
Code § 17.1-313, we find no error in the judgment of the trial
court and will affirm that judgment, including the sentences of
death.
I. FACTS AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we
consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial
Harrison, III, and Shearyia Stephens), but only depravity of
mind in the fourth murder (Nykia Stephens).
2
court.2 Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 313, 541 S.E.2d 872,
877, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001); see also Lovitt v.
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 502, 537 S.E.2d 866, 870 (2000),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815 (2001).
A. GUILT PHASE
On the afternoon of January 16, 2004, Keshia Stephens, her
younger brother Rueben Harrison, III,3 and two of Keshia’s
daughters, Nykia Stephens and Shearyia Stephens,4 were killed in
Keshia’s apartment in the City of Norfolk. When police arrived,
they found that the door to Keshia’s apartment had been forcibly
opened. All four victims were discovered in the master bedroom;
each had died as a result of gunshot wounds.
Keshia was stabbed through her abdomen, shot three times,
and grazed by a fourth bullet. One bullet went through her
intestine, kidney, and spine, causing spinal shock and leg
paralysis. Another bullet also passed through her intestines
and then proceeded to her abdominal aorta and inferior vena
cava, causing extensive bleeding.
The stab wound did not fatally wound Keshia, but tore
through the muscle of her abdominal wall. There was a great
2
Juniper did not present any evidence during the guilt
phase of the trial, with the result that all of the evidence
came from the Commonwealth’s witnesses.
3
The record contains several different spellings of Rueben
Harrison, III’s first name. We will spell his name “Rueben,”
consistent with the indictment.
3
deal of blood accompanying the wound, however, which led the
medical examiner performing the autopsy to conclude that the
stab wound was probably the first injury inflicted on Keshia.
The stab wound was consistent with a wound that would have been
caused by the knife blade found at the scene of the crime.
Two-year old Shearyia was shot four times while in her
mother’s arms. Two bullets entered Shearyia’s body in the shin
of her left leg, fractured the bone, and exited through her
calf. A third bullet entered and exited Shearyia’s body through
her thigh. The fourth bullet entered the crown of her head and
passed through her brain, causing bone fragments to chip off.
Rueben Harrison was shot three times. One bullet struck
his pelvic bone, and ricocheted through his body into his
abdomen, liver, heart and lung, finally coming to rest in his
armpit. A second bullet hit his hip bone, and exited through
the front of his leg. A third bullet broke his femur bone, and
exited his body at his front thigh. The medical examiner
testified that the broken bones would have caused excruciating
pain and immediately disabled Rueben.
Four-year old Nykia was shot one time behind her left ear.
The bullet moved through her skull and cerebellum to the base of
her skull, into her esophagus and trachea, causing substantial
damage and bleeding, before exiting her chest. The medical
4
Shearyia Stephens was also known as Sheryia Benns.
4
examiner testified that the bullet’s path was consistent with
Nykia ducking her head and body toward the shooter prior to
being shot. In addition, the presence of blood in Nykia’s lungs
indicated that she had taken one or two breaths between being
shot and dying. Her body was found lying on top of her uncle’s
body.
Evidence presented at trial showed that Juniper and Keshia
had been involved in an on-again, off-again tumultuous
relationship for approximately two years. On the morning of the
shootings, Juniper telephoned his friend, Renee Rashid, from his
mother’s house where he was living at the time. Juniper asked
Rashid to drive him to Keshia’s apartment so that he could
retrieve some of his belongings. A short time later Rashid
picked up Juniper at his mother’s house and drove him to
Keshia’s apartment.
Both Juniper and Rashid entered Keshia’s apartment, which
was on the second floor of the apartment building. Rashid saw
four individuals in the apartment: Keshia, Rueben, who was
asleep on the couch, and two of Keshia’s children, Nykia and
Shearyia, who were preparing to take a bath. After helping
Juniper disconnect a DVD player, Rashid was talking to the two
girls, but overheard Juniper and Keshia arguing in another room.
Keshia repeatedly made comments such as, “[T]here’s nobody but
you. I told you I’m not seeing anybody but you.”
5
After Rashid announced that she was leaving, Juniper
followed her to the door of the apartment. Hearing the door
shut, Rashid assumed Juniper was behind her as she began to
descend the apartment building steps. But as she was going down
the stairway outside Keshia’s apartment, Rashid heard a “loud
boom” that she described as “sound[ing] like the door being
kicked in.” Not stopping to look behind her, Rashid hurried to
her car. While waiting in her car outside the apartment, Rashid
heard Keshia crying and repeating her statement that she was not
seeing anyone but Juniper. Rashid sounded her horn to alert
Juniper that she wanted to leave. Juniper yelled at Rashid to
“Go ahead” so she began to drive away. As she drove away from
the apartment she heard four “booms,” which she described as
“sound[ing] like gunshots.”
Rashid did not stop, but proceeded to Juniper’s mother’s
house, and expressed her concern that Juniper had remained at
Keshia’s apartment. Juniper’s friend, Keon Murray, was there
when Rashid arrived. Juniper called his mother’s house and
Murray talked to him on the telephone. Murray observed that
Juniper was calling from Keshia’s apartment because the Caller
ID number matched Keshia’s telephone number. Juniper told
Murray that “They gone,” and that Keshia’s apartment was
surrounded. He also stated that he “killed them,” although he
did not name particular individuals.
6
Murray then called Tyrone Mings, a friend who lived near
Keshia’s apartment building, and asked him to check Keshia’s
apartment. Mings walked to the apartment and observed that the
front door appeared to have been kicked in. Upon entering
Keshia’s apartment, Mings testified that he saw Juniper standing
in the living room with a white substance on his face and
holding an automatic pistol. When Mings asked Juniper about
Keshia, Juniper directed Mings to the back of the apartment.
Upon entering the master bedroom, Mings saw Rueben and a young
girl lying on the bed. Mings did not see Keshia and asked
Juniper where she was. Juniper told Mings she was “between the
bed and the dresser.” Mings returned to the bedroom and called
to the people in the room, but no one answered. Mings departed
Keshia’s apartment, leaving Juniper in the living room, still
holding the pistol. Upon returning to his apartment, Mings
called the police.
In the meantime, Rashid and Murray picked up Juniper’s
cousin (“Little John”) and drove to Keshia’s apartment. Murray
and Little John went to look for Juniper, while Rashid stayed in
the car. They returned to the car with Juniper, who sat in the
front passenger seat next to Rashid, the driver. Rashid
described Juniper as being “jittery” and “breathing real hard.”
Juniper kept looking in the mirrors, saying, “they’re behind us”
throughout the car ride. Murray stated that Juniper “look[ed]
7
nervous,” “[l]ike he was in shock,” and that he had a powdery
substance like cocaine on his face. Juniper held a black and
chrome automatic pistol in his right hand, resting on his lap.
The police first arrived at Keshia’s apartment complex at
12:50 p.m., after receiving a telephone call reporting possible
gunshots. The responding officer walked around the apartment
building and spoke with two residents, but did not go up the
stairway to Keshia’s apartment. After conferring with a second
police officer who had arrived on scene, both officers left the
apartment complex believing the call to have been a false
report.
Mings observed the officers leave and called the police a
second time. Near 2:20 p.m. police officers again arrived at
the apartment complex and this time went up the stairway to
Keshia’s apartment. Officer W.G. Snyder testified the “whole
center part of the door was completely knocked . . . inward into
the apartment, and wooden debris from the door was lying inside
the apartment.” The officers entered the apartment, and
observed Nykia’s body lying across Rueben on the bed in the
master bedroom. They then observed Shearyia’s body lying across
Keshia’s body on the floor beside the bed. The officers
received no response from any of them.
Police investigators recovered a cigarette butt from the
floor by the front door of Keshia’s apartment. From the master
8
bedroom where the bodies were located, investigators recovered a
knife blade, a knife handle, and shell casings. Shell casings
were also found in a bathroom adjoining the master bedroom.
A firearm and toolmark examinations expert testified that
bullet casings found in the apartment and the bullets recovered
from the victims’ bodies were fired from a single nine-
millimeter, Luger semi-automatic pistol.5 The expert also
analyzed the recovered knife blade and knife handle and
determined that the blade and handle were originally joined.
A latent fingerprint expert testified a fingerprint found
on the knife blade had “a minimum of 23 matching
characteristics” to Juniper’s right thumbprint. In addition, an
expert in forensic serology and DNA analysis testified that
Juniper’s DNA profile matched DNA from the knife handle6 and the
cigarette butt.7
The police obtained warrants for Juniper’s arrest and he
surrendered voluntarily on January 26, 2005. While incarcerated
at the Hampton Roads Regional Jail awaiting trial, Juniper
5
The firearm was never recovered.
6
Sixteen loci from the knife handle matched Juniper’s DNA
profile. The DNA expert testified that Juniper could not be
excluded as the source of the DNA, with the odds of another
individual having a matching DNA profile being one in greater
than six billion individuals, the population of the world.
7
Fifteen loci matched Juniper’s profile from the DNA on the
cigarette butt; again, the DNA expert testified that Juniper
could not be excluded as the source of the DNA, with the odds of
9
admitted to a fellow inmate, Ernest Smith, that he committed the
murders. Smith testified that while the two were together in
the medical pod at the Hampton Roads Regional Jail, Juniper
confessed to shooting the four victims. Smith testified that
Juniper told him that he had killed the children because “he
didn’t want to leave any witnesses at the scene of the crime.”
B. PENALTY PHASE
During the penalty phase, the Commonwealth introduced
evidence of Juniper’s criminal record, which contained
convictions for grand larceny, possession of cocaine, possession
of marijuana, threatening to kill, disorderly conduct, failure
to appear, and numerous motor vehicle violations. The
Commonwealth contended its evidence proved the aggravating
factors of both future dangerousness and vileness.
The Commonwealth also introduced evidence of Juniper’s
violent behavior and unadjudicated criminal conduct. Several of
another individual having a matching DNA profile being one in
greater than six billion individuals.
10
the Commonwealth’s witnesses testified about Juniper’s
tumultuous and abusive relationship with Keshia. Ruqayyah
Barnes described an incident that occurred at a night club in
August 2003. She was present when Juniper accused Keshia of
“some guy looking at her, and so he started getting mad and
calling her names. He told her, ‘Bitch, get over here right now
before I whoop your ass,’ and said, ‘That guy looking at you.’ ”
Ruqayyah testified that Juniper was “screaming” these things to
Keshia and “standing right in front of her face.” According to
her testimony, Juniper yelled at Keshia because “[t]hat nigger
over there looking at you.” And accused Keshia of “f**king with
him.”
Ruqayyah also testified about an event in September 2003.
She and Keshia returned from shopping when Juniper began
fighting with Keshia. He complained that Keshia and Ruqayyah
were
taking too long and [Keshia] don’t do s**t for no kids. He
do everything. He feed them. He do their hair. He buy
their clothes. He do everything. They’re his kids. . . .
And then he pulled her by her hair and start screaming in
her face about us being gone at the mall too long. Then he
punched her in her face. She fell down on the floor. She
slid back in the hallway into the kitchen.
Ruqayyah clarified that Juniper “just grabbed [Keshia’s] hair
and yanked it real hard and she came closer to him.” When
Juniper punched Keshia, he did so “with a closed fist . . .
right in her eye.”
11
Ruqayyah’s sister, Malika T. Barnes, testified that in the
spring of 2003, she witnessed Juniper trying to get Keshia’s
attention, and when Keshia did not respond to her name, he said,
“ ‘B, I know you heard me calling you,’ ” before “calling her a
whole bunch of names.” When Keshia sat down in the room where
Malika and Juniper were located, Juniper “told [Keshia] to go
back in the room.” When Keshia did not leave, Juniper “grabbed
her by her arm and got her, and guid[ed] her toward the room.”
Malika also described an incident that occurred at the food
store where Keshia worked. Before Malika entered the store,
Juniper told her that Keshia was cheating on him. Juniper
followed Malika into the store and “told Keshia to go to the
back to get something, and she didn’t move fast enough to get
it.” So Juniper pulled Keshia’s arm as he “fuss[ed] and
holler[ed] as usual.”
In the summer of 2003, Malika witnessed Juniper “grabb[ing]
Keshia’s arm.” In clarifying what she saw, Malika stated that
Juniper grabbed Keshia “[f]orcefully” and “grabbed her arm to
direct her toward him.” When Malika confronted Juniper for
acting that way, Malika testified that Juniper responded,
“ ‘That’s my bitch.’ ‘That’s my hoe.’ ‘When I tell my bitch to
come here, that’s what I want her to do.’ ” He then threatened
to “f**k all [you] bitches up.”
12
The assistant manager of the food store where Keshia worked
recounted several verbal and physical altercations between
Juniper and Keshia. In January 2003, the assistant manager
observed Juniper approach Keshia after she smiled at a customer.
She testified that Juniper had told Keshia that he would “smack
the s**t out [of] you, bitch, for smiling at the customer that
went out.”
The manager also described an incident she observed between
Keshia and Juniper in the spring of 2003. According to her
testimony, Juniper
punched [Keshia] in her face, and her wig came off. She
picked her wig back up and put it on. By that time I was
getting out [of] the car. Keshia ran in the [food store],
and I unlocked the office. And I took her in the office,
and I told her that he had to leave the premises or I was
going to call the police. After that he was barred from
the store.
The manager confirmed that by “punch” she meant that Juniper’s
“right hand [was] balled up into a fist with [his] fingers
curled into [his] palm.”
In June 2003, police responded to a domestic dispute
between Juniper and Keshia. Juniper admitted to “slap[ping]”
duct tape on Keshia’s arm, mouth, and head in order to “keep her
quiet,” and confirmed that he had “done that before.” Juniper
was charged with abduction as a result of this incident, but the
charges were not prosecuted because Keshia failed to appear in
court.
13
Other witnesses described Juniper’s conduct while
incarcerated. A deputy in the Norfolk Sheriff’s Department
testified that when she informed Juniper that he did not have
any mail that day, he responded by calling her “a cracker ass
whore” and telling her to “Walk away, you f**kin’ bitch. Carry
your ass away, you f**kin’ bitch.”
During a search of Juniper and his jail cell in April 2004,
corrections officers found a large paper clip concealed under
Juniper’s tongue. Possession of the paper clip was prohibited
contraband because it could be used as a weapon or handcuff key.
In October 2004, Juniper attacked a sleeping inmate with a
pillowcase containing dominoes and kicked the inmate in the
ribs. Juniper left the scene of the attack when challenged by
another inmate and ran into an elderly inmate’s cell, whereupon
he took the footrest from the inmate’s wheelchair. Juniper then
confronted the other inmates with the wheelchair footrest,
threatening, “I kill you.” It required several officers fifteen
to twenty minutes to stop Juniper’s attack.
Juniper offered evidence in mitigation including testimony
from his older sister regarding the physical abuse that he
suffered as a child from his stepfather, who sold drugs from the
home where Juniper lived. Juniper never met his actual father
until he was 23 years old, and had no male role models growing
up except his maternal grandfather. Juniper’s sister and aunt
14
testified that Juniper had a close relationship with his
maternal grandfather and was greatly affected by the
grandfather’s death when Juniper was a youth. Witnesses also
testified about Juniper’s generosity and caring relationship
with several young children, including Keshia’s children.
Dr. Thomas Pasquale, a clinical psychologist appointed to
assist Juniper by performing a psychological assessment,
testified as to his findings. He found significant problems
with Juniper's family of origin including the lack of a
"consistent father figure" and a "withdrawn" and "emotionally
absent" mother. These inadequate relationships in addition to
physical abuse caused Juniper to "fe[el] abandoned," have
"difficult[y] trust[ing] people" and conclude that "if you're
not in control, then you're likely to be harmed."
Dr. Pasquale found that Juniper had an average I.Q. and was
not a psychopath, but he determined that Juniper had "features
of a characterological dysfunction, personality disorder which
demonstrated a failure to adapt [and] develop." Dr. Pasquale
listed the characteristics of this personality disorder for the
jury:
Antisocial thought and behavioral patterns,
difficulties with impulsivity, reliance on the more
primitive defense mechanisms of denial and blame, an
easily compromised conscience, problems with anger,
mood instability, alcohol and drug abuse, and chronic
difficulties with the legal system.
15
Dr. Pasquale diagnosed Juniper with depression, alcohol, cocaine
and marijuana dependence, and antisocial personality disorder.
II. ANALYSIS
A. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Juniper presents 33 assignments of error in this appeal.8
We will initially dispose of those assignments of error that
were not adequately preserved for appeal and therefore will not
be considered.
1. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR WAIVED, DEFAULTED, OR ABANDONED
a. Motion for Forensic Expert
Juniper contends "[t]he trial court erred in failing to
entertain and rule upon Juniper's filed Motion for a Forensic
Expert." The record contains no such motion, although Juniper
filed a document styled Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Appointment of Forensic Expert. Juniper cites only the
Memorandum in his argument on this assignment of error. The
trial court never ruled on Juniper's request for a forensics
expert, but the record reflects no request for a ruling or that
the trial court was ever alerted to the existence of the
Memorandum. Therefore, Juniper has waived any claim under this
assignment of error because he was required to request a ruling
from the trial court and he failed to do so. Lenz v.
16
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 463, 544 S.E.2d 299, 306, cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001) (failure to request ruling on
pretrial motion waived issue on appeal); Riner v. Commonwealth,
268 Va. 296, 323-25, 601 S.E.2d 555, 571-72 (2004) (failure to
alert trial court to fact that it had ruled only on
admissibility of primary hearsay in statement waived defendant's
argument on appeal that the statement was inadmissible as second
level hearsay).
b. Motion for Change of Venue
Juniper assigns error to the trial court's "denying" his
motion for a change of venue and argues the trial court abused
its discretion in doing so. The Commonwealth responds that
Juniper waived this argument on appeal because he failed to
renew the motion prior to trial.
In a pretrial motion for a change of venue Juniper's
counsel stated, "We make [the motion] at this time anticipating
that the Court is going to take it under advisement. We will
continue to make it as we . . . believe that the potential juror
pool is tainted by [media] coverage." The trial court took the
motion under advisement, but Juniper never renewed the motion
before the jury was empanelled.
8
Juniper filed 34 separate assignments of error, but in his
brief to this Court he withdrew Assignment of Error No. 4.
Therefore, it will not be considered on appeal.
17
[W]hen a change of venue motion is taken under
advisement or continued until the jury is empaneled,
it is incumbent on the party seeking a change of venue
to renew the motion or otherwise bring it to the
court's attention. Failure to do so implies
acquiescence in the jury panel and is tantamount to
waiver of the motion for change of venue.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 430-431, 587 S.E.2d 532,
539 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 842 (2004) (citation
omitted).
Accordingly, Juniper has waived any claim under this
assignment of error because he was required to timely renew the
motion or bring the matter to the attention of the trial court,
which he failed to do. See id.; Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va.
81, 94-95, 580 S.E.2d 834, 842 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1194 (2004).
c. Motions to Produce Files
In separate assignments of error, Juniper argues the trial
court erred in refusing to compel the Commonwealth to produce
its files from his prior criminal convictions and of
unadjudicated bad acts that would be referenced in the penalty
phase. He also claims an entitlement to the files related to a
prior prosecution of Rueben for rape.
On appeal, Juniper argues the prior criminal conviction and
unadjudicated bad acts files should have been produced because
"to thoroughly investigate and to essentially reconstruct those
35 . . . events was unduly burdensome, if not impossible." As
18
to Rueben’s files, Juniper's appellate argument is the "files
cannot be reasonably recreated . . . and . . . his
constitutional rights were violated by the failure to compel the
file." Neither argument was made to the trial court.
At trial, Juniper made the same argument as the basis to
grant both motions:
Although the Defendant has an investigator available
to him, the time to interview all the witnesses that
would be essential to reconstructing the information
contained in those files cannot [be] reasonably
ascertained by the Defendant without extensive costs
to the Commonwealth in the form of attorneys fees
and/or investigator fees.
This ground was reemphasized by defense counsel's oral argument
that "it would be more economical for the Commonwealth if they
would provide us with the files rather than having [defense
counsel or the court-appointed investigator] have to try to
reconstruct each of those separate 35 events." In other words,
Juniper's sole contention at trial for both motions is that
granting the motions would save the Commonwealth money.9 This is
obviously not the argument Juniper makes on appeal; therefore,
consideration of either assignment of error is barred under Rule
5:25. See Buck v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449, 452-53, 443 S.E.2d
414, 416 (1994). Furthermore, Juniper proffered no evidence or
9
Juniper has never contended that the Commonwealth failed
to disclose any exculpatory evidence contained in any of the
files that were the subject of the motions.
19
explanation as to any nexus between Rueben’s rape conviction and
any matter at issue in this case.
d. Using “Exceedingly Difficult” Instead of “Substantially
Impair” During Voir Dire
Juniper also claims the trial court erred “by changing the
standard death penalty voir dire partially through jury
selection by using the phrase ‘exceedingly difficult’ instead of
‘substantially impair.’
Part of the way through voir dire of the potential venire,
the trial judge stated, “When I ask these questions[,] instead
of using [‘substantially impair,’] I’m going to start [using the
term] [‘exceedingly difficult.’] I think substantially impaired
– I think it’s a legal term [and] I’m not sure the jurors
understand what I’m talking about when I say that.” Juniper’s
counsel responded, “We don’t quarrel with that but the case law
does use substantially impair.” The trial judge then noted, “If
you-all want to use it in your questions that’s fine, but I’ve
just noticed when I’m asking the question their eyes seem to
glaze over when I start saying things like that.” Juniper’s
counsel replied, “That’s fine.”
This exchange clearly shows that Juniper’s counsel not only
did not object to the trial court’s decision to alter the voir
dire language, but acquiesced to it. Consequently, Juniper has
waived any right to appeal on this issue under Rule 5:25.
20
e. Grant of Immunity to Keon Murray
Juniper argues the trial court erred in "allowing the
Commonwealth to grant immunity to witness Keon Murray with no
notice, contrary to the law, and due process rights of
[Juniper]."
Keon Murray testified for the Commonwealth. At the
beginning of his testimony, he agreed that no "promises [had]
been made to [him] by the Commonwealth in exchange for [his
testimony]." Murray testified that he was close to Juniper and
his family and knew Keshia. When questioned about the events on
the day of the murders, Murray answered, "Your Honor, I plead
the Fifth." The trial court called a recess and outside of the
presence of the jury, the Commonwealth stated its intention to
offer Murray immunity.10 Defense counsel stated his objection as
follows:
I object to the procedure . . . on behalf of
defendant, Mr. Juniper.
. . . .
The question is whether or not this procedure
denies the defendant due process of the law.
. . . .
[T]hreatening [Murray] about his testimony is a
denial of due process to Mr. Juniper. That's the best
argument I can make.
10
The Commonwealth determined Murray could incriminate
himself as an accessory after the fact or give information that
could lead to a charge of misprision of a felony offense.
21
On appeal, Juniper argues the grant of immunity was an
abuse of discretion because it prevented effective cross-
examination of Murray in violation of Juniper's due process
rights under the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, Juniper
contends that "since the grant of immunity was
contemporaneous with the witness's testimony," the defense
lacked "[t]he pre-trial preparation and reflection
required" to allow a full and fair examination of Murray.
In response, the Commonwealth essentially argues that
Juniper has waived this due process argument because he failed
to assert a violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause in the trial court. We agree with the Commonwealth
because the record reflects Juniper never argued to the trial
court the Confrontation Clause claims he now makes on appeal as
the basis of his due process argument.
As he acknowledges on appeal, Juniper's argument that the
trial court's decision undermined his ability to cross-examine
Murray, is actually a claim under the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause. As such, a general assertion of a due
process violation in the trial court is insufficient to preserve
this argument for appeal. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
273 (1994). Therefore, Juniper has waived this assignment of
error under Rule 5:25.
f. Penalty phase jury instructions and verdict forms
22
Juniper assigns error to the trial court “allowing
instructions and verdict forms in the penalty phase regarding
future dangerousness when the predicates were not proven and
that unanimity is required to prove an aggravating factor for
death.”
On brief, Juniper argues only that the trial court was
wrong in “refusing Instruction D-P8.”11 The Commonwealth
contends that Juniper waived the argument regarding instruction
D-P8 because the record does not indicate that Juniper ever
submitted the instruction to the trial court, nor does Juniper
mention the instruction during his arguments and objections
regarding other refused jury instructions.
The record supports the Commonwealth’s claims. The only
mention of instruction D-P8 in the record appears in the text of
11
Instruction No. D-P8 states:
Part A
If you can possibly reach a unanimous verdict, it is
your duty to do so. You should listen to the views and
opinions of your fellow jurors and give consideration to
what they say. However, you should reach an agreement only
if that can be done without sacrificing your individual
judgment. During your deliberations each of you should not
hesitate to re-examine your own views and change your
opinion if you are convinced it was wrong. No juror,
however, should give up his or her honest opinion solely
because of the opinions of other jurors or for the mere
purpose of returning a unanimous verdict.
Part B
In the event you cannot agree as to the sentence, the
court will dismiss you and impose a sentence of
imprisonment for life. That life sentence will be a life
sentence without the possibility of parole.
23
the instruction and Juniper’s Memorandum in Support of
Instruction No. D-P8, which is dated January 13, 2005. Because
the record does not show that the trial court ruled on
Instruction D-P8 or that Juniper requested a ruling or objected
to a ruling made, even if the assignment of error had
corresponded to Juniper’s arguments regarding Instruction No. D-
P8, this Court would not consider the merits of the claim. See
Lenz, 261 Va. at 463, 544 S.E.2d at 306.
2. ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED
Included in Juniper’s assignments of error are arguments
this Court has previously rejected on several occasions.
Finding no reason to modify or revisit our expressed views on
these issues, we adhere to our previous holdings and reject the
following contentions.
a. The Constitutionality of Virginia’s Capital Murder and
Death Penalty Statutes
Juniper challenges the constitutionality of Virginia’s
capital murder and death penalty statutes, but cites only Code
§ 19.2-264.4 and § 19.2-264.5. All of the arguments Juniper
posits in support of his assignment of error have been
previously considered and rejected by this Court:
(1) The terms “future dangerousness” and “vileness” are
unconstitutionally vague, failing to provide the
sentencer with meaningful instruction to avoid the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of a death
sentence. Rejected in Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va.
373, 387, 484 S.E.2d 898, 907, cert. denied, 522 U.S.
24
1018 (1997) (“vileness”); Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247
Va. 395, 403, 442 S.E.2d 678, 684, (“vileness” and
“future dangerousness”), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 513 U.S. 922 (1994); see also Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 205-06, 590 S.E.2d 520,
535-36, cert. denied, 543 U.S 891 (2004) (“future
dangerousness”); Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193,
208, 576 S.E.2d 471, 480, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1019
(2003) (“vileness” and “future dangerousness”).
(1) The statutes impose unconstitutional barriers to
a jury’s consideration of mitigation evidence.
Rejected in Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469,
490-91, 331 S.E.2d 422, 438 (1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1099 (1986); see also Swann v.
Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 228, 441 S.E.2d 195,
200, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 889 (1994).
(2) The statutes are unconstitutional because they
permit a sentencer to find future dangerousness
based upon unadjudicated criminal conduct.
Rejected in Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va.
192, 209-10, 402 S.E.2d 196, 206, cert. denied,
502 U.S. 902 (1991); see also Jackson, 267 Va. at
206, 590 S.E.2d at 536.
(3) The statutes permit consideration of a post-
sentence report that may infringe upon
defendant’s right to due process, to confront
accusers, to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, and to effective assistance of
counsel because the report may contain hearsay
and permits the death sentence despite a showing
of good cause that a life sentence is just and
appropriate. Rejected in O’Dell v. Commonwealth,
234 Va. 672, 701-02, 364 S.E.2d 491, 507-08,
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); Breard v.
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670,
675-76, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994) (“good
cause” for life sentence); see also Jackson, 267
Va. at 206, 590 S.E.2d at 536 (rejecting both
arguments).
(2) The statutes deny individuals sentenced to death
from meaningful appellate review. Rejected in
Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 253, 389
S.E.2d 871, 876 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
25
881 (1990); see also Stockton, 241 Va. at 215-16,
402 S.E.2d at 210.
b. Denial of Motion for a Bill of Particulars – Penalty Phase
Juniper assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his
Motion for a Bill of Particulars to require the Commonwealth to
describe the theory it intended to rely upon to prove the
“vileness” factor at sentencing under Code § 19.2-264.2 and
19.2-264.4(C). But we have repeatedly held that the
Commonwealth need only allege the elements of capital murder set
forth in Code § 18.2-31 without providing the accused with
notice of additional allegations or a bill of particulars
regarding aggravating factors. See, e.g., Muhammad v.
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 493-94, 619 S.E.2d 16, 40 (2005)
(“[I]n Virginia, if the indictment gives a defendant sufficient
notice of the nature and character of the offense charged so he
can make his defense, no bill of particulars is required . . . .
[A]ggravating factors are not constitutionally required to be
recited in a capital murder indictment.” (citations omitted));
see also Swisher v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 471, 480-81, 506
S.E.2d 763, 768 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 812 (1999).
The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in
denying Juniper’s motion for a bill of particulars. See
Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 372, 402 S.E.2d 218,
223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991).
26
c. Conducting Voir Dire in Panels of Five
Juniper also contends the trial court erred “in conducting
voir dire of the potential jurors regarding questions of death
in panels of five.” His argument is based on the contention
that individual voir dire “is the best process for ensuring that
truly unbiased, unprejudiced jurors are chosen to sit in
judgment of the defendant.” We have previously ruled that the
manner of conducting voir dire rests “within the [trial] court’s
discretion.” Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 410-11, 374
S.E.2d 46, 50 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S 1028 (1989). In
Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 276-77, 427 S.E.2d 411,
417-18, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993), we expressly upheld
the trial court’s discretion to question prospective jurors in
panels of five. Juniper makes no individualized claim of
impartiality or prejudice as a result of the trial court’s
manner of conducting voir dire. Consequently, we find no reason
to revisit our previous holdings on this issue.
B. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES
1. REFUSAL TO DISQUALIFY THE COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY
Juniper contends the trial court erred in failing to
disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Norfolk,
John R. Doyle, III, because of his previous representation of
Juniper in a criminal case ten years earlier. In addition,
Juniper challenges the trial court's denial of his request to
27
cross-examine Doyle at the hearing on his disqualification
motion.
In 1994, Doyle represented Juniper on charges of escape
without force and trespass. Juniper pled guilty and entered
into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth. Juniper alleges
Doyle's former representation in this unrelated matter created a
conflict of interest in the case at bar which could be cured
only by Doyle's disqualification from prosecuting him. Juniper
also argues he should have been allowed to cross-examine Doyle
because Juniper carried the burden of proof on the
disqualification motion. See Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va.
107, 138, 590 S.E.2d 537, 556, cert. denied, 543 U.S 892 (2004).
At the hearing on the disqualification motion, Doyle
represented to the trial court that he gained no privileged
information from his prior representation of Juniper, harbored
no animosity towards him as a result of that representation, and
had no personal interest in the prosecution of the case at bar.
Juniper made no argument and presented no evidence to the
contrary. Neither Doyle nor Juniper had a personal recollection
of the prior representation. Furthermore, Doyle represented
that the Commonwealth would not use the record of that former
conviction as evidence. In response, Juniper agreed that this
concession by the Commonwealth benefited him, but then made the
argument that allowing Doyle to continue the prosecution did not
28
"[do] justice . . . to the community represented by the jury
which arguably should have that evidence." Juniper does not
repeat this argument on appeal, but simply contends Doyle's
status as Commonwealth Attorney creates an undefined conflict of
interest. All of Juniper's arguments are meritless.
The interest to be considered on a motion for
disqualification of a prosecutor is the protection of the
defendant's former attorney-client relationship and his right to
a fair trial in the matter at hand. See Powell, 267 Va. at 139,
590 S.E.2d at 557 (Commonwealth's attorney need not be
disqualified if defendant's antagonism had no "effect on his
professional judgment in seeking fairly and impartially to see
justice done"); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387, 394, 329
S.E.2d 22, 26-27 (1985) (due process rights of criminal
defendant violated when Commonwealth's Attorney who has conflict
of interest relevant to defendant's case prosecutes defendant).
Juniper has alleged no personal prejudice in the trial of
his case as a result of the former attorney-client relationship
with Doyle. The trial court argument that Doyle's offer not to
use his former conviction does an injustice to the jury and the
community at large is irrelevant, if not frivolous. The trial
court thus did not err in denying Juniper's motion for
disqualification nor in refusing his request to cross-examine
Doyle at the hearing on that motion.
29
2. REFUSAL TO FUND EXPERT WITNESSES
Juniper separately assigns error to the trial court's
denial of his motions to fund a corrections expert and
mitigation expert in addition to those experts already appointed
by the court.12
Citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), and
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), Juniper contends that
failure to provide funds for his requested experts excluded
mitigation evidence in violation of his federal constitutional
rights. We disagree. The cases Juniper cites establish the
admissibility of specific mitigating evidence, not a
constitutional mandate that certain expert assistance be
provided an indigent defendant.13 See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4-5
(defendant's behavior during incarceration relevant to
determination of future dangerousness); and Eddings, 455 U.S. at
116 (background and mental and emotional development of youthful
defendant must be considered a mitigating factor). These cases
provide no support for Juniper's argument that his
12
The trial court entered orders allowing Juniper to retain
Wayne Kennedy as a special investigator for the defense, and
appointing Dr. Thomas A. Pasquale, Ph.D., as a mental health
expert "to assist defense counsel in the preparation and
presentation of information concerning the defendant's history,
character, or mental condition."
13
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985), established a
three part test to determine when the Constitution requires that
certain expert assistance be provided an indigent defendant.
30
constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's denial
of his motion to fund mitigation and corrections experts.
Instead, we note that while the Commonwealth is required to
provide adequate expert assistance to indigent defendants in
certain circumstances, it is not required to provide them with
"all assistance that a non-indigent defendant may purchase."
Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 211, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925
(1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1154 (1997).
[A]n indigent defendant seeking the appointment of an
expert has the burden of showing a particularized need
therefor. The required showing must be determined on a
case-by-case basis, and a determination whether an
adequate showing has been made is a matter that rests
within a trial court's discretion. . . . A hope or
suspicion that favorable evidence may be procured from
an expert, however, is not sufficient to require the
appointment of an expert.
Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 171, 477 S.E.2d 270, 276
(1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997) (citation omitted).
The Commonwealth maintains that Juniper failed to show a
particularized need for either of these experts. We agree.
With regard to the corrections expert, Juniper argued that
such a person was "necessary to examine the defendant's
background, behavior in the Norfolk City Jail and previous
incarcerations and provide testimony and documents." He
proffered no reason why examination of such records could not be
Juniper has made no argument under Ake that his requested
experts are "basic tools of an adequate defense." Id.
31
adequately conducted by his counsel, investigator or mental
health expert. As Juniper failed to show a particularized need
for a corrections expert, the trial court properly denied his
motion.
Juniper contended the mitigation expert could "locate
essential witnesses and data, examine and evaluate testimony and
documents." In denying this motion, the trial court noted that
the services of the requested mitigation expert were duplicative
of those of the court appointed private investigator, Wayne
Kennedy.
I can't think of anybody who's better qualified to
locate essential witnesses and data, examine and
evaluate testimony and documents than [Wayne Kennedy]
is. I don't know how much money the court authorized
for Mr. Kennedy when he was appointed, but [if there]
are other things that you all think he needs to do and
you need to come back, do so. Wayne Kennedy is
perfectly capable of doing these things, so that
motion is denied.
Although not receiving the particular expert he requested,
Juniper, in fact, received the services he requested. Thus, his
motion for a mitigation expert was properly denied. See Winston
v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 581, 604 S.E.2d 21, 30-31 (2004),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 107 (2005).
3. REFUSAL TO PERMIT EXAMINATION OF INVESTIGATORS UNDER OATH
The trial court denied Juniper's discovery request in a
Motion to Examine Investigators Under Oath in which he sought to
“ensure that law enforcement officials have not concealed
32
exculpatory evidence . . . and that any and all such evidence
will be available prior to trial.” Juniper assigns error to
this ruling arguing that the trial court abused its discretion.
We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the
motion sought material beyond the scope to which Juniper is
entitled under Rule 3A:11 or any other provision of law.
There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a
criminal case, even where a capital offense is charged.
Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 490-91, 404 S.E.2d 227,
233, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991). While a defendant has
the right to exculpatory evidence in the Commonwealth's
possession upon request, Stover v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 789,
795, 180 S.E.2d 504, 509 (1971), Rule 3A:11 defines the other
discovery available to the accused in a felony case. See
Hackman v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 710, 713, 261 S.E.2d 555, 558
(1980) (decided under previous Rule 3A:14). Under Rule 3A:11, a
felony defendant is entitled to his own "written or recorded
statements" made to law enforcement personnel, certain written
reports in the possession of the Commonwealth, and "tangible
objects . . . within the possession, custody, or control of the
Commonwealth" which "may be material to the preparation of [the]
defense." Rule 3A:11(b). The Rule specifically does not
authorize discovery of "statements made by Commonwealth
witnesses or prospective . . . witnesses to agents of the
33
Commonwealth . . . in connection with the investigation or
prosecution of the case." Rule 3A:11(b)(2).
Citing past instances in other cases when law enforcement
failed to provide prosecutors with all exculpatory evidence in
their possession, Juniper argues that he should be able to
examine the Commonwealth's investigators at a pretrial hearing
in order to determine independently if they have provided all
Brady material to the Commonwealth's Attorney. See Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Juniper offers no authority
to support this argument.
It is "the individual prosecutor [who] has a duty to learn
of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police." Burns
v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 328, 541 S.E.2d 872, 886, cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 437 (1995)). Juniper admitted that "the Commonwealth's
Attorney has apparently disclosed all exculpatory evidence," and
he does not assert that any additional discoverable material
actually exists or that he has any reason to believe that there
is any which has not been disclosed.
We agree with the Commonwealth that Juniper's motion is "a
speculative search for evidence." No statute or rule of court
affords a defendant the right to use a pretrial hearing as a
discovery vehicle in this manner. Davis v. Commonwealth, 215
34
Va. 816, 821, 213 S.E.2d 785, 788-89 (1975); see also Williams
v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 724, 729, 160 S.E.2d 781, 784-85
(1968). Because granting Juniper's motion to examine the
Commonwealth's investigators under oath would have allowed
Juniper discovery which is not authorized under Rule 3A:11 or
otherwise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion.
4. JURY SELECTION ISSUES
a. Limitation of Questions During Voir Dire
In four separate assignments of error, Juniper contends the
trial court abused its discretion by limiting his voir dire
examination of prospective jurors. Specifically, Juniper argues
he should have been allowed to question potential jurors about
(1) the age and sex of their children and grandchildren; (2)
their educational coursework in psychology, psychiatry, or law;
(3) their military experience, including courts martial; and (4)
their “philosophical” beliefs. Although Juniper argues the
trial court abused its discretion, he also relies on the
statutory right to examine potential jurors on issues of
relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice under Code § 8.01-
358.
The Commonwealth responds there was no abuse of discretion
and that parties only have a right to ask potential jurors
questions “relevant to the [Code § 8.01-358] factors of
35
relationship, interest, opinion or bias.” The Commonwealth
contends Juniper’s proposed questions were not relevant to any
of those factors.
The purpose of voir dire is to protect an accused’s
constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const.
Amends. VI and XIV; Va. Const. Art. I, § 8. Code § 8.01-358
expands upon these principles by providing, in relevant part:
[t]he court and counsel for either party shall have
the right to examine under oath any person who is
called as a juror therein and shall have the right to
ask such person or juror directly any relevant
question to ascertain whether he is related to either
party, or has any interest in the cause, or has
expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any
bias or prejudice therein . . . .
Even so, parties do not have “an unlimited constitutional
or statutory right to propound any question to a jury panel.
Rather, the questions propounded during voir dire must be
relevant to the factors prescribed in Code § 8.01-358.”
Commonwealth v. Hill, 264 Va. 315, 319, 568 S.E.2d 673, 675
(2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1202 (2003). Thus, “[i]f an
answer to the question would necessarily disclose, or clearly
lead to the disclosure of the statutory factors of relationship,
interest, opinion, or prejudice, it must be permitted.
Questions which go beyond this standard are entirely within the
trial court’s discretion.” LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va.
36
564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S 1063
(1984). A party does not have a right to
propound any question he wishes, or to extend voir
dire questioning ad infinitum. The court must afford
a party a full and fair opportunity to ascertain
whether prospective jurors ‘stand indifferent in the
cause,’ but the trial judge retains the discretion to
determine when the parties have had sufficient
opportunity to do so.
Id.
i. Age and Gender of Juror’s Children and Grandchildren
Juniper contends the trial court abused its discretion in
restricting his voir dire of potential jurors by limiting
inquiry about the specific age and gender of their children or
grandchildren. This limitation, Juniper argues, had the
"potential for prejudice in contemplating punishment,” because
of “a parent’s protective instincts toward his or her own
children” in view of the young ages of Shearyia and Nykia.
The Commonwealth argues that the question requesting the
age and gender of a potential juror’s children and grandchildren
was unnecessarily intrusive. Furthermore, the Commonwealth
avers that the actual voir dire of potential jurors ascertained
whether they had children or grandchildren under the age of 14,
and, if so, whether those jurors could fairly try the case.
Although the trial court did not permit an open-ended
inquiry, it did permit the panels of potential jurors to be
asked: “[D]o [any of] you have children or grandchildren under
37
the age of 14?” and “Would the fact that those of you who have
answered this question in the affirmative have children or
grandchildren under the age of 14, given the statement of the
case that was read to you by the Court . . . prevent you from
giving both sides in this case a fair trial and . . . basing
your verdict on the evidence?” The trial court had informed the
potential venire that "I expect that the Commonwealth will
present evidence that the defendant shot and killed . . . Nykia
Stephens who was four years old and Shearyia Stephens who was
two years old."
Juniper conceded at trial that a juror would not be struck
for cause based solely upon the age or sex of that juror’s
children. He nonetheless contends the trial court abused its
discretion in not permitting his requested inquiry. We disagree
with Juniper that the trial court abused its discretion.
Juniper had the opportunity to ascertain from all potential
jurors if they had a child or grandchild under the age of 14.
He did not ask two of the ten panels this question at all, and
in two panels only asked one or two of the potential jurors.
All potential jurors in the remaining six panels were asked
these questions.
38
Furthermore, Juniper had the opportunity, in addition to
the trial court’s examination on bias,14 to specifically inquire
as to bias on the basis of the age of a juror’s progeny. All
prospective jurors who responded that having young children or
grandchildren would affect their ability to be impartial were
struck for cause without objection. Juniper thus had full
knowledge of those potential jurors who had not indicated bias
or prejudice as a result of having young children or
grandchildren and could consider this factor in exercising
peremptory strikes if he so chose.
Nonetheless, he argues, without citation to authority, that
he should have been able to gather further information about the
age and gender of the potential jurors’ children and
grandchildren. As we noted in an analogous voir dire context in
LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 582, 304 S.E.2d at 653, “[s]uch attitudes
might well be interesting to counsel, but they have no
relationship to the juror’s ability to abide by the court’s
14
In addition to pursuing other specific areas of potential
bias or prejudice, the trial court asked the panels variations
of the following open-ended questions to determine the potential
jurors’ impartiality and fairness: “Do any of you know of any
reason . . . why you could not or would not be able to fairly
and impartially determine the facts of the case or abide by the
instructions of the Court on capital murder sentencing issues?”
“Do you know of any reason . . . even if I haven’t already asked
you . . . that would prevent you from giving a fair and
impartial trial to the Commonwealth and to Mr. Juniper based
solely on the law and the evidence?”
39
instructions, to find the facts impartially, and to apply the
law to the facts conscientiously.”
Our jurisprudence according deference to the trial court’s
discretion in consideration of juror voir dire matters is long-
standing. “Whether to permit a party to ask a question that
goes beyond what is permissible under Code § 8.01-358 is a
matter entirely within the trial court’s discretion.” Powell,
267 Va. at 143, 590 S.E.2d at 559; see also Green, 266 Va. at
96-97, 580 S.E.2d at 843 (“When, as here, a trial court affords
ample opportunity to counsel to ask relevant questions and where
the questions actually propounded by the trial court were
sufficient to preserve a defendant’s right to trial by a fair
and impartial jury, we will generally not reverse a trial
court’s decision to limit or disallow certain questions from
defense counsel.”); Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 458, 470
S.E.2d 114, 125, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996) (“[S]ince
[the accused] had ample opportunity to ask relevant questions,
and since the questions asked were sufficient to preserve [the
defendant’s] right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask
additional questions.”); LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 581, 304 S.E.2d
at 653. We see no reason not to accord deference to the trial
court's ruling on this issue.
40
In addition to our long-standing recognition of deference
to the trial court’s discretion on matters of voir dire, we find
instructive the decision of the Supreme Court of California,
which examined a similar issue in People v. Box, 5 P.3d 130,
146-47 (Cal. 2000), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (2001).
Box involved a multiple homicide, one of the victims being
a three-year-old boy. Id. at 142. Defendant’s counsel sought
to ascertain in voir dire “whether the prospective jurors had
young children or grandchildren.” Id. at 147. The trial court
declined to permit that inquiry, but did make specific
examination of the potential venire as to any bias based on one
of the murder victims being a young child. Id. Finding that
“the bias these inquiries sought to uncover was adequately
addressed” by the trial court’s voir dire, the California
Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion. Id.; see also
United States v. Joe, 831 F.2d 218, 221 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1072 (1988).
In the case at bar, Juniper’s counsel was permitted greater
latitude of inquiry than in Box, having the ability to ascertain
those potential jurors with children or grandchildren under the
age of 14. The trial court, and Juniper, made full inquiry as
to any bias or prejudice on the part of such potential jurors.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
refusal of Juniper’s requested inquiry.
41
ii. Other Questions
Juniper also contends he should have been able to inquire
as to a juror’s educational background in the fields of
psychology, psychiatry, or law because those studies could lead
to impermissible “preconceived notions” regarding the testimony
of Juniper’s expert witnesses or on matters of the law. The
Commonwealth responds that the specific questions Juniper
proposed did not inquire as to whether the potential jurors had
earned particular degrees, but whether they had "any education"
in the particular fields. The Commonwealth further questions
the relevance of determining that “somebody once took Psych 101”
to evaluate a juror’s potential bias.
Juniper’s concerns regarding the potential jurors’
educational background in psychology, psychiatry, and law were
adequately addressed by inquiring about the potential jurors’
occupations and, when necessary, for a description of their work
responsibilities. Little, if any, relevant information would
have emerged from learning the specific coursework of a
potential juror outside their particular career. The trial
court did not err in barring Juniper’s proposed questions.
Juniper also assigns error to his inability to question
potential jurors regarding their military experience,
particularly as to courts martial. He contends that such an
inquiry could reveal whether potential jurors had a background
42
in military law enforcement or the military justice system. The
Commonwealth argues that a juror’s generic military experience
is irrelevant because “members of the armed forces generally
have no role in the investigation or prosecution of crimes.”
Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends any relevant concern
regarding a background in military law enforcement was
adequately covered by the trial court’s direct inquiry about law
enforcement experience.15
Juniper’s concerns were adequately covered by the trial
court’s direct question to jurors about law enforcement service.
A potential juror’s military experience would have had little,
15
The transcript of the voir dire depicts the relevant
question and clarification asked of the entire panel of
potential jurors:
Have any of you or any member of your immediate
family ever been employed in law enforcement? I’ll
try to give you some definition.
Immediate family I would certainly think includes
your husband, your wife, your parents, your children,
any relative who lives with you. I know some families
are closer than others. Any family member you feel
especially close to, I’ll have to leave that up to
your judgment.
Law enforcement would include state, local
police, sheriff’s department, correctional officers,
FBI agents, ATF agents, military police, secret
service agents, naval investigators. I’m sure there
are other agencies I haven’t thought of.
Law enforcement officers don’t include lawyers
unless they are prosecuting attorneys, but anyway,
with those general definitions in mind I’ll restate
the question.
Have any of you or members of your immediate
family ever been employed in law enforcement?
43
if any, probative value, as the trial court confirmed that
Juniper was never a member of the armed services. To the extent
that requesting the potential jurors’ military service would
have shed light on their law enforcement experience, the trial
court’s explanation of “law enforcement” covered any law
enforcement experience while in military service.
Lastly, we find no merit in Juniper’s assertion that the
potential jurors should have been directly asked about their
“philosophical” beliefs, which might affect their judgment as
jurors. The trial court asked a series of questions designed to
alert jurors to possible bias from their opinions or beliefs
that could influence their function as impartial triers of fact.
Although “religious or moral” beliefs were specifically
addressed in voir dire, the trial court also inquired as to “any
opinion or belief” that would influence the potential jurors’
consideration of sentences of life or death and “any reason
whatsoever” that would prevent them from affording Juniper a
fair trial. (Emphasis added.) Juniper’s request is semantic
irrelevance.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
permit Juniper to ask potential jurors any of the aforementioned
questions.
b. Failure to Strike Certain Jurors for Cause
(Emphasis added.)
44
Juniper assigns error to the trial court’s failure to
strike four potential jurors: Henry, Colander, Ashby, and
Molinaro. Code § 8.01-358 and Rule 3A:14 facilitate an
accused’s constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury
by providing that members of the venire must “stand indifferent
in the cause.” A prospective juror
must be able to give [the accused] a fair and
impartial trial. Upon this point nothing should be
left to inference or doubt. All the tests applied by
the courts, all the enquiries made into the state of
the juror’s mind, are merely to ascertain whether [the
juror] comes to the trial free from partiality and
prejudice.
Wolfe, 265 Va. at 211, 576 S.E.2d at 482 (quoting Wright v.
Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 941, 943 (1879)).
On appeal, this Court generally gives deference to the
trial court’s decision whether to strike a potential juror for
cause. Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d
170, 176 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1218 (2000). We do so
“[b]ecause the trial judge has the opportunity, which we lack,
to observe and evaluate the apparent sincerity,
conscientiousness, intelligence, and demeanor of prospective
jurors first hand . . . .” Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114,
123-24, 360 S.E.2d 352, 358 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015
(1988) (citing Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 256, 258-59, 307
S.E.2d 896, 898 (1983)). Consequently, unless “manifest error
45
appears in the record,” the trial court’s decision will not be
disturbed. Id.
In reviewing whether a potential juror should have been
removed from the venire, we consider “the prospective juror’s
entire voir dire, not just isolated portions.” Jackson, 267 Va.
at 191, 590 S.E.2d at 527. Guided by these principles, we
review the entire voir dire of the four prospective jurors
Juniper argues should have been stricken for cause.
i. Juror Henry
Juniper moved to strike prospective juror Henry for the
“bias and prejudice” shown in his responses to whether he would
consider life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to
the death penalty. Juniper asserts that prospective juror Henry
was not successfully rehabilitated from his statement that he
“would more likely favor the death penalty.” Juniper contends
Henry’s voir dire “demonstrated the type of preconceived opinion
that the process of voir dire is designed to ferret out.”
The Commonwealth submits that the totality of Henry’s voir
dire indicates an open mind to consideration of a sentence of
life imprisonment. In particular, the Commonwealth notes that
Henry stated that he did not know whether there were mitigating
factors that would affect his decision and agreed that he would
“consider all the alternative punishments prior to reaching a
decision.”
46
The record contains the following exchange:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [You] are able to consider life
imprisonment without parole as an alternative to the
death penalty in this case?
MR. HENRY: Yes sir. It’s possible, but I would more
likely favor the death penalty.
. . . .
THE COURT: You could consider life imprisonment
without parole?
MR. HENRY: It’s within the realm of possibility, but
not likely.
. . . .
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Dr. Henry, would you restate what
you said a moment ago?
DR. HENRY: I said it’s within the realm of
possibility that I would – could see a sentence of
life imprisonment, but most likely I would favor the
death penalty based on what you’ve told me so far. I
don’t know if there are other mitigating factors that
could come up, but in general, I would favor the death
penalty.
. . . .
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: So, Dr. Henry . . . you
know at the end when it comes time for a jury to
deliberate the Court will give you instructions
setting out the law, giving you guidance as to [how
to] conduct your deliberations and you could follow
the Court’s instructions including if the Court
instructed the jury to consider all the alternative
punishments prior to reaching a decision? Is that
fair to say?
[DR. HENRY]: Yes.
In denying Juniper’s motion to strike Henry, the trial
court stated,
47
I gleaned from his answer he said he would be
inclined to the death penalty if that is proven and
the defendant is guilty of capital murder, but he
could consider the other one. . . . I think Dr.
Henry’s voir dire in its entirety [reflects] he’d be
open to consider both penalties.
Henry’s overall responses to voir dire questions relevant
to this particular issue reveal that he could “stand indifferent
in the cause” and would consider both the prosecution and
defense’s evidence when determining the appropriate sentence for
Juniper. He unequivocally responded “yes” when asked if he
would conduct deliberations as a juror according to the trial
court’s instructions, and he mentioned that mitigating factors
would play a role in determining Juniper’s sentence.
As we have previously stated, “[t]he standard to be applied
by a trial court in deciding whether to exclude or retain a
prospective juror is whether the prospective juror’s views
‘would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath.’ ” Breard, 248 Va. at 77, 445 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting
Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246, 397 S.E.2d 385, 391
(1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991)); see also Schmitt v.
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 139-41, 547 S.E.2d 186, 195-96
(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094 (2002). Henry satisfied
this test by indicating that he could consider sentences both of
life or death in accord with the evidence. We also afford
48
deference to the trial court’s observation that Henry’s
responses showed he would “be open to consider both penalties.”
Therefore, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s
decision refusing to strike this juror for cause.
ii. Juror Colander
Juniper claims the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to strike prospective juror Colander from the venire
because she had stated that it would cause hardship to be away
from her position as a public school principal for the duration
of the trial. The Commonwealth counters Juniper’s assertion by
observing that difficulty finding a replacement at work is
“irrelevant to any disqualifier under §8.01-358.” When refusing
to strike Colander from the venire, the trial court expressed
confidence that the Norfolk public school system could
accommodate her absence.
Juniper has not cited, nor does the record reflect, any
basis for removing Colander for cause. Decisions of the trial
court regarding whether to retain or excuse potential jurors are
entitled to great deference on appeal. As such, we find no
manifest error in the trial court’s decision rejecting Juniper’s
motion to strike Colander as a juror.
iii. Juror Ashby
Juniper contends that prospective juror Ashby should have
been struck for cause because her answers “indicated that she
49
[could not] sit fairly and impartially as she [had] already
formed opinions regarding Juniper and the evidence before the
commencement of the trial.” Specifically, Juniper cites Ashby’s
statement that “it’s hard when kids are involved” and her
knowledge of the case through media coverage to support this
assertion.
The Commonwealth responds that Ashby’s statements plainly
show she had not formed an opinion and would fairly contemplate
the evidence and instructions presented at trial. The
Commonwealth also relies on the trial court’s observation that
although “[Ashby’s] answers at least regarding capital
punishment were somewhat inconsistent,” her responses did not
provide a “reason to strike.”
The following colloquy occurred after Ashby indicated she
had heard “something” about the case from media reports:
[COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: Has what you heard about it
or the seriousness of the allegations made you to
[sic] form an opinion about the guilt or innocence of
the person who’s accused?
[MS. ASHBY]: No. It haven’t [sic] made me form an
opinion or nothing, but it’s hard when kids is
involved. I’ll put it that way. So I can’t say. I
can’t form an opinion until all evidence is heard or
what.
[COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: So you would base your
decision on the evidence that you will hear in the
courtroom which may include the deaths of children and
– but make your decision on what you hear in the
courtroom? You’re nodding your head yes?
50
[MS. ASHBY]: Yes.
. . . .
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ms. Ashby, based upon what you
have heard or read, have you formed an opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of Mr. Juniper?
MS. ASHBY: No. No.
The totality of Ashby’s voir dire reflects that she would
not rely on any information she had read or heard about the case
and that she had not formed an opinion regarding Juniper’s guilt
or innocence. As such, she would be able to “stand indifferent
in the cause” and fairly and impartially perform the duties of a
juror.
Mere exposure to media coverage does not disqualify a
potential juror as long as that individual can still fairly and
impartially weigh the evidence presented at trial. See Mu’Min
v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 430 (1991); see also Wolfe, 265 Va.
at 209-12, 576 S.E.2d at 480-82; Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va.
172, 192-94, 563 S.E.2d 695, 709-10 (2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1123 (2003). Consequently, we find that the trial court
did not err in refusing to strike this potential juror.
iv. Juror Molinaro
Juniper’s final challenge is that prospective juror
Molinaro should have been struck for cause because she was an
acquaintance of the Commonwealth’s Attorney. Juniper asserts
that when asked if it “would affect her ability to sit fairly
51
and impartially[, Molinaro] responded, ‘[I]’ve been thinking
that since nine o’clock this morning, and I don’t think so.’ ”
This exchange, Juniper contends, reflects Molinaro’s clear
“inability to give an unequivocal answer in light of her
familiarity to the prosecutor” and “illustrated her inability to
be a qualified juror for Juniper.”
The Commonwealth initially notes that Juniper misquotes
Molinaro’s response to the question regarding her impartiality
in such a way that suggests equivocation on Molinaro’s part that
her actual response does not. The record demonstrates
Molinaro’s complete response was, “I’ve been thinking about that
since nine o’clock this morning, and I don’t think so.”
(Emphasis added). From Molinaro’s actual response, the
Commonwealth asserts that far from equivocation, her answers
show “conscientious introspection with respect to possible bias
before reaching the conclusion that she could be fair.” In
light of this showing of truthfulness and frankness, the
Commonwealth contends the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to strike Molinaro.
The record shows the following colloquy during Molinaro’s
voir dire:
THE COURT: [W]hat’s the nature of your acquaintance
with [the Commonwealth’s Attorney]?
. . . .
52
MS. MOLINARO: I know his wife from my work at
Sentara. I did – am I allowed to say I did put some
signs up in yard[s] in the neighborhood when he was
running for Commonwealth[’s] Attorney.
THE COURT: Do you believe your acquaintance with Mr.
Doyle would in any way prejudice you in favor of the
prosecution or impair your ability to give a fair and
impartial trial to –
MS. MOLINARO: I’ve been thinking about that since
nine o’clock this morning, and I don’t think so.
. . . .
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: . . . I just wanted to be
sure we brought that all out. In fact, you may be
acquainted with [Defense Counsel] as well.
[MS. MOLINARO]: I know of [Defense Counsel] through
soccer.
. . . .
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can you be certain [that you would
not be inclined or partial to the Commonwealth in this
case]?
[MS. MOLINARO]: I feel certain that knowing him the
little that I do, that I would be an impartial juror
just because I have faith in myself, but the reason I
have been asking is because I don’t do this very often
and so I do not know, but I do not think.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You threw me off.
[MS. MOLINARO]: Yeah. Okay. Well, you’re more
experienced with screening jurors, but I think that I
am an impartial juror.
In rejecting Juniper’s motion to strike Molinaro, the trial
court stated:
I think she said she’d been thinking about it all
morning. The impression I got from observing her
demeanor was I imagine she made up her mind she can be
53
fair in this case. . . . If people who knew the
Commonwealth’s attorney were disqualified from being
on a jury, in most rural areas in this state you’d
never have a criminal trial.
Our previous decisions have generally held that
relationship does not automatically disqualify a potential juror
from being fair and impartial. Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va.
322, 325, 337 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1112 (1986) (citing Calhoun, 226 Va. at 263, 307 S.E.2d at 900).
The overarching consideration is whether the trial court erred
in determining that the prospective juror would fairly and
impartially decide the accused’s case. See, e.g., Jackson, 255
Va. 625, 640-41, 499 S.E.2d 538, 548 (1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1067 (1999) (upholding trial court’s refusal to strike a
juror for cause when the juror’s husband was a first cousin of
the Commonwealth’s attorney); Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va.
324, 343, 468 S.E.2d 98, 109, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996),
overruled in part on other grounds by Morrisette v. Warden of
the Sussex I State Prison, 270 Va. 188, 202, 613 S.E.2d 551, 562
(2005) (upholding retention of juror when the Commonwealth’s
attorney in a capital case formerly represented prospective
juror in a matter and the prospective juror still regarded him
as his “personal attorney”); Wise, 230 Va. at 325, 337 S.E.2d at
717 (1985) (upholding retention of prospective juror who was the
54
Commonwealth’s attorney’s “golfing buddy” and “long standing”
friend).
The voir dire of Molinaro demonstrates that after carefully
considering her association with the Commonwealth’s Attorney,
she could be impartial as a juror. We do not find manifest
error in the trial court’s conclusion that Molinaro would “stand
indifferent in the cause” and act as an impartial and fair
juror.
c. Batson Challenges
Juniper contends the trial court “erred in denying
Juniper’s Batson challenge to jurors Mix, McClain, Bailey,
Boddie and Dawley.” “In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89
(1986), the United States Supreme Court held that excluding a
potential juror solely on the basis of the juror’s race is
purposeful discrimination and a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.” Jackson, 266 Va. at 435, 587 S.E.2d at
542.
When a defendant makes a Batson challenge to the use of a
peremptory strike, he must show that the individual “is a member
of a cognizable racial group,” Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 262
Va. 388, 394, 551 S.E.2d 306, 309 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
1060 (2002) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96), and “make a prima
facie showing that the peremptory strike was made on racial
55
grounds.” Jackson, 266 Va. at 436, 587 S.E.2d at 542. Mere
exclusion of members of a particular race by using peremptory
strikes “does not itself establish such a prima facie case under
Batson.” Yarbrough, 262 Va. at 394, 551 S.E.2d at 309. To
establish a prima facie case, the defendant must also “identify
facts and circumstances that raise an inference that potential
jurors were excluded based on their race.” Id.
Once a prima facie case is put before the court, the burden
shifts to the prosecution “to produce race-neutral explanations
for striking the juror.” The defendant can then argue that the
prosecution’s explanations were purely a pretext for
unconstitutional discrimination. Jackson, 266 Va. at 436, 587
S.E.2d at 542.
Juniper offered no basis for his challenge that the strikes
were racially motivated other than observing that the jurors
were African-American.16 Nonetheless, the Commonwealth offered
the following race-neutral explanations for exercising its
peremptory strikes against the five jurors:
16
Although Mix, McClain, Boddie, and Dawley were African-
American, Juniper did not establish Bailey’s race. He never
inquired as to Bailey’s race or offered any evidence in that
regard. The trial court refused Juniper’s request that it find
as a matter of fact that Bailey was African-American and found
“[i]t appears Ms. Bailey is white.” Juniper did not assign
error to that finding and under Rule 5:17(c) he cannot challenge
that finding on appeal.
56
(1) India Mix was struck because she had been a
client of one of Juniper’s attorneys in a prior
criminal case.
(2) The Commonwealth stated that it was “concern[ed]”
by the fact that Charlotte McClain’s brother had
been prosecuted in Norfolk by the Commonwealth
Attorney’s Office the previous year resulting in
a conviction.
(3) Malia Bailey was struck due to “inconsistent”
answers to questions regarding the possible
imposition of the death penalty. The prosecutor
observed that at one point in the voir dire, Ms.
Bailey “was pretty close” to crying as a result
of the questioning regarding the death sentence
and “said at one point it makes her sick to think
about . . . the possible imposition of the death
penalty.” In addition, the Commonwealth cited
Ms. Bailey’s on-going medical appointments
related to breast cancer treatments.
(4) Richard Boddie was struck because of his
“affirmative [response] that it would be
difficult to impose the death penalty.” In
addition, the Commonwealth noted that Mr. Boddie
was the final potential alternate juror who had
indicated “any difficulty” with the death
penalty.
(5) Michelle Dawley was struck because her brother
had been convicted of murder 25 years ago, and
the prosecutor believed that the conviction would
affect her.
The trial court concluded that Juniper failed to satisfy
the threshold requirement of a prima facie showing that any of
the strikes was racially motivated. In making its decision, the
trial court noted, “over the seven strikes the Commonwealth
made, four were black, . . . three were white which is generally
in fairly good proportion from the total mix on which they had
57
to strike.”17 Even if a prima facie case had been made, however,
the trial court found that the Commonwealth had provided a
sufficient race-neutral reason to strike each prospective juror
at issue.
Our previous decisions recognize the “unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor and credibility of potential jurors during
voir dire,” and therefore afford the trial court’s determination
whether the Commonwealth’s explanation is race neutral “great
deference.” Jackson, 266 Va. at 437, 587 S.E.2d at 543. We
will not reverse the trial court’s decision “unless it is
clearly erroneous.” Id.
Even if we assume that Juniper made a prima facie showing,
we find nothing in the record to support a conclusion that the
trial court’s determination was clearly erroneous. Far from
being pretextual explanations, as Juniper contends, the
Commonwealth’s reasons for dismissing each of the potential
jurors directly related to valid race-neutral reasons.
Furthermore, “the record supports the Commonwealth’s
characterization of the statements made by the potential jurors
in question.” See Jackson, 266 Va. at 437, 587 S.E.2d at 543.
17
Even if Ms. Bailey were properly categorized as African-
American, using five of seven peremptory strikes to remove
potential African-American jurors would not necessarily
establish a prima facie case of discrimination or overcome the
prosecution’s race-neutral explanations for its strikes. See,
58
Finding no basis for Juniper’s contention that the juror strikes
were racially motivated, we will not disturb the trial court’s
findings that Juniper had not established a prima facie case of
racial discrimination and that the Commonwealth’s explanations
for striking these jurors were race neutral.
5. DENIAL OF SUBSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERT AND FINDING OF
FAILURE TO COOPERATE
The trial court granted Juniper's motion under Code § 19.2-
264.3:1(A) for the appointment of a mental health expert, Dr.
Thomas A. Pasquale, to assist with his defense. Pursuant to
Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F), the trial court granted the
Commonwealth's request for a similar expert, Dr. David Keenan.
The trial court also advised Juniper that his refusal to
cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert could result in the
exclusion of testimony by his expert witness or notice to the
jury that Juniper refused to cooperate with the Commonwealth's
expert. Juniper acknowledged to the trial court that he
understood the requirements and the potential consequences for
noncompliance. Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2).
On December 29, 2004, the Commonwealth's expert, Dr.
Keenan, met with Juniper. Ten minutes into the meeting,
"Juniper stood, turned around, banged on the glass, said a few
things, banged on the glass." Juniper became angry, cursed at
e.g., Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 276-77, 455 S.E.2d
59
Dr. Keenan and told a guard that Dr. Keenan was "trying to set
[him] up." Juniper demanded that the guard remove him from the
interview room. The interview was thus terminated, and Dr.
Keenan testified that he did not "believe [he could] get any
useful information from Mr. Juniper" should they arrange another
meeting.
The Commonwealth then filed a motion under the provisions
of Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2) to bar Juniper from presenting
expert testimony from Dr. Pasquale at sentencing or to permit
the Commonwealth "to introduce evidence of the defendant's
refusal to cooperate." Juniper filed a motion to appoint a
substitute expert for Dr. Keenan. At the hearing on this
motion, Juniper again acknowledged that refusal to cooperate
with Dr. Keenan could result in either "tell[ing] the jury that
[he] refused to cooperate or . . . exclud[ing] Dr. Pasquale."
Though Dr. Keenan and Juniper's accounts of the interview
questions differ, Juniper did not dispute that he refused to
cooperate with Dr. Keenan or that he terminated the interview.
Rather than asking that Juniper be prohibited from
presenting his own expert testimony, the Commonwealth agreed to
allow Juniper to present testimony from Dr. Pasquale as long as
the jury was informed of his refusal to cooperate with Dr.
Keenan. The trial court found "as a matter of fact that Mr.
219, 223-24, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 889 (1995).
60
Juniper refused to cooperate with the evaluation requested by
the Commonwealth," and ordered the sanction recommended by the
Commonwealth.
Juniper assigns error to the trial court's finding of
failure to cooperate and the denial of his motion to appoint a
substitute expert in place of Dr. Keenan. Code § 19.2-
264.3:1(F)(2) explicitly provides that the choice of sanction is
within the trial court's discretion. Based on the record and
Juniper's own admission that he made the decision to end the
interview, the trial court's finding that Juniper refused to
cooperate with Dr. Keenan was not erroneous. Similarly, we find
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Juniper's motion to appoint a substitute expert. See Mackall v.
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 247, 372 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1988),
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989) (indigent defendant not
entitled to a second psychiatric examination at state expense
where the Commonwealth already had paid for his first
examination); Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 276-77, 351
S.E.2d 1, 7 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987) (defendant
“has no right to 'shop around' at state expense until he finds a
doctor who will give him the opinion he wants”).
C. GUILT PHASE
1. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
a. Fitzgerald Cross-Examination
61
Juniper contends that the trial court erred by disallowing
cross-examination of Terence Fitzgerald regarding "foot traffic"
to and from Keshia's apartment.
Fitzgerald, a friend of Keshia's, testified that he
obtained and paid the rent for the apartment in which Keshia and
her children lived. On cross-examination, defense counsel
attempted to ask Fitzgerald if the landlord had ever complained
to him about "foot traffic" at Keshia's apartment. The
Commonwealth objected on hearsay and relevance grounds.
Juniper's counsel responded that the inquiry was "simply offered
to show why [Fitzgerald] . . . went and talked to Keshia[–]
because he received a complaint, not for the truth of [the 'foot
traffic' complaint]." Fitzgerald was then asked if he "ever
complained to Keshia about the traffic at the apartment" and the
Commonwealth again objected. Defense counsel then argued the
question was relevant "as to whether or not someone else was
there or had the opportunity to be involved in these crimes.
You have high traffic," and represented that she planned "to
introduce evidence that the [apartment] looked like it had been
searched." The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's
objections.
Juniper assigns error to these rulings because he alleges
the trial court disallowed questioning which "would lead to
62
relevant testimony tending to show [Juniper] did not commit the
crime for which he was charged." Juniper cites the following
statement of law in support of this assertion:
In Virginia, evidence that a crime was actually
committed by someone other than the accused is
admissible for the purpose of generating a reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused. However, the
evidence introduced must point directly to guilt of a
third party. Thus, where there is a trend of facts and
circumstances tending clearly to point out some other
person as the guilty party, the [defendant] may
introduce any legal evidence which is available
tending to prove that another person committed the
crime with which he is charged. The admissibility of
circumstantial evidence tending to prove the guilt of
a third person is left to the discretion of the trial
court. Although circumstantial evidence tending to
prove the guilt of a third party is to be liberally
received, the evidence must be legally admissible.
That is, the evidence must be relevant and material,
and may not be hearsay.
Weller v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 886, 890, 434 S.E.2d 330,
333 (1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis
added), aff’d in rehearing en banc, 443 S.E.2d 171 (1994). In
Weller, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial
court disallowing testimony that the defendant proffered to
implicate a particular individual, on the grounds that such
testimony was inadmissible hearsay and irrelevant. Id. at 890-
91, 434 S.E.2d at 333-34.
In this case, Juniper's attempted questioning of Fitzgerald
did not implicate another particular individual in the murders.
Defense counsel merely alleged that there were other people who
63
came to the apartment at unknown times, but never proffered any
evidence to support this claim. As we have previously stated,
[p]roffered evidence that merely suggests a third
party may have committed the crime charged is
inadmissible; only when the proffered evidence tends
clearly to point to some other person as the guilty
party will such proof be admitted. . . . [A] large
discretion must and should remain vested in the trial
court as to the admission of this class of testimony.
Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396, 424, 593 S.E.2d 270, 287
(2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005) (quoting Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 681, 529 S.E.2d 769, 784, cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 981 (2000)). Thus, we find the trial court
correctly excluded the "foot traffic" question because it did
not tend "clearly to point to some other person as the guilty
party." Id.
b. Admission of Exhibits
Juniper assigns error to the trial court admitting exhibits
130 and 136 into evidence on the grounds those exhibits were
"prejudicial, inflammatory, and/or irrelevant." He separately
assigns error to the admission of exhibits 163-165 on the
grounds those exhibits were also "prejudicial, inflammatory, and
irrelevant." In determining whether relevant evidence should be
admitted, the trial court must apply a balancing test to assess
the probative value of the evidence and any undue prejudicial
effect of that evidence. Dandridge v. Marshall, 267 Va. 591,
596, 594 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2004). The determination to admit
64
such relevant evidence rests within the trial court's sound
discretion and will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing
of an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits about which
Juniper complains.
Exhibits 130 and 136 are autopsy photographs of Shearyia
that were admitted during the guilt phase of the trial. Exhibit
130 showed her leg with steel rods inserted to demonstrate the
trajectory of the bullets. Juniper argues the Commonwealth
should have used a Styrofoam model to show bullet trajectory as
it did with the other victims, instead of an actual photograph
of the leg. While admitting that Exhibit 130 is relevant,
Juniper argues it is inflammatory and the prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value.
Exhibit 136 depicts no injury to Shearyia, but shows magic
marker ink on the side of her face as Rashid described. Juniper
argues that this exhibit is irrelevant and cumulative of Exhibit
135, which also depicts no injury, but shows ink on Shearyia's
back.
Photographs of a victim are admissible to show motive,
intent, method, malice, premeditation, and the atrociousness of
the crime. Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 92, 501 S.E.2d
134, 138, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046 (1998). The fact that the
65
photograph also relates to an undisputed issue does not render
it irrelevant. See Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 402, 519
S.E.2d 808, 815 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113 (2000)
(Commonwealth could introduce photograph of victim's fatal wound
even though defendant stipulated cause of death); see also
Goins, 251 Va. at 459, 470 S.E.2d at 126 (photographs of victims
at crime scene admissible over defendant's objection that they
were irrelevant as identities of victims were not in dispute.).
In Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 86, 452 S.E.2d 862,
867, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995), this Court affirmed the
trial court's decision to admit into evidence photographs
showing bullet trajectory over the defendant's objection that
such evidence was cumulative of the medical examiner's
description and diagram of the wounds. We held that the
"photographs were admissible because they further illustrate the
location and nature of [the victim's] wounds and provide
additional support to the medical examiner's conclusion . . . ."
Id. In this case, the Commonwealth represented, without
contradiction, that the photograph was "the best evidence that
we have to explain" the findings of the examining physicians.
Furthermore, Exhibit 130 was "very important” because it
permitted the jury to “understand how the wounds in the child
correspond with the wounds on the mother." Just as the
Commonwealth in Joseph was not required to rely on a description
66
and diagram of the victim's wounds, the Commonwealth could
validly introduce a photograph of the victim showing bullet
trajectory or a model of the victim's body for the same purpose.
Thus, Exhibit 130 was properly admitted into evidence.
The trial court determined that Exhibit 136 was admissible
because it corroborated Rashid's testimony that Shearyia had
black marker on her face on the morning of the murders. A
photograph may be admissible merely because it is "part of the
facts of this particular case," Jackson, 267 Va. at 202, 590
S.E.2d at 534, or because it corroborates witness testimony.
See Brown v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 515, 519, 184 S.E.2d 786, 789
(1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 940 (1972). The
trial court therefore did not err in admitting Exhibit 136.
Exhibits 163 and 164 are photographs of firearms recovered
from Juniper's residence during the execution of a search
warrant by the Norfolk Police on April 27, 2001. Exhibit 165 is
a stipulation of the facts regarding items found in the search,
signed by Juniper and the Commonwealth's Attorney as part of
Juniper's plea agreement on charges of possession of cocaine and
possession of marijuana. Exhibits 163, 164, and 165 were
introduced during the penalty phase of the trial. While
admitting that this evidence was relevant, Juniper argued to the
trial court any relevance was outweighed by the prejudicial
67
effect especially because the possession of firearms charges
from that incident were nol prossed by the Commonwealth.
In argument on brief, Juniper names the exhibits relating
to this assignment of error as Exhibits 162-64.
We do not consider any argument relating to the
admissibility of Exhibit 162 as it was not included in any
assignment of error. Rule 5:17(c). Neither do we consider if
the trial court erred in admitting Exhibit 165 because that
exhibit was never discussed on brief. Powell, 267 Va. at 135,
590 S.E.2d at 554 (failure to adequately brief assignment of
error is considered a waiver.). We consider only Juniper's
argument that the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits 163
and 164 into evidence. We find the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in so doing.
Juniper argues that admitting these photographs resulted in
prejudice to him that outweighed their probative value. He
notes that the photographs depict weapons that were the subject
of prior nol prossed charges, and "the weapon found was not the
weapon used relating to the case at bar."
The trial court ruled the photographs of the guns
admissible and agreed with the Commonwealth that they were
"relevant to the issue of a propensity for violence . . .
association with a firearm [and] future dangerousness." We find
that the evidence supports the trial court's decision.
68
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the photographs that are Exhibits 163 and 164.
Furthermore, Juniper's argument that the photographs
prejudicially refer to a weapon not associated with the crimes
charged in the case at bar is made moot by his waiver of his
assignment of error as to Exhibit 165, the stipulation of facts,
which also mentions the weapons.
c. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Juniper assigns error to the trial court’s failure “to
strike the Commonwealth’s evidence as to guilt” on the ground
that “the witness testimony of Renee Rashid, Keon Murray and
Tyrone Mings was inherently incredible and not worthy of
belief.” To support this claim, Juniper cites the “substantial
gap” in time “from the criminal act to when [Mings and Murray]
notified the police of their alleged knowledge of the events.”
Juniper makes the same contention regarding Rashid’s delay of
ten days before contacting an attorney and the police regarding
her knowledge of the crimes.
In addition, Juniper notes that Mings gave different
versions of the events to the police and, if he had actually
come upon Juniper “with a gun in his hand, and cocaine on his
face with dead bodies in the room,” could have been Juniper’s
fifth victim. Lastly, Juniper claims that the Commonwealth’s
case “was circumstantial in that the record is void of
69
eyewitnesses to the shooting.” Thus, Juniper argues the
totality of the evidence “plac[ing] Juniper at the scene and the
time of the incident, is inherently incredible.” We disagree.
Our oft-repeated statement regarding appellate review of
witness testimony is, “[t]he trier of fact is the sole judge of
the credibility of the witnesses, unless, as a matter of law,
the testimony is inherently incredible.” Walker v.
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70-71, 515 S.E.2d 565, 575 (1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000) (citations omitted). To be
“incredible,” testimony “must be either so manifestly false that
reasonable men ought not to believe it, or it must be shown to
be false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of
which reasonable men should not differ.” Cardwell v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 414, 164 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1968)
(quoting Burke v. Scott, 192 Va. 16, 23, 63 S.E.2d 740, 744
(1951)).
The mere fact that a witness may have delayed in reporting
knowledge of a case or given inconsistent statements during the
investigation of a crime does not necessarily render the
testimony unworthy of belief. This circumstance is
appropriately weighed as part of the entire issue of witness
credibility, which is left to the jury to determine. See
Shelton v. Mullins, 207 Va. 17, 22, 147 S.E.2d 754, 757-58
70
(1966); Bradley v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1126, 1136, 86 S.E.2d
828, 834 (1955).
Rashid testified that she drove Juniper to Keshia’s
apartment and left that location without him on the morning of
the crime. She also stated that she heard “booms” corresponding
to the sound of gunshots as she left. After returning with
Murray and Little John to pick up Juniper, Rashid observed that
Juniper was carrying a pistol that matched the description of
the gun that both Mings and Murray testified they saw Juniper
carrying in Keshia’s apartment.
Mings testified that he found the door to Keshia’s
apartment knocked in from the outside, which comports with the
police officer’s description of Keshia’s door at the scene.
Mings also testified that he saw Juniper inside the apartment
and that Juniper had a powdery substance on his face. This
testimony is consistent with Murray’s testimony that Juniper had
a powdery substance like cocaine on his face when Murray picked
up Juniper from Keshia’s apartment a short time after Mings saw
Juniper.
Mings also testified that he saw Rueben and a young girl on
the bed in the master bedroom. He further testified that
Juniper told him that Keshia was on the floor “between the bed
and the dresser.” The positions of these victims are consistent
71
with their locations when the police first entered Keshia’s
apartment.
As noted, Murray’s testimony contained several facts that
supported the testimony of both Rashid and Mings. In addition,
Murray’s testimony that Juniper confessed to him that “[t]hey
gone” and he “killed them,” is supported by a second confession
Juniper made to Ernest Smith while incarcerated at the Hampton
Roads Regional Jail.
Having reviewed the entire testimony of Renee Rashid, Keon
Murray, and Tyrone Mings, we conclude that their testimony is
not inherently incredible. We next address Juniper’s more
general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and the
jury’s reliance on circumstantial evidence to support its
verdict.
Circumstantial evidence of guilt presented to the jury “is
as competent, and entitled to the same weight, as direct
testimony if such evidence is sufficiently convincing.”
Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 329, 448 S.E.2d 638,
650 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995) (quoting Derr v.
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424, 410 S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991)).
Thus, “[w]hile no single piece of evidence may be sufficient,
the ‘combined force of many concurrent and related
circumstances, each insufficient in itself, may lead a
reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.’ ” Id., 448
72
S.E.2d at 650 (quoting Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260,
273, 257 S.E.2d 808, 818 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972
(1980)).
In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a verdict, the proof must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth. Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va.
at 337, 541 S.E.2d at 892. Much of the evidence has already
been detailed above and was not limited to the testimony of
Rashid, Murray, and Mings. As noted, Ernest Smith testified
that Juniper confessed to him that he had killed the victims.
Smith also stated that Juniper told him he killed the children
because “he didn’t want to leave any witnesses at the scene of
the crime.” In addition, the Commonwealth presented evidence
that Juniper’s DNA matched DNA found on the knife that was used
to stab Keshia, and that Juniper’s fingerprint also matched a
print retrieved from the knife.
Considering all of this evidence, and the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from it, we conclude that the
evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of guilt. We hold
that the trial court did not err in denying Juniper’s motion to
strike the evidence.
2. JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUES
Juniper contends the “trial court erred by instructing the
jury as to ‘armed' burglary and not burglary.” On brief, he
73
argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to prove “[a]n
essential element of armed burglary,” namely, “that [Juniper
was] armed with a deadly weapon.” It is further argued that
“[e]ven if Juniper was the individual who kicked the door in,
there is no evidence that he was armed with a weapon.”
Juniper posits as the basis for his argument the
proposition that Rashid’s testimony was inherently incredible
and not worthy of belief. To support this claim, Juniper cites
Rashid’s admission on cross-examination that she “didn't notice
any bulges in [Juniper’s] pants [or his] jacket . . . that
suggested . . . that he had a gun . . . [o]r a box of bullets."
The Commonwealth responds by asserting that Juniper waived
his right to appeal the jury instruction on armed burglary
because he did not object to the instruction when it was given.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends that “[t]o the extent
that [Juniper] argues that the court should have granted his
motion to strike as to armed burglary, this argument is
redundant of the argument made in Assignment of Error 26.”
The record establishes that Juniper made a motion to strike
the indictment for armed burglary at the close of the
Commonwealth’s evidence, and he renewed the motion to strike at
the close of all the evidence. As such, Juniper preserved his
right to appeal the trial court’s giving of instructions on the
charge of armed burglary.
74
The record reflects that the jury was instructed as
follows:
The defendant is charged with the crime of
burglary while armed. The Commonwealth must prove
[four elements, the fourth being] [t]hat at the time
of his entry he was armed with a deadly weapon.
If you find the Commonwealth has proved all 4
[elements], you shall find the defendant guilty of
burglary while armed.
If you find the Commonwealth has proved all
[elements] but #4, you shall find the defendant guilty
of burglary.
This instruction is consistent with the trial court’s statements
at the time it rejected Juniper’s motion to strike the charge of
armed burglary. The trial court explained its decision:
I don’t find that any of the testimony heard is
inherently incredible. I’ll overrule the motions. I
think certainly the jury would have to be instructed
on the burglary charge for armed burglary as well as
unarmed burglary. I think they could conclude from
the evidence that no weapon was present at the time of
entry, but they could also conclude that one was.
It’s a factual question they have to decide.
The armed burglary instruction properly set forth the legal
definition of both armed burglary and the lesser-included
offense of burglary. An instruction accurately stating the law
is nonetheless improperly given if it is “inapplicable to the
facts and circumstances of the case.” Hatcher v. Commonwealth,
218 Va. 811, 813-14, 241 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1978). “An
instruction must be supported by more than a scintilla of
evidence.” Id. at 814, 241 S.E.2d at 758.
75
As previously addressed in our discussion of the
sufficiency of the evidence claim, admissible evidence was
before the jury from Rashid, Murray, and Mings as to Juniper’s
possession of an automatic pistol at Keshia’s apartment at the
time of the crimes. If so believed by the jury, this witness
testimony was “more than a scintilla of evidence” necessary to
support the armed burglary instruction. None of the testimony
was inherently incredible, and none of it reduced to a scintilla
the amount of evidence indicating Juniper was armed with a
deadly weapon upon entering Keshia’s apartment. The instruction
appropriately left the factual determination of whether the
Commonwealth had sufficiently proven the fourth element of the
crime – that at the time of his entry Juniper was armed with a
deadly weapon – to the jury. We thus find no error in the trial
court’s decision to instruct the jury on armed burglary.
D. PENALTY PHASE
1. WITNESS TESTIMONY
a. Notice of Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct
Juniper argues the trial court abused its discretion with
regard to certain testimony of Malika Barnes about instances of
his unadjudicated conduct because there was no specific notice
given by the Commonwealth. He assigns error to the admission of
that testimony.
76
In accordance with Code § 19.2-264.3:2, the Commonwealth
provided written notice to Juniper describing his unadjudicated
acts of criminal conduct which the Commonwealth intended to
present at the sentencing phase. In accordance with the
statute, the notice described each incident and gave the time
and place such conduct was alleged to have occurred. Juniper
argues that the Commonwealth's notice was insufficient as to
"the specific criminal acts, separate and distinct criminal
acts" that allegedly occurred in two of the listed incidents.
First, Juniper contends that while Malika testified that in
the spring of 2003, Juniper entered the food store where Keshia
worked and pulled her by the arm, the corresponding notice
stated as follows:
16. At diverse times during the Spring of 2003 at the
Tinee Giant . . . the defendant did threaten to do
bodily harm to Keshia Stephens (indicating that he
would beat her ass).
Second, Juniper alleges that Malika's testimony that in the
Spring of 2003, at Juniper's mother's home, Juniper addressed
Keshia as "bitch" and pulled her up out of a chair by her arm,
did not correspond to the notice which stated as follows:
15. During the Spring of 2003 at 1051 Kittrell Street
in Norfolk, Virginia the defendant did assault and
batter Keshia Stephens by grabbing her arm and
forcefully pulling her out of a chair.
77
At trial, Juniper argued that the notice was insufficient
because it did not allege Juniper physically assaulted Keshia at
the food store, nor did it charge Juniper verbally berated her
at his mother's home, as Malika testified. He contends:
[A] physical assault and curse and abuse are not the
same offenses. They are routinely charged as separate
offenses when they're in lower court. . . . And if
they are separate offenses [and] we are noticed as to
a verbal assault and [this witness] start[s] talking
about grabbing and kicking and hitting, then we have
not been given notice. . . . Notice I believe . . .
should tell us what the offense is.
The trial court addressed Juniper's argument as to only the
food store incident, determining that a separate noticed
incident18 which alleged Juniper slapped Keshia, gave the defense
sufficient notice of the assault allegation.
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that because the noticed
incidents advised Juniper of "two separate assaults that Spring
at the Tinee Giant . . . [t]he trial court properly concluded
that [Juniper] had fair notice of the Commonwealth's intent to
prove . . . assault." Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends
that even if the notice was not sufficient to advise Juniper of
the alleged incidents to which Malika testified, such error is
18
The incident to which the trial court referred is as follows:
10. During February or March 2003 at the Tinee Giant
. . . the defendant did threaten Keshia Stephens by
indicating "wait until you get off work" and
physically assault Keshia Stephens by slapping her in
the face.
78
harmless as Malika’s testimony was merely cumulative of other
incidents of assault by Juniper. We agree with the
Commonwealth.
The notice advised Juniper of four separate incidents at
the food store, which together alleged one incident of verbal
abuse, three counts of threatening bodily harm, and two assaults
on Keshia. Altogether, the Commonwealth noticed at least 11
assaults, four incidents of verbal abuse, and at least eight
occasions of threatening bodily harm by Juniper against Keshia.
With regard to the discrepancy between Malika’s testimony and
the food store incident, we agree with the trial court that the
two other alleged assaults at the Tinee Giant were sufficient to
notify Juniper of the unadjudicated assault conduct to which
Malika testified. We also find that Malika’s testimony that
Juniper called Keshia a "bitch" at his mother's house is merely
cumulative of the other incidents of alleged verbal abuse.
b. Testimony of Rueben Harrison, Sr.
Juniper contends the trial court “erred in refusing to
allow Juniper to call witness Rueben Harrison, Sr. [the father
of one of the decedents] regarding the imposition of the death
penalty.” Juniper asked the trial court to permit Harrison, Sr.
to testify about remarks attributed to him by the news media to
the effect “that as a Christian he cannot hope that jurors
79
impose the death penalty.” The trial court denied Juniper’s
request.
Juniper argues that Harrison, Sr.’s testimony should have
been permitted because he was the father of one of the victims,
and thus a “victim” permitted to testify under Code § 19.2-264.4
and Code § 19.2-11.01. Furthermore, Juniper contends the
testimony Harrison, Sr. would have given was relevant under Code
§ 19.2-299.1(vi), which permits victim impact testimony that
“provide[s] such other information as the court may require
related to the impact of the offense upon the victim.”
The Commonwealth responds that Harrison, Sr.’s potential
testimony does not fall within the scope of victim impact
testimony authorized under Code § 19.2-299.1 and is not relevant
to the ultimate decision of sentence, which is the sole province
of the jury. We agree with the Commonwealth.
The opinion of Harrison, Sr. as to the appropriate sentence
for Juniper is not an item encompassed within Code § 19.2-
229.1(i) through (vi),19 which sets forth the only factors about
19
Code § 19.2-299.1 states, in relevant part:
A Victim Impact Statement . . . shall (i) identify the
victim, (ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the
victim as a result of the offense, (iii) identify the
nature and extent of any physical or psychological
injury suffered by the victim as a result of the
offense, (iv) detail any change in the victim’s
personal welfare, lifestyle or familial relationships
as a result of the offense, (v) identify any request
for psychological or medical services initiated by the
80
which testimony by a victim are permitted. See Code § 19.2-
264.4(A1).
More importantly, witness opinion on what the jury should
decide as the appropriate sentence in a given case is not
admissible. It is irrelevant to the sentencing decision, which
is only for the jury to make. A victim called as a witness by
the Commonwealth would clearly not be permitted to opine as to
his or her preferred sentence for the defendant. Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 n.2 (1991) (“Booth [v. Maryland]
also held that the admission of a victim’s family members’
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant,
and the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.”);
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508-09 (1987) (“The admission
of these emotionally charged opinions as to what conclusions the
jury should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with
the reasoned decisionmaking we require in capital cases.”); see
also Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 217 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“[T]he Payne Court did not alter Booth’s holding that admitting
evidence of the victims’ opinions of the crime and of the
appropriate sentence for the defendant violates the Eighth
Amendment . . . .”).
victim or the victim’s family as a result of the
offense, and (vi) provide such other information as
the court may require related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim.
81
The trial court did not err in excluding the requested
testimony of Rueben Harrison, Sr.
c. Dr. Pasquale's Testimony
Juniper posits two assignments of error regarding the trial
court's refusal to permit certain testimony by Juniper's mental
health expert, Dr. Thomas Pasquale. Initially, Juniper contends
the trial court wrongfully excluded Dr. Pasquale's testimony as
to Juniper's impulsiveness. Second, he argues the trial court
erred in not permitting Dr. Pasquale to testify regarding
Juniper's risk assessment related to his future dangerousness in
the context of a prison environment.
i. Impulsiveness
Juniper first maintains that Dr. Pasquale's testimony about
impulsiveness did not, as the Commonwealth alleges, relate to
premeditation which had been decided at the guilt phase.
Rather, Juniper contends Dr. Pasquale testified to "his overall
opinion that Defendant is an impulsive person and is possessed
of an impulsive character." He argues that Dr. Pasquale did not
testify that Juniper's "actions with regard to the murder were
an impulsive act." We disagree.
Prior to the Commonwealth's objection, Dr. Pasquale made
references to impulsiveness, which he described as a trait of
the preadolescent stage of development, an indicator of
82
characterological disfunction, and a characteristic of anti-
social behavior, all of which he said applied to Juniper.
However, defense counsel, near the end of his examination of Dr.
Pasquale, moved from questions regarding a general evaluation of
Juniper to Dr. Pasquale's opinion as to influences upon Juniper
at the time of the offense.
Q: Now, I want to direct your attention more
specifically to the issues before us in this case.
Specifically, sir, and I'm referring you to page
ten of your report. Would you address the issue of
. . . whether you have an opinion as to whether or not
Mr. Juniper acted under extreme mental or emotional
disturbance at the time of the offense?
A: What I had stated [in my report] are three
questions that are being asked in reference to issues
relevant to mitigation and risk. The first one [was]
did this person have a lot of stress, mental,
emotional disturbance at the time of offense.
And I said [in my report] that . . . he was in a
highly emotional, abusive and troubling relationship
with Ms. Stephens over a period of many months; that
when you combine his attachment problems, his rage
reactions, his need to control with a person that he's
embroiled with, that a foundation for violence becomes
built.
Now, I went on to look at something else as
well. . . . [T]hat . . . the issue of premeditated
aggression may be questioned in contrast to an act of
impulsivity.
Q: Explain that if you would, Dr. Pasquale.
A: Well, it's the notion of how do I view Mr.
Juniper behaving violently, being aggressive. And
. . . my interpretation was that he was a very
impulsive person who might not put a lot of thought at
all into doing something.
(Emphasis added).
83
The Commonwealth then objected, arguing that
"[premeditation] has already been resolved with the guilt
phase." Juniper responded that Dr. Pasquale was not "testifying
that [Juniper] lacked premeditation, but perhaps just putting it
in context of the impulsivity that Dr. Pasquale has already
testified to,20 not that there was an absence of [premeditation]
in context."
Dr. Pasquale testified that there was a difference between
"premeditated aggression" and an "act of impulsivity." However,
any contrast between Juniper's alleged mental state at the time
of the crime and the required element of premeditation is
applicable only as it relates to Juniper's culpability, not his
sentence. We agree with the Commonwealth that Dr. Pasquale's
testimony on this point would have been properly admissible only
if Juniper were advancing a defense based upon mental disease or
disorder in the guilt phase, which he did not. See generally,
Dandridge, 267 Va. at 596-97, 594 S.E.2d at 581-82; Bailey v.
20
On brief, Juniper argues that "Dr. Pasquale had already
testified as to Defendant's impulsivity, without objection from
the Commonwealth, when testifying with regard to Defendant's
anti-social thought and behavioral patterns." To the extent
Juniper intends the Commonwealth had waived its objections to
Dr. Pasquale's later testimony, he is incorrect. Pasquale's
prior testimony regarding impulsiveness as a general
characteristic is substantially different from his later
testimony that Juniper was affected by impulsivity at the time
of the offense. Thus, we find that the Commonwealth did not
waive its right to object to Dr. Pasquale's impulsiveness
84
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 734, 529 S.E.2d 570, 576, cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000).
The trial court ruled that Dr. Pasquale could not "render
opinions on premeditation during the commission of the
offenses." We agree. The trial court's exclusion of Dr.
Pasquale's impulsiveness testimony regarding Juniper's state of
mind at the time of the offense was not erroneous.
ii. Risk Assessment
Citing no case authority in the trial court or on appeal,
Juniper contends the trial court abused its discretion when it
refused to permit “Dr. Thomas Pasquale to testify regarding
Juniper’s risk assessment related to his future dangerousness.”
This claim of error goes to the trial court’s prohibition of
proffered testimony from Dr. Pasquale, Juniper’s court appointed
psychologist, that Juniper’s risk assessment for future
dangerousness was different in a prison setting from that in an
“open community.”
Juniper asked the trial court “to allow Dr. Pasquale to
give his opinion on [Juniper's] future dangerousness in the
penitentiary.” The Commonwealth had objected to this line of
questioning arguing that “the question is in general terms would
the defendant exhibit violent conduct in the future as opposed
testimony as it related to Juniper's mental state at the time of
the murders.
85
to the question of could.” (Emphasis added.) Counsel argued
the issue and Dr. Pasquale was examined by both parties and the
trial court outside the presence of the jury.
Juniper represented that Dr. Pasquale would testify “there
is a difference in risk assessment which is to say future
dangerousness or the prediction of future dangerousness in an
open community such as the one we live in and in a prison
environment such as the one Mr. Juniper will live in.” The
trial court responded by noting that “I would think the jurors
could determine that without the need of expert testimony. I
think common sense would tell people that.” The Commonwealth
argued that in the context of future dangerousness “whatever is
said by [the] expert has to refer to the character of the
defendant, not the character of the prison or anything else.”
In response to voir dire, Dr. Pasquale explained that his
assessment of a defendant to evaluate future dangerousness would
involve a number of factors. “[W]hen you do the actuarial for
the open community, you're asking about the person. Did they
live with their biological parents? How did they go to school?
Do they have a personality disorder?” However, Dr. Pasquale
then explained that “[t]here have only been two variables that I
have described that have been shown to demonstrate some issue
about workability in prison[:] age and past performance in
incarceration.”
86
While Juniper agreed he could not offer evidence on general
prison conditions, he did not proffer from Dr. Pasquale or
otherwise that there would be any testimony about how Juniper’s
personal and specific characteristics would be reflected in his
ability to adapt in prison or whether there was any past
incarceration performance to evaluate. Instead, Dr. Pasquale
acknowledged his “ultimate testimony is that . . . there is less
risk of the defendant acting out violently in prison than it
would be the defendant acting out violently in the open
community.” Upon completion of counsels' arguments and the
examination of Dr. Pasquale, and still outside the presence of
the jury, Juniper made a proffer of Dr. Pasquale’s proposed
testimony.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If I [were] to ask you the
question and if the Court were to allow it, your
opinion would be that his risk assessment in the open
community is high and his risk assessment in the
prison setting is low to moderate?
[DR. PASQUALE]: Yes.
The trial court then later permitted Juniper’s counsel to
ask Dr. Pasquale this question in the presence of the jury:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: In your opinion is the risk
assessment of Mr. Juniper’s future dangerousness
dependent on or related to the circumstances of his
environment?
[DR. PASQUALE]: Yes.
87
However, the trial court did not allow any broader testimony
from Dr. Pasquale on the subject of future dangerousness in a
prison environment including the proffered question. In
rejecting Juniper’s request, the trial court observed “a
determination of future dangerousness revolves around an
individual defendant and a specific crime.” We do not find
error in the trial court’s ruling.
We have held in our prior decisions that “what a person may
expect in the penal system is not relevant mitigation evidence.”
Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 310, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653,
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Walker, 258 Va. at 70, 515 S.E.2d at 574. We
have also been plain in establishing threshold requirements of
relevance for the admission of evidence in mitigation
particularly as it relates to the statutory factor of future
dangerousness: such evidence should “concern the history or
experience of the defendant.” Cherrix, 257 Va. at 310, 513
S.E.2d at 653; see also Burns, 261 Va. at 340, 541 S.E.2d at
893-94.
In Burns, we further delineated this concept while
rejecting Burns’ claim seeking evidence on “daily inmate
routine, general prison conditions.” Id. at 338, 541 S.E.2d at
892.
88
Burns wanted to show, in rebuttal to the
Commonwealth’s evidence of his future dangerousness,
that his opportunities to commit criminal acts of
violence in the future would be severely limited in a
maximum security prison. However, in Cherrix, we
reiterated the principle that the United States
Constitution “does not limit ‘the traditional
authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant,
evidence not bearing on the defendant’s character,
prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.’ ”
Cherrix, 257 Va. at 309, 513 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 n.12 (1978)).
Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether Burns could
commit criminal acts of violence in the future but
whether he would. Indeed, Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and –
264.4(C) use the phrase “would commit criminal acts of
violence.” Accordingly, the focus must be on the
particular facts of Burns’ history and background, and
the circumstances of his offense. In other words, a
determination of future dangerousness revolves around
an individual defendant and a specific crime. . . .
Unlike the evidence proffered by Burns, the evidence
in Skipper [v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986)]
was peculiar to that defendant’s history and
background.
Id. at 339-40, 541 S.E.2d 893-94.
In Bell, 264 Va. at 201, 563 S.E.2d at 714, we re-
emphasized the necessity that relevant mitigating evidence on
the issue of future dangerousness must be based on the specific
characteristics of the defendant. In that context, evidence
relating to a prison environment must connect the specific
characteristics of the particular defendant to his future
adaptability in that environment in order to be heard by the
jury. It must be "evidence peculiar to a defendant's character,
89
history and background" in order to be "relevant to the future
dangerousness inquiry . . ." Id. We further observed that
[t]he testimony that Bell sought to introduce through
the expert concerned the conditions of prison life and
the kind of security features utilized in a maximum
security facility. That is the same kind of evidence
that we have previously rejected as not relevant to
the future dangerousness inquiry. . . . Nor is such
general evidence, not specific to Bell, relevant to
his “future adaptability” or as a foundation for an
expert opinion on that issue.
Id.
The proffer of Dr. Pasquale’s testimony on future
dangerousness in a prison setting fails to meet the test of
relevance established in our prior cases. Neither the actual
proffer, counsel’s argument, nor Dr. Pasquale’s explanations on
voir dire tie his proposed opinion testimony on future
dangerousness in a prison environment to Juniper’s “history and
background, and the circumstances of his offense,” Burns, 261
Va. at 340, 541 S.E.2d at 893, to Juniper's "character, history
and background" or was “specific to [Juniper], relevant to his
'future adaptability.'” Bell, 264 Va. at 201, 563 S.E.2d at 714.
While Dr. Pasquale may not have sought to offer specific
evidence on a day in the life of a prisoner, as in Cherrix, he
offered nothing to the trial court to support his opinion as
being based on Juniper's individual characteristics that would
90
affect his future adaptability in prison and thus relate to a
defendant-specific assessment of future dangerousness.21
The burden rested upon Juniper, as the proponent of Dr.
Pasquale’s testimony, to make a threshold showing, in conformity
with Bell and Burns, that an assessment of future dangerousness
was grounded on Juniper's specific characteristics in the
context of his future adaptability in a prison setting. See
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 268 Va. 161, 165, 597 S.E.2d 197, 199
(2004) (party offering expert testimony must make proper proffer
of testimony's admissibility). Juniper failed to carry that
burden. The trial court thus correctly barred Dr. Pasquale’s
generalized testimony and did not abuse its discretion in doing
so.
2. REJECTED PENALTY PHASE INSTRUCTIONS
Juniper contends the trial court erred “by disallowing
Juniper’s proposed instructions in the penalty phase regarding
depravity of mind, aggravated battery, and mitigating evidence.”
The three rejected instructions are:
(Def. A) In deciding whether the Commonwealth has proven
that the defendant’s conduct was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved depravity of mind, you are instructed
that depravity of mind is not proven by proof of
21
There was no issue in the case at bar, as existed in
Skipper, 476 U.S. 1, as to evidence concerning Juniper’s actual
adaptation to confinement while awaiting trial. This subject
was never mentioned at trial, and no contention is made in that
regard by Juniper.
91
an intentional killing. Rather, depravity of
mind means a degree of moral turpitude and
psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in
the definition of ordinary malic[e] and
premeditation. Ordinary malice is that state of
mind which results in the intentional doing of a
wrongful act to another without legal
justification or excuse, at a time when the mind
of the actor is under the control of reason.
Ordinary premeditation is a specific intent to
kill, adopted at some time before the killing,
but which need not exist for any particular
length of time.
(Def. B) In deciding whether the Commonwealth has proven
that the defendant’s conduct was outrageously
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved an
aggravated battery to the victim, you are
instructed that an aggravated battery is not
proven by proof of an intentional killing.
Rather, an aggravated battery is a battery which,
qualitatively and quantitatively, is more
culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish
an act of murder. A battery is the actual
infliction of corporal hurt on another. A
battery which causes death is a murder, but that
fact, standing alone, does not make the battery
an aggravated battery.
(Def. C) If you unanimously find that the Commonwealth has
proved an aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must go on to consider
mitigating evidence. Mitigating evidence is any
fact or circumstance that, while it does not
excuse or justify the offense, nonetheless in
fairness and mercy may either extenuate or
explain it or reduce the degree of the
defendant’s moral culpability such that he should
not be sentenced to death.
Certain factors, if they exist, are made
mitigating by law. In this case, they are:
1. That the defendant has no significant history
of prior criminal activity.
92
2. That the capital felony was committed while
the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
3. At the time of the commission of the capital
felony, the capacity of the Defendant to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law was significantly impaired.
You must consider the evidence bearing on
each of these factors. Each of you must then
decide, individually, whether you find that the
factor exists. If you, individually, find that
any of these factors does exist, that factor is
mitigating and you must consider it in deciding
upon sentence.
Other factors, if they exist, may be
mitigating. You must consider all of the
evidence offered in mitigation. Each of you must
then decide, individually, whether the evidence
establishes the existence of any other factor and
whether that factor is mitigating. If you,
individually, find that a factor exists and that
it is mitigating, you must consider it in
deciding sentence.
In refusing the proposed instructions, the trial court
stated, “I think other instructions that are being given
adequately cover the subject instructions.”
Juniper asserts that because each proposed instruction
accurately states the law and substantially tracks either model
jury instructions or instructions used in other cases, the trial
court should have given his proposed instructions. He also
contends that giving a jury instruction regarding aggravating
and mitigating circumstances without also instructing the jurors
93
that the mitigating circumstances need not be unanimously found
is unconstitutional.22
The Commonwealth responds by asserting that the proposed
instructions were “cumulative” and “redundant” of instructions
given to the jury. Specifically, the Commonwealth notes the
substantially similar, and in cases identical, text in the
following instructions given by the trial court:
(1) “Depravity of Mind” means a degree of moral turpitude
and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in
the definition of ordinary legal malice and
premeditation.
(2) An “aggravated battery” is a battery which,
qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable
than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of
murder.
(3) If you find that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating
circumstance, in determining the appropriate
punishment, you should consider any evidence presented
of circumstances which do not justify or excuse the
offense but which in fairness or mercy may extenuate
or reduce the degree of moral culpability and
punishment.
To the degree that the proposed instructions differed from
those actually given, the Commonwealth argues that the proposed
instructions would have impermissibly confused or misled the
jury, suggested a particular response from the jury, or provided
an incorrect statement of the law. "Def. A," the proposed
22
Juniper apparently refers to Instruction CS-7 given by
the trial court, but he fails to identify the specific
instruction.
94
instruction on depravity of mind, for example, included
instructions on malice and premeditation, which are not relevant
for consideration in the sentencing phase of the trial.
Similarly, "Def. B," the proposed instruction on aggravated
battery, “suggest[ed] resolution of the question in [Juniper’s]
favor.” As to proposed instruction “Def. C,” the Commonwealth
argued this would mislead the jury because it suggested the
listed mitigating factors had been determined to exist by the
trial judge, which was not the case.
After comparing the proposed instructions to those actually
given, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing Juniper’s proposed instructions. The language
relevant and appropriate to Juniper’s case was “fully and
fairly” covered by the instructions given to the jury.
Instruction “Def. A” regarding malice and premeditation was
superfluous and potentially confusing to the jury at the penalty
stage because those factors are only at issue during the guilt
phase of the trial. The depravity of mind instruction that was
given contained sufficient information for the jurors to
understand that term. Similarly, the jury was adequately
instructed on what constitutes aggravated battery. The
additional information contained in the proposed instruction
“Def. B” was unnecessary and suggestive.
95
With regard to Juniper’s proposed instruction “Def. C,” we
agree with the Commonwealth that the wording of the instruction
would have misled the jury as to the existence of the listed
mitigating factors because it implied that such factors had been
established. That determination was the responsibility of the
jury. Furthermore, we have previously rejected “the argument
that the jury should have been instructed its finding of
mitigating factors need not be unanimous” as being “unnecessary”
and “confusing.” Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 212, 257
S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
“Since only by unanimous agreement can the death penalty be
inflicted, a disagreement by one or more of the jurors as to the
proper sentence would, by statute, result in life imprisonment.
Code § 19.2-264.4(E).” Id. The differences between aggravating
and mitigating factors, and their role in determining a sentence
of death versus imprisonment for life, were sufficiently covered
by the instructions given to the jurors by the trial court.
Our previous decisions reflect that even if jury
instructions contain accurate statements of law, a trial court
does not abuse its discretion by refusing the instruction if it
“is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case,”
Hatcher, 218 Va. at 813-14, 241 S.E.2d at 758, or if it “would
have created confusion and would have been misleading.” Hubbard
v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 1, 15, 413 S.E.2d 875, 883 (1992). Nor
96
does a trial court abuse its discretion by refusing a relevant
instruction if the “granted instructions fully and fairly cover”
the same legal principle. Stockton, 227 Va. at 145, 314 S.E.2d
at 384. The trial court thus did not err in refusing Juniper’s
proposed instructions.
E. STATUTORY REVIEW UNDER CODE § 17.1-313
Juniper’s initial assignments of error are that the
sentence of death (1) “was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor” and (2) “is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the appellant.” These
assignments of error track nearly verbatim the mandatory review
of a sentence of death which this Court must undertake under
Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) and (2). Accordingly, we consider
Juniper’s assignments of error and our statutory review
together.
1. CODE § 17.1-313(C)(1): PASSION, PREJUDICE OR OTHER
ARBITRARY FACTOR
Juniper argues that the imposition of his death sentence
demonstrates that the jury and trial court “were swept away on a
tide of passion, prejudice and other arbitrary factors,” but
cites no evidence from the record to support his contention.
Juniper’s failure to make a “particularized argument that the
jury’s verdict was not the product of a reasoned and
97
dispassionate deliberation” is not dispositive because of our
statutory mandate to review his sentence. Elliott, 267 Va. at
429, 593 S.E.2d at 291. We have completed that review of the
record and find no basis to conclude that the jury or trial
court were influenced by passion, prejudice or other arbitrary
factor in sentencing Juniper to death.
2. CODE § 17.1-313(C)(2): EXCESSIVE OR DISPROPORTIONATE
SENTENCE
We must also determine whether the death sentence imposed
upon Juniper is “excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases.” Code § 17.1-313(C)(2). Juniper’s
argument on this issue is again conclusory and without reference
to any particular reason his sentence is excessive or
disproportionate. That failure on Juniper’s part does not
affect our own proportionality review required by statute.
We do not conduct a proportionality review to “insure
complete symmetry among all death penalty cases.” Muhammad, 269
Va. at 532, 619 S.E.2d at 63 (quoting Orbe, 258 Va. at 405, 519
S.E.2d at 817). Nor do we seek to “understand why the trier of
fact imposed the sentence of life” rather than a sentence of
death. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 302, 312, 593 S.E.2d 220,
226, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 904 (2004). Our review is to
“identify and invalidate the aberrant death sentence.”
Muhammad, 269 Va. at 532, 619 S.E.2d at 63 (quoting Orbe, 258
98
Va. at 405, 519 S.E.2d at 817). We find no aberration in the
case at bar.
In conducting the proportionality review, we must determine
whether “other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally
impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes,
considering both the crime and the defendant.” Lovitt, 260 Va.
at 518, 537 S.E.2d at 880 (quoting Johnson, 259 Va. at 683, 529
S.E.2d at 786). We have taken into account the circumstances of
the crimes and of Juniper. We have compared the record in the
case at bar with the records of other capital murder cases,
including those in which a sentence of life imprisonment was
imposed, pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(E). In particular, we have
reviewed capital murder cases where a defendant killed more than
one person as part of the same act or transaction, Code § 18.2-
31(7), and cases where a person age twenty-one or older killed a
person under the age of 14, Code § 18.2-31(12), and where the
sentence of death was imposed based upon the aggravating factors
of vileness and future dangerousness. See, e.g., Zirkle v.
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 631, 553 S.E.2d 601 (2001) (capital murder
of two persons, one of whom was under age of 14 by person age 21
or older); Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d
400, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999) (capital murder of family
of four, including two children under age of 14); Stewart v.
Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d 394, cert. denied, 510
99
U.S. 848 (1993) (capital murder of more than one person,
including wife and infant son); Goins, 251 Va. 442, 470 S.E.2d
114 (capital murder of family of five, including three children
under age of 14). In each of those cases, this Court affirmed
the sentences of death.23 Upon review, we conclude that
Juniper’s sentence of death was not excessive or
disproportionate to the sentences imposed by other sentencing
bodies in the Commonwealth in comparable cases with comparable
defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
Upon review of the record and upon consideration of the
arguments presented, we find no reversible error in the judgment
of the trial court. Furthermore, we find no reason to commute
or set aside the sentences of death. We will affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
23
These cases are cited as examples, but “our
proportionality analysis encompasses all capital murder cases
presented to this Court for review and is not limited to these
selected cases.” Burns, 261 Va. at 345, 541 S.E.2d at 896-97
(internal quotation mark omitted).
100