Muhammad v. Com.

Present: All the Justices

JOHN ALLEN MUHAMMAD

v. Record Nos. 041050 & 041051
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
April 22, 2005

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
LeRoy F. Millette, Judge

In these appeals, we consider two capital murder

convictions and two death sentences imposed upon John Allen

Muhammad ("Muhammad"), along with his convictions for

conspiracy to commit capital murder and the illegal use of a

firearm in the commission of murder. This prosecution arose

from the investigation of a series of sixteen shootings,

including ten murders that occurred in Alabama, Louisiana,

Maryland, Washington, D.C., and Virginia over a 47-day period

from September 5 to October 22, 2002. For the reasons

discussed herein, the judgment of the trial court and the

sentences of death will be affirmed.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

A. Facts

On the morning of Wednesday, October 9, 2002, Dean H.

Meyers ("Meyers") was shot and killed while fueling his car at

the Sunoco gas station on Sudley Road in Manassas, Virginia.

Meyers was shot in the head by a single bullet. The bullet
entered behind his left ear, where it fragmented into multiple

small pieces. The bullet fragments shattered the temporal

bone and the fragments of bullet and bone then traveled

through his brain and caused multiple fractures of his skull.

This gunshot wound was consistent with injuries from a bullet

fired from a high velocity rifle, 1 and was the cause of Meyers'

death. Evidence at trial established that the bullet came

from the .223 caliber Bushmaster rifle Muhammad possessed when

he was arrested. An eyewitness testified that she saw

Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo ("Malvo") in the vicinity of the

shooting approximately one hour beforehand. Police

interviewed Muhammad immediately after the shooting in a

parking lot across the street from where Meyers was shot. In

both encounters, Muhammad was driving a Chevrolet Caprice

("Caprice") in which he was later arrested. Muhammad's

fingerprints were on a map police found in the parking lot

where Muhammad had been interviewed.

Meyers was killed during a 47-day period, from September

5 to October 22, 2002, in which ten others were murdered and

six more suffered gunshot wounds as a result of the acts of

1
Throughout the trial, various witnesses and counsel made
references to a high velocity rifle, high velocity weapon, and
high velocity bullet, cartridge, or load. The technical
distinctions between these terms are insignificant to the
analysis in this opinion.

2
Muhammad and Malvo in concert. The murder of Meyers was the

twelfth of these sixteen shootings.

The first shooting occurred in Clinton, Maryland on

September 5, 2002. Paul J. LaRuffa ("LaRuffa"), the owner of

Margellina's Restaurant, left the restaurant at closing and

proceeded to his car with his briefcase and Sony portable

computer. Inside the briefcase were bank deposit bags that

contained $3,500 in cash and credit card receipts from that

evening. LaRuffa placed the briefcase and laptop on the

backseat of his car, and then sat behind the steering wheel.

He testified that, almost immediately after he sat down, he

saw a figure to his left and a flash of light. He heard

gunshots and the driver's side window shattered. When he

stepped out of his car, he realized he had been shot. The

trauma surgeon who treated him testified that LaRuffa was shot

six times: once in the back left side of his neck, three

times in the left side of his chest, and twice in his left

arm.

An employee who left the restaurant with LaRuffa, Paul B.

Hammer ("Hammer"), witnessed the shooting and called "911."

Hammer testified that he saw a "kid" run up to LaRuffa's car,

fire shots into it, and then open the rear door and take the

briefcase and portable computer. He was unable to provide a

detailed description because of lighting conditions, but

3
testified that the shooter was a male in his late teens or

early twenties. The briefcase and empty bank deposit bags,

along with a pair of pants and a shirt, were found six weeks

later in a wooded area about a mile from the shooting. Hair

on the clothing yielded DNA that was consistent with Malvo's

DNA.

Four days later, on September 9, Muhammad purchased a

1990 Caprice automobile from Christopher M. O'Kupski

("O'Kupski") in Trenton, New Jersey. O'Kupski testified that

before the purchase, Muhammad got into the trunk and lay down.

O'Kupski also testified that, when Muhammad purchased it, the

Caprice did not have a hole in the trunk or a passageway from

the backseat to the trunk; the trunk was not spray-painted

blue; and the windows were not tinted.

The second shooting occurred in Clinton, Maryland on

September 15, 2002. Muhammad Rashid ("Rashid") was closing

the Three Roads Liquor Store. Rashid testified that he

noticed the Caprice outside the store shortly before closing.

He testified that he was in the process of locking the front

door from the outside when he heard gunshots from behind him.

At the same time, a young man with a handgun rushed towards

Rashid and shot Rashid in the stomach. At trial, Rashid

identified Malvo as the person who shot him. Two bullets were

removed from inside the store. The bullets had been shot

4
through the front door and the trajectory of the bullets

placed the shooter in a field across the street from the

store.

The third and fourth shootings occurred in Montgomery,

Alabama on September 21, 2002. Claudine Parker ("Parker") and

Kelly Adams ("Adams") closed the Zelda Road ABC Liquor Store

and walked out. They were shot immediately. Parker died as a

result of a single gunshot wound that entered her back,

transected her spinal cord, and passed through her lung.

Adams was shot once through her neck, but lived. The bullet

exited through her chin, breaking her jaw in half, shattering

her face and teeth, paralyzing her left vocal cord, and

severing major nerves to her left shoulder. Both gunshot

wounds were consistent with injuries caused by a high velocity

rifle. Testing revealed that the bullet fragments recovered

from the Parker shooting were fired from a Bushmaster rifle

possessed by Muhammad when he was arrested.

As the rifle shots were fired, a young man, later

identified as Malvo, ran up to Parker and Adams. A police car

happened to pass the scene immediately after the shots were

fired. A police officer observed Malvo with a handgun. He

was going through the women's purses. The officer and another

eyewitness chased Malvo. Although he escaped, Malvo dropped

an "ArmorLite" gun catalogue during the chase. At trial, both

5
the officer and the other eyewitness identified Malvo as the

young man with the handgun who fled the scene. Additionally,

Malvo's fingerprints were on the "ArmorLite" gun catalogue he

dropped during the chase. The handgun Malvo carried that

evening, a .22 caliber stainless steel revolver, was found in

the stairwell of an apartment building that Malvo ran through

during the chase. Forensic tests determined that this .22

caliber revolver was the same gun used to shoot both LaRuffa

and Rashid.

The fifth shooting occurred in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on

September 23. Hong Im Ballenger ("Ballenger"), the manager of

the Beauty Depot store, closed the store for the evening. As

she was walking to her car, she was shot once in the head with

a bullet fired from a high velocity rifle. Ballenger died as

the result of the single shot. The bullet entered the back of

her head and exited through her jawbone. The wound caused

massive bleeding and compromised her airway. Ballistic tests

determined that the bullet fragments recovered from Ballenger

were fired from the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad

when he was arrested. An eyewitness saw a young man leave the

scene with Ballenger's purse. At trial, this young man was

identified as Malvo. Another eyewitness saw Malvo flee the

scene with Ballenger's purse and get into the Caprice.

6
 The sixth shooting occurred in Silver Spring, Maryland on

October 3, 2002. At approximately 8:15 a.m., Premkumar A.

Walekar ("Walekar") was fueling his taxicab. He was shot once

with a bullet from a high velocity rifle. The bullet passed

through his left arm and then entered his chest, where it

broke two ribs, shredded portions of his lungs, and damaged

his heart. A physician, who was fueling her car next to

Walekar, attempted CPR but was unsuccessful. Ballistic tests

established that bullet fragments recovered from the Walekar

shooting were fired from the Bushmaster rifle possessed by

Muhammad when he was arrested.

The seventh shooting occurred in Silver Spring, Maryland

on October 3, 2002. At approximately 8:30 a.m., Sarah Ramos

("Ramos") was sitting on a bench in front of the Crisp & Juicy

Restaurant in the Leisure World Shopping Center. She was shot

once with a bullet from a high velocity rifle. The bullet

entered the front of her head and exited through her spinal

cord at the top of her neck. An eyewitness identified the

Caprice at the scene prior to the shooting. Bullet fragments

recovered from the Ramos shooting were fired from the

Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was arrested.

The eighth shooting occurred in Kensington, Maryland on

October 3, 2002. At approximately 10:00 a.m., Lori Lewis-

Rivera ("Lewis-Rivera") was vacuuming her car at the Shell gas

7
station on the corner of Connecticut Avenue and Knowles

Avenue. She was shot once in the back by a bullet from a high

velocity rifle as she vacuumed her car. An eyewitness

testified that he saw the Caprice in the vicinity of the gas

station approximately 20 minutes before the shooting. Bullet

fragments recovered from the Lewis-Rivera shooting were fired

from the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was

arrested.

The ninth shooting occurred in Washington, D.C. on

October 3, 2002. At approximately 7:00 p.m., a police officer

stopped Muhammad for "running" two stop signs. The police

officer testified that the windows of the Caprice were heavily

tinted and that he could not see anyone else in the car. The

police officer gave Muhammad a verbal warning and let him go.

At approximately 9:15 p.m. on that day, Paschal Charlot

("Charlot") was shot in the chest as he crossed the

intersection of Georgia Avenue and Kalmia Road. This

intersection was about 30 blocks from where the police officer

stopped Muhammad. The bullet entered Charlot's chest and

shattered his collarbone and three ribs before lacerating his

lungs. Charlot died before emergency personnel arrived.

Eyewitnesses testified that they saw the Caprice at the scene

at the time of the shooting, and that the driver drove away

without its headlights on immediately after the shooting. It

8
had been parked in a space on the street with its trunk

positioned toward Georgia Avenue. One eyewitness testified

that he saw a flash of light from the Caprice at the time the

shot was fired. Ballistics tests determined that the bullet

fragments recovered from the Charlot shooting were fired from

the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was

arrested.

The tenth shooting occurred in Fredericksburg, Virginia

on October 4, 2002. Caroline Seawell ("Seawell") had finished

shopping at a Michael's Craft Store, and was putting her bags

in her minivan, when she was shot once in the back by a bullet

from a high velocity rifle. The bullet severely damaged her

liver and exited through her right breast. Seawell survived

the shooting. An eyewitness testified that he saw the Caprice

in the parking lot at the time of the shooting. Ballistics

tests determined that the bullet fragments recovered from the

Seawell shooting were fired from the Bushmaster rifle

possessed by Muhammad when he was arrested.

The eleventh shooting occurred in Bowie, Maryland on

October 6, 2002. Tanya Brown ("Tanya") took Iran Brown

("Brown") to Tasker Middle School. As Brown was walking on

the sidewalk to the school, he was shot once in the chest by a

bullet from a high velocity rifle. Tanya decided not to wait

for emergency personnel and drove Brown to a health care

9
center. Brown's lungs were damaged, there was a large hole in

his diaphragm, the left lobe of his liver was damaged, and his

stomach, pancreas, and spleen were lacerated by bullet

fragments. Surgeons were able to save Brown's life and he

spent eight weeks recovering in the hospital.

Two eyewitnesses testified that they saw the Caprice in

the vicinity of Tasker Middle School the day before the

shooting and the morning of the shooting. One of these

eyewitnesses positively identified both Muhammad and Malvo in

the Caprice the morning of the shooting. They were seen in

the Caprice which was parked at an intersection with a line of

sight to the school. Following the shooting, police searched

the surrounding area and found a ballpoint pen and a shell

casing in the woods next to the school. The pen and shell

casing were located in an area that had been patted down like

a hunting blind. This blind offered a clear line of sight to

the scene of the shooting. Tissue samples from the pen

matched Muhammad's DNA. The shell casing had been fired by

the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was

arrested, and tests determined that the bullet fragments

recovered from Brown were fired from that rifle.

In the woods, police also found the first communication

from Muhammad and Malvo. A tarot card, the one for death, was

found with handwriting that stated, "Call me God." On the

10
back of the card was handwriting that stated, "For you, Mr.

Police. Code: Call me God. Do not release to the Press."

The twelfth shooting, discussed above, was the murder of

Dean Meyers in Manassas, Virginia on October 9, 2002.

The thirteenth shooting occurred in Massaponax, Virginia

on October 11, 2002. Kenneth Bridges ("Bridges") was at an

Exxon gas station on Jefferson Davis Highway. He was shot

once in the chest by a bullet from a high velocity rifle. The

bullet damaged his lungs and heart, causing fatal internal

injuries. Two eyewitnesses testified that they saw the

Caprice at or near the Exxon station on the morning of the

shooting. Ballistics tests determined that the bullet

fragments recovered from the Bridges shooting were fired from

the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was

arrested.

The fourteenth shooting occurred in Falls Church,

Virginia on October 14, 2002. Linda Franklin ("Franklin") and

her husband were shopping at a Home Depot store. As they

loaded their purchases in their car, Franklin was shot and

killed by a single bullet from a high velocity rifle. The

bullet entered the left side of her head, passed through her

brain and skull, and exited from the right side of her head.

An off-duty police officer testified that she saw Malvo

driving the Caprice in the vicinity of the shooting

11
immediately after it occurred. Tests determined that bullet

fragments recovered from the Franklin shooting were fired from

the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was

arrested.

On October 15, the day after Franklin was murdered, a

Rockville, Maryland police dispatcher received a telephone

call in which the caller stated:

Don't say anything, just listen, we're the
people who are causing the killings in
your area. Look on the tarot card, it
says, "call me God, do not release to
press." We've called you three times
before trying to set up negotiations.
We've gotten no response. People have
died.

The dispatcher attempted to transfer the call to the Sniper

Task Force, but the caller hung up.

Three days later, on October 18, Officer Derek Baliles

("Officer Baliles"), a Montgomery County, Maryland Police

Information Officer, received a telephone call. The caller

told Officer Baliles to "shut up" and stated that he knew who

was doing the shootings, but wanted the police officer to

verify some information before he talked further. The caller

told Officer Baliles to verify information concerning a

shooting at a liquor store near "Ann Street." The caller gave

Officer Baliles the name and telephone number of a police

officer in Alabama. Officer Baliles confirmed the shootings

12
of Parker and Adams. The caller called Officer Baliles again.

Officer Baliles told him that he had verified the information

concerning the shootings of Parker and Adams. The caller then

said that he had to find more coins for the call and had to

find a telephone without surveillance and then hung up.

On the same day, William Sullivan ("Sullivan"), a priest

in Ashland, Virginia, received a telephone call from two

people. The first voice, a male, told him someone wanted to

speak with him. Sullivan testified that a second male voice,

told him that "the lady didn't have to die," and "it was at

the Home Depot." The second voice also told him about a

shooting at a liquor store in Alabama and then said, "Mr.

Policeman, I am God. Do not tell the press." The second

voice concluded by telling Sullivan to give this information

to the police.

The fifteenth shooting occurred in Ashland, Virginia on

October 19, 2002. Jeffrey Hopper ("Hopper") and his wife

stopped in Ashland to fuel their car and eat dinner. They

left the restaurant and were walking to their car when Hopper

was shot in the abdomen. Hopper survived the shooting, but

underwent five surgeries to repair his pancreas, stomach,

kidneys, liver, diaphragm, and intestines. In the woods near

the shooting, police found a hunting-type blind similar to the

one found at the Brown shooting. At the blind, police found a

13
shell casing, a plastic sandwich bag attached to a tree with a

thumbtack at eye level that was decorated with Halloween

characters and self-adhesive stars, and a candy wrapper.

Tests determined that the shell casing and bullet fragments

recovered from the Hopper shooting came from the Bushmaster

rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was arrested.

Surveillance videotapes identified Muhammad in a Big Lots

Store on October 19, 2002 near the shooting from which the

plastic sandwich bag and decorations were likely obtained.

The candy wrapper contained both Malvo's and Muhammad's DNA.

Police also found a handwritten message in the plastic

sandwich bag that read:

For you Mr. Police. "Call me God."
Do not release to the Press.
We have tried to contact you to start
negotiation . . . These people took our
call for a Hoax or Joke, so your failure
to respond has cost you five lives.
If stopping the killing is more
important than catching us now, then you
will accept our demand which are non-
negotiable.
(i) You will place ten million
dollar in Bank of america account . . .
We will have unlimited withdrawl at any
atm worldwide. You will activate the bank
account, credit card, and pin number. We
will contact you at Ponderosa Buffet,
Ashland, Virginia, tel. # . . . 6:00 am
Sunday Morning. You have until 9:00 a.m.
Monday morning to complete transaction.
"Try to catch us withdrawing at least you
will have less body bags."
(ii) If trying to catch us now more
important then prepare you body bags.

14
 If we give you our word that is what
takes place.
"Word is Bond."
P.S. Your children are not safe
anywhere at anytime.

The note was not found until after the deadline had passed.

The day after Hopper was shot at the Ponderosa, an FBI agent

operating the "Sniper Tip Line" received a call from a young

male who said, "Don't talk. Just listen. Call me God. I

left a message for you at the Ponderosa. I am trying to reach

you at the Ponderosa. Be there to take a call in ten

minutes."

On October 21, 2002, an FBI agent received a call to the

FBI negotiations team which had been re-routed from the

Ponderosa telephone number referenced in the note left after

the Hopper shooting. A recorded voice stated:

Don't say anything. Just listen. Dearest
police, Call me God. Do not release to the
press. Five red stars. You have our terms.
They are non-negotiable. If you choose Option
1, you will hold a press conference stating to
the media that you believe you have caught the
sniper like a duck in a noose. Repeat every
word exactly as you heard it. If you choose
Option 2, be sure to remember we will not
deviate. P.S. – Your children are not safe.

The sixteenth shooting occurred in Aspen Hill, Maryland

on October 22, 2002. At approximately 6:00 a.m., Conrad

Johnson ("Johnson"), a bus driver for the Montgomery County

Transit Authority, was shot in the chest at the entrance to

15
his bus. Johnson remained conscious until rescue workers

arrived, but died at the hospital. A single high velocity

rifle bullet killed Johnson. The bullet entered his right

chest, and caused massive damage to his diaphragm, liver,

pancreas, kidneys, and intestines. Tests determined that the

bullet fragments recovered from the Johnson shooting were

fired from the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he

was arrested. A hunting-type blind, similar to those found at

the Brown and Hopper shootings, was found in the woods near

where Johnson was shot. A black duffle bag and a left-handed

glove were found. A hair from the duffle bag yielded DNA that

matched Muhammad's DNA. The police also found another plastic

sandwich bag which contained a note and self-adhesive stars.

Muhammad and Malvo were captured and arrested on October

24, 2002, by agents of the FBI at a rest area in Frederick

County, Maryland. They were asleep in the Caprice at the time

of their capture. Inside the Caprice, police found a loaded

.223 caliber Bushmaster rifle behind the rear seat. Tests

determined that the DNA on the Bushmaster rifle matched the

DNA of both Malvo and Muhammad. The only fingerprints found

on the Bushmaster rifle were those of Malvo.

The Caprice had been modified after Muhammad purchased it

from O'Kupski. The windows were heavily tinted. The rear

seat was hinged, providing easy access to the trunk from the

16
passenger compartment. The trunk was spray-painted blue. A

hole had been cut into the trunk lid, just above the license

plate. The hole was blocked by a right-handed brown glove

that matched the left-handed glove found in the woods near the

Johnson shooting. The trunk also had a rubber seal that

crossed over the hole.

Inside the Caprice, police found a global positioning

system (GPS) receiver, a magazine about rifles, an AT&T

telephone charge card, ear plugs, maps, plastic sandwich bags,

a rifle scope, .223 caliber ammunition, "walkie-talkies," a

digital voice recorder, a receipt from a Baton Rouge,

Louisiana grocery store dated September 27, 2002, an

electronic organizer, a plastic bag from a Big Lots Store, a

slip of paper containing the Sniper Task Force phone number,

and a list of schools in the Baltimore area.

Police also found LaRuffa's portable computer in the

Caprice. Muhammad had loaded software entitled "Microsoft

Streets and Trips 2002" onto this computer on September 29,

2002. In this program, there were various maps showing

particular routes and places marked with icons, some with a

skull and crossbones. Icons had been added to mark the places

where Walekar, Lewis-Rivera, Seawell, Brown, Meyers and

Franklin were shot. There was also a Microsoft Word file

17
titled "Allah8.rtf" that contained portions of the text

communicated to police in the extortion demands.

B. Proceedings Below

Subsequent to his arrest on October 24, 2002, Muhammad

was indicted by a grand jury on October 28, 2002, for the

capital murder of Meyers in the commission of an act of

terrorism, Code §§ 18.2-31(13) and 18.2-46.4; capital murder

of Meyers and at least one other person within a three-year

period, Code § 18.2-31(8); conspiracy to commit capital

murder, Code §§ 18.2-22 and 18.2-32; and illegal use of a

firearm in the commission of capital murder, Code § 18.2-53.1.

Muhammad waived his right to a speedy trial on November

13, 2002. Upon motion by Muhammad, and without objection by

the Commonwealth, venue was changed from the Circuit Court of

Prince William County to the Circuit Court of the City of

Virginia Beach.

From October 20 through November 17, 2003, Muhammad was

tried before a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of

Virginia Beach. The jury convicted Muhammad of all charges in

the grand jury indictments. In a separate sentencing

proceeding from November 17 through November 24, 2003, the

jury sentenced Muhammad to two death sentences for the capital

murder convictions, finding both the future dangerousness and

vileness aggravating factors. The jury also sentenced

18
Muhammad to 13 years in prison upon the remaining convictions.

At the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, venue was

transferred back to the Circuit Court of Prince William

County.

On March 9, 2004, the trial court imposed the two death

sentences and the sentences of imprisonment as fixed by the

jury. A final sentencing order was entered on March 29, 2004.

Muhammad noted appeals of his convictions. On May 7,

2004, this Court certified Muhammad's appeals of his non-

capital convictions under Code § 17.1-409 for consolidation

with the appeals of his capital murder convictions and the

review mandated by Code § 17.1-313.

We will recite additional facts and incidents of trial as

necessary in context as specific assignments of error are

considered.

II. Preliminary Issues

A. Issues Abandoned or Waived

Muhammad advances 102 assignments of error in his appeal.

The Commonwealth maintains that Muhammad failed to

sufficiently argue in his brief assignments of error 33, 34,

43, 45, 47, 52, 53, 68, 70, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 88, and 96.

Rules 5:17(c)(4) and 5:27 require that a brief contain "[t]he

principles of law, the argument, and the authorities relating

to each assignment of error," and further require that "[w]ith

19
respect to each assignment of error, the principles, the

argument, and the authorities shall be stated in one place and

not scattered through the petition." In his reply brief,

Muhammad contests the Commonwealth's assertion only as to

assignments of error 43, 52, 78, 79, 80, 81, and 83. 2

Accordingly, assignments of error 33, 34, 45, 47, 53, 68, 70,

82, 88, and 96 are waived. Consequently, we will consider

only assignments of error 43, 52, 78, 79, 80 and 83 as being

in controversy.

Assignment of error 43 pertains to the admission of crime

scene and autopsy photographs. Assignment of error 52 refers

to testimony of Officer Cindy Martin concerning her

observations of "brain matter" at the scene of the Ramos

shooting. With respect to both of these assignments, there is

insufficient argument in the brief. Having been directed by

Muhammad to particular page citations where he claims to have

presented these arguments, we agree with the Commonwealth's

observation that Muhammad merely restates his assignment of

error and makes reference to pages in the appendix where his

trial court arguments can be found. We have previously held

that such a practice is improper and is insufficient to meet

the requirements of our Rules. Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262

2
The Commonwealth did not claim that Muhammad waived
assignment of error 81.

20
Va. 127, 138, 547 S.E.2d 186, 194 (2001), cert. denied, 534

U.S. 1094 (2002). Failure to adequately brief an assignment

of error is considered a waiver. Powell v. Commonwealth, 267

Va. 107, 135, 590 S.E.2d 537, 554, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,

125 S.Ct. 86 (2004). Therefore, assignments 43 and 52 are

deemed waived.

The remaining assignments of error claimed by the

Commonwealth to be waived by lack of argument pertain to

unadjudicated criminal conduct evidence presented at the

bifurcated sentencing proceeding. Assignment of error 78

refers to evidence of the killing of Kenya Cook in Tacoma,

Washington. Assignment of error 79 refers to a shooting into

Temple Beth El Synagogue in Tacoma, Washington. Assignment of

error 80 refers to testimony about the presence of a .308

caliber rifle found pointing to a particular apartment in

Tacoma, Washington. Assignment of error 83 refers to evidence

of a sharpened spoon handle in Muhammad's cell in the Prince

William County jail.

For each of these assignments of error related to

unadjudicated criminal conduct, Muhammad cites pages in the

section of his brief entitled "Statement of Facts" and one

page in the "Argument" section of his brief. The references

in the "Statement of Facts" are to arguments made in the trial

proceeding. Even giving Muhammad the benefit of examining

21
additional pages of his brief not referred to as the location

of his argument, Muhammad does not make particularized

arguments in his brief concerning each of the categories of

evidence he finds objectionable, except for evidence of the

alleged escape attempt contained in assignment of error 81,

which the Commonwealth agrees was not waived. Assignments of

error 80 and 83 raise issues of lack of notice of presentation

of unadjudicated criminal conduct; however, there is no

argument of the question in the brief itself. Assignments of

error 78, 79, 80, and 83 are not sufficiently argued in the

brief. We will not consider them. Rule 5:17(c)(4); Rule

5:27; Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396, 422, 593 S.E.2d

270, 286 (2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 875

(2005); Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 537, 450 S.E.2d

365, 372 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995).

B. Sufficiency of the Commonwealth's Capital Murder
Theories and of the Evidence to Support These Theories

We first address the dominant issue presented in this

case, namely the legal viability of the Commonwealth's

theories of capital murder and the sufficiency of the evidence

to support its theories. Muhammad's assignments of error 63–

69, 71-74, 97, and 102, present these issues. We review

questions of law, and mixed questions of law and fact,

utilizing a de novo standard of review. Quatannens v.

22
Tyrrell, 268 Va. 360, 365, 601 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2004), McCain

v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 489-90, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545

(2001).

In accordance with established principles of appellate

review, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court. We

also accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences

fairly deducible from the evidence. Riner v. Commonwealth,

268 Va. 296, 303-04, 601 S.E.2d 555, 558-59 (2004), Armstrong

v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 576, 562 S.E.2d 139, 140 (2002);

Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d

534, 537 (1975).

There is no distinction in the law between the weight or

value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence.

The finder of fact is entitled to consider all the evidence,

without distinction, in reaching its determination.

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 512-13, 578 S.E.2d 781,

785, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 972 (2003). Circumstantial

evidence is not viewed in isolation. While no single piece of

evidence may be sufficient, the combined force of many

concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in

itself, may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a

conclusion. Id. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 786. We will set aside

the judgment only if it is clearly wrong or unsupported by the

23
evidence. Powell v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 233, 236, 602

S.E.2d 119, 120-21 (2004).

The jury found Muhammad guilty of capital murder under

two separate provisions of Virginia law: Code § 18.2-31(8) for

the "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more

than one person within a three-year period;" and Code § 18.2-

31(13) for the "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing

of any person by another in the commission of or attempted

commission of an act of terrorism." Among the challenges

made, Muhammad argues that the trial court erred in permitting

a legally flawed "triggerman" theory to be presented to the

jury as a result of various rulings and instructions.

Muhammad further argues that, even under the Commonwealth's

theory, the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the

so-called "triggerman." Also, Muhammad challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence to support his capital murder

conviction based upon acts of terrorism. His constitutional

challenges to the capital murder statute based upon terrorism

are addressed elsewhere in this opinion.

1. Capital Murder Conviction Based Upon
Murder of More Than One Person in Three Years

(a) Sniper Team Theory

The Commonwealth introduced the testimony of Sergeant

Major Mark Spicer ("Spicer") of the British Armed Forces as an

24
expert in sniper methodology. His testimony and the direct

and circumstantial evidence presented to the jury are more

than sufficient to support, beyond a reasonable doubt,

Muhammad's conviction for the capital murder of Dean Meyers

and others within three years.

Spicer testified that "sniping is the ability of two men

to go out and inflict injuries or kill people and more

importantly spread terror across a much larger force." While

acknowledging that a sniper can act alone or in a team of

three, he stated, "the basic unit for a sniper team . . . is

. . . a two-man unit." Spicer testified at length about the

distinct responsibilities of each member of a two-man sniper

unit. Essentially, one member of the team is the long-range

shooter occupying an obscured position with the opportunity to

shoot a particular victim. Because of the intensity and

discipline required to take advantage of the narrow window of

opportunity to take the long-range shot, the other member of

the team, the "spotter," informs the long-range shooter by

radio that the victim is coming within the zone of potential

fire and that other circumstances are ripe for the shot. The

"spotter" may ultimately give the order to shoot.

Spicer connected the evidence found by police

investigators in this case to the tools and methods ordinarily

used by a sniper team. The .223 caliber Bushmaster rifle used

25
in at least ten of the shootings, including Dean Meyers, is

equivalent to the M4 rifle used by military snipers.

Additionally, sniper teams use tools such as those found in

the Caprice: a bipod support system for support of the rifle;

holographic and telescopic scopes to aid sighting; GPS

equipment to locate and relocate a vantage point for the long-

range shot; "walkie-talkie" handheld radio sets for

communication; pocket recording equipment for recording data

in the dark, bungee cords for easy "break down" of the rifle

for transportation; maps; silencers.

Spicer also testified about the methodology of a sniper

team which was supported by the evidence in this case. Spicer

emphasized the constant training with the rifle to maintain

skills, the creation of a camouflaged location for firing, the

use of existing traffic to facilitate escape, and the "team"

approach with a "spotter" who is armed with a handgun and may

additionally participate in the assault by firing from close

range.

With regard to the Caprice, Spicer testified about the

alterations made to it to facilitate the methodology of the

sniper team. The rear firewall had been removed from the

Caprice to provide entry into the trunk from the passenger

compartment. The trunk compartment had been spray-painted a

26
dark color to minimize contrast and shadow to avoid detection

in the event the trunk was opened.

Finally, Spicer gave particular significance to the

peculiar hole placed in the back of the trunk lid that

enlarged the field of vision while minimizing the ability to

see the person in the trunk. He referred to this special

process as implementing the "castle principle" making

reference to ancient methods of protecting the castle while

minimizing danger to the shooter and maximizing the range of

fire.

The Commonwealth presented compelling evidence that such

a sniper team methodology was used by Muhammad and Malvo in

multiple shootings prior to and after the murder of Dean

Myers. Perhaps no one or two incidents could reasonably

confirm the use of this methodology by the two perpetrators of

this unique criminal enterprise. But in its entirety, the

weight of the direct and circumstantial evidence in the case

is sufficient to prove that Muhammad and Malvo acted together

as a sniper team.

(b) Jury Instructions on Multiple Homicide
Theory of Capital Murder

Muhammad was convicted under Code § 18.2-31(8), of the

willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Dean Meyers

and others within a three-year period. He maintains, "Only

27
the immediate perpetrator of a homicide, the one who fired the

fatal shot, and not an accessory before the fact or a

principal in the second degree, may be convicted of capital

murder." He claims that under the Commonwealth's theory of

the case, Muhammad could never be the "triggerman" as defined

in our cases.

It is well-established that in felony cases:

A principal in the first degree is the actual
perpetrator of the crime. A principal in the
second degree, or an aider or abettor as he is
sometimes termed, is one who is present,
actually or constructively, assisting the
perpetrator in the commission of the crime.
In order to make a person a principal in the
second degree actual participation in the
commission of the crime is not necessary. The
test is whether or not he was encouraging,
inciting, or in some manner offering aid in
the commission of the crime. If he was
present lending countenance, or otherwise
aiding while another did the act, he is an
aider and abettor or principal in the second
degree.

Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 372-73, 157 S.E.2d 907,

909 (1967). A principal in the second degree "must share the

criminal intent of the actual perpetrator or be guilty of some

overt act." Hall v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 533, 536, 303

S.E.2d 903, 904 (1983). That there may be more than one

principal in the first degree for a particular offense is

beyond dispute:

Where two people engage in criminal conduct
together, as where they participate in

28
 striking and killing another, each participant
is a principal in the first degree in the
homicide. Likewise, where part of a crime is
committed in one place and another part is
committed in a different place, the author of
each part is a principal in the first degree.

1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 30 (15th ed. 1993).

Generally in Virginia, a principal in the second degree

is subject to the same punishment as the principal in the

first degree. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 683, 687-88,

537 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2000). However, with the exception of

capital murder prosecutions for a killing for hire, or a

killing pursuant to the direction or order of one who is

engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, or a killing

pursuant to the direction or order of one who is engaged in

the commission of or attempted commission of an act of

terrorism, "an accessory before the fact or principal in the

second degree to a capital murder shall be indicted, tried,

convicted and punished as though the offense were murder in

the first degree." Code § 18.2-18. Accordingly, pursuant to

the charge of capital murder based upon killing of two or more

persons within a three-year period, the Commonwealth must

prove that Muhammad was a principal in the first degree.

The euphemism, "triggerman," is inadequate to describe

the breadth of criminal responsibility subject to the death

penalty in Virginia. Immediately and obviously, capital

29
murder cases are not confined to murders completed by the

instrumentality of a firearm. Recognizing this inadequacy,

our capital murder cases routinely use the term "immediate

perpetrator" as the appropriate descriptive term. The term is

not new, having been used as early as 1880 in our case law.

Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 845, 868 (1880).

Muhammad argues in assignments of error 66 and 69 that

the trial court erred in giving instructions 4 (capital murder

finding instruction) and 9 (defining principals in the first

and second degree), and further argues in assignments of error

71 and 73 that the trial court erred in refusing to give his

proffered instruction J (concerning multiple killings) and L

(concerning the definition of a principal in the first and

principal in the second degree). Muhammad's quarrel with the

instructions is a function of his disagreement over the scope

of the concept of "immediate perpetrator" for the purposes of

the capital murder statutes. He further argues that the

instructions at issue confuse the concept of principal in the

first degree with the requirements of principal in the second

degree and undermine the concept of "aiding and abetting."

Instruction 4 required Muhammad to be a "princip[al] in

the first degree, as defined in Instruction No. 9" for the

jury to convict for capital murder. The pertinent part of

Instruction 9 states:

30
 A principal in the first degree is the
immediate perpetrator of the offense.
Where two or more persons take a direct
part in inflicting fatal injuries, each joint
participant is an immediate perpetrator for
the purpose of proving capital murder.
The principal in the second degree is a
person who is present, aiding and abetting, by
helping in some way in the commission of the
crime. Presence and consent alone are not
sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting.
It must be shown the Defendant, John Allen
Muhammad, intended his word, gestures, signals
or actions to in some way, encourage, advise
or urge, or in some way help the person
committing the crime commit it . . . .

In Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 404 S.E.2d

227, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991), we reviewed a capital

murder conviction wherein the "Commonwealth's theory of the

case was that Strickler and Henderson had acted jointly to

accomplish the actual killing" of the victim by crushing her

skull with a 69-pound rock. Id. at 494, 404 S.E.2d at 235.

The evidence was consistent with the Commonwealth's argument

that one of the two men held the victim immobile while the

other dropped or threw the rock on her head. Citing Coppola

v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 256-57, 257 S.E.2d 797, 806

(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980), where we held that

a defendant who "jointly participated in [a] fatal beating"

was subject to conviction and punishment for capital murder,

we restated the rule of culpability for capital murder as

follows:

31
 We adhere to the view that where two or more
persons take a direct part in inflicting fatal
injuries, each joint participant is an
"immediate perpetrator" for the purposes of
the capital murder statutes.

Strickler, 241 Va. at 495, 404 S.E.2d at 235. This rule has

been reaffirmed in several cases since Strickler. See Lenz v.

Warden, 265 Va. 373, 381, 579 S.E.2d 194, 199 (2003);

Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 349-50, 551 S.E.2d

620, 630 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002); Williams,

248 Va. at 545, 450 S.E.2d at 376; Hancock v. Commonwealth, 12

Va. App. 774, 779-81, 407 S.E.2d 301, 304-05 (1991).

In Lenz and Remington, two criminal actors were immediate

perpetrators because they "jointly participated in the fatal

stabbing." Remington, 262 Va. at 350, 551 S.E.2d at 630.

Another category of multiple actors who may be immediate

perpetrators was established in Strickler. The Court held

that the evidence supported the Commonwealth's theory that one

actor held the victim while the other actor dropped a large

rock on her head. We observed that "it would have been

necessary that she be held down by one assailant while the

other lifted the rock and dropped it on her head." Strickler,

241 Va. at 494, 404 S.E.2d at 235. As established in

Strickler, conduct of two criminal actors may be such that

they jointly complete the criminal act. It is not a matter of

encouraging, advising, urging, or facilitating another in the

32
commission of the crime. It is the actual participation

together in a unified act that permits two or more persons to

be immediate perpetrators. In Strickler, the Commonwealth

advanced its theory concerning how the murder was

accomplished. Our review on appeal considered whether the

evidence supported the theory.

Similarly, we must consider the evidence in support of

the Commonwealth's theory of how Muhammad and Malvo acted

together in the murder of Dean Meyers. Spicer's expert

testimony, the evidence recovered from the Caprice, the

evidence from the 16 shootings, and the additional evidence

concerning Malvo and Muhammad's relationship and activities

support the Commonwealth's theory of the case. Muhammad and

Malvo and the Caprice were identified in the immediate

vicinity of Dean Meyers' murder approximately one hour before

it occurred. Immediately after the murder, Muhammad was

identified in the parking lot across the street from where

Meyers was shot. Muhammad was driving the Caprice in which he

and Malvo were later arrested. Ballistics tests determined

that the bullet that killed Meyers was shot from the .223

caliber Bushmaster rifle found in the Caprice with Muhammad

and Malvo when they were arrested. The Caprice was located in

a position providing a direct line of fire to accomplish the

murder. Significantly, the shot from the parking lot had to

33
cross nine lanes of traffic on a heavily traveled highway at

approximately 8:15 p.m. on a weekday evening. With the

relatively small portal offered by the hole in the trunk of

the Caprice and the obstacle presented by nine traffic lanes,

the evidence supports the Commonwealth's theory of a "shooter"

and a "spotter" and the direction by the spotter to shoot at

the opportune time. As in Strickler, we review the evidence

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine

if it is sufficient to support the Commonwealth's theory. 241

Va. at 485, 404 S.E.2d at 230. Upon review of that evidence,

we cannot say that the trial court was plainly wrong or

without evidence to support its judgment.

The jury instructions given by the trial court accurately

conveyed applicable law without confusion to the jury.

Furthermore, Instructions J and L offered by Muhammad did not

embrace a correct definition of immediate perpetrator and were

properly refused by the trial court.

The theory of the Commonwealth concerning multiple

immediate perpetrators acting as principals in the first

degree accurately encompasses Virginia law. The jury

instructions in question properly instructed the jury on the

law and the facts of the case.

2. Capital Murder in the Commission
of an Act of Terrorism

34
 (a) Sufficiency of Evidence

Muhammad was also convicted of capital murder pursuant to

Code § 18.2-31(13) for the willful, deliberate, and

premeditated killing of Dean Meyers in the commission of an

act of terrorism as defined in Code § 18.2-46.4. Code § 18.2-

46.4 defines an "act of terrorism" as

an act of violence as defined in clause (i) of
subdivision A of § 19.2-297.1 committed with
the intent to (i) intimidate the civilian
population at large; or (ii) influence the
conduct or activities of the government of the
United States, a state or locality through
intimidation.

Code § 19.2-297.1 includes, among the acts of violence the

offenses of first and second degree murder, voluntary

manslaughter, malicious wounding, and robbery. Additionally,

Code § 18.2-18 provides that a person convicted of capital

murder under Code § 18.2-31(13) is not required to be a

principal in the first degree to the murder if the killing was

"pursuant to the direction or order of the one who is engaged

in the commission of . . . an act of terrorism."

Significantly, Muhammad does not contest the sufficiency

of evidence to support the charge that acts of violence

committed by him and Malvo were done with the intent to

"intimidate the civilian population at large" or to "influence

the conduct or activities of the government of the United

States, a state or locality through intimidation." Rather, he

35
challenges his conviction for capital murder based upon the

terrorism predicate by attacking the validity of the statute,

constitutionally and otherwise, and by challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence that he "directed" or "ordered"

Malvo with respect to the killing of Dean Meyers. We will

consider Muhammad's challenge to the validity of the statute

elsewhere in this opinion.

The Commonwealth argues that the evidence is sufficient

to support two separate evidentiary theories upon which

Muhammad's conviction for capital murder in the commission of

an act of terrorism is based. One theory is based upon

Muhammad committing the murder of Dean Meyers as a principal

in the first degree because he is an immediate perpetrator of

the crime. The second evidentiary theory is based upon

Muhammad giving a direction or order to Malvo to kill Dean

Meyers. Either or both theories are sufficient to sustain the

proof necessary to affirm Muhammad's conviction for capital

murder in the commission of an act of terrorism.

As stated above, the proof is sufficient to establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that Muhammad acted as a principal

in the first degree, as an immediate perpetrator, in the death

of Dean Meyers. The "sniper theory" advanced by the

Commonwealth is supported through Spicer's expert testimony,

the ample evidence of such a methodology, and our prior

36
decisions. As an immediate perpetrator of the death of Dean

Meyers in a murder that qualifies as an act of violence under

Code § 19.2-297.1, Muhammad was a principal in the first

degree in the "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing

of [a] person . . . in the commission . . . of an act of

terrorism." Code § 18.2-31(13).

Additionally, the combined weight of direct and

circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain Muhammad's

conviction even if he is considered to have been a criminal

actor in the second degree who gave an order or direction to

Malvo to kill Dean Meyers. Malvo and Muhammad were seen in

the Caprice in the vicinity of Meyers' shooting approximately

one hour beforehand. The Caprice was the same vehicle in

which Muhammad and Malvo were arrested. It was altered to

provide access to the trunk from the inside and a portal for

firing a rifle through the trunk lid. Muhammad was

interviewed by police immediately after the shooting in a

parking lot across the street from where Meyers was shot.

Malvo was not seen at the parking lot. There was a direct

line of fire between the parking lot and the Sunoco station

where Meyers was shot. Between the parking lot and the site

where Meyers was shot were nine traffic lanes. The evidence

shows that Malvo and Muhammad possessed the .223 caliber

Bushmaster rifle, mittens with open fingers, a GPS receiver,

37
earplugs, maps, rifle scopes, "walkie-talkies," a voice

recorder, an electronic organizer, and other evidence

previously described. The evidence proves that the bullet

that killed Dean Meyers came from the .223 caliber Bushmaster

rifle in the possession of Muhammad and Malvo when they were

arrested. The evidence also contains direct or circumstantial

proof of instances where the two men committed similar crimes

together.

Muhammad and Malvo were seen nearby in the Caprice

immediately before the murder of Dean Meyers. Only Muhammad

was seen immediately afterward. The weight of the evidence

supports the conclusion that either Muhammad or Malvo fired

the fatal shot that killed Dean Meyers. If it was Muhammad,

he is a principal in the first degree, with or without the

sniper theory advanced by the Commonwealth. The evidence more

reasonably proves that Malvo was the shooter and was in the

converted trunk when Muhammad was interviewed in the parking

lot immediately after the murder.

The circumstances of this murder are consistent with the

expert testimony concerning a two-man sniper team. As Spicer

testified, the "spotter" sets up the shot at a position safe

from view yet within range of the target. In this case, the

relatively limited range of the shooter in the trunk of the

car requires split-second timing to successfully hit a target

38
that quickly comes into range and just as quickly moves out of

range. This abbreviated window of opportunity is made all the

more difficult by nine lanes of traffic passing between the

shooter and the target. According to Spicer, the job of the

spotter is to communicate with the shooter, give the order or

direction, and then to provide an undetected getaway.

Furthermore, the record is replete with evidence that

Muhammad directed and ordered Malvo in the entire criminal

enterprise. As the Commonwealth argued based upon evidence

presented:

It was Muhammad who brought Malvo to this
country from Jamaica. It was Muhammad who had
the military background in shooting and
snipering skills and who trained Malvo. It
was Muhammad who provided the weapons. It was
Muhammad who was determined to terrorize his
ex-wife's area of the country. It was Muhammad
who was the "father" and Malvo who was the
"son." All the evidence about their
relationship – from the Lighthouse Mission and
friends in Washington state to Muhammad's
cousin in Baton Rouge and the YMCA personnel
in Maryland – consistently showed Muhammad
directing and ordering Malvo's conduct.
Everyone who saw them together observed that
Malvo was extremely obedient to Muhammad, not
the other way around.

On this issue, the trial court held that there was

"overwhelming circumstantial evidence regarding [Muhammad's]

direction and ordering of Mr. Malvo." Upon review of the

evidence, we cannot say that the trial court was clearly wrong

39
or without evidence to support this conclusion. Powell, 268

Va. at 236, 602 S.E.2d at 120-21.

We hold that Muhammad was an immediate perpetrator and as

such was a principal in the first degree in the commission of

capital murder during the commission of an act of terrorism.

We further hold that the evidence proves that Muhammad gave a

direction or order sufficient to satisfy the requirements of

Code § 18.2-18 such that even if he were a criminal actor

ordinarily demonstrating culpability as a principal in the

second degree, he is nonetheless guilty of capital murder

under Code §§ 18.2-31(13) and 18.2-18.

(b) Jury Instructions on the
Terrorism Capital Offense

Muhammad maintains that it was error for the trial court

to give Instructions 5 and 6 and to refuse his Instructions K

and M. (Assignments of Error 67, 68, 72, 74). Assignment of

error 68 regarding instruction 6 has been waived for failure

to brief the issue. Upon review of the evidence and the

instruction, we hold that the trial court did not err in

granting instruction 5. With respect to Muhammad's proffered

instructions K and M, he states in his brief only that they

properly addressed the terrorism issues. There is no argument

concerning why it would be error to refuse them in light of

40
the other instructions given. We will not consider this

argument. Rule 5:17(c).

C. Alleged Inconsistent Prosecution Theories

The independently elected Commonwealth's Attorneys of

Prince William County and Fairfax County maintained

contemporaneous prosecutions of Muhammad and Malvo. In

Fairfax County, Malvo was prosecuted for the murder of Linda

Franklin wherein Malvo interposed an insanity defense. In

Prince William County, Muhammad was prosecuted for the murder

of Dean Meyers. Much of the same evidence was utilized in

each prosecution. In assignments of error 8, 100, and 101,

Muhammad argues that the Commonwealth violated principles of

due process "by simultaneously taking materially inconsistent

positions in the Muhammad case, where it claimed Muhammad

directed and controlled Malvo, and in the Malvo case where it

claimed that Malvo was a free agent." Muhammad further argues

that the Commonwealth should be judicially estopped from

maintaining prosecution theories in two cases based upon the

same evidence because the theories of prosecution are

"inconsistent" and "irreconcilable." We need not address the

legal arguments advanced by Muhammad because we hold that the

theories of prosecution by the two independent prosecutors

were not inconsistent.

41
 Malvo sought to prove in his case in Fairfax County that

he was insane or "brainwashed" by Muhammad. Evidence was

successfully offered to rebut such claims. In the Fairfax

County prosecution, the Commonwealth offered expert testimony

that Malvo was "fully cognizant, conscious, deliberate, [and]

purposeful." The Commonwealth argued in Malvo's case that he

was a "bright, clever human being" who knew what he was doing

when he acted in concert with Muhammad. In the Prince William

County case against Muhammad, the Commonwealth presented

evidence that Muhammad was the "leader" and "teacher" who

trained and directed Malvo to perfect his sniper skills. A

successful rebuttal of Malvo's affirmative defense of insanity

is not inconsistent with a theory of prosecution that includes

Muhammad engaged in training and directing Malvo in their

sniper team activity. It is beyond peradventure that

businesses, sports teams, and military operations involve

training and direction without insanity of the participants as

an issue. The trial court did not err in rejecting Muhammad's

claim of inconsistent theories of prosecution.

III. Indictment and Grand Jury Process

Muhammad asserts in multiple assignments of error that

often overlap that there were fatal flaws in the indictment

process. (Assignments of Error 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17,

18, 19, 27). We will consider them topically.

42
 A. Alleged Failure to Accuse Muhammad
as the "Triggerman"

Muhammad argues the Commonwealth failed to allege facts

necessary for a death sentence in the indictment because it

did not allege that he actually fired the shot that killed

Dean Meyers. He further alleges that it was error to deny his

motion for a bill of particulars to accomplish this end.

Also, he argues that the Commonwealth's notice of intent to

seek the death penalty does not cure this alleged legal flaw

in the indictment. Finally, he argues that the trial court

should have dismissed the indictment for its failure to indict

Muhammad for murder in the second degree rather than capital

murder because of lack of allegations that he was the

"triggerman."

These related allegations simply advance Muhammad's

argument that upon the facts of this case, only the person who

"pulls the trigger" is eligible for the death sentence under

Virginia law. As we have set forth, an immediate perpetrator

of the act is eligible for the death sentence. The trial

court did not err in recognizing this principle of law in its

rulings on these motions.

B. Failure to State Aggravating
Factors in the Indictment

Muhammad alleges that the capital murder indictments are

defective because they failed to recite aggravating factors

43
that would support a death sentence. He argues that pursuant

to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), aggravating factors

in support of the death penalty are the functional equivalent

of elements of the offense of capital murder. He further

alleges that it was error to refuse his request for a bill of

particulars specifying the aggravating factors upon which the

Commonwealth would rely. Finally, despite the fact that the

Commonwealth filed a notice of intent to seek the death

penalty based upon both aggravating factors of vileness and

future dangerousness, he argues that the Commonwealth's notice

did not cure the defect in the indictments.

Ring involved the statutory sentencing scheme in Arizona

where a death sentence may not legally be imposed unless at

least one aggravating factor is found to exist beyond a

reasonable doubt. Ring, 536 U.S. at 596. Additionally, the

Arizona statutes provided that the judge, without a jury, was

to make this determination. Id. at 592-93. The issue before

the Supreme Court of the United States was stated as follows,

"The question presented is whether that aggravating factor may

be found by the judge, as Arizona law specifies, or whether

the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, made applicable to

the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that the

aggravating factor determination be entrusted to the jury."

Id. at 597. Citing the Court's prior opinion in Apprendi v.

44
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the precise answer was

provided: "Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors

operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a

greater offense,' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n.19, the Sixth

Amendment requires that they be found by a jury." Ring, 536

U.S. at 609.

The Virginia statutory scheme does not suffer from the

infirmities found in Apprendi and Ring. In Virginia, if the

defendant elects a jury trial, the existence of one or both

aggravating factors of vileness or future dangerousness is

submitted to a jury. Muhammad recognizes that Virginia's

statutory scheme provides for jury determination of

aggravating factors; however, he argues that the indictments

in his case were defective for failure to set out the

aggravating factors upon which the Commonwealth would seek the

death penalty.

In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), the

Supreme Court reviewed a conviction under a federal statute

prosecuted in federal court. The Court stated, "under the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury

trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than

prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a

crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,

and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 243, n.6. The

45
Court in Apprendi quoted this statement and added, "The

Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case

involving a state statute." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.

However, in a footnote to the opinion, the Court stated,

Apprendi has not here asserted a
constitutional claim based on the omission of
any reference to sentence enhancement or
racial bias in the indictment. He relies
entirely on the fact that the "due process of
law" that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
the States to provide to persons accused of
crime encompasses the right to a trial by jury
. . . and the right to have every element of
the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt
. . . . That Amendment has not, however, been
construed to include the Fifth Amendment right
to "presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury"
that was implicated in our recent decision in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224 (1998). We thus do not address the
indictment question separately today.

Apprendi, 530 at 477, n.3. As if to emphasize the point, the

Court stated in a footnote to Ring,

Ring does not contend that his indictment was
constitutionally defective. See Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 477, n.3 (Fourteenth Amendment "has
not . . . been construed to include the Fifth
Amendment right to 'presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury' ").

Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, n.4.

Muhammad concedes in his brief, "[w]e have acknowledged

that states are currently not bound by the federal

constitution to proceed in felony cases by way of indictment."

He then makes the argument that is now before this Court:

46
"Nevertheless, having chosen to establish a grand jury system

in Virginia, there is a federal due process right that demands

the state properly follow that scheme." We disagree with

Muhammad. A similar argument was made and rejected in

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). In Finley,

Pennsylvania provided court appointed counsel for collateral

attacks upon conviction, a right not required by the

Constitution of the United States. The Court held that Finley

could not sustain a federal constitutional claim for deficient

performance of counsel in such collateral proceedings where

there was no federal constitutional right to counsel in the

first place. Id. at 558-59. Similarly, Muhammad has no

constitutional claim for failure to include aggravating

factors in the two capital murder indictments because

proceeding by indictment is not constitutionally required of

the states.

Additionally, in Virginia, if the indictment gives a

defendant sufficient notice of the nature and character of the

offense charged so he can make his defense, no bill of

particulars is required. Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324,

340, 468 S.E.2d 98, 107, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996),

Wilder v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 145, 147, 225 S.E.2d 411, 413

(1976). In Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 454, 470

S.E.2d 114, 123, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996), we held

47
that an indictment reciting an offense under Code § 18.2-31

was sufficient to place the defendant on notice of the nature

and character of the offense charged. We noted that:

The capital murder indictment alleged that "on
or about October 14, 1994, in the City of
Richmond, Christopher Cornelius Goins did
feloniously and unlawfully commit capital
murder in that he did kill and murder Robert
Jones in a willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing of more than one person
as part of the same act or transaction."

Id. at 454 n.1, 470 S.E.2d at 123 n.1. We held that the

indictment in Goins was sufficient. Muhammad's indictments

were sufficient as well.

A defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars as a

matter of right. Code § 19.2-230 provides that a trial court

"may direct the filing of a bill of particulars." The trial

court's decision whether to require the Commonwealth to file a

bill of particulars is a matter committed to its sound

discretion. Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 372,

402 S.E.2d 218, 223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991). Here,

the trial court denied Muhammad's motion for a bill of

particulars identifying the aggravating factors upon which the

Commonwealth would rely. After the trial court denied the

bill of particulars, the Commonwealth nonetheless filed a

notice of intent to seek the death penalty which fully placed

48
Muhammad on notice that the Commonwealth intended to prove

both future dangerousness and vileness as aggravating factors.

We hold that aggravating factors are not constitutionally

required to be recited in a capital murder indictment. We

hold that the indictments in this case were sufficient under

Virginia law. We hold that the purported violation of

Virginia's indictment provisions in this case does not rise to

the level of a federal constitutional claim. We hold that it

was not an abuse of discretion to refuse Muhammad's motion for

a bill of particulars. Finally, we hold that any error that

could have been committed by the failure to order a bill of

particulars was rendered harmless by the provision of the

information Muhammad sought in the Commonwealth's notice of

intent to seek the death penalty.

C. Alleged Defect in Indictment
Because of Disjunctive Language

In assignment of error 15, Muhammad asserts that the

indictment charging capital murder under the terrorism

predicate is defective because of the use of disjunctive

terms. The indictment in question follows the language of

Code § 18.2-46.4 which states in pertinent part:

"Act of terrorism" means an act of violence as
defined in clause (i) of subdivision A of
§ 19.2-297.1 committed with the intent to (i)
intimidate the civilian population at large;
or (ii) influence the conduct or activities of

49
 the government of the United States, a state
or locality through intimidation.

Code § 18.2-46.4 (emphasis added). Muhammad claims that the

indictment is defective because it did not specify which of

the two intents Muhammad had at the time of the killing. His

argument is not based upon any constitutional claims; rather,

his argument is confined to state law issues.

The indictment charges a single offense and not two

separate offenses. The single offense can be satisfied upon

proof of either or both of two mens rea conditions. A

reasonable construction of the indictment as rendered by the

grand jury includes both. Here, the trial court permitted the

amendment of the indictment to more particularly express what

was already a reasonable construction of the meaning of the

indictment as delivered. The indictment was amended from "or"

to "and/or."

Previously, we considered a similar claim of defective

indictment based upon the use of the disjunctive, "or." In

Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 398, 384 S.E.2d 757,

763 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990), the defendant

was charged with capital murder based upon the killing of more

than one person as a part of the same act or transaction.

Buchanan killed four people. We observed that:

The first indictment charged, in essence, that
Buchanan killed Buchanan, Sr. as part of the

50
 same act or transaction in which he killed
J.J., Donnie, or, Mrs. Buchanan.

238 Va. at 396, 384 S.E.2d at 762. We held that this

indictment reasonably placed Buchanan on notice in the

following manner:

Under the first indictment, Buchanan was on
notice that he had to defend against a claim
that he killed Buchanan, Sr. and all three of
the other victims as part of the same act or
transaction; that he killed Buchanan, Sr. and
any two of the other victims as part of the
same act or transaction; or that he killed
Buchanan, Sr. and any one of the other victims
as part of the same act or transaction.

Id. at 397, 384 S.E.2d at 762.

Muhammad had notice in the indictment, as originally

found by the grand jury and as amended, that he was charged

with a single offense that could be proved by showing: (1) his

intent to intimidate the civilian population at large, or (2)

his intent to influence the conduct or activities of the

government of the United States, a state or locality through

intimidation; or (3) his intent to do both 1 and 2 above. The

trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the terrorism

indictment.

D. Alleged Deficiencies in the
Composition of the Grand Jury

Muhammad argues that the process utilized in his

indictment was fatally flawed because the grand jury that

indicted him was "improperly constituted in violation of

51
Virginia Law and [his] rights to due process and equal

protection." Other than this conclusory statement and the

further statement that the process is "arbitrary and vague,"

Muhammad makes no constitutional argument in his brief in

support of his contentions. His argument is insufficient.

Rule 5:17(c). Furthermore, no constitutional argument was

raised in the trial court. Rule 5:25. We will not consider

this vague and uncertain constitutional challenge to the

composition of the grand jury.

Additionally, his statutory challenge is without merit.

Code §§ 19.2-191 through -205 govern the selection of regular

grand jurors. The record reveals that the grand jurors who

returned indictments against Muhammad were selected pursuant

to the following routine process. The clerk of the court

creates a list of individuals who have been called to serve as

petit jurors at least three times, but not in the immediately

preceding three years. From that list, a smaller list of 120

names is created. The list of 120 names is reviewed by all

the judges of the circuit. Questionnaires are sent to the

persons on the list. At each term of court, seven jurors are

randomly selected to serve as regular grand jurors. The chief

judge of the circuit reviews the questionnaires prior to the

first meeting of the grand jury. During his first meeting

52
with the grand jurors, the chief judge discusses their duties

with them and selects one of them to be the foreperson.

The procedure employed in this case complies with the

requirements outlined by statute that the grand jury be

composed of "persons 18 years of age or over, of honesty,

intelligence and good demeanor and suitable in all respects to

serve as grand jurors," Code § 19.2-194, and "a citizen of

this Commonwealth, eighteen years of age or over, and shall

have been a resident of this Commonwealth one year and of the

county or corporation in which the court is to be held six

months, and is in other respects a qualified juror." Code

§ 19.2-195.

Finally, Muhammad claims that the grand jurors "were not

properly rotated as required by Section 19.2-194." There is

no evidence to support his claim. The evidence does establish

that this grand jury was sworn to sit for a two month term in

October and November 2002. We hold that the evidence does not

sustain a claim that there were infirmities in the process,

selection, or make-up of the grand jury that indicted

Muhammad.

IV. Constitutional Challenge
to the Terrorism Statute

53
 In assignment of error 17, Muhammad maintains that the

terrorism statutes, Code §§ 18.2-31(13) and 18.2-46.4 are

unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. We disagree.

As the Supreme Court stated in Hoffman Estates v.

Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982):

In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and
vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to
determine whether the enactment reaches a
substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct. If it does not, then the
overbreadth challenge must fail. The court
should then examine the facial vagueness
challenge and, assuming the enactment
implicates no constitutionally protected
conduct, should uphold the challenge only if
the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of
its applications. A plaintiff who engages in
some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others. A court
should therefore examine the complainant's
conduct before analyzing other hypothetical
applications of the law.

Id. at 494-95. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52

(1999). The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth requires

proof that a law "punishes a 'substantial' amount of protected

free speech, 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly

legitimate sweep.' " Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118

(2003) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615

(1973)). While Muhammad utilizes the term "overbroad," he

offers no evidence or argument in support of the requirements

54
of this doctrine. Instead, Muhammad confines his argument to

vagueness.

A successful challenge to the facial validity of a

criminal statute based upon vagueness requires proof that the

statute fails to provide notice sufficient for ordinary people

to understand what conduct it prohibits, or proof that the

statute "may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement." Morales, 527 U.S. at 56;

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). But "[o]ne to

whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully

challenge it for vagueness." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,

756 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 267 Va. 573, 580–81, 596

S.E.2d 74, 78 (2004); accord Gibson v. Mayor of Wilmington,

355 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2004); Fuller v. Decatur Public

School Board of Education School District 61, 251 F.3d 662,

667 (7th Cir. 2001); Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353,

1359-60 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d

976, 979 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d

1055, 1063-64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 872 (1999);

Woodis v. Westark Community College, 160 F.3d 435, 438-39 (8th

Cir. 1998); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 803 (10th

Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1133 (1998); Love v.

Butler, 952 F.2d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1991); Hastings v. Judicial

Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 107 (D.C. Cir.

55
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988); Hill v. City of

Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1127 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 482 U.S.

451 (1987); Gallaher v. City of Huntington, 759 F.2d 1155,

1160 (4th Cir. 1985).

Capital murder pursuant to Code § 18.2-31(13) is defined

as the "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of any

person by another in the commission of or attempted commission

of an act of terrorism as defined in Code § 18.2-46.4."

"Act of terrorism" means an act of violence as
defined in clause (i) of subdivision A of
§ 19.2-297.1 committed with the intent to (i)
intimidate the civilian population at large;
or (ii) influence the conduct or activities of
the government of the United States, a state
or locality through intimidation.

Code § 18.2-46.4. The "act of violence" reference to Code

§ 19.2-297.1 includes a list of certain specific aggravated

felonies including murder, voluntary manslaughter, mob-related

felonies, malicious assault or bodily wounding, robbery,

carjacking, sexual assault and arson. The combination of

these statutes defines criminal conduct that constitutes a

willful, deliberate and premeditated killing in the

commission, or attempted commission, of one of the designated

felonies with the intent to intimidate the civilian population

or influence the conduct of government through intimidation.

Additionally, under Code § 18.2-18 the General Assembly

extended the reach of criminal conduct subject to the death

56
penalty to include "a killing pursuant to the direction or

order of one who is engaged in the commission of or attempted

commission of an act of terrorism under the provisions of

subdivision 13 of § 18.2-31."

Muhammad raises questions about the definition of

"intimidation," "civilian population at large," and "influence

the conduct or activities of government." He suggests that

failure to statutorily define these phrases renders the

statutes unconstitutional. He further complains that "no

distinction can be drawn between the newly defined crime and

any 'base offense' which carries with it the same hallmarks of

intimidation and influence," and that this allows "unguided

and unbridled law enforcement discretion." Muhammad further

maintains that extending the scope of the statute to reach

those who order or direct a killing in the commission of or

attempted commission of an act of terrorism somehow violates

what he calls the "triggerman rule." In a particularly

exaggerated statement, Muhammad claims that extending the

scope of the statute "allows almost any violent criminal act

to be classified as terrorism and thereby rendering any

individual charged eligible for the death penalty." We

disagree with each of Muhammad's contentions.

By referencing established criminal offenses as acts of

violence subject to the statutory scheme, the legislature

57
included offenses with previously defined elements and mens

rea requirements. Additionally, the term "intimidate" has

been defined by case law. See Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228 Va.

654, 663, 324 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1985) (defining intimidation as

unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear).

We have no difficulty understanding that "population at

large" is a term that is intended to require a more pervasive

intimidation of the community rather than a narrowly defined

group of people. Examples are illustrative. When used in a

descriptive sense referring to a prison, the prison

"population at large" consists of everyone in the prison

rather than a small subset of prisoners. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 358 (1996); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 210

(1985). In a case involving the exclusion of certain people

from capital juries, the term "population at large" meant the

community from which the jury pool could be chosen. Lockhart

v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 179 (1986). It is significant to

note that Muhammad offered a similar understanding of the term

when he argued below that all potential jurors in his case

were victims. We do not believe that a person of ordinary

intelligence would fail to understand this phrase.

Similarly, we do not believe that a person of ordinary

intelligence needs further definition of the phrase "influence

the conduct or activities of government." Muhammad's argument

58
on this point is essentially a strained "legislative history"

argument. Quoting former Attorney General Jerry Kilgore's

press releases, Muhammad claims that the statutes are designed

"to address al-Qaeda type attacks – attacks motivated by a

greater political purpose." Even if a press release could

qualify as legislative history, it is quite a leap to impute,

from the press releases of an Attorney General, the intent of

the General Assembly. We find the intent of the General

Assembly primarily in the words it employs in enacting

legislation. Nothing in the words of these statutes evinces

an intent to limit its application to criminal actors with

political motives.

Muhammad maintains that there is no distinction between

the "base offense" and the capital offense based upon

terrorism. What he appears to be arguing is that the

terrorism statute is unnecessary on the one hand because a

killing in the commission of one of the enumerated violent

acts could result in the death penalty anyway, and on the

other hand, its reach is extended too far by including those

who order or direct such killings. Clearly, the General

Assembly has the power to define criminal conduct even if

statutes overlap in coverage. Whether a defendant can be

simultaneously or successively charged with overlapping

offenses implicates other questions not presented here.

59
 Muhammad's quarrel with the expansion of the potential

imposition of the death penalty to those who order or direct

another in a killing in the commission of or attempted

commission of an act of terrorism is a policy question well

within the purview of legislative power so long as it is not

otherwise unconstitutional. In that respect, Muhammad argues

in assignment of error 18 that the provisions of Code § 18.2-

18 allow the death penalty for a defendant with no

demonstrated intent to kill the victim. Muhammad incorrectly

characterizes the extension of the scope of the statute to

reach traditional "aiders and abettors." The provisions of

Code § 18.2-18 do not extend to "aiders and abettors;" rather,

it extends only to those who "direct" or "order" the killing.

The criminal actor who "orders" or "directs" the killing is

not unlike the criminal actor who hires another to kill and is

potentially subject to the death penalty under Code § 18.2-

31(2). The criminal actor who "orders" or "directs" the

killing shares the intent to kill with the one who carries out

the murder. The provisions of Code § 18.2-18 do not have the

effect imagined by Muhammad.

Muhammad's argument concerning vagueness does not focus

on his conduct. Indeed, Muhammad does not claim in his brief

that his actions and those of Malvo were not acts of terrorism

under the statutory provisions. Rather, Muhammad

60
hypothetically poses questions about the applicability of the

statute in other circumstances. As discussed above, the

statutes provide notice sufficient for ordinary people to

understand what conduct they prohibit, and do not authorize

and/or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

More importantly, Muhammad cannot and does not maintain that

the statutes do not give him notice that his conduct and

Malvo's conduct was prohibited. Nor does Muhammad allege that

he has been subject to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement

of the statutes. One who engages in conduct that is clearly

proscribed and not constitutionally protected may not

successfully attack a statute as void for vagueness based upon

hypothetical conduct of others. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at

494-95.

V. Alleged Conflict Between Sentencing Provisions

Muhammad argues in assignment of error 27 that he may not

be sentenced to death because of an "absolute and un-

rectifiable conflict" between the capital murder statute (Code

§ 18.2-31(13)), and the terrorism statute (Code § 18.2-46.4,

et seq.). Capital murder is a Class 1 felony punished by life

imprisonment or death. The terrorism statute provides for a

penalty as a Class 2 felony "if the base offense of such act

of terrorism may be punished by life imprisonment, or a term

of imprisonment of not less than twenty years." Code § 18.2-

61
46.5. Muhammad argues that there is "no discernable

distinction whatsoever between murder committed under the

terrorism provision and murder committed under the capital

murder provision." He maintains that he may not be subject to

the greater punishment.

The Supreme Court of the United States resolved this same

issue in a case involving sentencing provisions under two

statutes that encompassed the same criminal act. Holding that

the prosecutor had discretion to choose which statute to base

the prosecution upon, the Court stated:

The provisions in issue here, however,
unambiguously specify the activity proscribed
and the penalties available upon conviction.
That this particular conduct may violate both
Titles does not detract from the notice
afforded by each. Although the statutes
create uncertainty as to which crime may be
charged and therefore what penalties may be
imposed, they do so to no greater extent than
would a single statute authorizing various
alternative punishments. So long as
overlapping criminal provisions clearly define
the conduct prohibited and the punishment
authorized, the notice requirements of the Due
Process Clause are satisfied.

This Court has long recognized that when
an act violates more than one criminal
statute, the Government may prosecute under
either so long as it does not discriminate
against any class of defendants.

United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979).

Muhammad makes no constitutional argument in his brief on this

issue. He merely recites that there is a conflict. He does

62
not argue that there is ambiguity in either statute nor does

he argue that application of the statute discriminates against

any class of defendants. The trial court did not err in

denying Muhammad's motion to preclude a death sentence on this

basis.

VI. Right to Self-Representation

Muhammad alleges in briefing assignment of error 35 that

the trial court violated Muhammad's "Sixth Amendment right to

self-representation by unduly interfering with his ability to

consult with standby counsel."

The right of a criminal defendant to represent himself is

found in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 836 (1975).

The right is not without limitations and conditions. Only

after the jury panel had been sworn, did Muhammad request

permission to represent himself. At that time, Muhammad did

not have a constitutional right to proceed pro se. As the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has

held,

we think it is reasonable, and entirely
compatible with the defendant's constitutional
rights, to require that the right of self-
representation be asserted at some time
"before meaningful trial proceedings have
commenced," and that thereafter its exercise
rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court.

63
United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir.

1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1084 (1980). Nonetheless, after

extensive questioning of Muhammad concerning his decision and

appropriate admonition concerning the risks involved and the

manner in which it would be permitted, the trial court

exercised its discretion and allowed Muhammad to represent

himself. The trial court directed his lawyers to be "standby

counsel." The trial court informed Muhammad that "standby

counsel" could sit at counsel table with him, and "you can

perhaps upon occasion ask them questions, but I don't expect

you to ask them every question that's being formulated. That

would, I think, unduly hinder the trial process."

After two days of self-representation, Muhammad changed

his mind and requested that his "standby counsel" resume their

previously assigned role. Now Muhammad complains about the

limitations and restrictions placed upon him during those two

days. The only issue presented in this assignment of error is

stated by Muhammad as follows: "whether the court improperly

prohibited Muhammad from consulting with his standby counsel."

Soon after Muhammad began representing himself, the

Commonwealth objected to the extensive interaction between

Muhammad and standby counsel. The Commonwealth complained

that standby counsel was actually acting as co-counsel in

contravention of the trial court's instructions. An exchange

64
between the trial court and standby counsel appears to confirm

the Commonwealth's concern. Standby counsel stated:

Mr. Muhammad has asked about things such as
objections – what is hearsay? What is a
leading question? and so on. And so he's
inquired about that and the timing of
objections and so on, which as the court knows
is obviously crucial or else it's waived.
That's the context of it. We'd say hearsay,
and he knew the argument to make to Your Honor
and same thing as far as leading questions.

It is apparent from this exchange that standby counsel was

doing far more than responding to inquiries made by Muhammad.

Rather, as they admit, they were prompting him to make

objections during the course of testimony.

The trial court indicated that Muhammad would not be

permitted to have "hybrid" representation where standby

counsel becomes co-counsel by extensive participation and

direction of the defense. "Faretta does not require a trial

judge to permit 'hybrid' representation." McKaskle v.

Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984). As Muhammad acknowledges

in his brief, "[t]he court's solution to the perceived problem

was to move standby counsel down the table, away from Mr.

Muhammad, something that Mr. Muhammad had suggested."

Muhammad does not now complain that he could not have taken an

extra step or two to consult with counsel. He cannot be heard

to complain of a solution he proposed. There is no specific

ruling of the trial court that Muhammad identifies as error.

65
Muhammad points to no objection made by him concerning the

trial court's direction or handling of the issue. The record

reveals that Muhammad expressly agreed with the trial court's

instructions to standby counsel. Upon review of the specific

arguments made by Muhammad and the relevant portions of the

record he identifies, we hold that the trial court did not

abridge his rights under the Sixth Amendment to properly

consult with standby counsel.

VII. Refusal to Permit Expert Healthcare
Testimony at Sentencing

The trial court granted Muhammad's motion under the

provisions of Code § 19.2-264.3:1 for the appointment of

mental health experts to assist him in his defense.

Thereafter, Muhammad gave notice of his intent to use expert

psychiatric testimony at the sentencing phase to prove

mitigating factors. In response, the Commonwealth moved the

trial court for an order appointing an expert for the

Commonwealth pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F).

At the hearing on the Commonwealth's motion for the

appointment of an expert, the trial court granted Muhammad's

request that the Commonwealth's expert be prohibited from

inquiring into circumstances of the crimes alleged or

Muhammad's relationship with Malvo. This restriction was

based upon Muhammad's declaration that he did not intend to

66
present evidence that he acted under extreme mental

disturbance or failed to appreciate the criminality of his

conduct. At that time, the trial court advised Muhammad that

if he refused to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert, it

could result in the exclusion of Muhammad's expert's

testimony. Muhammad acknowledged to the trial court that he

understood the requirements and the potential consequences for

noncompliance.

Nonetheless, on October 8, 2003, Muhammad refused to be

interviewed by the Commonwealth's expert without his counsel

present. Also, he objected to the expert's use of a video

camera during the interview. After a hearing on the matter,

the trial court permitted counsel to be present at the

interview by the Commonwealth's expert and further ruled that

the interview could be recorded by video camera. Nonetheless,

the following day, Muhammad refused to meet with the

Commonwealth's expert under any circumstances.

In response, the Commonwealth moved the trial court under

the provisions of Code § 19.2-264.3:1 to prohibit Muhammad

from presenting expert testimony from his court appointed

experts at sentencing. At the hearing, the trial court again

directly addressed Muhammad concerning the potential effect of

his refusal to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert.

Muhammad indicated that he understood and that he had made the

67
choice not to cooperate. The trial court exercised its

discretion under the statute and barred Muhammad from

presenting expert testimony from his court appointed experts

regarding mitigating factors at the sentencing proceeding.

Despite the trial court's ruling, at the conclusion of

the evidence in the guilt phase of the trial, Muhammad moved

the trial court to permit him to present expert testimony from

one of his court appointed mental health experts, Dr.

Cunningham, in the sentencing phase. Muhammad represented

that Dr. Cunningham would not testify based upon anything he

learned from his examination; rather, he would testify based

upon statistical analyses about prison populations.

Apparently, this testimony would be offered as relevant to the

question of Muhammad's future dangerousness. The Commonwealth

objected, but the trial court overruled the Commonwealth's

objection at that time and invited Muhammad to present Dr.

Cunningham's testimony outside the presence of the jury for a

determination of its admissibility. Muhammad did not do so.

After all of the evidence had been presented to the jury

in the sentencing phase and after both sides rested their

case, Muhammad announced that he would present a proffer from

Dr. Cunningham. An affidavit from Dr. Cunningham was

thereafter submitted to the trial court.

68
 In assignments of error 29, 75, and 76, Muhammad attacks

various rulings of the trial court on this matter. Muhammad

argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court

to deny him the opportunity to present expert testimony. He

further states, in conclusory fashion, that the denial

violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He further complains that

he was not able to present lay testimony in mitigation.

Finally, he argues that, because of the notice of intent to

use expert testimony in a limited fashion, the Commonwealth

was not entitled to an expert evaluation of Muhammad.

Considering the Commonwealth's right to an evaluation of

Muhammad, the trial court found, and Muhammad agreed, that the

issue of notice of use of evidence in a limited fashion was

not raised before the trial court ruled on the matter. It was

raised for the first time in post trial proceedings. The

trial court ruled that it was waived. Objections must be

stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the trial

court's ruling in order to be preserved for appellate review.

This objection will not be considered on appeal. Rule 5:25.

Consideration of Muhammad's arguments on these matters

requires a clear understanding of what the trial court ruled

concerning these issues. The trial court ruled that Muhammad

could not present expert testimony on mitigation factors at

69
sentencing because of his refusal to abide by the trial

court's order to submit to an evaluation by the Commonwealth.

The trial court did not bar the presentation of non-expert

testimony on this issue. Thereafter, Muhammad sought the

ability to present limited expert testimony purporting not to

be based upon expert interviews. The Commonwealth objected.

The trial court overruled the Commonwealth's objection and

gave Muhammad the opportunity to present evidence out of the

presence of the jury that would allow the trial court to rule

on its admissibility. Muhammad did not take advantage of this

invitation. Only after all the evidence was presented at the

sentencing phase and both parties rested their case did

Muhammad offer an affidavit as a proffer of Dr. Cunningham's

testimony. He may not be heard to complain about the

exclusion of Dr. Cunningham's limited testimony when he did

not give the trial court the contemporaneous opportunity to

evaluate its admissibility. Rule 5:25.

Nothing in the trial court's ruling prohibited non-expert

testimony on mitigating factors in the sentencing proceeding.

Muhammad cites Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 257, 585 S.E.2d

801, 825-26 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1006 (2004), and

suggests that somehow that case further prohibits such

testimony in the absence of expert testimony. Nothing in

Lovitt suggests such a bar.

70
 Considering the main thrust of Muhammad's argument, we

turn our attention to the claim that the trial court abused

its discretion, and that its decision barring expert testimony

on mitigation factors and the statutes that permit such a

decision are unconstitutional. Muhammad makes no argument on

brief that the statutes are overbroad or vague. His only

argument is that their application to him under these

circumstances violated various constitutional rights.

The trial court provided Muhammad with the experts he

requested at state expense. The trial court granted

Muhammad's request that his counsel be present during any

evaluation by the Commonwealth. The trial court engaged

Muhammad directly in court on multiple occasions concerning

the potential consequences of his failure to cooperate with

the evaluation. On these occasions, Muhammad affirmatively

expressed his understanding and further acknowledged that he

freely decided not to cooperate. After the trial court made

its ruling, it even considered permitting expert mitigation

testimony not based upon his own expert's interview with him.

Muhammad did not avail himself of the opportunity.

Muhammad is correct that limiting the evidence that a

criminal defendant may present in his defense implicates

numerous constitutional rights. What Muhammad fails to

appreciate is that he may, by his knowing and informed

71
decisions, waive such rights. These rights may be as

venerated as the right to a jury, the right to counsel, the

right against self-incrimination, and the right to exclusion

of evidence seized in an unconstitutional manner. As the

Supreme Court recently noted, "Waiver of the right to counsel,

as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally,

must be a 'knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient

awareness of the relevant circumstances.' " Iowa v. Tovar,

541 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397

U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). We have no difficulty including the

right to present mitigating testimony within the panoply of

constitutional rights that may be waived by the accused.

Upon review of the record, we agree with the trial court

that Muhammad's decision not to cooperate was knowingly and

intelligently made. The real issue presented is whether the

trial court's exercise of discretion was reasonable under the

circumstances.

The detailed and balanced statutory scheme provided by

Code § 19.2-264.3:1 anticipates decisions made by the accused

and the Commonwealth regarding expert mental health

evaluations and testimony regarding sentencing issues in a

capital murder trial. One of those circumstances arises when

the defendant gives notice of intent to present certain types

of testimony at sentencing. In response, the Commonwealth may

72
request an evaluation of the defendant. The statute

explicitly provides that the trial court must "advise the

defendant on the record in court that a refusal to cooperate

with the Commonwealth's expert could result in exclusion of

the defendant's expert evidence." Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1).

The statute explicitly provides the remedy for lack of

cooperation: "the court may admit evidence of such refusal or,

in the discretion of the court, bar the defendant from

presenting his expert evidence." Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2).

The Supreme Court has recognized that the prosecution has

the right to a fair rebuttal of mental health evidence

presented by the defendant. In Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S.

402 (1987), the defendant challenged the introduction of

evidence from a psychiatric report prepared upon joint motion

of the defendant and the prosecution. The Court stated, "if a

defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric

evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut

this presentation with evidence from the reports of the

examination that the defendant requested." Id. at 422-23.

We agree with the Commonwealth's characterization of the

circumstances presented on this question. "By his own

deliberate conduct, the defendant sought to gain an unfair

benefit by obtaining an evaluation that the Commonwealth would

be powerless to contest at trial either by meaningful cross-

73
examination or by presenting its own expert testimony. The

trial court's remedy thus was protective of the interests of

all parties in a fair trial and was not punitive." The trial

court's ruling was not unreasonable, especially considering

that it was willing to consider expert testimony from Dr.

Cunningham not based upon interviews with Muhammad, but

Muhammad did not avail himself of the opportunity. We hold

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding

Muhammad's expert witness testimony concerning mitigation

factors at sentencing.

VIII. Discovery Issues

In assignments of error 1, 2, 3, 22, 98, and 99, Muhammad

attacks the constitutionality of criminal discovery rules in

Virginia, specific rulings of the trial court regarding

discovery, the refusal of the trial court to permit ex parte

application for expert witness assistance, and the refusal to

grant a new trial upon "after-discovered" evidence of an

alleged exculpatory nature. There is no merit to any of

Muhammad's contentions.

Muhammad's claim that criminal discovery rules in

Virginia are unconstitutional because they provide for limited

discovery, has been previously decided. Bailey v.

Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 736, 529 S.E.2d 570, 577, cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000); Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va.

74
54, 63, 515 S.E.2d 565, 570-71 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.

1125 (2000). We see no reason to revisit this issue.

Additionally, the trial court did not err in denying

certain specific requests for discovery:

a. The trial court was correct in denying Muhammad's
request 1(b) seeking "the specific questions, comments
or statements of any person involved in the
conversation with, or interrogation of, John Allen
Muhammad, which brought about any response." Rule
3A:11 requires production of the substance of the
defendant's statements but does not require production
of the statements sought by Muhammad in this request.
Nonetheless, the trial court did order that if a video,
audio, or otherwise transcribed interrogation existed,
the entirety of such material would be provided to the
defendant.
b. The trial court was correct in denying Muhammad's
request for "any contemporaneously made notes of
statements attributed to the defendant." Except for
specifically designated items, subsection (b) of the
Rule 3A:11 excludes the production of such notes.
c. The trial court did not err in denying Muhammad's
discovery request seeking "charged offenses,
investigation or [items] which allege unadjudicated
conduct." Such items are not discoverable under Rule
3A:11; rather such information and items may be
provided by motion under Code § 19.2-264.3:2.
Similarly, Muhammad's request for evidence of
unadjudicated criminal conduct in request 8 was
properly denied under Rule 3A:11.

Muhammad alleges that it was error for the trial court to

refuse to permit him to make ex parte application to the court

"in order to seek funds and authorization to retain expert

evaluations." We have previously rejected this argument and

find no reason to revisit the issue. Weeks v. Commonwealth,

248 Va. 460, 473, 450 S.E.2d 379, 388 (1994), cert. denied,

75
516 U.S. 829 (1995); Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413,

422, 437 S.E.2d 566, 571 (1993), vacated on other grounds, 512

U.S. 1217 (1994).

The final issue related to discovery questions involves

Muhammad's assertion that the trial court erred in failing to

grant him a new trial because the Commonwealth allegedly

failed to provide exculpatory evidence to him pursuant to

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Malvo wrote

certain letters from jail addressed to "Pacman," a person who

remains unidentified. Counsel for Muhammad state that they

first became aware of the existence of these letters when they

were the subject of testimony in Malvo's trial. The

Commonwealth represented to the trial court that prosecutors

in Muhammad's case were unaware of the letters before the

post-trial motion for a new trial was filed.

Muhammad claims that the so-called "Pacman letters" are

exculpatory in nature because of the issue raised by Code

§ 18.2-18, previously discussed herein, extending the

potential applicability of the death sentence in a capital

murder prosecution under the terrorism statute where there is

proof that the accused "directed" or "ordered" the killing.

Muhammad maintains that the letters show the independence of

Malvo from him and demonstrate that Malvo could not have acted

under Muhammad's "direction" or "order."

76
 We have previously stated:

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
the United States Supreme Court held that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Id. at 87. Whether evidence is
material and exculpatory and, therefore,
subject to disclosure under Brady is a
decision left to the prosecution.
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59
(1987). Inherent in making this decision is
the possibility that the prosecution will
mischaracterize evidence, albeit in good
faith, and withhold material exculpatory
evidence which the defendant is entitled to
have under the dictates of Brady. If the
defendant does not receive such evidence, or
if the defendant learns of the evidence at a
point in the proceedings when he cannot
effectively use it, his due process rights as
enunciated in Brady are violated. United
States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir.
1992); United States v. Shifflett, 798 F.
Supp. 354 (1992); Read v. Virginia State Bar,
233 Va. 560, 564-65, 357 S.E.2d 544, 546-47
(1987).

. . . .

Exculpatory evidence is material if there
is a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the proceeding would have been different
had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense. "A reasonable probability" is one
which is sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome of the proceeding. United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Robinson
v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 151, 341 S.E.2d
159, 164 (1986).

Bowman v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 130, 133, 445 S.E.2d 110, 111-

12 (1994).

77
 We need not resolve questions related to when the

Commonwealth knew of the letters or whether the knowledge of

Fairfax prosecutors should be imputed to Prince William

prosecutors because, upon review of the record, we hold that

the letters were not exculpatory in nature, were not likely to

be admissible in Muhammad's case, were cumulative of other

testimony, and the admission of such letters would not result

in a "reasonable probability that the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense."

The letters do not significantly address the relationship

between Malvo and Muhammad. They do suggest the ability of

Malvo to think and act independently, a subject squarely at

issue in Malvo's case because Malvo maintained that he was

"brainwashed" by Muhammad. As previously discussed herein,

Malvo's claim of insanity was demonstrably different than the

issue of his action under "direction" or "order" of Muhammad.

Also, the ability of Malvo to think and act independently

was amply revealed in other discovery given to Muhammad, such

as transcripts of Malvo's confessions to police and drawings

and writings Malvo made while in custody. In this respect the

"Pacman letters" are merely cumulative in nature.

Muhammad argues that the result of the trial would have

been different had the jury received the letters in evidence.

78
The admissibility of the letters in Muhammad's case is far

from established. Muhammad only states that they were

admissible in Malvo's case, so they must be admissible in

Muhammad's. However, in Malvo's case the letters may have

satisfied an exception to the hearsay rule as statements of

the defendant. Muhammad offers no theory of admissibility of

this evidence in his trial that would overcome a hearsay

objection.

In ruling on the motion for a new trial, the trial court

stated:

And I do not believe that the Pacman
letters are such as to require the granting of
a new trial.
I believe that they are cumulative,
corroborative and collateral . . . they are
not material, such that they would not produce
an opposite result on the merits at another
trial, or, in the other analysis, that they
are not favorable evidence that could
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in
such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict.

Upon review of the record, we agree with the trial court. The

trial court did not err in denying Muhammad's motion for a new

trial based upon the "Pacman letters."

IX. Jury Selection Issues

In assignments of error 16, 20, 30, and 31, Muhammad

complains of error in the jury selection process. As a

preliminary matter, he asserts that he cannot be tried by any

79
jury in the United States for capital murder under the

terrorism statute. He asserts that this unique charge

alleging "intent to . . . intimidate the civilian population

at large" results in the "legal impossibility to impanel an

impartial jury." His logic is simply stated: because victims

of the crime charged cannot be jurors in the case, no one from

the "civilian population at large" can serve on his jury.

Taking this tautology to its extreme application, Muhammad

concludes, "The entire civilian population of Prince William

County, and indeed, of the entire state and the United States,

was alleged to be the victim."

We need not address Muhammad's extensive citation of

cases concerning prohibition of victims of a particular crime

serving on the jury trying the crime at issue. The entirety

of his argument is premised upon the status of jurors in this

case as victims. They are not victims. The victim in the

capital murder charge based upon terrorism is Dean Meyers.

Arguably, Muhammad's victims under the facts of the case and

the evidence presented also included Keenya Cook, Muhammad

Rashid, Paul LaRuffa, Claudine Parker, Keely Adams, Hong Im

Ballenger, Premkumar Walekar, Sara Ramos, Lori Lewis-Rivera,

Paschal Charlot, Caroline Seawell, Iran Brown, Kenneth

Bridges, Linda Franklin, Jeffrey Hopper, and Conrad Johnson.

80
 The trial court's task was to empanel an impartial jury.

This task was accomplished by the application of the

requirements of carefully drafted statutes in Virginia and the

use of voir dire in the selection of the panel. The trial

court did not err in denying Muhammad's motion to dismiss the

indictment because of a "legal impossibility" of empanelling a

jury on the capital murder charge based upon terrorism.

With regard to the voir dire process itself, Muhammad

maintains that the trial Court erred in precluding counsel

from propounding certain questions and "limiting voir dire

. . . regarding capital punishment attitudes, pre-trial

publicity and other issues." Additionally, Muhammad makes

general arguments attacking the process of "death

qualification" of jurors.

In his brief, Muhammad does not argue that the trial

court abused its discretion in refusing any question he

proposed. In fact, Muhammad does not identify any voir dire

question he was not permitted to ask. In this respect, his

assignments of error on these issues are inadequately

supported by argument on brief and are waived. Rule 5:17(c);

Powell, 267 Va. at 135, 590 S.E.2d at 554. Muhammad does

specifically complain in assignment of error 32 that the court

erred in permitting the Commonwealth to question jurors during

voir dire concerning the "concept of direction or order of a

81
42 year old over a 17 year old regarding the terrorism

theory." His argument consists of one sentence: "the

Commonwealth should not have been able to telegraph its theory

of direction or order." This single sentence does not

constitute sufficient argument. The remainder of the specific

complaints in assignment of error 32 are not mentioned at all

in the argument. Consequently, they are deemed waived. Rule

5:17(c); Powell, 267 Va. at 135, 590 S.E.2d at 554.

Finally, with regard to the qualification of the jury,

Muhammad argues that the "death qualification" process itself

is unconstitutional. There is no assignment of error

concerning this issue; consequently, it is not properly before

us. Rule 5:17(c); Powell, 267 Va. at 135, 590 S.E.2d at 554.

X. Evidentiary Issues

A. Sergeant Major Mark Spicer

In assignments of error 36, 37, and 62, Muhammad alleges

that it was error for the trial court to permit the testimony

of Sergeant Major Mark Spicer concerning the Commonwealth's

sniper theory. Spicer's testimony came at a time in the trial

proceedings when Muhammad was representing himself with the

aid of standby counsel.

Muhammad maintains that the Commonwealth did not identify

Spicer as an expert witness pursuant to the requirements of a

pretrial order. He further argues that the "slides" used as

82
demonstrative aids in his presentation constituted "reports"

subject to disclosure under the pretrial order. The pertinent

part of the pretrial order required the Commonwealth's

production of "written reports of autopsies, ballistic tests,

fingerprint analysis, handwriting analysis, blood, urine and

breath tests and other written scientific reports and . . .

oral scientific reports that the Commonwealth intends to offer

in its case in chief or that are exculpatory." In

consideration of Muhammad's motion for a new trial, the trial

court held that the pretrial order did not require disclosure

of all experts. It only required the disclosure of scientific

tests and results. Spicer's slides were not in the nature of

scientific tests and results.

Next, Muhammad asserts that Spicer's testimony was

irrelevant and that he should not have been permitted to

testify about "Mr. Muhammad's background, military career, and

other factors not in evidence." Upon review of the record, we

hold that Muhammad did not make contemporaneous objections

concerning these matters; consequently, they are not preserved

for appeal and may not be considered. Rule 5:25. The trial

court did not err in refusing to exclude Spicer from

testifying or in refusing to grant Muhammad's motion for a new

trial on these grounds.

B. Jeffrey Miller

83
 Muhammad alleges in assignment of error 44 that the trial

court erred in permitting Fairfax Police Officer Jeffrey

Miller to "testify as to his opinion." In argument, Muhammad

maintains that Miller's testimony was expert opinion testimony

and that it was based upon conjecture and surmise and facts

not in evidence. Muhammad appears to complain in his brief,

although not in the assignment of error, that he was not given

notice of Miller's testimony in violation of the pretrial

discovery order.

Muhammad did not object at trial on the basis that he had

no notice of Miller's testimony. He did not object at trial

that Miller's testimony was based upon conjecture or surmise

or not supported by facts in evidence. He did not object at

trial that Miller's testimony was expert in nature. We will

not consider these arguments for the first time on appeal.

Rule 5:25.

C. Edward Bender

In assignment of error 54, Muhammad argues that the trial

court erred in admitting certain laboratory reports of the

Virginia Department of Forensic Science through Edward Bender,

a chemist at the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms. His assignment of error asserts that admission of

the report constituted a "violation of a right to confront the

84
person who undertook that analysis pursuant to Crawford v.

Washington," 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

Crawford had not been decided at the time of Muhammad's

trial. No objection was made at trial based upon Sixth

Amendment rights. Muhammad's objections were based upon

compliance with Code § 19.2-187 not constitutional concerns.

The objections on appeal based upon the Sixth Amendment and

Crawford were not preserved at trial. We will not consider

them. Rule 5:25.

D. Professor Steven Fuller

George Mason University Professor Steven Fuller testified

over the defendant's objection about the economic impact of

the 47 days of turmoil caused by the criminal conduct of

Muhammad and Malvo. Assignment of error 60 complains that his

testimony was permitted without notice required by the

pretrial discovery order, "and further was without proper

foundation or a basis in the record for such expert testimony

to be admitted."

The trial court found that Fuller did not generate any

reports which were required to be produced by the pretrial

discovery order. Although Muhammad claims in his brief that

"the testimony was wholly irrelevant," he also answers his own

objection by stating, "[t]his witness was crucial to the

Commonwealth theory that the October, [2002] shooting

85
influenced the government." Other than relevance, an issue he

concedes, Muhammad does not offer any specific basis upon

which this testimony was admitted without proper foundation.

Upon review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court

abused its discretion in permitting Fuller to testify.

E. Alleged Victim Impact Evidence
Admitted During Guilt Phase

In assignments of error 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42, Muhammad

makes various objections to the introduction of biographical

information and backgrounds of various victims. Specifically,

Muhammad objects to the trial court's admission of "so-called

'photographs in life'" of various shooting victims and the

admission of certain "911" calls, particularly that of Ted

Franklin, husband of Linda Franklin.

At trial, Muhammad did not object to the admission of the

"photographs in life" of various victims. He did raise an

objection to the Commonwealth's use of the photographs during

opening statement, but did not object to the photographs when

admitted. Also Muhammad did not object to the admission of

the first three "911" tapes received in evidence regarding the

shooting of Meyers and LaRuffa. These objections are not

preserved. Rule 5:25.

Three other "911" tapes were admitted into evidence.

Muhammad objected to the tape related to Rashid's shooting as

86
"irrelevant." With regard to the tapes involving the

shootings of Brown and Franklin, Muhammad objected that the

tapes were irrelevant and cumulative. The trial court ruled

that the tapes were "very relevant . . . and material

evidence." Muhammad objected to the "911" tape of Franklin's

husband as prejudicial. Upon consideration of the objection,

the trial court ruled that the prejudicial impact was

outweighed by its probative value. The trial court

specifically noted that the tape was relevant to the issue of

terror in the community.

Muhammad objected to a question asked of Meyers' brother

regarding Meyers' military service. The trial court sustained

the objection. Every objection made by Muhammad to the

testimony of Parker's sister was sustained. Muhammad did not

make a contemporaneous objection to the testimony of

Ballenger's sister; rather, he waited until her testimony was

concluded. Any objection not raised contemporaneously is

waived. Rule 5:25. To the extent that a continuing or

renewed objection was made to the introduction of a photograph

of Ballenger, the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibit

137A. Similarly, Muhammad's objection to the testimony of

Ballenger's widower was not timely. An objection during the

testimony of Walekar's daughter resulted in a direction from

the trial court to limit the testimony to biographical

87
information. The objection made by Muhammad to the testimony

of Ramos' widower was sustained. Before Lewis-Rivera's

widower testified, Muhammad objected to what he expected to be

"victim-impact" testimony. The court instructed the

Commonwealth concerning proper limitations upon the testimony

and, when it was offered, there was no objection. Every

objection to the testimony of Charlot's daughter, Franklin's

daughter, and Johnson's widow was sustained.

The record reveals that the trial court carefully limited

the Commonwealth in the guilt phase to short biographical

information about the victim and the manner in which the

particular family member found out about the shooting. The

testimony was not "victim-impact" testimony allowed in the

penalty phase. It did not consist of evidence of economic or

psychological loss, or grief. The trial court did not abuse

its discretion in the admission of such evidence.

F. The Rashid Shooting

Muhammad alleges in assignment of error 46 that evidence

of the robbery and shooting of Muhammad Rashid was immaterial

and irrelevant to the Commonwealth's theories of the case. He

also argues that the probative value of the evidence was

outweighed by the prejudicial impact upon the jury.

At trial the Commonwealth explained the relevance of the

evidence. Rashid was shot and wounded at the Three Roads

88
Liquor Store. Rashid saw the Caprice outside the store before

the shooting. He identified Malvo as the person who shot him

with a handgun. At the same time that Malvo shot him, he was

shot at with a rifle from a distance. The rifle shot missed

its target. The handgun was the same weapon used to shoot and

wound LaRuffa and the same weapon found at the scene in

Montgomery, Alabama where Malvo dropped it after Parker and

Adams had been shot with a high-powered rifle. The rifle used

to wound and kill Parker and Adams at the same time that Malvo

held the handgun during their robberies was the .223 caliber

Bushmaster rifle recovered from the Caprice with Muhammad and

Malvo.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the

admission of this evidence because it demonstrated a "singular

strong resemblance to the pattern of the offense charged,"

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 677, 529 S.E.2d 769,

782, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 981 (2000), and it provided

significant links connecting Muhammad and Malvo to each other,

to the weapons used, and supported the theories of the

Commonwealth concerning the methodology of their cooperative

criminal efforts.

G. Documents Related to the Caprice

During the testimony of Christopher O'Kupski, a used car

salesman from New Jersey, the trial court admitted certain

89
"paperwork" related to the ownership and transfer of title for

the Caprice. In assignment of error 48, Muhammad argues that

the trial court erred in admitting these documents because

they were "not properly authenticated" and "were hearsay."

Exhibit 65 consisted of four documents: the temporary car tag,

a registration application, a reassignment form, and the

original title to the Caprice. Upon questioning by the trial

court, the witness stated that he had "filled out" the

documents, with the exception of the registration application

which is a form regularly used by the New Jersey Division of

Motor Vehicles. Assuming, without deciding that the admission

of any or all of these documents was improper, the error would

be harmless. The evidence was offered to show Muhammad's

purchase of and connection to the Caprice. Considering

O'Kupski's testimony apart from the documents themselves, and

the extensive evidence of Muhammad's connection to the

Caprice, if the trial court erred, such error was most

certainly harmless error.

H. Charlene Anderson

Charlene Anderson, Muhammad's cousin, testified about her

encounters with Muhammad and Malvo in Baton Rouge, Louisiana

in August 2002. In assignments of error 49, 50, 51, and 62,

Muhammad asserts that her testimony was irrelevant, that "the

prejudicial value outweighed any probative assistance to the

90
fact finder," and that the Commonwealth was permitted to

question Anderson on redirect beyond the scope of cross-

examination.

Anderson testified that Muhammad told her that he and

Malvo were on a mission for the military to recover

explosives. Anderson was a law enforcement officer. Muhammad

asked her to provide him with bullets. Anderson testified

that Muhammad told her that Malvo was "highly trained."

Muhammad objected to this testimony on the grounds that

it was hearsay and irrelevant. The trial court overruled the

objection on the grounds that it was not offered for the truth

of its content, namely that Muhammad and Malvo were actually

on a mission for the military and that Malvo actually was

"highly trained." The purpose for the testimony was to show

Muhammad's attempt to obtain ammunition for his rifle shortly

before the string of shootings began and also to show the

nature of the relationship between Malvo and Muhammad.

During cross-examination of Anderson, Muhammad elicited

testimony suggesting that Muhammad and Malvo did not interact

or talk to each other. On redirect, the trial court permitted

the Commonwealth to ask Anderson about a conversation she

overheard between Muhammad and Malvo.

Lastly, with respect to Anderson's testimony, Muhammad

asserts that it was error to permit Anderson to describe the

91
rifle Muhammad showed her. Muhammad made no such objection at

trial. He may not advance this claim of error for the first

time on appeal. Rule 5:25.

Upon review of the record and upon the issues preserved

for appeal, we hold that the trial court did not err in

admitting Anderson's testimony. It was relevant and its

probative value outweighed any claim of prejudicial effect

upon the jury.

I. Demonstrative Evidence – Model
of the Caprice Trunk and Video

At trial the Commonwealth offered demonstrative evidence

utilizing a model of the trunk of the Caprice and a video

demonstrating how a shooting could take place from the trunk.

The use of demonstrative evidence to illustrate testimony is a

matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 254, 372 S.E.2d 759, 768

(1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989).

Muhammad claims in assignments of error 55, 56, 57, and

58 that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence

because "the reconstruction was not complete," it "was out of

context," and "did not include the materials in the trunk from

the time of Mr. Muhammad's arrest or any specific incident."

Muhammad further argues that it was error to allow the jury to

inspect the Caprice after viewing the demonstrative replica

92
and the video. He further complains about the use of "police

officer stand-ins" in the video and that the evidence

presented invited the jury to speculate about what occurred in

the shootings, particularly the shooting of Dean Meyers.

The evidence presented was not expert reconstructive

opinion testimony. Rather it was demonstrative evidence,

illustrative in nature of other evidence presented. Muhammad

claims that the demonstration was not supportive of the

Commonwealth's theory of the case nor based upon other

evidence presented. We disagree with Muhammad.

Scientific evidence of the presence of nitroglycerine and

gunshot residue in the trunk of the Caprice proved that

gunshots were fired from the trunk. A witness testified that

he saw a flash come from the car when Charlot was murdered.

Muhammad and Malvo were seen in the Caprice immediately before

the murder of Dean Meyers. Immediately after the murder of

Dean Meyers, Muhammad was interviewed in the parking lot

across the street and in the presence of the Caprice. Malvo

was not seen at the parking lot, leaving the reasonable

inference that Malvo was in the trunk. Demonstrative evidence

concerning how a person could get from the passenger

compartment to the trunk from the inside and how a person

could shoot a rifle from within the trunk was relevant and

helpful to the jury.

93
 The trial court carefully considered the relevance of the

demonstrative evidence and the foundation for its

admissibility. The trial court did not abuse its discretion

in permitting this demonstrative evidence followed by an

actual inspection of the trunk of the Caprice.

J. Testimony Regarding Terror in the Community

Robert Saady, a convenience store operator in Ashland,

Virginia testified at trial about the impact of the sniper

shootings on his business, his employees, and other businesses

in the Ashland area. Montgomery County Police Sergeant Robert

Thompson testified at trial concerning the shootings in the

Washington D.C. area. Muhammad argues in assignments of error

59 and 61 that Saady's testimony was "irrelevant, speculative,

and immaterial," and that Thompson's testimony was

"cumulative, irrelevant and immaterial." He argues that proof

of actual fear in the community is not probative of Muhammad's

intent.

School officials in three different school systems also

testified about the impact of the sniper shooting upon

personnel, students and parents, and the operation of the

schools. However, the only assignments of error before this

Court involve the testimony of Saady and Thompson.

With regard to Thompson, Muhammad objected only to

specific questions not the overall nature of the testimony.

94
None of those specific objections are made the subject of

argument in his brief. With regard to Saady, Muhammad did

object to the relevance of his testimony in its entirety.

Section 18.2-46.4 required proof that Muhammad intended to

"intimidate the civilian population at large or . . .

influence the conduct or activities of the government . . .

through intimidation." It is an axiom of law and human

behavior that one may infer that a person intends to produce

the consequences reasonably anticipated from his acts. Wilson

v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 101, 452 S.E.2d 669, 673, cert.

denied, 516 U.S. 841 (1995); see also Mickens v. Commonwealth,

247 Va. 395, 408, 442 S.E.2d 678, 687, rev'd on other grounds,

513 U.S. 922 (1994); Green v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 706, 711,

292 S.E.2d 605, 608 (1982); Barrett v. Commonwealth, 210 Va.

153, 156, 169 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1969). As such, testimony

about what was actually and reasonably produced by Muhammad's

conduct was relevant to prove his intent. The trial court did

not err in permitting such testimony.

K. Motion to Quash Eyewitness Identifications

In assignment of error 25, Muhammad alleges that "the

court erred in denying the motion to quash and suppress as

unreliable various eyewitness identifications." In his one

paragraph argument in his brief, Muhammad offers insufficient

95
argument in support of his assignment of error. It is waived.

Rule 5:17(c); Powell, 267 Va. at 135, 590 S.E.2d at 54.

XI. Sentencing

A. Torture, Aggravated Battery, or Depravity of Mind

In assignment of error 12, Muhammad asserts that:

It was error to deny the motion to preclude
sentence of death based on vileness factor and
allow the Commonwealth to base its request for
the death sentence on the "vileness" factor,
since there was no evidence of torture,
aggravated battery, or depravity of mind.

Muhammad raised this issue in a pre-trial motion which the

trial court took under advisement until the evidence had been

presented. At the conclusion of the presentation of the

evidence, Muhammad expressly stated that he objected to the

case being presented to the jury based upon torture or

aggravated battery. Muhammad's assignment of error is in the

disjunctive. He claims that there was no evidence of torture,

aggravated battery, or depravity of mind. He did not object

to "depravity of mind" as a predicate finding for vileness.

The trial court ruled that it would not include "torture" in

the instructions. Muhammad's objections in the trial court do

not preserve assignment of error 12. Rule 5:25; Rule 5:17.

B. Victim Impact Testimony

Muhammad argues in assignment of error 11 that it was

error under the due process clause to permit victim impact

96
testimony during the penalty phase of his trial. He argues

that prior to 1998, the Virginia capital sentencing scheme

"only contemplated the presentation of victim impact testimony

to the judge prior to the imposition of sentence." To the

extent that this statement provides a separate grounds for his

assignment of error, it is barred from review because the

issue was not raised in the trial court. Rule 5:25. With

respect to Muhammad's complaint about victim impact evidence

presented to a jury, we have previously considered such claims

and have rejected them. Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373,

385, 484 S.E.2d 898, 906, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1018 (1997);

Weeks, 248 Va. at 476, 450 S.E. 2d at 389. We see no reason

to revisit our previous decisions.

C. Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct

Muhammad alleges in assignments of error 77, 78, 79, 80,

81, 82, and 83 that the trial court erred in admitting

multiple instances of unadjudicated criminal conduct. As

previously discussed, he has waived assignments of error 78,

79, 80, 82, and 83 for failure to adequately brief the issues.

Rule 5:17(c). We will turn our attention to assignments of

error 77 and 81. Assignment of error 77 states:

The court erred by allowing unadjudicated acts
to be received into evidence by the jury
without any standard of proof or
particularized burden on the Commonwealth to
prove such acts to a specific standard of

97
 proof in violation of Mr. Muhammad's right to
due process under the Virginia and United
States Constitutions.

As stated, assignment of error 77 is unspecific. We must look

to other assignments of error to place his complaint in a

particular context. The only specific issue involving

unadjudicated criminal conduct properly before us on appeal is

the subject of assignment of error 81 concerning testimony

about an alleged escape attempt from the Prince William County

Adult Detention Center.

The Commonwealth presented evidence of the attempted

escape through two witnesses, without objection from the

defendant. Only after the completion of all the evidence from

the prosecution and the defense at the sentencing phase and

after both parties had rested, did Muhammad move to strike the

evidence of the attempted escape. The trial court properly

denied the motion because it was untimely. In order to

preserve an issue for appeal, an objection must be made

contemporaneously or it is waived. Muhammad has failed to

preserve assignments of error 77 and 81. Rule 5:25.

D. Testimony of Mildred Muhammad

In assignments of error 84 and 85, Muhammad asserts that

the trial court erred in allowing Mildred Muhammad,

("Mildred"), the defendant's former wife, to testify about

98
statements made to her by her lawyer in Tacoma, Washington and

a statement made by their child, Taalibah.

Mildred testified that the lawyer representing her in a

custody proceeding told her to leave town quickly because of

fear that Muhammad would find her and kill her. Muhammad

objected to this statement on the grounds of hearsay. The

trial court overruled the objection because it was not offered

for the truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was offered

to show why Mildred left Washington State and moved to the

suburbs of Washington, D.C. The trial court gave the jury a

limiting instruction directing it that the evidence was to be

considered only to prove that she moved because of the

statement made by her lawyer. After further discussion with

counsel, the court gave an additional limiting instruction

drafted by Muhammad. Also, Mildred testified that her

daughter, Taalibah, said to her that if Muhammad "gets out,"

she was concerned that he would kill her mother. Muhammad

objected on the grounds of hearsay.

Muhammad maintains on appeal that allowing such

statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront

witnesses against him and violated the rule established in

Crawford. Crawford had not been decided at the time of

Muhammad's trial. He made no objection based upon the Sixth

Amendment to the testimony of his former wife. These issues

99
will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Rule

5:25.

The trial court did not err in admitting Mildred's

testimony regarding her lawyer's statement to her. It was not

hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter

asserted. Chandler v. Graffeo, 268 Va. 673, 682, 604 S.E.2d

1, 5 (2004). A proper limiting instruction was given, not

once, but twice. One of the instructions was drafted by

Muhammad. A jury is presumed to have followed the

instructions of the trial court. Green v. Young, 264 Va. 604,

611, 571 S.E.2d 135, 139 (2002) (citing Zafiro v. United

States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993)).

With regard to Mildred's testimony about her daughter's

statement to her, the record reveals a more complicated

context. Muhammad objected on the grounds of hearsay and

relevancy, not on Sixth Amendment grounds. It is significant

that the Commonwealth did not seek to introduce Mildred's

testimony about her daughter's statement until after the trial

court, over the Commonwealth's objection, ruled that it would

allow Muhammad to present to the jury several letters written

to him from his children, including Taalibah, which gave the

impression that the children had no fear of him. After

considerable argument from counsel, the trial court ruled that

all the letters Muhammad sought to introduce would be allowed

100
and a single statement from Taalibah to her mother would also

be allowed. The trial court ruled that all of this evidence

was admissible pursuant to the state-of-mind exception to the

hearsay rule. The Commonwealth also argued that Taalibah's

statement should be independently admissible as rebuttal to

Muhammad's introduction of the letters.

The nature of the evidence offered by Muhammad was to

show his relationship with his children. He offered out of

court statements in the form of letters from his children for

this purpose. Similarly, the Commonwealth offered an out of

court oral statement from Taalibah for the same purpose. Upon

review of the record, we hold that, if the admission of

Taalibah's statement was error, it was invited error. We will

not "notice error which has been invited by the party seeking

to take advantage thereof on appeal." Saunders v.

Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 400, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970);

Clark v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 787, 791, 120 S.E.2d 270, 273

(1961). Muhammad's introduction of evidence showing the state

of mind of his children toward him – arguing that such proof

was both relevant and not objectionable hearsay – surely

invited evidence of a similar nature from the Commonwealth.

Whether as evidence in its case in chief or as rebuttal

evidence, the trial court did not err in permitting Mildred to

testify about Taalibah's statement.

101
 XII. Jury Instructions

In assignments of error 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94,

and 95, Muhammad alleges defects in the instruction of the

jury.

A. Aggravated Battery

Muhammad objected to the trial court's instruction to the

jury that it could find the aggravating factor of vileness

under Code § 19.2-264.2 from proof of aggravated battery in

the death of Dean Meyers. Muhammad asserts that a single shot

has never qualified as an aggravated battery. We have defined

aggravated battery as "a battery which, qualitatively and

quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to

accomplish an act of murder." Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va.

455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.

967 (1979). Muhammad asserts that, in a shooting case, this

Court has always required more than one gunshot to satisfy the

requirements of aggravated battery.

In Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 513 S.E.2d 634,

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999), we noted that the clear

language of Code § 19.2-264.2 demonstrates that "the term

'vileness' includes three separate and distinct factors, with

proof of any one factor being sufficient to support a finding

of vileness and hence a sentence of death." Id. at 341-42,

102
513 S.E.2d at 640. Those factors are torture, depravity of

mind, or aggravated battery to the victim.

The significance and effect of Muhammad’s argument

attacking the aggravated battery instruction must be assessed

in the context of the other jury instructions and the jury's

actual findings. Jury instruction 14 dealt with the offense

of “the killing of Dean Meyers as part of the killing of more

than one person in a three-year period.” Jury instruction 14A

dealt with the offense of “the killing of Dean Meyers in the

commission or attempted commission of an act of terrorism.”

Each of the instructions included direction to the jury that

the penalty of death could not be imposed for either of the

offenses unless the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable

doubt at least one of the following aggravating circumstances:

1. That, after consideration of his history
and background, there is a probability that he
would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing serious threat to
society; or

2. That his conduct in committing the offense
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman, in that it involved depravity of mind
or aggravated battery to the victim beyond the
minimum necessary to accomplish the act of
murder.

For each of the offenses, the jury’s verdict forms expressly

found that Muhammad “would commit criminal acts of violence

that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society,”

103
and that “the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile,

horrible, or inhuman.” Additionally, each of the verdict

forms expressed findings of both “[d]epravity of mind” and

“[a]ggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum

necessary to accomplish the act of murder.” Based upon these

multiple findings, the jury unanimously fixed Muhammad’s

punishment at death for each of the offenses.

Even if the trial court erred in granting an instruction

based upon aggravated battery, the error would be harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury’s verdict of death for

each of the offenses was predicated upon additional and

independent findings of future dangerousness and vileness

based upon depravity of mind.

B. Future Dangerousness Instruction

Muhammad argues in his brief that the future

dangerousness instruction given is unconstitutionally vague.

The Court can find no assignment of error that attacks this

instruction on that basis. Furthermore, his one sentence

conclusory argument is inadequate. We will not consider the

argument. Rule 5:17(c).

C. Finding Instruction

In assignment of error 91, Muhammad alleges that the

trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury "that the

verdict be unanimous as to any aggravating factors."

104
Muhammad's argument on this point is a one-sentence repetition

of his assignment of error. It is inadequate argument and

will not be considered. Rule 5:17(c).

D. Life Without Parole

In assignments of error 87 and 90, Muhammad maintains

that the trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth's

proposed instructions "without including the 'life without the

possibility of parole' language." He further argues that the

trial court should have granted his proposed instruction with

such language. Once again, Muhammad, in one sentence

conclusory arguments, simply repeats the language of the

assignment of error and offers no argument. The assignments

of error are deemed waived. Rule 5:17(c).

E. Remaining Issues Relating to Instructions

Numerous other issues are waived by Muhammad for failure

to make sufficient argument in his brief. He makes

insufficient argument that:

1. The trial court should have granted his instruction K
defining mitigation. Additionally, here the trial court
did define mitigation, it simply refused to highlight any
particular evidence as Muhammad wanted;
2. The trial court should have instructed the jury that it
could consider life without parole in determining
aggravating factors and as a mitigating factor;
3. The trial court should have given his instruction L
because the jury was "left directionless" as to how to
"weigh" mitigation evidence;
4. The trial court should have instructed the jury that the
vileness factor applied only to Meyers' killing.
Additionally, here the instruction offered was incorrect

105
 because the vileness factor could be found based upon
depravity of mind as well;
5. The trial court should have granted his instruction T
regarding mitigating evidence to be considered in
weighing culpability and future violence. The entirety
of his argument consists of the following: "The jury was
entitled to this guidance."
6. The trial court did not make it clear in instructions
that the jury could impose life in prison even if it
found aggravating factors. The record demonstrates that
the jury was properly instructed on this matter.

For each of these matters (1 - 6), Muhammad fails to make

sufficient argument in his brief. The matters are waived.

Rule 5:17(c).

XIII. Pretrial Publicity and
the Right to a Fair Trial

In assignments of error 5, 23, 24, and 28, Muhammad makes

various arguments concerning alleged errors of the trial court

concerning its handling of pretrial publicity. Muhammad

argues that:

1. The trial court erred by denying his motion to issue a
show cause order, quashing subpoenas related to seeking
evidence of pretrial leaks of information concerning the
investigation of Muhammad and Malvo, and denying a
request for appointment of a special prosecutor to
investigate pretrial leaks;
2. The trial court erred by denying Muhammad's motion to
close a hearing on a motion in limine;
3. The trial court erred in failing to prevent information
leaks and to take appropriate corrective action
concerning the leaks;
4. The trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charges
against Muhammad based upon leaks of information;
5. The leaks "hindered the defendant's ability to seat a
fair jury despite the change of venue."

106
 This case attracted extensive media coverage. Counsel

for Muhammad and the Fairfax Commonwealth's Attorney agreed to

a consent order in the Fairfax County Circuit Court, where

Malvo's prosecution was pending, generally prohibiting law

enforcement officials of the Fairfax County Police Department

and its civilian employees from disclosing information in

violation of the Department's own rules, namely, General Order

401.1. Among other things, General Order 401.1 and the

consent order in Fairfax County Circuit Court specifically

prohibit disclosure of evidence of statements, criminal

records, opinions of guilt or innocence, testing and test

results, and statements about expected testimony.

Additionally, counsel for Muhammad and the Commonwealth's

Attorney for Prince William County agreed that all discovery

from the Commonwealth would be sealed to limit dissemination

of information that might have an effect upon jury selection.

Due to continued concerns about allegations of leaks of

information related to the investigation and prosecution of

Muhammad and Malvo, Muhammad filed a motion for rule to show

cause in the Prince William County Circuit Court requesting

that the trial court determine the source of information

appearing in the media concerning the Malvo and Muhammad cases

which had been attributed to law enforcement sources, and take

appropriate action. In the alternative, Muhammad requested

107
that the trial court appoint a special prosecutor or

investigator. The trial court denied the motion. A similar

motion had been presented to the Circuit Court of Fairfax

County and was denied.

Thereafter, Muhammad and the Prince William County

Commonwealth's Attorney agreed to the entry of an order on

August 5, 2003, providing in pertinent part:

Law enforcement employees, from all agencies
working as members of the prosecution Task
Force, or working with the Task Force, whether
sworn officers/agents or civilian employees
shall not disclose any information to the
press or public related to the investigation
leading to the arrests of John Allen Muhammad
and Lee Boyd Malvo, and pending prosecution of
John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo in
Prince William and Fairfax County Circuit
Courts.

Approximately two weeks before the commencement of

Muhammad's trial, a book entitled "Sniper: Inside The Hunt For

The Killers Who Terrorized The Nation," was released to the

public. This 237-page publication contained detailed

information concerning the investigation of Muhammad and

Malvo. Muhammad filed a motion to dismiss the charges or for

other appropriate relief asserting that there had been a

flagrant violation of the August 5, 2003 order by numerous and

unknown law enforcement agents. In the motion, Muhammad did

not fault the prosecutors in the case and did not argue that

there had been any discovery violations under Rule 3A:11.

108
 The trial court expressed its concern about the matter

but disagreed regarding Muhammad's proposed remedies. In the

absence of any violations of the discovery rules, the trial

court declined to prohibit introduction of specified evidence

of the Commonwealth. The trial court declined to order that

the Commonwealth could not seek the death penalty. The trial

court indicated that it would allow individual voir dire of

potential jurors on the issue of pre-trial publicity. The

trial court had already granted a motion for change of venue

and the trial was scheduled to be held in Virginia Beach,

Virginia.

Muhammad asserts that the trial court should have

dismissed the charges, precluded the death penalty, or limited

the introduction of evidence pursuant to the authority of Code

§ 19.2-265.4. However, this code section recites potential

remedies for failure to provide discovery under Rule 3A:11.

Muhammad expressly stated in his motion that no discovery

violations under the rule had occurred.

In his motion, Muhammad does not suggest that the

Commonwealth's Attorney's office of Prince William County was

the source of leaks. Additionally, there is no evidence that

the information contained in the book published before trial

came from leaks after the August 5, 2003 order. The trial

court noted that it was likely that most of the information in

109
the book came from communications prior to the time the trial

court was asked to intervene and prohibit disclosure of any

information regarding the Muhammad and Malvo investigations.

In his brief on this matter, Muhammad cites one statute,

which does not apply, and no cases, in support of his argument

that Muhammad was not tried by a fair and impartial jury or

that his trial was in any way tainted by pretrial publicity.

Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court

took appropriate action to limit the effect of pretrial

publicity in this case. The trial court entered a consent

order regarding sealing of discovery responses of the

Commonwealth; when asked, the trial court entered the August

5, 2003 order prohibiting law enforcement and civilian

employees of law enforcement agencies from disclosing to the

media or the public any information concerning the

investigation of Muhammad and Malvo; the trial court granted

Muhammad's motion for a change of venue to a location away

from the immediate zone of pretrial publicity; and, the trial

court permitted individualized voir dire of potential jurors

concerning pretrial publicity.

Muhammad does not cite any actual tainting of the jury

selection process or any way in which his trial was

compromised by pretrial publicity. He does not cite any

particular consequences of the trial court's denial of a

110
motion to close a hearing on a motion in limine or the trial

court's refusal to issue show cause orders or appoint a

special prosecutor to investigate leaks. It is most telling

that at trial, of the 125 potential jurors questioned, only 8

were challenged on grounds that exposure to pretrial publicity

made them inappropriate jurors. We hold that the trial court

did not err with regard to any of the issues raised in

Muhammad's assignments of error 5, 23, 24 and 28.

XIV. Miscellaneous Constitutional Challenges
to the Death Penalty

In assignments of error 13, 21, and 26, Muhammad raises

numerous issues relating to the constitutionality of the death

sentence generally and as it is applied in Virginia. Support

for many of his arguments is not found in his brief. Rather,

Muhammad attempts to incorporate by reference various motions,

memoranda, and argument made in the trial court. We have

previously held that such a practice is impermissible.

Schmitt, 262 Va. at 138, 547 S.E.2d at 194; Burns v.

Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 319, 541 S.E.2d 872, 881, cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001). We will not consider such

arguments. They are waived. Rule 5:17(c).

Other matters raised in these assignments of error and

argued in Muhammad's brief have been previously decided by

this Court:

111
(1) Virginia statutes fail to provide
meaningful guidance to the jury because
the aggravating factors are vague,
rejected in Jackson, 267 Va. at 205-06,
590 S.E.2d at 535 (dangerousness);
Powell, 267 Va. at 136, 590 S.E.2d at 554
(both); Wolfe, 265 Va. at 208, 576 S.E.2d
at 480;

(2) The Virginia scheme fails to provide the
jury with guidance regarding its
consideration of mitigating evidence,
rejected in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522
U.S. 269, 275-76 (1998); Jackson, 267 Va.
at 206, 590 S.E.2d at 536; Johnson, 267
Va. at 69, 591 S.E.2d at 56; Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 429, 587
S.E.2d 532, 538 (2003); Lovitt, 260 Va.
at 508, 537 S.E.2d at 874;

(3) The Commonwealth is permitted to prove
future dangerousness by evidence of
unadjudicated criminal conduct without
any standard of proof, rejected in
Jackson, 267 Va. at 206, 590 S.E.2d at
536; Powell, 267 Va. at 136, 590 S.E.2d
at 554; Johnson, 267 Va. at 70, 591
S.E.2d at 56; Bell v. Commonwealth, 264
Va. 172, 203, 563 S.E.2d 695, 716 (2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003).
Additionally, we note that all Muhammad's
assignments of error regarding
unadjudicated criminal conduct have been
rejected either because they were not
preserved in the trial court (Rule 5:25)
or they have been inadequately briefed
(Rule 5:17(c)). Consequently, no issues
related to unadjudicated criminal conduct
are properly before the Court.

(4) The statute allows, but does not require,
that a sentence of death be set aside
upon a showing of good cause and permits
the court to consider hearsay in a post-
sentence report, rejected in Jackson, 267
Va. at 206, 590 S.E.2d at 536; Powell,
267 Va. at 136, 590 S.E.2d at 555;

112
 Johnson, 267 Va. at 70, 591 S.E.2d at 56;
Jackson, 266 Va. at 430, 587 S.E.2d at
539;

(5) This Court fails to conduct an adequate
proportionality review and
passion/prejudice review, rejected in
Jackson, 267 Va. at 206, 590 S.E.2d at
536; Powell, 267 Va. at 136, 590 S.E.2d
at 555; Johnson, 267 Va. at 70, 591
S.E.2d at 56.

XV. Statutory Review

Muhammad does not argue that his sentences of death are

excessive, arbitrarily imposed, or disproportionate to other

similar cases. Nonetheless, pursuant to Code § 17.1-

313(C)(2), we must conduct a review of these issues.

Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial

court conducted the proceedings related to this case with

patience and fairness. Muhammad was given access to the trial

court to present each and every issue he desired to present

and was entitled to present. The jury selection process was

untainted by pretrial publicity. The trial court's granting of

the motion to change venue provided additional protection to

the right of the defendant to a fair trial. The record

contains no reversible error. Simply stated, we find not even

a hint of arbitrariness or prejudice in the conduct of the

trial or the jury's imposition of the sentences of death.

Our proportionality review is not undertaken to "insure

complete symmetry among all death penalty cases." Orbe v.

113
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1999),

cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113 (2001). The review we employ is

done to "identify and invalidate the aberrant death sentence."

Id.

With regard to the death sentences imposed for the

killing of more than one person in three years or in the same

act or transaction we have reviewed our cases involving the

killing of two or more people. Of the fourteen cases in which

the death sentence was given, five involved more than two

killings. Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 384 S.E.2d

757 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990) (four victims);

Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196 (1987),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988) (two victims); Davidson v.

Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 419 S.E.2d 656, cert. denied, 506

U.S. 959 (1992) (three victims); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244

Va. 1, 419 S.E.2d 606, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992) (two

victims); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d

394, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993) (two victims); Burket

v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 450 S.E.2d 124 (1994), cert.

denied, 514 U.S. 1053 (1995) (two victims); Goins v.

Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 470 S.E.2d 114, cert. denied, 519

U.S. 887 (1996) (five victims plus the death of a fetus); Kasi

v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 508 S.E.2d 57 (1998), cert.

denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999) (two victims); Bramblett v.

114
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d 400, cert. denied, 528

U.S. 952 (1999) (four victims); Walker v. Commonwealth, 258

Va. 54, 515 S.E.2d 565 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125

(2000) (two victims); Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 631, 553

S.E.2d 520 (2001) (two victims); Hudson v. Commonwealth, 267

Va. 29, 590 S.E.2d 362 (2004) (three victims); Elliott v.

Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396, 593 S.E.2d 270 (2004), cert.

denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 875 (2005) (two victims);

Winston v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 604 S.E.2d 21 (2004)

(two victims).

In the cases in which the death sentence was sought but a

life sentence was given, of the fourteen cases only four

involved the killing of more than two persons and three of

those cases had unusual circumstances. Woodfin v.

Commonwealth, 236 Va. 89, 372 S.E.2d 377 (1988), cert. denied,

490 U.S. 1009 (1989) (two victims); Mundy v. Commonwealth, 11

Va. App. 461, 390 S.E.2d 525 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S.

840 (1991) (two victims); Moran v. Commonwealth, No. 1708-90-3

(Va. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1991) (two victims); Stephenson v.

Commonwealth, No. 2080-91-1 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1993) (two

victims); Hamlin v. Commonwealth, No. 1279-99-2 (Va. Ct. App.

Apr. 25, 2000) (four victims killed by arson); Novak v.

Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373, 457 S.E.2d 402 (1995), cert.

denied, 519 U.S. 1006 (1996) (two victims); Pritchett v.

115
Commonwealth, No. 1968-95-3 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1996) (two

victims); Owens v. Commonwealth, No. 2259-95-1 (Va. Ct. App.

Nov. 19, 1996) (four victims; defendant was 16 years old at

time of offense); Williams v. Commonwealth, No. 2423-96-2 (Va.

Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1997) (three victims; defendant was alleged

to be brain-damaged and border-line mentally retarded);

Stoneman v. Commonwealth, No. 3069-96-3 (Va. Ct. App. June 9,

1998) (two victims); Evans v. Commonwealth, No. 2089-99-3 (Va.

Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2000) (two victims); Burlile v.

Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 544 S.E.2d 360 (2001) (two

victims); Hairston v. Commonwealth, No. 1722-01-3 (Va. Ct.

App. Mar. 28, 2002) (two victims); Cooper v. Commonwealth, No.

0819-03-4 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) (three victims).

Additionally, we reviewed two cases in which the

Commonwealth did not seek the death penalty for the killing of

two or more persons. In those two cases there were only two

murders in each case. Smith v. Commonwealth, No. 0628-93-1

(Va. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 1994) (two victims); Hobbs v.

Commonwealth, No. 1301-99-1 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2000) (two

victims).

Apart from the Cooper case, except where unusual

circumstances existed, all the capital prosecutions in

Virginia that we have reviewed wherein more than two people

116
were murdered and the prosecution was based upon Code § 18.2-

31(7) or (8) resulted in the death penalty being imposed.

This case represents the first capital murder case with a

death sentence under the terrorism statute. We are unaware of

any state that has reviewed a death sentence predicated upon a

similar provision.

We think the death penalty is not an excessive nor a

disproportionate penalty for a case with evidence of ten

murders and six malicious woundings. Similarly, the evidence

presented on the terrorism count independently supports the

imposition of the death penalty.

Muhammad's crimes cannot be compared to any other case in

the Commonwealth. The evidence of vileness and future

dangerousness in support of the jury's verdict justifies its

sanction of death.

Muhammad with his sniper team partner, Malvo, randomly

selected innocent victims. With calculation, extensive

planning, premeditation, and ruthless disregard for life,

Muhammad carried out his cruel scheme of terror. He did so by

employing stealth and secrecy using a sniper methodology that

put his victims at great risk while reducing his own. He

employed a weapon with truly awesome power to inflict massive

injury upon his victims. Muhammad recruited a younger boy,

117
Malvo, and carefully trained and guided him in this murderous

enterprise.

His victims came from all walks of life who were engaged

in everyday pursuits when their lives were tragically ended or

altered. Paul LaRuffa, Muhammad Rashid, Hong Im Ballenger,

Claudine Parker, and Kelly Adams were closing and leaving

their places of business. Sarah Ramos was sitting on a bench

in front of a store. Lori Lewis-Rivera was vacuuming her car

at a gas station. Paschal Charlot was crossing an

intersection as a pedestrian. Caroline Seawell and Linda

Franklin were putting packages in their respective

automobiles. Iran Brown was walking to school. Dean Meyers,

Kenneth Bridges, and Premkumar Walekar were putting fuel in

their vehicles at gasoline stations. Jeffrey Hopper was

leaving a restaurant after a meal. Conrad Johnson, a bus

driver, was standing in the doorway of his bus. Muhammad

inflicted death or massive injury upon these victims as he

pursued his mission of terror.

Muhammad's threats to those within the communities he

stalked including the warning, "Your children are not safe

anywhere at anytime." He communicated his desire to extort

money from the government through the demand to deposit ten

million dollars in an account connected to a card for

accessing the account through automated teller machines.

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Whatever else may have been his intentions, he certainly

intended to intimidate the civilian population and to

influence the conduct and activities of government. He did so

with breathtaking cruelty. If society's ultimate penalty

should be reserved for the most heinous offenses, accompanied

by proof of vileness or future dangerousness, then surely,

this case qualifies.

XVI. Conclusion

Upon review of the record and upon consideration of the

arguments presented, we find no reversible error in the

judgment of the trial court. Further, we find no reason to

commute or set aside the sentences of death. We will affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE KINSER, concurring.

I fully agree with the majority opinion in this case. I

write separately to address the dissent’s failure to view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, to

consider the circumstantial evidence, and to address the

Commonwealth’s theory of the case. Unlike the dissent, I

conclude that the Commonwealth did indeed prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that John Allen Muhammad was a principal in

the first degree in the murder of Dean Meyers under Code

119
§ 18.2-31(8), “[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated

killing of more than one person within a three-year period.”

Certain basic and well-established principles must guide

the appellate review of this case. When the sufficiency of

the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court must view the

evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom in

the light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial, in

this case the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Norman, 268 Va.

539, 545-46, 604 S.E.2d 82, 85 (2004); Commonwealth v. Hudson,

265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786, cert. denied, 540 U.S.

972 (2003). It is our duty to affirm the trial court’s

judgment unless that judgment is plainly wrong or without

evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680; Barrett v.

Commonwealth, 268 Va. 170, 179, 597 S.E.2d 104, 108 (2004);

Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d

534, 537 (1975).

In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prevailing party at trial, we must consider all the

evidence, both direct and circumstantial. “There is no

distinction in the law between the weight or value to be given

to either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Hudson, 265 Va.

at 512, 578 S.E.2d at 785. “Indeed, in some cases

circumstantial evidence may be the only type of evidence which

can possibly be produced.” Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.

120
260, 272, 257 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.

972 (1980) (citing Toler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 780, 51

S.E.2d 210, 213 (1949)).

Instead of adhering to these principles of appellate

review, the dissent presents the evidence in the light most

favorable to Muhammad rather than the Commonwealth. The

dissent does so by failing to address the compelling

circumstantial evidence concerning the other 15 shootings that

occurred during a span of 47 days in addition to the Meyers

shooting and the similarities among those shootings that

demonstrate the method employed by Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo

in the murder of Meyers. There is no mention of the forensic

evidence establishing that the .223 caliber Bushmaster rifle

recovered when Muhammad and Malvo were apprehended was used in

13 of the 16 shootings, including the Meyers murder, or the

evidence showing that the rifle is equivalent to a type of

weapon used by military snipers. Likewise, the dissent takes

no notice of the fact that, in 10 of the 16 shootings, the

Caprice that Muhammad purchased after the first shooting and

in which he and Malvo were sleeping when arrested was seen in

the vicinity of those shootings, including the Meyers

shooting, either before, at the time of, or soon after they

occurred. In the Meyers shooting, the Caprice actually was

seen in the area both before and after the shooting.

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 The dissent further makes no reference to the alterations

to the Caprice enabling the shooter in the two-man sniper team

to fire a high-velocity rifle from the trunk while minimizing

the shooter’s visibility. Finally, there is no mention of the

many tools used by sniper teams that were recovered in the

Caprice along with the Bushmaster rifle: a bipod system for

support of the rifle; holographic and telescopic scopes to aid

sighting; global positioning system equipment to locate and

relocate a vantage point for the long-range shot; “walkie-

talkie” handheld radio sets for communication; bungee cords

for easy “break down” of the rifle for transportation

purposes; and silencers. The dissent’s failure to consider

all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth is contrary to the

principles of appellate review.

The dissent also does not address the Commonwealth’s

theory of the case. The Commonwealth predicated its theory on

the methodology employed by a two-man sniper team. The

testimony of Sergeant Major Mark Spicer clearly demonstrated

that such a team employs one member as the long-range

“shooter” and the other member as the “spotter.” The

spotter’s job is to determine when the target is within the

zone of fire and a shot can be taken, given the other

surrounding circumstances, and to inform the shooter, who is

122
positioned in an obscure place, of these facts and to give the

order to shoot at the opportune moment.

It is the order to shoot that differentiates this case

from the dissent’s analogy to a “lookout” or “wheelman.” The

typical lookout or wheelman in a robbery does not direct at

what moment the robber brandishes a weapon at a bank teller or

store clerk and demands money. In the present case, it is

that direct and immediate action by the spotter in giving the

order to shoot that forms the basis of the Commonwealth’s

theory that Muhammad acted as a principal in the first degree.

Such conduct by the spotter in a two-man sniper team is not

“indirect” and is not “the quintessence of a principal in the

second degree.”

The dissent, however, never explains why such action by

the spotter would not make that person a principal in the

first degree. Instead, the dissent concludes that Malvo made

the final decision about whom to shoot and when to do so. The

dissent states, again not in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, that “Malvo could have picked any target and

decided at any time to fire or not,” and thereby reduce

Muhammad’s role to that of merely giving advice about the

traffic flow on a multi-lane highway. In other words, the

dissent does not deal with the Commonwealth’s theory that

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Muhammad gave the order to shoot and the circumstantial

evidence that supports the theory.

Under our case law, “where two or more persons take a

direct part in inflicting fatal injuries, each joint

participant is an ‘immediate perpetrator,’ ” i.e., a principal

in the first degree. Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482,

495, 404 S.E.2d 227, 235, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991);

see also Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 349-50, 551

S.E.2d 620, 630 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002);

Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 545, 450 S.E.2d 365,

375 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995). In Strickler,

the Commonwealth’s theory was that Strickler and another

individual had jointly participated in the actual killing.

Id. at 494, 404 S.E.2d at 235. The Commonwealth argued that,

since the victim’s death was caused by the crushing of her

skull with a 69-pound rock, it would have been necessary for

one assailant to hold her down on the ground while the other

assailant lifted the rock and dropped it on her head. Id. We

agreed and concluded that the weight and size of the rock

“made it apparent that a single person could not have lifted

it and dropped or thrown it while simultaneously holding the

victim down.” Id. Even though the evidence did not show

which assailant wielded the rock, we held that Strickler took

a direct part in inflicting the fatal injuries and was

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therefore an “immediate perpetrator.” Id. at 495, 404 S.E.2d

at 235.

Turning to the evidence in this case and viewing it in

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, I conclude that

Muhammad, like Strickler, acted as a principal in the first

degree. The dissent does not dispute, nor can it, that

Muhammad, Malvo, the Caprice, and the Bushmaster rifle were

all present at the scene of the Meyers shooting. In fact,

soon after the shooting, Muhammad and the Caprice were seen in

a parking lot directly across the street from the gas station

where Meyers was shot. A police officer questioned Muhammad

about why he was in the parking lot. Muhammad told the

officer that the police had directed him into that parking

lot. However, the officer explained that, after the shooting,

the procedure was to direct traffic away from the area, not

into it.

Also, a map containing both Muhammad’s and Malvo’s

fingerprints was found in the parking lot. Forensic evidence

established that the bullet recovered during the autopsy of

Meyers’ body was fired from the Bushmaster rifle. While only

Malvo’s fingerprints were found on the Bushmaster rifle, DNA

matching that of both Muhammad and Malvo was found on the

rifle.

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 The question is whether the “combined force” of this

evidence along with “many [other] concurrent and related

circumstances” surrounding not only the Meyers shooting but

also the other 15 shootings and the sniper tools found in the

Caprice when Muhammad and Malvo were apprehended establishes

beyond a reasonable doubt that Muhammad acted as an immediate

perpetrator in the Meyers killing. Hudson, 265 Va. at 514,

578 S.E.2d at 786 (citation omitted). Each piece of

circumstantial evidence is not to be viewed in isolation. Id.

Soon after the Meyers shooting, the Caprice, with

Muhammad in the driver’s seat, was in a parking lot directly

across a nine-lane highway from the gas station where Meyers

was killed. The location of the parking lot provided a direct

line of fire to the gas station. Due to the traffic on this

multi-lane highway and the small hole in the trunk of the

Caprice through which to fire the Bushmaster rifle, the jury

could reasonably have inferred that the shooter fired upon

order from the spotter because only the spotter could

determine the opportune moment to fire a shot that would avoid

oncoming vehicular traffic, then strike and kill the victim.

See Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563,

567-68 (1976) (“it is within the province of the jury to

determine what inferences are to be drawn from proved facts,

126
provided the inferences are reasonably related to those

facts”).

Thus, in this case, Muhammad was either the shooter,

making him a principal in the first degree, or the spotter,

also making him a principal in the first degree. The evidence

concerning all 16 shootings and the reasonable inferences

flowing therefrom viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth demonstrate that, in this two-man sniper team,

the spotter took an immediate and direct action in the Meyers

murder by giving the order to shoot, an act that, in my view,

is equivalent to pulling the trigger or holding the victim

down on the ground as in Strickler. Such action by the

spotter goes beyond the conduct of a principal in the second

degree who merely encourages, incites, or aids in the

commission of a crime. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va.

370, 372-73, 157 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1967).

For these reasons, I respectfully concur and, like the

majority, would affirm all the convictions.

JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE KOONTZ join,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.

The common law classification of criminal perpetrators

that distinguished between principals in the first and second

degree has become of limited significance in modern times.

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Nearly all jurisdictions have enacted provisions similar to

Virginia Code § 18.2-18, which erase the distinction between

principals of the first and second degree by treating both

categories of criminal actors as principals in the first

degree for purposes of indictment, trial, conviction, and

punishment.

However, the common law distinction between principals of

the first and second degrees remains of significant importance

in a case of capital murder in Virginia because the General

Assembly has specifically provided in Code § 18.2-18 that a

“principal in the second degree to a capital murder shall be

indicted, tried, convicted and punished as though the offense

were murder in the first degree.” Thus, unless the

Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that John Allen

Muhammad was a principal in the first degree to the murder of

Dean Meyers under Code § 18.2-31(8), the plain language of

Code § 18.2-18 bars conviction and punishment of Muhammad for

capital murder under Code § 18.2-31(8). Accordingly, the

common law distinction between acts sufficient to constitute a

principal in the first degree and those of a principal in the

second degree is of vital importance.

At common law, a principal in the first degree is a
person who engages in criminal conduct by his own
hand—he fires the gun that kills, he takes and
carries away the property of another.

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 . . . .

At common law, a principal in the second
degree is a person who is present at the
scene of a crime, but does not engage in
the criminal conduct; he merely aids and
abets the principal in the first degree in
committing the crime. He may be actually
present, assisting the principal in the
first degree, standing ready to assist if
needed, or commanding, counseling, or
otherwise encouraging the principal in the
first degree to commit the crime; or,
although at a distance from the scene of
the crime, he may be deemed present when
he is acting as a driver of the getaway
car or as a lookout with instructions to
warn the principal in the first degree if
anyone approaches.

1 Charles Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law §§ 30-31 (15th ed.

1993).

Based on the record in this case, the Commonwealth did

not prove that Muhammad was a principal in the first degree to

the capital murder of Dean Meyers under Code § 18.2-31(8).

Under established law, Muhammad may be a principal in the

first degree to the Meyers murder in two circumstances: (1) if

he actually shot Meyers or (2) if he and Lee Boyd Malvo are

found to be joint principals, with each acting as an

“immediate perpetrator” in the killing. The record does not

establish that the Commonwealth proved either circumstance.

Our decision in Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 410

S.E.2d 621 (1991), precludes finding that Muhammad is a

principal in the first degree as the actual shooter of Meyers

129
under the facts of this case. In Rogers, we reversed a

defendant’s capital murder conviction because the evidence

placed the defendant and another man in the victim’s house at

the time of the murder and the Commonwealth failed to present

“any evidence . . . which places the murder weapon in

defendant’s hands.” Id. at 319, 410 S.E.2d at 628. “Stated

differently, the Commonwealth . . . failed to exclude [the

second man] as the perpetrator.” Id.

Following Rogers, Muhammad cannot be a principal in the

first degree as the actual shooter of Meyers because the

Commonwealth has not excluded Malvo as that person, and it

presented no evidence that Muhammad was the actual shooter.

“Because the circumstances of defendant’s conduct do not

exclude the reasonable hypothesis that [the second man

(Malvo)] killed the victim, the capital murder prosecution

fails.” Id. at 320, 410 S.E.2d at 629. Therefore, Muhammad

may not be convicted of Meyers’ capital murder upon this

record if the Commonwealth’s position is Muhammad actually

shot Meyers.

The Commonwealth primarily relies, however, on an

expansive reading of the concept of “immediate perpetrator”

based on Sergeant Spicer’s theory of how a sniper team should

operate. The majority opinion adopts this theory and

concludes both Malvo and Muhammad are culpable as principals

130
in the first degree because “actual participation together in

a unified act” renders each an immediate perpetrator. In

doing so, the Commonwealth and the majority opinion reach

beyond any precedent of this court and ignore clear

foundations of the criminal law that have long defined the

distinction between principals of the first and second degree.

Our precedent establishes that co-actors in a capital murder

can only be immediate perpetrators when each actor undertook a

direct act “in the immediate presence of the victim’s body

when the fatal blows were struck and, hence, had jointly

participated in the killing.” Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241

Va. 482, 494, 404 S.E.2d 227, 235 (1991), cert. denied, 502

U.S. 944 (1991).

In Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797

(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980), the victim died

from blows to the head. Id. at 246, 257 & n.5, 257 S.E.2d at

800, 807 & n.5. In the course of an armed robbery, the

defendant beat the victim’s head against the floor and a

codefendant struck her in the head with his fist. Id. at 246,

257 S.E.2d at 800. We affirmed the defendant’s death sentence

finding him to be “an immediate perpetrator” because both he

and his codefendant directly assaulted the victim as they

“jointly participated in the fatal beating.” Id. at 256, 257

131
S.E.2d at 806. This action rendered the defendant a principal

in the first degree.

In Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 404 S.E.2d 227

(1991), the evidence showed that the victim was killed by a

blow to the head from a 69 pound rock. We noted “a single

person could not have lifted [the rock] and dropped or thrown

it while simultaneously holding the victim down.” Id. at 494,

404 S.E.2d at 235. We affirmed the conviction for capital

murder holding that because the defendant “[took] a direct

part in inflicting [the] fatal injuries” he was an “immediate

perpetrator” and thus a principal in the first degree. Id. at

495, 404 S.E.2d at 235.

In Lenz v. Warden, 265 Va. 373, 381, 579 S.E.2d 194, 199

(2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2933 (2004),

Lenz and another convict, Remington, inflicted “68 stab wounds

and all the wounds contributed to the victim’s death.” Lenz

argued that “he could only be convicted of capital murder in

the event the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was

the triggerman.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We

disagreed, holding that “when two or more persons take a

direct part in inflicting injuries, each joint participant is

an immediate perpetrator for the purposes of the capital

murder statutes.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

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 In Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 551 S.E.2d 620

(2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002), Lenz’ co-

perpetrator was convicted for the same capital murder. We

affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s proffered

jury instructions that would have instructed the jury that he

was a principal in the second degree unless he inflicted the

actual fatal blow that caused the victim’s death out of the

many blows struck. Because the evidence established “that

Remington and Lenz jointly participated in [the victim’s]

death[,]” we found that the trial court did not err in

refusing the instruction. Id. at 350, 551 S.E.2d at 630.

Similarly, the Court of Appeals found the defendant in

Hancock v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 774, 407 S.E.2d 301

(1991), to be an immediate perpetrator of attempted capital

murder by arson when he poured gasoline on a cushion while

another person immediately ignited it. The court noted that

“[b]oth men were principals in the first degree. Both

provided the direct means to ignite the fire. Placing the

flammable material in place for another to ignite it makes

that person a perpetrator.” Id. at 781, 407 S.E.2d at 305-06.

All of these cases involve direct, contemporaneous acts

on the part of the co-perpetrators that combined to

proximately inflict the injury on the victim. In each case,

both perpetrators were physically present and personally

133
participated by a direct act against the victim to accomplish

the murder, or to set the fire in Hancock. In the case at

bar, however, there is no such evidence of a similar direct

act by Muhammad.

Assuming Muhammad acted as hypothesized by the

Commonwealth's witness, Mark Spicer, in positioning the

Caprice in the Bob Evans parking lot to face the gas station

and communicating to Malvo that the coast was clear to fire at

Meyers, that is not the act of a principal in the first degree

under Virginia law. Such conduct is the quintessence of

activity by a principal in the second degree: “encouraging,

inciting, or in some manner offering aid in the commission of

the crime . . . lending countenance, or otherwise aiding while

another did the act.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370,

373, 157 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1967).

In that regard, Muhammad’s actions were of the same

character as those of a lookout or wheelman in a robbery.

Such a person may provide the means and direction for the

commission of the robbery by driving the actual perpetrators

to the scene and keeping watch while the others directly

commit the crime. Like Muhammad, the wheelman may communicate

by walkie-talkie or cell phone to the actual perpetrators

instructing them as to when to commit the robbery and then

134
exit the premises in heavy traffic. 3 Undoubtedly these acts

accord the actual perpetrators, who take the immediate and

direct action to effectuate the robbery, an easier task with

an increased likelihood of escape. Nevertheless, no serious

argument can be made such a wheelman is a principal in the

first degree under our jurisprudence.

That is because the wheelman takes an indirect role, not

a direct role, in the crime of robbery. He is present,

keeping watch and offering his counsel and direction to commit

the crime to the actual perpetrators, which is Muhammad’s role

under the Commonwealth's theory of the case. The wheelman is

an actual participant in the unified act of disparate persons

culminating in a robbery, just as Muhammad was an actual

participant in an act with Malvo that resulted in Meyers’

murder. Neither the wheelman, nor Muhammad, in the given

circumstances, can be deemed an immediate perpetrator and thus

a principal in the first degree under Virginia law.

The crimes in Strickler, Coppola, Lenz, Remington and

Hancock could not have occurred without the direct,

contemporaneous, physical act of both perpetrators. The fire

3
Grant v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 166, 168-69, 217 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1975) (lookout
and driver of the getaway car convicted as principal in the second degree); Camphor v. State,
196 A.2d 75, 75 (Md. 1963) (accomplice who distracted the attention of a store clerk while
immediate perpetrator stole a sewing machine was a principal in the second degree); Vincent
v. State, 151 A.2d 898, 902-03 (Md. 1959) (lookout and driver of getaway car who provided a
second set of clothing to the robbers was a principal in the second degree).

135
could not have been set without the direct, physical

participation of both defendants in Hancock. Similarly, the

murder in Strickler could not have occurred without both

perpetrators acting together directly on the victim. The

defendants in Coppola, Lenz and Remington each directly

participated in the physical beating or stabbing of the

victim. These direct acts define an immediate perpetrator,

rendering each actor a principal in the first degree, but

stand in contrast to Muhammad’s indirect acts. The record in

this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, is simply devoid of the direct acts regarding a

victim that our precedent requires to find Muhammad an

immediate perpetrator acting as a principal in the first

degree.

Assuming that the events occurred as the Commonwealth

theorizes, it was nonetheless, Malvo, not Muhammad, who

finally sighted the rifle to its target and made the ultimate

decision to pull the trigger. Malvo could have picked any

target and decided at any time to fire or not. While the

range of Malvo’s vision was more restricted than Muhammad’s,

the record reflects that Malvo was not “blind” and dependent

on Muhammad in order to shoot Meyers. Spicer’s own testimony

confirms the shooter had “a very large field of view by

slightly moving [his] head left or right while still

136
maintaining a very small outward chance of . . . being seen.”

The prosecutor even argued this point to the jury, noting that

the shooter had “a much wider field of vision and a much

narrower exposure.” Obviously, Muhammad's advice and

direction to Malvo of the traffic flow along the multiple lane

highway made Malvo’s choice easier and more likely to succeed.

But in the end, it was Malvo who had to make the final

decision to shoot and performed the direct act of firing the

rifle.

Put simply, there is a failure of proof to establish

Muhammad as a principal in the first degree so as to sustain

his conviction under Code § 18.2-31(8). The evidence in this

record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

and indulging all the inferences from its theory of the case,

establishes Muhammad's actions as those of a principal in the

second degree, “actually present, assisting the principal in

the first degree [Malvo], standing ready to assist if needed,

or commanding, counseling, or otherwise encouraging the

principal in the first degree to commit the crime,” 1

Wharton's Criminal Law, supra, at § 31. Conversely, this same

evidence of Muhammad commanding and directing Malvo's actions

effectively proves the requisite conduct for the conviction

under Code § 18.2-31(13) for "a killing pursuant to . . .

direction and order." Code § 18.2-18.

137
 Virginia law is clear that “a principal in the second

degree, may [not] be convicted of capital murder under the

provisions of [the] Code,” Coppola, 220 Va. at 256, 257 S.E.2d

at 806, unless one of the enumerated exceptions such as under

Code § 18.2-31(13) applies. Thus, we have noted that

[o]nly the actual perpetrator of the crime may
be convicted of capital murder . . . Thus,
neither an accessory before the fact nor a
principal in the second degree may be so
convicted. . . . The Commonwealth has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that one accused of capital murder was the
actual perpetrator of the crime. Suspicion of
guilt, however strong, or even a probability of
guilt is insufficient to support a conviction.

Rogers, 242 Va. at 317, 410 S.E.2d at 627 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

The General Assembly has specifically limited a capital

murder conviction under Code § 18.2-31(8) by its enactment of

Code § 18.2-18. In doing so, the General Assembly has

mandated that a principal in the second degree cannot be

convicted of capital murder, but his conviction is limited to

murder in the first degree. This statutory mandate is binding

on the judiciary until altered by the General Assembly.

For the forgoing reasons, Muhammad’s conviction and

sentence for the capital murder of Dean Meyers under Code

§ 18.2-31(8) should be reversed and remanded according to the

statutory directive of Code § 18.2-18. Accordingly, I

138
respectfully dissent from section II(B)(1) of the majority

opinion regarding the conviction and sentence under Code

§ 18.2-31(8). To the extent the conviction under Code § 18.2-

31(13) is based upon a principal in the first-degree analysis,

I respectfully dissent from section II(B)(2), but I concur in

the alternative ground in section II(B)(2) and would thus

affirm the conviction and sentence of death under Code § 18.2-

31(13). Otherwise, I concur in the majority opinion.

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