Riner v. Com.

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J.

CHARLES DOUGLAS RINER

v. Record No. 031299 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER
September 17, 2004
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Charles Douglas Riner (“Riner”) was convicted by a

jury of the first degree murder of his wife, Karen Denise

Riner (“Denise”), in violation of Code § 18.2-32; of arson,

in violation of Code § 18.2-77; and of petit larceny in

violation of Code § 18.2-96. The Court of Appeals of

Virginia affirmed the convictions and the judgment of the

Circuit Court of Wise County (“the trial court”). Riner v.

Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 440, 479, 579 S.E.2d 671, 691

(2003).

We awarded Riner this appeal on six assignments of

error.1 He challenges the denial of his motion for a change

of venue, the denial of his motion for a mistrial because

of alleged jury misconduct, the use of a “private

prosecutor,” the admission of double hearsay testimony

concerning a threat he made to his wife, the admission of

certain business records because the Commonwealth failed to

1
The petit larceny conviction is not before us in this
appeal.
show that the entrant was unavailable to testify, and the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the arson

conviction. We also awarded an appeal on the

Commonwealth’s two assignments of cross-error. Finding no

error, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. RELEVANT FACTS2

In accordance with established principles of appellate

review, we state the facts in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.

We also accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all

inferences fairly deducible from the evidence. Armstrong

v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 576, 562 S.E.2d 139, 140

(2002); Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218

S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). Circumstantial evidence, when

sufficiently convincing, is entitled to the same weight as

direct evidence. Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424,

410 S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991); Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224

Va. 214, 228, 294 S.E.2d 882, 890 (1982).

A. THE FIRE

In the early morning hours of August 12, 1998, Larry

Odle, who lived next to the Riners in the Town of Coeburn

in Wise County, saw flames coming from the Riner house.

2
We will recite additional facts relevant to
particular assignments of error.

2
Odle walked outside to investigate the fire and observed a

“shadow or reflection . . . peek around the [left] corner”

of the Riner house three or four times. A person then

emerged from that corner and yelled “help, help, my house

is on fire.” Odle returned to his house and called the

“911” emergency number. He then went back to the site of

the fire and saw Riner walk from the same left corner of

the burning house carrying two of the Riner children.3

One of the first three police officers to arrive at

the scene stated that, when he got there, the fire was

“basically still in the lower part of the house . . . and

it was crawling across the [front] porch area and coming

out the other side where the top part of the house was on

fire.” When that officer exited his police vehicle, he

observed Riner and two small children coming around the

left corner of the house.4 The officer approached Riner and

asked if anyone else was in the home. Riner did not

respond and, in the officer’s opinion, “[s]eemed surprised

that someone was there.” The officer repeated his

3
During their eight-year marriage, the Riners had
three children. Denise also had a son by a previous
marriage. That son was not at the Riner house when the
fire occurred.
4
The Riners’ third child was already out of the house.
Riner told one of the police officers that he had sent that
child to call the fire department.

3
question, but Riner again did not answer. Only after two

of the officers approached the burning house did Riner

inform the third officer that his wife was still inside

their home. Two of the officers then kicked opened a door

on the rear of the house, but they could not go inside more

than two or three feet because of the intense smoke and

heat.

The fire consumed the second floor and roof of the

Riner house as well as the front porch, including the floor

and the “uprights” of the porch. There was also extensive

damage throughout the interior of the first floor,

including the master bedroom where Denise’s body was found.5

There and elsewhere on the first floor of the house, fire

investigators discovered piles of paper that had been torn

apart lengthwise. Some of the torn paper came from

correspondence or publications belonging to Riner.

According to the forensic pathologist who performed an

autopsy on Denise’s body, Denise died from smoke

inhalation, which is determined by looking in the airways

for “soot” and “black material” and measuring the carbon

monoxide level in the blood. The forensic pathologist

stated that Denise’s body had been “incinerated.” Her

5
The master bedroom was located at the front of the
house on the right, as viewed from the main road.

4
skin, muscles, facial features, scalp, arms and legs had

been burned. Because of the extensive burning of her body,

the forensic pathologist could not determine whether Denise

had suffered other injuries or had been rendered

unconscious by some other trauma before her death.

However, the forensic pathologist did not find any evidence

of blunt force or penetrating injuries to Denise’s body.

Although a partially burned baseball bat was found near her

body, the forensic pathologist could not put that bat “in

or on the body.”

On the night of the fire, Riner claimed that he was

upstairs, asleep in a room with the three Riner children.

However, the family’s housekeeper testified that she did

not remember anytime that all three children had slept

upstairs or in the same bed with Riner. Riner also

admitted that the children normally slept downstairs in a

bed with Denise.

Riner testified that, when he awoke and smelled smoke,

he looked toward the rear of the house and saw smoke coming

up the steps. He stated that the smoke was so intense that

he could barely breathe and that his eyes were burning so

badly that he could not see. However, he was able to find

the three children, help them out a window onto the rear

porch roof, and then lower them to the ground. Although

5
Denise died from smoke inhalation, Riner did not have any

symptoms consistent with carbon monoxide intoxication or

carbon monoxide poisoning upon examination at a local

emergency room on the morning of the fire. The forensic

pathologist testified that, if smoke from a fire is very

dense, a person could breathe in a lethal level of carbon

monoxide within seconds. Additionally, a nurse who checked

Riner in the emergency room did not observe any soot on him

or smell any smoke about his body. Riner did, however,

have a low oxygen level based on an arterial blood gas

study, which was consistent with a sudden or acute injury

to his airway from inhaling smoke.

B. RINER’S ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO AND AFTER THE FIRE

Two issues caused recurring disagreements between the

Riners during their marriage. One of those issues

concerned Riner’s discipline of Denise’s son by her

previous marriage. In the early part of August 1998,

Denise learned that Riner had choked and slapped her son at

a family reunion. That incident exacerbated the Riners’

already existing marital difficulties, causing Denise to

meet with an attorney on August 4 to obtain information

about divorce proceedings. The next day she opened a

checking account in her own name. On August 7, she

confronted Riner with her knowledge about his abuse of her

6
son and demanded that he move out of the marital residence.

Riner apparently agreed to move on the following weekend,

which would have been the weekend immediately after the

fire. However, he told one of the fire investigators that

Tuesday night, August 11, 1998, was to be his last night in

the marital home.

The other subject causing disagreement was the

couple’s financial condition. Within a week after the

Riners were married in 1990, Riner quit his job.

Throughout the marriage, Denise, a nurse, provided the

primary financial support for the family.

By mid-1998, Riner had pressing financial

difficulties. He had incurred several substantial debts

and was delinquent in some of his financial obligations.

In particular, Riner had agreed to make restitution in the

amount of approximately $5,400 by October 1998 as a

condition of probation in a federal pre-trial diversion

program in which he was participating. Due to his failure

to pay the restitution as scheduled, Riner still owed about

$2,900 as of June 1998 and was therefore facing the

possibility of being prosecuted on federal bank fraud

charges. In fact, he was scheduled to meet with his

federal probation officer on August 12, 1998, the day of

the fire. The probation officer had also learned that

7
Riner had two outstanding criminal charges, one a

misdemeanor and one a felony, for having issued two checks

for which there were insufficient funds to pay the checks.

After Denise’s death, Riner collected approximately

$8,500 from Denise’s employer and then paid the restitution

in full. Riner insisted, however, that he paid the federal

restitution with money he had received from selling two

vehicles. He also paid the indebtedness owed to a local

merchant for the two checks that were returned for

insufficient funds.

Riner also filed two insurance claims. One was a fire

insurance claim in the amount of $186,820.24, of which the

sum of $116,453.00 was for personal property. The second

claim was on a group life insurance policy provided to

Denise by her employer. In anticipation of receiving funds

from those claims, Riner purchased a used Mercedes

automobile by borrowing $9,000 on a 30-day single payment

note. He also relocated himself and the three Riner

children to eastern Tennessee and made an offer to purchase

a house there for the price of $169,000.

The day before the fire, a neighbor observed Riner

storing three trash bags in a building located apart from

the Riner house. In March 1999, Riner sold jewelry at a

pawn shop located in Bristol, Tennessee. Denise’s sisters

8
subsequently accompanied a police officer to the pawn shop

and identified three rings found there as belonging to

Denise. The rings were part of the jewelry Riner sold, and

the Commonwealth introduced evidence showing that the rings

would have been damaged or destroyed if they had been in

the Riner house during the fire. One of the rings came

from Denise’s great-grandmother. Another ring was a

diamond anniversary band that Denise wore daily and was, in

fact, wearing on the day prior to her death. The third

ring was a pearl ring that Denise had received as a

birthday gift from her co-workers at her place of

employment.

C. RINER’S ARREST

In November 1999, Riner told his employer and

personnel at his children’s schools that he and the

children would be traveling to Pennsylvania to attend a

funeral. Instead, Riner spent about 19 days traveling

around to different destinations in the United States and

then flying to Panama. The flight out of the country

occurred at a time when the police investigation into the

fire and death of Denise was nearing completion and Riner

remained a prime suspect. In fact, Riner was indicted for

9
first degree murder and arson on January 18, 2000.6 Riner

was arrested in Panama on January 21, 2000. At that time,

he had in his possession clothes, documents, and luggage

that had been in the house prior to the fire.

II. ANALYSIS

A. CHANGE OF VENUE

Prior to trial, Riner moved for a change of venue,

asserting that he could not receive a fair trial in Wise

County because of prejudicial pre-trial media coverage of

the case. After an ore tenus hearing, the trial court took

the motion under advisement and allowed the parties to

submit affidavits from Wise County citizens regarding the

change of venue issue. After hearing additional argument

on Riner’s motion, the trial court again took the motion

under advisement, stating from the bench that, if selecting

a jury “becomes a problem, then we will change the venue.”

Riner did not object to the court’s decision to do so.

At the conclusion of juror voir dire, the trial court

asked, “Any motions by counsel before we take a short break

and come back and select the jury?” Counsel for Riner

responded, “No, Your Honor.” However, before the parties

exercised their peremptory strikes, a dispute arose

6
A September 1, 2000 superseding indictment charged
Riner with capital murder, arson, and robbery.

10
concerning whether the Commonwealth would introduce the

fact of Riner’s trip to Panama as evidence of flight.

Riner indicated that he wished to counter any such evidence

suggesting flight by mentioning in opening statement and by

introducing into evidence the fact that he had passed a

polygraph test. Riner asserted that the successful

polygraph result directly influenced his decision to travel

to Panama. Riner took the position that, by introducing

evidence about the trip and the polygraph test, he could

demonstrate that he had a legitimate reason for going to

Panama, which would rebut adverse media publicity about the

trip. During the course of the colloquy with the trial

court about these issues, the court stated:

Well, you know, there’s no proof that these
jurors know about the flight, but down deep in my
little heart and my conscience, I know dang good and
well they probably know or some of them, if not all of
them, some of them know about it and I have a hard
time ignoring that fact. I can’t ignore it.

In response to the trial court’s comment and out of

concern that a ruling by the court to admit the polygraph

evidence would be tantamount to a finding that the jury was

not impartial, the Commonwealth stated that, if the trial

court intended to admit evidence about the polygraph

because of its perceived “taint in the community,” then the

Commonwealth was prepared to join in Riner’s motion for a

11
change of venue. Riner initially disagreed with the basis

of the Commonwealth’s motion, but he ultimately joined in

the motion. At no point during the discussion about the

Commonwealth’s motion for a change of venue or when Riner

joined in that motion did he reiterate or rely upon his

previously stated reasons for a change of venue. The trial

court overruled the motion.

The parties then exercised their peremptory strikes

without any further motions or discussion. The next

morning before the jurors selected to hear the case were

sworn, the trial court asked, “Any preliminary motions

before we bring in the [j]ury?” Counsel for Riner stated,

“None from the defense.” The 12 jurors and 3 alternates

were then sworn to try the issues joined between the

Commonwealth and Riner.

As presented on appeal, Riner’s assignment of error

challenging the trial court’s denial of a change of venue

is three-fold. He argues that the trial court applied an

improper legal standard because it considered only the fact

that a jury had been selected rather than “the ease of

seating the jury” as required by our decision in Thomas v.

Commonwealth, 263 Va. 216, 232, 559 S.E.2d 652, 661 (2002).

Next, he asserts that prejudicial pre-trial publicity

prevented the selection of an impartial jury and that the

12
trial court therefore erred in denying his change of venue

motion. Finally, he says that the trial court erred in

denying the Commonwealth’s change of venue motion, joined

in by Riner, because the court itself questioned the

impartiality of the jury.

With regard to Riner’s assertion that the trial court

applied an incorrect legal standard, the Court of Appeals

concluded that Riner had defaulted this portion of his

argument. Riner, 40 Va. App. at 457, 579 S.E.2d at 679.

Riner did not argue before the trial court that it had

applied an improper legal standard when considering the

change of venue motion nor did he object when the court

stated, “I hate to say that I told you so, but we got a

jury now.” Applying Rule 5A:18, the Court of Appeals thus

held that this aspect of his challenge to the trial court’s

refusal to change venue was barred. Id. at 456-57, 579

S.E.2d at 679.

In his assignment of error to this Court with regard

to the change of venue issue, Riner states only that the

“Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s

erroneous denial [of] Riner’s motion for change of venue

and a joint motion for change of venue.” Riner does not

challenge that portion of the judgment of the Court of

Appeals barring his argument that the trial court used the

13
wrong legal standard. Thus, under Rule 5:17(c), we do not

consider the issue. See Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va.

501, 507-08, 544 S.E.2d 360, 363 (2001). We also find no

reason to apply the “ends of justice” exception as

requested by Riner.

We further conclude that Riner defaulted his challenge

to the trial court’s denial of his change of venue motion

in which he asserted that he could not receive a fair trial

because of adverse pre-trial media coverage of the case.

When voir dire of the jury was completed, the trial court

asked counsel for the parties whether there were any

motions. Riner’s counsel specifically stated, “No, Your

Honor.” Riner did not renew his change of venue motion at

that point or remind the trial court that it previously had

taken the motion under advisement. Nor did he do so before

the parties exercised their peremptory strikes or before

the 12 jurors and 3 alternates selected to hear the case

were sworn.

The posture of Riner’s change of venue motion is

analogous to the situation in Green v. Commonwealth, 266

Va. 81, 580 S.E.2d 834 (2003). There, the defendant, like

Riner, had filed a pre-trial change of venue motion. Id.

at 93, 580 S.E.2d at 841. The trial court took the motion

under advisement, and the defendant did not object to the

14
court’s doing so. Id. The defendant did not renew the

motion or remind the court that it was still pending at any

time, including after the jury panel had been qualified or

before the parties exercised their peremptory strikes. Id.

at 93-94, 580 S.E.2d at 841-42. Because the defendant did

not object to the trial court’s decision to take the change

of venue motion under advisement pending outcome of voir

dire, we held that it was “incumbent upon [the defendant]

to renew the motion before the jury was empanelled and

sworn, or at least remind the court that it was still

pending and that he wanted the court to rule on it.” Id.

at 94, 580 S.E.2d at 842. Thus, we held that the defendant

had waived his change of venue argument under Rule 5:25.

Id. at 95, 580 S.E.2d at 842.

We reach the same conclusion here. Like the defendant

in Green, Riner did not object to the trial court’s

decision to take the change of venue motion under

advisement. Thus, it was incumbent upon him to renew that

motion or remind the court that it was still pending at

some point before the jurors selected to hear the case were

sworn. Since he failed to do so, Riner’s argument for a

change of venue because of pre-trial publicity is waived.

See Rule 5:25.

15
 Consequently, the only aspect of the change of venue

issue properly before this Court is Riner’s challenge to

the trial court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s change of

venue motion joined in by Riner. However, the reason for

that motion was narrow. The Commonwealth wanted a change

of venue only if the trial court, concerned that some of

the jurors probably knew about Riner’s trip to Panama,

intended to allow Riner to introduce evidence that he had

passed a polygraph test. In other words, the Commonwealth

was amenable to a change of venue for the sole purpose of

eliminating the trial court’s rationale for allowing Riner

to introduce evidence about the polygraph test. Riner

initially objected to the basis of the Commonwealth’s

motion but eventually decided to join it. During the

discussion on the Commonwealth’s motion, Riner did not

present any other reasons for joining in the motion nor did

he reiterate his prior argument concerning pre-trial

publicity. Thus, we consider only whether the trial court

abused its discretion in refusing the Commonwealth’s

specific motion.

Contrary to Riner’s argument, the trial court’s

statement that at least some of the jurors probably knew

about Riner’s trip to Panama cannot be understood as a

question in the court’s mind about the jurors’

16
impartiality. Instead, the trial court merely indicated

that, when deciding whether Riner could introduce evidence

that he had passed the polygraph test, it could not ignore

the fact that some jurors probably knew about the Panama

trip. The trial court’s statement was not a finding that

the jurors in fact had this knowledge and could not ignore

it, or that the jury was not impartial.

“[T]here is a presumption that a defendant can receive

a fair trial from the citizens of the jurisdiction in which

the offense occurred.” Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va.

386, 398, 422 S.E.2d 380, 388 (1992). Only when that

presumption is overcome by evidence “demonstrating that the

feeling of prejudice on the part of the citizenry is

widespread and is such that would ‘be reasonably certain to

prevent a fair trial’ ” is a change of venue warranted.

Id. (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 137,

314 S.E.2d 371, 380 (1984)). The Commonwealth’s reason for

requesting a change of venue was to avoid an anticipated

evidentiary ruling it did not like. That reason was not

sufficient to overcome the presumption that Riner could

receive a fair trial from the citizens of Wise County.

Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the Commonwealth’s motion for a

17
change of venue, that motion having been joined in by

Riner. See id.

B. JUROR MISCONDUCT

On the 16th day of trial, the trial court dismissed

juror Gibson from jury service because of his failure to

abide by the court’s instructions concerning discussion of

the case among jurors while the trial was ongoing. Riner

made several motions for a mistrial based on this juror’s

misconduct, all of which the trial court denied. The Court

of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Riner’s motions for a mistrial. See

Riner, 40 Va. App. at 465-70, 579 S.E.2d at 684-86. We

agree.

The problems with juror Gibson began on day eight of

the trial. That morning, before trial commenced, juror

Gibson went to the office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney to

ask a question about one of the Commonwealth’s exhibits,

the medical examiner’s report. The juror spoke with the

secretary of the Commonwealth’s Attorney and stated that

the exhibit indicated that Riner found his wife’s body but

that other evidence showed that Riner was at the hospital

when Denise’s body was found at the fire scene.7 The

7
The parties stipulated that the information in the
exhibit was incorrect because Riner was in fact at the

18
Commonwealth’s Attorney did not talk to juror Gibson and

immediately reported the incident to the trial court.

Riner moved for a mistrial on the grounds that juror Gibson

had ignored the court’s instructions and had conducted, or

attempted to conduct, an independent investigation. The

trial court denied the motion, finding no prejudice to

Riner.

On the 11th day of trial, the bailiff delivered a note

from a juror to the trial court. The note was directed to

the Commonwealth’s Attorney and asked, “It has been

established that the floor under the body was unburnt; what

type of clothing, if any, was under the body.” Although

Riner now asserts that juror Gibson was the author of this

note, he presented no evidence to establish that fact. Nor

did he move for a mistrial when the note was brought to the

trial court’s attention.

During Riner’s testimony on day 16 of the trial, his

counsel moved for a mistrial because of juror Gibson’s

“distractions, inattentiveness, and . . . misconduct.”

Counsel noted that this juror had been talking to two

fellow jurors during the presentation of evidence. Riner’s

counsel stated to the trial court, “I don’t know what’s

hospital when his wife’s body was found in the burned
house, and the trial court so instructed the jury.

19
going on in the jury room, but if he’s . . . doing that

publicly in the courtroom, my common sense tells me that

he’s engaging in similar conduct . . . in other places.”

The trial court and the Commonwealth’s Attorney

acknowledged that they had also noticed some of the

behavior pointed out by Riner’s counsel.

The trial court decided to question under oath juror

Gibson as well as the two jurors to whom he had been

speaking in the jury box. During the questioning of juror

Gibson, he admitted commenting to two jurors about exhibits

while witnesses were testifying. One of those exhibits was

a picture showing Denise’s pearl ring. Juror Gibson had

pointed out to another juror that “it looks like that pearl

ring that [Denise] got and [Riner] said he didn’t recognize

any of the rings.” Juror Gibson also admitted that he had

sometimes watched for audience or lawyer reaction to

certain evidence rather than looking at the witnesses who

were testifying. The two jurors who were questioned

confirmed that juror Gibson had made comments to them about

certain exhibits. However, they both stated that they had

not been influenced by juror Gibson’s comments and still

had an open mind about the case.

Riner then moved for a mistrial, not because of any

concern about the two jurors to whom juror Gibson had made

20
comments in the jury box, but because of “the kind of

unknown comments he’s made in the jury room.” In the

alternative, Riner asked the trial court to excuse juror

Gibson. The trial court denied the mistrial motion but did

dismiss juror Gibson from jury service.

The trial court subsequently advised the remaining 14

jurors that it had released juror Gibson and asked en masse

whether juror Gibson had commented to any of them about the

facts, exhibits, or evidence in the case. Eight jurors

answered affirmatively by raising their hands. The trial

court then questioned those eight jurors individually under

oath.

That questioning revealed that juror Gibson had indeed

made comments about the evidence. For example, he had

speculated that, if Denise was not clothed, she might have

been raped, and he had discussed a witness’s testimony

about the terms “flammable” and “combustible.” Juror

Gibson also had made inappropriate sexual comments to a

juror. All the jurors who were questioned expressed their

annoyance with juror Gibson and his behavior. They told

the trial court that they had repeatedly asked him to

refrain from discussing the evidence, and some admitted

that they had attempted to avoid him. They were also

adamant that they had not been influenced by juror Gibson’s

21
behavior and comments, still had open minds about the case,

and could be fair to both sides. In one juror’s words,

“[Y]ou could tell he was kind of a blow bag.”

Several jurors also reported that juror Gibson had

frequently contacted his wife during the lunch break in

order to learn what the newspaper headlines said about the

trial. He had then attempted to share that information

with the jury. However, only one juror remembered anything

specific that he had said about the newspaper reports.

That juror recalled that juror Gibson had mentioned that a

newspaper article reported that the defense had moved for a

mistrial because jurors were taking notes.

After the juror questioning was completed, Riner

renewed his motion for a mistrial on three specific

grounds: (1) the comment to a juror in the jury box about

the exhibit showing the pearl ring; (2) the speculation

that Denise might have been raped if she was not clothed;

and (3) the newspaper report about the defense mistrial

motion. The trial court overruled Riner’s motion.8 The

trial court did, however, give the jury a cautionary

instruction with regard to juror Gibson’s behavior and

comments:

22
 The Court instructs you jurors that Mr. . . .
Gibson, one of your jurors yesterday, throughout the
trial until yesterday, made certain assertions and the
Court admonishes you and warns you that you cannot
believe and you should not and you shall not believe
any assertions that he, Mr. . . . Gibson, made while
in the courtroom, in the jury box or in the jury room,
when we took breaks. Some of his assertions were not
correct and you are to ignore and disregard what
Mr. . . . Gibson has said. I want you to rely upon
your independent recollection of the facts, as they,
facts, exhibits and law as it will come out and has
come out already in this trial, in this courtroom. You
should not consider and again, I advise you and order
you to disregard anything, any assertions that
Mr. . . . Gibson has said in your presence.

On appeal, Riner separates juror Gibson’s activities

and comments into two categories, “Third Party Contact” and

“Other Misconduct.” He argues that he was prejudiced by

juror Gibson’s third-party contact and/or other misconduct

and, therefore, did not receive a fair trial. We do not

agree and will address these categories in that order.

1. THIRD PARTY CONTACT

Riner asserts that juror Gibson’s contact with his

wife regarding the newspaper headlines about the case was

unauthorized third party contact. Citing Remmer v. United

States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954), Riner argues that such

contact was presumptively prejudicial, thereby shifting the

burden to the Commonwealth to establish that it was

8
Riner also filed a post-trial motion to set aside the
verdict in which he challenged the trial court’s denial of
this mistrial motion based on juror misconduct.

23
harmless to the defendant. We agree that the legal

standard for evaluating a claim of extraneous jury contact

requires that “ ‘any private communication, contact or

tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a

trial about the matter pending before the jury . . . [be]

deemed presumptively prejudicial’ ” unless the contact was

pursuant to the directions and instructions of the trial

court with complete knowledge by both parties. Lenz v.

Warden, 267 Va. 318, 328, 593 S.E.2d 292, 298 (2004)

(quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229).

This presumption, however, is not conclusive. Id.

The prosecution has the burden “to establish, after notice

to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the

juror was harmless to the defendant.” Id. We explained in

Lenz that “[t]he Remmer presumption of prejudice arises

upon a showing of two elements: that an extraneous contact

with or by a member of the jury took place and that such

contact was ‘about the matter pending before the jury.’ ”

267 Va. at 329, 593 S.E.2d at 298 (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S.

at 229).

Clearly, juror Gibson’s communication with his wife

about the headlines in the newspaper was an improper

contact with a third party about the matter pending before

the jury. However, it is debatable whether his

24
communication, or attempted communication, of the content

of the newspaper headlines to the other jurors constituted

extraneous jury contact. Instead, it is analogous to

jurors’ reading or hearing news media reports about the

criminal trial in which they are sitting.

In Thompson v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 498, 502-03, 247

S.E.2d 707, 709 (1978), we addressed an incident in which

two jurors in a criminal trial admitted that they had read

a newspaper article concerning the evidence and the

defendant. We enumerated the following principles for

resolving whether that kind of jury conduct denied a

defendant of a fair trial:

First, the influence of newspaper articles or
other publicity during a criminal trial may be of such
a nature as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.
Second, jurors serving in a criminal case may not,
during the trial, properly read newspaper stories or
listen to media reports discussing the proceedings.
The basis for this elementary proposition is that a
juror’s information about the case should come only
from the evidence presented at trial and not from any
extraneous source. Third, upon a showing that such
jurors have read or heard news accounts of the
proceedings, the test to be used by the trial court in
determining if a mistrial or a new trial should be
ordered is whether under the circumstances there has
been interference with a fair trial. Fourth, mere
reading or hearing news accounts of the trial while it
is in progress does not in every case amount to
prejudicial misconduct by the jury as a matter of law.
Some publicity to which jurors have been exposed may
be inherently prejudicial while in other cases inquiry
will be necessary to ascertain whether the information
“may have effectively prejudiced the jury in its
deliberation.” Fifth, the decision whether such media

25
 information brought to the jury’s attention results in
prejudice to the defendant rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. And, sixth, because
there can be no fixed rule which defines what
constitutes prejudicial interference with a fair
trial, each case must be decided on its special facts.

Id. at 500, 247 S.E.2d at 708 (internal citations omitted).

Our holding in Thompson requires a trial court to

determine whether a juror’s exposure to media coverage of

the proceedings interfered with a fair trial. Unlike

extraneous juror contact, a juror’s reading or hearing news

accounts about a criminal trial is not presumptively

prejudicial. For purposes of this case, we will, however,

apply the test set out in Remmer and Lenz and assume, as

did the Court of Appeals, that juror Gibson’s contact with

his wife about the newspaper article reporting that the

defense had moved for a mistrial because the jurors were

taking notes, as well as his communication, or attempted

communication, of that information to other jurors, was

“sufficient to shift the burden to the Commonwealth” to

prove the contact was harmless to Riner. Riner, 40 Va.

App. at 468, 579 S.E.2d at 685.

We conclude that the Commonwealth carried its burden.

First, juror Gibson was discharged from jury service; so he

did not participate in the deliberations that resulted in

the guilty verdict. See Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313,

26
339, 356 S.E.2d 157, 171 (1987) (finding no prejudice where

an alternate juror who failed to respond to voir dire

question about family members employed in law enforcement

was released from the panel before the case was submitted

to the jury and did not participate in the jury’s

deliberations). That is a significant fact distinguishing

the present case from many other cases involving juror

misconduct. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va.

178, 197, 590 S.E.2d 520, 531 (2004) (after conclusion of

trial, alternate juror stated that she had heard jurors

discussing the case before the close of the evidence);

Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 460, 423 S.E.2d 360,

370 (1992) (post-trial interview of jury foreman revealed

that jurors had discussed defendant’s parole eligibility if

he received a life sentence); Haddad v. Commonwealth, 229

Va. 325, 327, 329 S.E.2d 17, 18 (1985) (misconduct during

lunch break by juror who later became foreman of the jury).

Second, only one juror heard or remembered juror

Gibson’s comment about the specific newspaper article

discussing a defense motion for a mistrial. Next, the

questioning of the jurors revealed that they were not

influenced by juror Gibson, actually attempted to avoid him

so they would not hear his comments, and still had open

minds about the case. Finally, after releasing juror

27
Gibson, the trial court not only instructed the jurors to

disregard anything that juror Gibson had said but also told

them that some of his comments were not correct. Unless

the record shows otherwise, and it does not in this case,

we presume that a jury follows an explicit cautionary

instruction given by the trial court. See LeVasseur v.

Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 304 S.E.2d 644, 657 (1983).

In summary, the extraneous juror contact was harmless to

Riner. Thus the trial court did not err in denying Riner’s

motion for a mistrial based on “unauthorized third party

contact.”

2. OTHER MISCONDUCT

Before determining whether juror Gibson’s “other

misconduct” warranted a mistrial, we reiterate several

applicable principles. “[T]he mere fact of juror

misconduct does not automatically entitle either litigant

to a mistrial.” Robertson v. Metropolitan Washington

Airport Auth., 249 Va. 72, 76, 452 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1995)

(citing Haddad, 229 Va. at 330, 329 S.E.2d at 20); see also

Jackson, 267 Va. at 199, 590 S.E.2d at 532. As the party

moving for a mistrial, Riner had the burden to establish

that juror misconduct “probably resulted in prejudice.”

Robertson, 249 Va. at 76, 452 S.E.2d at 847. The trial

court, in the exercise of its discretion, makes that

28
determination. Id. Here, the trial court properly

investigated the misconduct when it was brought to its

attention. See id. (trial court abuses its discretion by

ruling on motion for mistrial without investigating the

alleged misconduct when it is discovered after the jury is

discharged). Finally, we have generally limited findings

of prejudicial juror misconduct to events that occurred

outside the jury room and that interjected information

about the case that was not admitted into evidence.

Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Hulvey, 233 Va. 77, 83, 353

S.E.2d 747, 751 (1987).

Applying these principles, we conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Riner’s

motions for a mistrial based on the “other misconduct” by

juror Gibson. First, as the Court of Appeals noted, there

is no evidence that any juror was aware of juror Gibson’s

brief contact with the office of the Commonwealth’s

Attorney or his efforts to resolve an apparent conflict in

the evidence. Riner, 40 Va. App. at 465, 579 S.E.2d at

684. Thus, Riner has not shown how he was prejudiced by

that incident since juror Gibson did not participate in the

jury deliberations.

Next, after learning about the anonymous note directed

to the Commonwealth’s Attorney, Riner did not move for a

29
mistrial. Thus, he cannot now be heard to complain about

that incident. Rule 5:25.

Continuing, when Riner moved for a mistrial after

juror Gibson was released from jury service, Riner was not

concerned about the two jurors to whom juror Gibson had

been making comments while in the jury box. Instead, Riner

based his motion on unknown comments that juror Gibson

might have been making in the jury room. At that point,

the nature of those comments was not known and the trial

court had discharged juror Gibson. Thus, Riner failed to

demonstrate how he was prejudiced.

Finally, when Riner renewed his motion for a mistrial

after the eight additional jurors had been questioned, he

offered only three reasons in support of the motion: (1)

juror Gibson’s comment about the exhibit showing the pearl

ring; (2) juror Gibson’s speculation that Denise might have

been raped; and (3) the newspaper article about the defense

mistrial motion.9 We have already dealt with the third

reason. As to the first reason, Riner voiced no concern

about the juror who heard the comment about the pearl ring

when he moved for a mistrial after juror Gibson had been

questioned. Nevertheless, upon considering the nature of

9
We do not consider grounds for a mistrial that were
not raised before the trial court. See Rule 5:25.

30
that comment as well as juror Gibson’s speculation that

Denise might have been raped, we conclude that Riner did

not establish that juror Gibson’s misconduct probably

resulted in prejudice to Riner. See Haddad, 229 Va. at

330, 329 S.E.2d at 20. As we previously explained, the

trial court discharged juror Gibson before the jurors began

their deliberations; the jurors were not influenced by

juror Gibson but found him annoying; they remained able to

listen to the evidence with open minds; and the trial court

carefully instructed the jurors to disregard anything juror

Gibson had said to them about the case.

C. PRIVATE PROSECUTOR

Prior to trial, the Commonwealth moved the trial court

to allow a private attorney, hired by Denise’s family, to

assist in the prosecution of the charges against Riner.

Over Riner’s objection, the trial court granted the motion.

Riner renewed his objection prior to trial and again in a

post-trial motion to set aside the verdict. He now assigns

error to the trial court’s permitting a private attorney to

participate and assist in the prosecution of the case.

Riner asserts that the attorney should have been barred

from serving as a private prosecutor because of an alleged

conflict of interest and because the attorney improperly

became “de facto lead counsel” for the Commonwealth. He

31
also urges this Court to abolish the use of private

prosecutors.

The private prosecutor had a conflict of interest,

according to Riner, because the law firm in which he was a

partner represented the parent company of the life

insurance company issuing the policy on Denise’s life.

Riner based that assertion on information contained in the

2000 edition of a publication listing law firms and their

representative clients. The private prosecutor, however,

avowed to the trial court that he had performed a conflict-

of-interest check and that neither he nor his firm

currently represented either the parent company or its

subsidiary, despite the listing in the publication. The

company issuing the life insurance policy had initiated an

interpleader action in federal court regarding the life

insurance proceeds, but the private prosecutor’s law firm

did not represent the parent company or any other party in

that proceeding. The private prosecutor acknowledged that

his firm may represent insureds of the parent company but

argued the client, in that situation, is the insured, not

the insurance company. He also admitted that his firm had

represented the parent company about 10 years prior to the

present trial.

In Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387, 392, 329

32
S.E.2d 22, 26 (1985), we stated that “[t]he common-law

right of a crime victim, or of [the victim’s] family, to

assist the prosecution with privately employed counsel is

not absolute, but lies within the discretion and continuing

control of the trial court.” However, a private prosecutor

who has “a civil interest in the case so infects the

prosecution with the possibility that private vengeance has

been substituted for impartial application of the criminal

law, that prejudice to the defendant need not be shown.”

Id. at 394, 329 S.E.2d at 26. In that situation, a

defendant’s due process rights under Article I, § 11 of the

Constitution of Virginia are violated. Id. at 394, 329

S.E.2d at 26-27.

The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion,

must determine whether the private prosecutor had a

conflict of interest. That determination in this case was

factual and depended on whether the private prosecutor

and/or his law firm represented either the parent company

of the insurance company issuing the life insurance policy

on Denise’s life or the insuring company itself. The trial

court accepted the representations of the private

prosecutor that he had checked for any conflict of interest

and found none. We agree with the Court of Appeals that

the trial court “was entitled to credit [the private

33
prosecutor’s] representations” over the information

contained in a publication entry listing the parent company

as a representative client of the firm. Riner, 40 Va. App.

at 473, 579 S.E.2d at 687. We reach this conclusion even

though, as Riner demonstrated at a post-trial hearing, the

2001 version of the publication contained the same

information. The trial court’s factual findings on this

issue were not plainly wrong or without evidence to support

them. Thus, they are binding on appeal. Mercer v.

Commonwealth, 259 Va. 235, 243, 523 S.E.2d 213, 217 (2000).

Riner further argues that the private prosecutor

became the “de facto lead counsel” by delivering the

opening statement; actively participating in objections,

motions, and bench conferences; conducting the direct

examination or cross-examination of expert witnesses; and

presenting argument on jury instructions. He claims that

the private prosecutor controlled the presentation of the

Commonwealth’s evidence of arson, which was the means by

which it proved the murder charge. In other words, Riner

contends that the public prosecutor did not remain in

control of the case.

In Cantrell, we explained the role of a private

prosecutor:

34
 His role is more limited than that of the public
prosecutor. By the weight of authority, he may not
initiate a prosecution or appear before the grand
jury; he may appear only by leave of the trial court;
he may participate only with the express consent of
the public prosecutor; he may make a closing jury
argument only in the court’s discretion; and he may
take no part in a decision to engage in plea
bargaining, deciding the terms of a plea bargain, or a
decision to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser crime
or to enter a nolle prosequi. Although there is no
arbitrary limitation as to the proportion of work
which may be done by a private prosecutor, the public
prosecutor must remain in continuous control of the
case.

229 Va. at 393, 329 S.E.2d at 26 (internal citations

omitted).

Riner does not suggest that the private prosecutor

engaged in any prohibited activities but only that he

dominated the case. However, upon reviewing the record, we

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion with

regard to the level of participation by the private

prosecutor. It is true that his efforts focused on proving

the arson charge; indeed arson was one of the areas in

which he had considerable experience in the practice of

law. However, we agree with the Court of Appeals,

“[p]ermitting private prosecutors to handle only innocuous

witnesses and evidentiary matters would effectively

abrogate the common-law principle that still permits their

appointment.” Riner, 40 Va. App. at 474, 579 S.E.2d at

688. We conclude that the public prosecutor, not the

35
private prosecutor, “remain[ed] in continuous control of

the case.” Cantrell, 229 Va. at 393, 329 S.E.2d at 26.

Finally, we reiterate that “[t]he policy arguments

advanced by [Riner] for a total prohibition of privately

employed prosecutors may have a sound basis in

considerations of public policy, but we think it advisable

to leave to the General Assembly such a basic change in the

long-established common law of Virginia.” Id. at 392, 329

S.E.2d at 25. Nor do we believe that the General

Assembly’s amendment of Code § 19.2-155 in 1996 reflects

any preference on the part of the General Assembly to

restrict the private bar from appearing as prosecutors.

Contrary to Riner’s assertion, the statute cannot be viewed

as a change in the common law allowing the use of private

prosecutors. Accordingly, we decline Riner’s suggestion

that we should overrule Cantrell and abolish the right of a

crime victim, or the victim’s family, to employ private

prosecutors to assist the Commonwealth. Such a change in

our common law is for the General Assembly to make, rather

than the courts.

For all these reasons, we conclude that the trial

court did not err in permitting the private attorney to

assist in the preparation and prosecution of the charges

against Riner nor in the level of his participation allowed

36
by the court. Both matters were within the discretion and

continuous control of the trial court. See Cantrell, 229

Va. at 393, 329 S.E.2d at 26.

D. HEARSAY EVIDENCE

Two of Riner’s assignments of error concern the trial

court’s admitting hearsay statements into evidence. The

trial court allowed the admission of double hearsay by

permitting a witness to testify about a threat made by

Riner to Denise, as related by Denise to the witness. The

other hearsay evidence about which Riner complains

concerned an entry in a pawn shop journal that the trial

court admitted without any testimony from the employee who

made the entry.

Before addressing the hearsay issues before us, we

note that, subsequent to oral argument before this Court,

the Supreme Court of the United States decided Crawford v.

Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004). In that

case, the prosecution had played for the jury the tape-

recorded statement made to the police by defendant’s wife,

who was at the scene of the crime, but the defendant had

not had an opportunity for cross-examination because the

defendant’s wife was unavailable as a trial witness due to

the invocation of marital privilege. Id. at ___, 124 S.Ct.

at 1357. For purposes of determining when a prior

37
statement by an unavailable declarant may be admitted into

evidence without violating the Confrontation Clause, the

Supreme Court drew a distinction between hearsay statements

that are “testimonial” and those that are “non-

testimonial.” Id. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 1374. The Court

held that, “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue, . . .

the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:

unavailability [of the declarant] and a prior opportunity

for cross-examination [by the defendant].” Id. The Court

declined to provide a comprehensive definition of

“testimonial” hearsay but offered some examples of the

“core class of ‘testimonial’ statements”: ex parte

testimony at a preliminary hearing, statements obtained

during custodial police interrogations, affidavits, and

“ ‘statements that were made under circumstances which

would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that

the statement would be available for use at a later

trial.’ ” Id. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 1364.

In light of the decision in Crawford and its potential

impact on the hearsay issues in this appeal, we requested

letter briefs from the parties addressing whether the

decision applied to or affected the hearsay issues. In

response, both Riner and the Commonwealth agreed that

Crawford has no bearing on whether the trial court properly

38
admitted the pawn shop journal because, as a business

record, it was not “testimonial” hearsay. Indeed, the

Court in Crawford indicated that business records are a

type of hearsay “that by their nature [are] not

testimonial.” Id. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 1367. With regard

to the double hearsay concerning the threat, Riner stated

that, “[a]t the time [the witness] testified, there was no

reason to probe whether, in the context of Denise’s

statement to [the witness], Denise (the declarant) would

reasonably have expected her statement to be used

prosecutorially.” In the absence of such evidence, Riner

admitted that he cannot assert that Denise’s statement to

the witness was “testimonial” hearsay within the rule

announced in Crawford. Thus, in light of the parties’

admissions, we conclude that the decision in Crawford is

not relevant to the hearsay issues before us. We turn now

to those specific issues.

1. DOUBLE HEARSAY

The Commonwealth called several witnesses to testify

about the relationship between Riner and Denise and to show

that Riner had threatened to take the children and never

let Denise see them if Denise separated from him. When the

Commonwealth called Donna Brickey to provide such

testimony, Riner objected and asked for a bench conference.

39
Based on information obtained from an insurance

investigator’s notes, Riner believed Brickey would testify

that Denise had told her about an incident in the early

1990s when Riner told Denise he would kill her if she ever

attempted to take the children away from him.

Riner first objected on the basis that the incident

was too remote in time, but the Commonwealth proffered that

Riner had made the threat within the year before the fire.

Riner then stated, “It’s double hearsay; . . . [i]t doesn’t

show [Denise’s] state of mind.” The Commonwealth

responded, “[A]ny threats made by the defendant that [were]

communicated to the decedent [are] admissible to show the

relationship of the parties, show his motive and his

intent.” After hearing further argument on the issue, the

trial court admitted the testimony, ruling that “[i]t

certainly shows threats of violence in the relationship

between the parties; state of mind of the accused.”

Brickey then testified, and the Commonwealth asked

whether Denise ever expressed any concerns about separating

from Riner. Brickey responded, “Well, [Denise] did say

that [Riner] had told her that if she tried to leave him

that he would take the kids away and she would never see

them again.” The Commonwealth then asked Brickey whether

Denise had told her about any threats by Riner. Brickey

40
answered, “[Denise] said that [Riner] told her that if she

tried to leave him and take the kids that he would kill

her.”

On appeal, Riner asserts that the trial court erred in

admitting Brickey’s testimony about his threat to kill

Denise. He argues that the testimony contained double

hearsay and that, to be admissible, “both the primary

hearsay declaration and each hearsay declaration included

within it must conform to a recognized exception to the

hearsay rule.” West v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 906, 910,

407 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1991). We agree that the testimony

contained double hearsay and with the principle stated in

West. However, we find that Riner waived this claim.

During argument on his objection to Brickey’s double

hearsay testimony, Riner asserted that the statement at

issue was inadmissible because Denise’s telling Brickey

about the threat did not show Denise’s state of mind. That

objection obviously addressed the second level of hearsay,

i.e., when Denise repeated the threat to Brickey. The

trial court admitted the testimony, ruling that “[i]t

certainly shows threats of violence in the relationship

between the parties; state of mind of the accused.”10 At

10
To the extent that the Court of Appeals found that
the trial court had ruled that Brickey’s statement was

41
that point, Riner asked the trial court, “What about the

second part, Judge, the stuff from the early 90’s?” Riner

was referring to portions of Brickey’s anticipated

testimony that pertained to threats allegedly made by Riner

to Denise many years ago. The trial court concluded that

those statements were not admissible because of their

remoteness.

Significant to this appeal is the fact that Riner did

not at that juncture in the trial remind the court that it

had not ruled on the admissibility of both levels of the

double hearsay contained in Brickey’s testimony.

Specifically, the trial court never decided whether the

second level of hearsay fell within a recognized exception

to the hearsay rule. The trial court dealt with only the

first level of hearsay and concluded that Riner’s threat to

Denise was admissible because it demonstrated his state of

mind.

Riner’s failure to renew his objection or bring to the

trial court’s attention the fact that it had not ruled on

his objection challenging the second level of hearsay is

analogous to the situation addressed by this Court in

Green, 266 Va. 81, 580 S.E.2d 834. As already explained,

admissible to show Denise’s state of mind, that finding was
in error. The trial court did not make such a ruling.

42
the defendant there did not renew his change of venue

motion, previously taken under advisement by the trial

court, before the jury was empanelled and sworn, nor did he

remind the court that it had not ruled on the motion. Id.

at 94, 580 S.E.2d at 842. We refused to address the

defendant’s assignment of error that the trial court had

erred in refusing to grant a change of venue because the

defendant had waived the issue. Id. at 95, 580 S.E.2d at

842.

We reach the same result here. Riner’s objection to

Brickey’s testimony focused on the second level of the

hearsay. He claimed that Denise’s repeating the threat to

Brickey did not fall within an exception to the hearsay

rule, thus making the entire statement inadmissible. See

West, 12 Va. App. at 910, 407 S.E.2d at 24. Riner did not

challenge both levels of the hearsay nor did he need to do

so. However, by failing to bring to the trial court’s

attention the fact that it had ruled only on the

admissibility of the primary hearsay in the statement,

Riner did not afford the trial court the opportunity to

rule intelligently on the issue now before us. See Johnson

v. Raviotta, 264 Va. 27, 33, 563 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2002)

(trial court must have “an opportunity to rule

intelligently on a party’s objections,” thereby “avoid[ing]

43
unnecessary mistrials or reversals”). In that

circumstance, the issue is waived on appeal.11 See Rule

5:25; Lenz, 261 Va. at 463, 544 S.E.2d at 306 (failure to

request ruling on pretrial motion waived issue on appeal);

Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 306, 377 S.E.2d 595, 597

(1989) (failure to renew change of venue motion waived the

issue under Rule 5:25); cf. Horner v. Dep’t of Mental

Health, 268 Va. 187, 194, 597 S.E.2d 202, 206 (2004)

(failure to assign cross-error on an issue the Court of

Appeals did not address waives further appellate review of

the issue).

2. PAWN SHOP JOURNAL

As already stated, Riner sold jewelry belonging to

Denise after the fire. The Commonwealth called Cheryl A.

Brown, manager of the pawn shop where Riner sold the items,

11
In the letter brief, Riner also argues that
Brickey’s hearsay testimony violated his rights under the
Confrontation Clause because the hearsay neither fell
within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” nor bore
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” as required
by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). We conclude
that Riner waived the constitutional argument he now makes.
When he objected to Brickey’s testimony at trial, he relied
only on state law hearsay grounds in support of his
objection. Riner did not mention the Sixth Amendment or
the Confrontation Clause. Under this Court’s
contemporaneous objection rule, see Rule 5:25, we do not
consider a constitutional argument raised for the first
time on appeal. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 53,
71, 591 S.E.2d 47, 57 (2004); Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257
Va. 292, 308 n.3, 513 S.E.2d 642, 652 n.3 (1999).

44
to testify about the transaction. Brown remembered an

occasion when an investigator from the Wise County

Sheriff’s Department came to the shop in search of some

jewelry. The investigator was accompanied by some

individuals that Brown later learned were Denise’s sisters.

According to Brown, Denise’s sisters “immediately”

identified three of Denise’s rings in a glass case

containing “maybe a thousand” rings.

Brown explained the legal requirements in Tennessee

for pawn shop transactions. The seller or pawnor must

present valid photographic identification, and the pawn

shop must record the name, address, and other information

about the pawnor as well as information about the items

pawned or sold. Continuing, Brown testified that an entry

in a journal kept in the regular course of the pawn shop’s

business showed that, on March 11, 1999, an individual by

the name of Charles Douglas Riner, with a Tennessee

driver’s license bearing an address of 159 Bear Drive,

Bluff City, Tennessee, sold three rings, four pocket

watches, and other assorted merchandise for the sum of

$230. The number assigned to that transaction corresponded

to the number on the rings identified by Denise’s sisters.

Upon learning during Brown’s testimony that she had

not personally handled the transaction at issue, Riner

45
moved to strike her testimony and objected to the

introduction of the journal into evidence. With regard to

the hearsay issue before us, Riner stated that the journal

was not admissible because Brown only approved the amount

to pay Riner for the jewelry and did not make the entry

into the journal, and because the Commonwealth had not

established that the actual entrant was unavailable to

testify. After hearing Riner’s objection, the trial court

allowed Brown to testify in more detail about the entrant.

Brown stated that the employee who made the relevant entry

in the pawn shop journal was 79 years of age and was “off

on sick leave” because she had “suffered a back injury” and

was “unable to get up right now.” After hearing this

additional evidence, Riner renewed his hearsay objection.12

Although the trial court stated, “I don’t know whether

she’s in the hospital or is available or not,” it

ultimately allowed the introduction of the pawn shop

journal. The Court gave the following explanation for its

ruling:

I think it’s relevant, I’m going to allow it and
overrule your motion and find it to be an exception to
the hearsay rule under the Shopbook Rule, the business
records kept. I think the fact that this is even

12
Riner also objected to the admission of the journal
on grounds of relevancy, but that issue in not before us on
appeal.

46
 overwhelmingly better because of the fact that this
woman . . . Apparently, they, in Tennessee they put a
lot of requirements and restrictions and legal
requirements on them in order to keep their records
correct and I think the records show total
trustworthiness and total . . . Tennessee is looking
over their shoulder very carefully at these pawn shops
and loan shops.

Later, during Riner’s testimony, he admitted that he

had sold a bag of what he described as “scrap jewelry” to

the pawn shop in Bristol, Tennessee and used his driver’s

license as identification during the transaction.

According to Riner, he found the jewelry, after moving to

Bluff City, Tennessee, in a zippered bag that he had

salvaged out of a safe kept in the basement of the burned

house in Coeburn. Riner denied having ever seen the three

rings that Denise’s sisters identified. He did not,

however, deny that the three rings were part of the items

he had sold to the pawn shop; instead, he stated, “I can’t

say they were or weren’t.” He also admitted that an

employee at the pawn shop “went through each individual

item separately.”

On appeal, Riner argues that the trial court erred in

admitting the pawn shop journal because the Commonwealth

failed to prove that the individual who entered the

relevant information in the journal was unavailable to

47
testify at trial.13 The Court of Appeals rejected this

argument, finding that the “evidence in the record supports

a finding that the employee who made the entry in the pawn

shop’s records was unavailable because she was out of work

with a back injury that left her ‘unable to get up’ at the

time of trial.” Riner, 40 Va. App. at 478, 579 S.E.2d at

690. We agree with that conclusion. Because the trial

court’s factual finding that the entrant was not available

to testify is supported by the evidence, we conclude that

the court did not err in admitting the pawn shop journal.14

E. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

To prove arson, as with any criminal charge, the

Commonwealth must establish beyond a reasonable doubt both

the corpus delicti and criminal agency. Cook v.

Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 431, 309 S.E.2d 325, 328 (1983)

13
Riner also asserts on brief that he was denied the
right to cross-examine the entrant. However, he did not
make a constitutional objection at trial with regard to the
admission of the pawn shop journal. We will not consider a
constitutional argument raised for the first time on
appeal. See Johnson, 267 Va. at 71, 591 S.E.2d at 57;
Cherrix, 257 Va. at 308 n.3, 513 S.E.2d at 652 n.3.
14
The parties, the trial court, and the Court of
Appeals viewed the unavailability of the entrant as a
requirement for admission of the pawn shop journal under
the business records exception to the hearsay rule. For
that reason, we treat the unavailability requirement as the
“law of the case.” However, we intimate no view in today’s
decision whether unavailability of the entrant is indeed a
requirement under the business records exception.

48
(citing Jones v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 1012, 1021, 49 S.E.

663, 666 (1905)). The corpus delicti of arson “must

consist of proof that the fire was of incendiary, rather

than of accidental origin.” Id. Here, Riner challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence only with regard to the corpus

delicti, i.e., whether the fire was of incendiary origin.

Notably, Riner does not challenge on appeal the sufficiency

of the evidence to support the jury’s determination that he

was the criminal agent. In other words, Riner implicitly

agrees that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence

to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that, if the fire

was of incendiary origin, he was the criminal agent who

started the fire.

With regard to the corpus delicti, a defendant has the

benefit of a presumption that the fire was caused by

accident. Id. (citing Simmons v. Commonwealth, 208 Va.

778, 782, 160 S.E.2d 569, 572-73 (1968)). That presumption

is, however, rebuttable. Knight v. Commonwealth, 225 Va.

85, 89, 300 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1983). “Whether the origin of

a fire was accidental or incendiary is a question of fact,

and resolution of that question may, and often must, turn

upon the weight of circumstantial evidence.” Id. Such is

the present case.

49
 The Commonwealth’s evidence regarding the incendiary

origin of the fire came primarily from two individuals,

Clark D. Davenport and John D. Walker, both of whom

testified as experts in the field of investigating the

origin and cause of fires. Davenport and Walker each

inspected the Riner home after the fire and concluded that

the fire was of incendiary origin.

Specifically, Walker opined that the “fire started at

the south end of the home” where the living room and master

bedroom were located, and that it “was caused by an

intentional human act meaning it was an incendiary or an

arson fire.” In his opinion, the fact that the floor of

the front porch and the “uprights” in the porch were

completely consumed by the fire was unusual and indicated

“a tremendous amount of fire at the whole front end of that

home.” Because of the extent of burning on the floor of

the Riner house and the burn patterns there, Walker further

opined that “liquid accelerant” had been poured on the fire

and that the liquid “ignited and burned the floor first

before everything else fell down on top of the floor.”

Walker testified that he eliminated any potential

accidental cause of the fire and found no indication that

the fire started in the electrical panel box because there

was no evidence of arcing there. Even though an analysis

50
of debris samples that Walker had collected from the fire

scene contained no evidence of liquid accelerant residue,

Walker did not alter his conclusions.

Similarly, Davenport opined that “deep seated charring

of burn patterns in areas on the floor of the master

bedroom” were caused by “burning of an ignitable liquid

that had been poured on the floor.” During his

investigation of the fire, Davenport found evidence of

newspaper strips in several areas of the house, including

the floor in the master bedroom where Denise’s body was

found. Davenport opined that the newspapers were “used as

an accelerant to spread the fire.” He stated that “the

newspapers in conjunction with an ignitable liquid were

spread throughout the first floor of the dwelling in the

areas where [he] determined that a flammable liquid or

ignitable liquid patterns were discovered.”

Davenport further testified that he found no evidence

that would cause him to conclude that the origin of the

fire could not be determined or was accidental. He also

discounted a theory advanced by one of the defense’s expert

witnesses that the fire had been caused by a short circuit

in a baseboard heater. In Davenport’s opinion, the

evidence of short-circuiting that he found in the wiring

that remained in the house was the result of the fire and

51
not the cause of it. When asked what kind of analysis he

performed to eliminate other possible sources of ignition,

Davenport responded, “In conjunction with Mr. Riner’s

statements to me, as far as the condition of the house,

smoking habits, electrical problems, coupled with what I

observed at the scene, I was able to eliminate the natural

or accidental fire causes verses [sic] what I saw; glaring

evidence of an ignitable liquid poured and burned.”

It is true, as Riner argues, that other expert

witnesses who investigated the fire, some of whom testified

on behalf of the Commonwealth, opined that the origin of

the fire could not be determined. It is also true that

Riner introduced evidence showing that the fire had been

caused by a short circuit in a baseboard heater. But, as

Riner conceded during oral argument, the conflicting

evidence created a “credibility battle” among the experts.

“ ‘Conflicting expert opinions constitute a question of

fact . . . .’ ” Mercer, 259 Va. at 242, 523 S.E.2d at 217

(quoting McCaskey v. Patrick Henry Hospital, 225 Va. 413,

415, 304 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1983)). In that situation, it is

within the province of the finder of fact, in this case the

jury, “ ‘to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the

probative value to be given their testimony.’ ” Id.

52
(quoting Richardson v. Richardson, 242 Va. 242, 246, 409

S.E.2d 148, 151 (1991)).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, as we must since it was the prevailing

party in the trial court, see Higginbotham, 216 Va. at 352,

218 S.E.2d at 537, we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred

that the fire was incendiary in origin. “When a fact-

finder has accepted the testimony of a qualified expert

witness, which negates every reasonable possibility that a

fire was of accidental origin, we cannot hold the evidence

insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a finding that

the fire was of incendiary origin.” Cook, 226 Va. at 432,

309 S.E.2d at 328. Accordingly, we hold that the trial

court did not err in finding the evidence of arson

sufficient to support the jury verdict.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated with regard to each of Riner’s

assignments of error, we find no error in the judgment of

the Court of Appeals. Thus, we will affirm that judgment

and Riner’s convictions.15

Affirmed.

15
In light of our decision, it is not necessary to
address the Commonwealth’s assignments of cross-error.

53
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL and JUSTICE
KEENAN join, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. In my view, the record in

this case does not support the majority’s conclusion that

Charles Douglas Riner waived his objection to the admission

of the double hearsay testimony of Donna Brickey at issue

in this appeal. In the absence of such waiver, the record

clearly establishes that the erroneous admission of this

evidence was not harmless error. It is axiomatic that

under such circumstances Riner was denied a fair trial and

his convictions for the first degree murder of his wife,

Karen Denise Riner, and for arson must be reversed.

The majority correctly relates the context in which

the hearsay issue arose at Riner’s trial and the substance

of the testimony of Brickey, who was called as a witness by

the Commonwealth to relate the purported statements made to

her by Denise, prior to Denise’s death in the fire that

destroyed the Riners’ home. The Commonwealth sought to

establish the tempestuous relationship between Riner and

his wife in support of its theory of the case that the fire

was not accidental. Over Riner’s objection, Brickey was

permitted to testify that Denise had told her that Riner

had said that “if [Denise] tried to leave him and take the

kids that he would kill her.” Beyond question, Brickey’s

54
testimony was “double hearsay and thus doubly suspect”

because her testimony concerned a statement made by Denise,

one level of hearsay, recounting a statement made by Riner,

another level of hearsay. Service Steel Erectors Co. v.

International Union of Operating Engineers, 219 Va. 227,

236, 247 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1978). To be admissible, both

levels of hearsay must fall within a recognized exception

to the hearsay rule. West v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App.

906, 909-10, 407 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1991). The majority agrees

that Brickey’s testimony constituted double hearsay and

that the principle established in West restricts the

admissibility of such testimony.

Riner objected to the admission of Brickey’s testimony

on the ground that “[i]t’s double hearsay; . . . [i]t

doesn’t show [Denise’s] state of mind.” Rule 5:25 requires

that an objection be made “with reasonable certainty” in

order to enable the trial judge to rule on the objection

intelligently and, thus, to avoid unnecessary reversal on

appeal. While admittedly Riner’s objection could have been

stated more precisely to assert that both levels of the

hearsay did not fall within a recognized exception to the

hearsay rule as required by West, the objection as stated

substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 5:25.

Overton v. Slaughter, 190 Va. 172, 179, 56 S.E.2d 358, 362

55
(1949) (“substantial compliance” with contemporaneous

objection rule found where objection was “sufficiently

broad to have given the trial court notice of the substance

of the objection”); Levine v. Levine, 144 Va. 330, 336-37,

132 S.E. 320, 322 (1926) (explaining that “it was not

intended that a strict compliance with the letter of the

[contemporaneous objection] rule should be necessary to

enable a litigant to ask [for] the consideration . . . of

an objection or exception which was plainly and manifestly

made in the trial court, and the grounds of which appear

from the ruling thereon by the trial court”). See also

Conquest v. Mitchell, 618 F.2d 1053, 1056 (4th Cir. 1980)

(finding that, under Virginia law, “if an objection is

raised in such a manner so as to give the trial court

notice of its substance, the rule will be deemed complied

with even though the objection could have been more

definitively given”).

In this case, the trial judge was not called upon to

rule upon the objection in a vacuum or without the

opportunity to rule intelligently. Riner’s objection

clearly called to the trial judge’s attention that

Brickey’s testimony contained “double hearsay” and that at

least one level, concerning Denise’s state of mind, was

inadmissible because it did not fall within a recognized

56
exception to the hearsay rule. While the trial judge did

not expressly rule on the admissibility of both levels of

hearsay contained in Brickey’s testimony, the judge

admitted Brickey’s entire testimony on the ground that her

testimony “shows threats of violence in the relationship

between the parties, state of mind of [Riner].”

The majority acknowledges that Riner did not need to

challenge both levels of hearsay contained in Brickey’s

testimony in order to invoke the principle stated in West

regarding the admission of double hearsay. And, indeed,

but for the double hearsay context in which it was

presented by Brickey’s testimony, Riner does not dispute

that one level of hearsay, the statement that he had

threatened to kill Denise if she left him and took the

couple’s children, would have been admissible as relevant

to show his state of mind and potential motive.

Nevertheless, the majority concludes that Riner waived his

objection to Brickey’s testimony because he failed to renew

his objection or “bring to the trial court’s attention” the

fact that it had not ruled on his objection challenging

Denise’s statement to Brickey. In effect, the majority

treats Brickey’s testimony as if it were divisible or

consisted of discrete parts, apparently because it

contained “double hearsay.” Brickey’s testimony that was

57
the subject of Riner’s objection, however, was not

susceptible to division. Brickey’s knowledge of Riner’s

purported threats of violence against Denise came to her

solely from Denise’s purported statement to her. Thus, it

was necessary that Brickey’s testimony include both levels

of hearsay in order for her testimony to convey anything

intelligible and relevant to the jury. The trial judge’s

ruling then necessarily resolved the issue of both levels

of hearsay contained in Brickey’s testimony by ruling that

her entire testimony was admissible.

The majority expressly and principally relies upon an

analogy it draws from the situation we addressed in Green

v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 93-95, 580 S.E.2d 834, 841-42

(2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1448 (2004),

to support its conclusion that Riner has waived his

objection to Brickey’s testimony. I respectfully disagree

with that analogy. In Green, the defendant’s change of

venue motion was taken under advisement. The defendant

subsequently did not renew his motion before the jury was

empanelled and sworn or remind the trial court that the

motion was still pending and that he wanted the court to

rule on it. Id. at 93-94, 580 S.E.2d at 841-42. We

concluded that the defendant had waived the issue regarding

the change of venue. Id. at 95, 580 S.E.2d at 842.

58
 In the present case, however, the question whether to

admit Brickey’s double hearsay testimony was not the

subject of a pre-trial motion that Riner failed to renew at

the time Brickey testified. Rather, the objection was made

at the point at which the evidence was to be admitted at

Riner’s trial. There can be no doubt that Riner objected

to the admission of Brickey’s testimony on the ground that

Denise’s out-of-court statement to Brickey did not fall

within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. When

the trial court ruled that Brickey’s entire testimony was

admissible, there was no need or occasion for Riner to

“renew” the objection just made. Indeed, Code § 8.01-384,

and cases construing it, not only expressly make such

objection “unnecessary,” but also indicate that the

objection was sufficient to preserve Riner’s right to

contest the trial court’s admission of the “double hearsay”

testimony on appeal.

In relevant part, subsection (A) of Code § 8.01-384

provides that:

Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the
[trial] court shall be unnecessary . . . [and] it
shall be sufficient that a party, at the time the
ruling or order of the court is made or sought,
makes known to the court the action which he
desires the court to take or his objections to
the action of the court and his grounds
therefore; and, if a party has no opportunity to
object to a ruling or order at the time it is

59
 made, the absence of an objection shall not
thereafter prejudice him on motion for a new
trial or on appeal.

Code § 8.01-384(A). Significantly, the statute also

expressly states that:

No party, after having made an objection or
motion known to the court, shall be required to
make such objection or motion again in order to
preserve his right to appeal, challenge, or move
for reconsideration of, a ruling, order, or
action of the court.

Id.

Cases applying this language clearly indicate that

once a party makes the trial court aware of its objection

to a particular ruling, there is no need for that party, as

a means of preserving its appeal rights, to subsequently

repeat the substance of its objections by noting a formal

exception. See, e.g., Ward v. Insurance Co. of North

America, 253 Va. 232, 233 n.1, 482 S.E.2d 795, 795 n.1

(1997) (citing Code § 8.01-384); Richmond Dept. of Soc.

Servs. v. Carter, 28 Va. App. 494, 497, 507 S.E.2d 87, 88

(1998) (plaintiff’s claim that defendant failed to preserve

standard of proof issue for appeal held “meritless” because

“[o]nce the objection was made at trial, the [defendant]

was not required to make it again to preserve the issue”

under Code § 8.01-384(A)); Brown v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.

App. 225, 229-30, 475 S.E.2d 836, 838-39 (1996) (where

60
arguments of defense counsel concerning admissibility of

hearsay evidence alerted the trial court to the possibility

of error and gave it the opportunity to take corrective

actions, arguments held sufficient as an objection to

preserve admissibility issue for appeal under Code § 8.01-

384).

In addition, the majority’s approach ignores the burden

of proof on a hearsay objection. When an objector draws the

trial court’s attention to the fact that the form of

proposed proof is hearsay, “the party attempting to

introduce a hearsay statement has the burden of showing the

statement falls within one of the exceptions.” Robinson v.

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 3, 6, 516 S.E.2d 475, 476 (1999); Doe

v. Thomas, 227 Va. 466, 472, 318 S.E.2d 382, 386 (1984)

(“ ‘One seeking to have hearsay declarations of a witness

admitted as an exception to the general rule must clearly

show that they are within the exception.’ ”), quoting

Skillen and Son, Inc. v. Rosen, 359 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex.

1962). Thus, once Riner made the hearsay objection it was

the Commonwealth’s burden to demonstrate the admissibility

of each “level” of hearsay involved.

In general it has been this Court’s practice to

recognize that a hearsay objection that is not fully argued

below before a ruling admitting proof is made will be

61
sufficient to bring the merits of the hearsay issue before

us. Thus, in Frank Shop, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum

Corp., 261 Va. 169, 174, 540 S.E.2d 897, 900 (2001), the

opponent raised a hearsay objection, the proponent

suggested that there were four theories involved, and the

trial court ruled to allow the putative hearsay into

evidence before the admission theories were even argued by

counsel. This Court proceeded to assess the evidence and

hold it inadmissible under the hearsay rule. Id. at 176,

540 S.E.2d at 901. See also Code § 8.01-384(A); Ward, 253

Va. at 233 n.1, 482 S.E.2d at 795 n.1; Carter, 28 Va. App.

at 497, 507 S.E.2d at 88; Brown, 23 Va. App. at 229-30, 475

S.E. 2d at 838-39.

While the trial court’s ruling expressly addressed

only the hearsay statement made by Riner to Denise, I am

unwilling to conclude that the trial court was unaware that

the effect of the ruling was to admit the hearsay statement

made by Denise to Brickey. The trial court surely

understood the significance of Riner’s “double hearsay”

objection. To require Riner to reiterate the argument

already made on the admissibility of the hearsay as between

Denise and Brickey and demand an express ruling from the

trial court on that issue was just as surely unnecessary.

Additionally, the view taken by the majority would place

62
every criminal defendant in the position of having to

request full and express rulings from the trial court on

every objection in order to avoid the waiver applied in

this case, a practice that is wholly impractical.

Though differing from the reasoning applied by the

majority, the Commonwealth contends that Riner has waived

his objection to the double hearsay evidence at issue on

two grounds. First, the Commonwealth asserts a waiver

because Riner did not object to the testimony of two

witnesses showing the discord in the Riners’ marital

relationship, and he had cross-examined one of those

witnesses regarding whether Denise had ever complained of

being physically abused by Riner. Second, the Commonwealth

asserts that Riner has not challenged the actual ruling of

the trial court, which was that the hearsay evidence was

admissible under an exception to show the state of mind of

Riner rather than Denise. Both assertions of waiver are

without merit.

With regard to the first, none of the other evidence

elicited by the Commonwealth or by Riner upon cross-

examination included the direct assertion that Riner had

ever threatened to kill Denise. There was no evidence of

physical abuse suffered by her. A death threat manifestly

63
is not the same character as a threat to withhold the

couple’s children in the event of a divorce.

With regard to the Commonwealth’s second assertion of

waiver, failure to challenge one level of hearsay within a

double hearsay statement would not constitute a waiver

because when a party objects that a proffered statement is

hearsay it is the burden of the proponent of the statement

to show that it is admissible. Where the notion that the

statement has two levels of hearsay has been presented to

the trial judge, it is the burden of the proponent of the

evidence to demonstrate to the judge that there is an

exception warranting receipt of both levels of the hearsay.

In this case, it is clear that at trial, in the Court of

Appeals, and presently in this appeal, Riner has not

focused on the fact that Brickey’s statement quotes Riner

(theoretically admissible as party admission or a statement

of Riner’s state of mind) but has pursued the objection to

the fact that Brickey’s testimony recounts an out-of-court

statement by Denise that does not fit a hearsay exception

(not an “excited utterance,” not within the admissible

state of mind doctrine in Virginia).

For these reasons, I am of opinion that a finding of

waiver of the issue regarding whether the trial court erred

in admitting the double hearsay testimony of Brickey is not

64
warranted and that the issue is properly before this Court

in this appeal. Accordingly, I will address the merits of

Riner’s assertion that Brickey’s testimony was erroneously

admitted against him at his trial.

In general terms, “hearsay is an out-of-court

statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted

and . . . hearsay includes testimony by a witness who

relates not what he knows personally but what others have

told him or what he has read.” Robinson v. Commonwealth,

258 Va. 3, 6, 516 S.E.2d 475, 476 (1999). “[H]earsay

evidence is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the

recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, and . . . the

party attempting to introduce a hearsay statement has the

burden of showing the statement falls within one of the

exceptions.” Id., 516 S.E.2d at 476-77 (internal citation

omitted). Pertinent to the present case, we have stated

that “[g]enerally, [hearsay] statements made by a crime

victim that show the victim’s state of mind are admissible

as an exception to the hearsay rule, provided the

statements are relevant and probative of some material

issue in the case.” Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253,

257, 546 S.E.2d 728, 730 (2001). “Evidence is relevant if

it tends to prove or disprove, or is pertinent to, matters

in issue.” Id. In the specific circumstance of a hearsay

65
statement purporting to show the state of mind regarding

the fear of a victim with respect to a death threat or

threat of violence made to the victim by the accused, the

hearsay statement of the victim is admissible to rebut

claims by the defense that the victim’s death was the

result of suicide, or where the defense admits some role in

the events causing the victim’s death, but contends that

the death was the result of an accident or an act of self-

defense. Id.; United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 770-71

(D.C. Cir. 1973). “When those defenses are not in issue

. . . the statement would become relevant only through ‘a

circuitous series of inferences.’ ” Hanson v.

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 173, 188, 416 S.E.2d 14, 23

(1992) (quoting Brown, 490 F.2d at 771).

Riner’s asserted theory of the case was that the fire

was accidental and that Denise’s death in that fire was

also accidental. This defense excludes an admission that

he accidentally caused the fire and obviously does not

involve a claim of suicide or self-defense. As previously

noted herein, but for the double hearsay context in which

it was presented by Brickey’s testimony, Riner does not

dispute that one level of the hearsay, the purported

statement that he had threatened to kill Denise if she left

him and took the children, was relevant to show his state

66
of mind and potential motive to commit the crimes for which

he was on trial. Rather, the thrust of Riner’s contention

is that the second level of hearsay, Denise’s statement to

Brickey, could only show that Denise’s state of mind was

fear and that state of mind was not relevant to any issue

in the case. Riner contends that Denise’s state of mind

was not probative of Riner’s state of mind because had

Riner possessed the motive and intent to kill her, “either

would have existed independent of [Denise’s] fear of him or

any other state of mind.” West, 12 Va. App. at 910, 407

S.E.2d at 24. Riner also finds support for his contentions

in Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 211, 361

S.E.2d 436, 449 (1987). Noting that West and Evans-Smith

are factually similar to the present case, Riner asserts

that Denise’s statement did not comply with the

requirements of the state of mind exception to the hearsay

rule and was inadmissible.

In response, the Commonwealth contends that the trial

court properly admitted the statement to show Denise’s

state of mind under the state of mind exception to the

hearsay rule as enunciated in Clay. The Commonwealth

asserts that Brickey’s testimony showed a motive for Riner

to kill his wife once she declared her intent to divorce

him and to use his abuse of his step-son to prevent him

67
from obtaining custody of the couple’s children. The

Commonwealth further contends that the statement “showed

that Riner viewed the loss of his children on an equal

footing with the need to rectify his financial problems.”

The Commonwealth interprets Clay broadly and argues that

our holding there was not limited to cases in which there

is an asserted defense of self-defense, suicide, or

accidental death in which the accused admittedly played

some role. The Commonwealth’s position would essentially

permit the state of mind exception to consume the hearsay

rule. Denise’s fear of Riner, if such were the case, was

not relevant because Riner would have had the motives

suggested by the Commonwealth in this case regardless of

that state of mind on her part. Moreover, under Clay,

Denise’s statement recounting Riner’s threat was not

admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay

rule to rebut Riner’s assertion of accidental death because

Riner was not contending that the fire was the result of

his actions. Accordingly, the trial court erred in

admitting Brickey’s testimony.

Where, as here, the erroneous admission of evidence is

not of constitutional dimension, the standard for reviewing

the harm to the defendant, if any, is to consider whether

68
 “when all is said and done, the conviction is
sure that the error did not influence the jury,
or had but slight effect, the verdict and the
judgment should stand . . . . But if one cannot
say, with fair assurance, after pondering all
that happened without stripping the erroneous
action from the whole, that the judgment was not
substantially swayed by the error, it is
impossible to conclude that substantial rights
were not affected . . . . If so, or if one is
left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot
stand.”

Clay, 262 Va. at 260, 546 S.E.2d at 731-32 (quoting

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).

See Code § 8.01-678 (providing the statutory standard for

harmless error involving nonconstitutional error).

The record does not support the Commonwealth’s

assertion that Brickey’s testimony “was only a fraction of

the motive evidence against Riner” and, thus, any error in

admitting this testimony was harmless. To the contrary,

despite other evidence that the Riner’s marriage was

discordant, no other witness testified that Riner had ever

been physically abusive to Denise or had threatened her

with physical violence. Nor was the evidence of Riner’s

financial difficulties in itself indicative that he would

seek to profit from her death. Thus, the evidence that

Riner had once threatened to kill Denise if, as actually

transpired, she sought to end their marriage and separate

69
him from their children, was not merely cumulative of other

motive evidence.

It is a regrettable but well acknowledged fact that

numerous marriages in this Commonwealth terminate in

divorce. The suggested reasons for that fact are also

numerous. In such cases it is also regrettable but not

uncommon that the actual separation and divorce of a couple

is preceded by arguments and even threats of violence. In

this context, prior threats of violence or death become

especially significant where a spouse anticipating a

divorce is the alleged victim of a homicide. Indeed,

where, as here, such a spouse has related to another a

death threat made by her husband, and the specifics of that

threat comport with the subsequent events leading up to the

alleged victim’s death, the death threat essentially

becomes a lens through which the jury will focus on the

evidence and assess the rest of the prosecution’s case

against the accused. Under such circumstances, far from

having slight or no effect on the verdict, it “ ‘cannot [be

said], with fair assurance . . . that the judgment was not

substantially swayed by the error.’ ” Clay, 262 Va. at

260, 546 S.E.2d at 731-32 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at

765). At the very least, in this case the error creates a

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“grave doubt” and, accordingly, “the conviction cannot

stand.” Id.

For these reasons, I would hold that the trial court’s

erroneous admission of Brickey’s double hearsay testimony

concerning the death threat Riner allegedly made to Denise

was not harmless. Accordingly, I would reverse Riner’s

convictions for first degree murder and arson on this

ground and remand the case for a new trial if the

Commonwealth be so advised.

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