Shackleford v. Commonwealth

Present: All the Justices

DORIAN LEE-KIRK SHACKLEFORD

v. Record No. 001795 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER
June 8, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Dorian Lee-Kirk Shackleford, a juvenile and citizen of

Jamaica, was charged with delinquency in petitions alleging

that he had committed three drug-related offenses. The

juvenile and domestic relations district court (juvenile

court) subsequently transferred Shackleford to the circuit

court. There, the court tried Shackleford as an adult in a

bench trial and convicted him of possession with intent to

distribute cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-248,

transporting one ounce or more of cocaine into the

Commonwealth with the intent to sell or distribute in

violation of Code § 18.2-248.01, and possession of a

firearm with intent to distribute a controlled substance in

violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(B). 1 Shackleford then

appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals. That

court affirmed the convictions. Shackleford v.

1
The circuit court sentenced Shackleford to a total of
23 years, with 16 years suspended; a fine of $2,500; and a
suspension of his operator’s license for a period of six
months.
Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 307, 329, 528 S.E.2d 123, 134,

(2000).

On appeal to this Court, Shackleford challenges the

jurisdiction of the circuit court because his parents did

not receive notice of certain proceedings, the

voluntariness of his statement to police, the seizure of

certain physical evidence, and the sufficiency of the

evidence. Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment of

the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

We will recite the evidence presented at trial in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing

party before the circuit court. Johnson v. Commonwealth,

259 Va. 654, 662, 529 S.E.2d 769, 773, cert. denied, ___

U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 432 (2000); Walker v. Commonwealth, 258

Va. 54, 60, 515 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1999), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 1125 (2000). We also accord that evidence all

inferences fairly deducible from it. Horton v.

Commonwealth, 255 Va. 606, 608, 499 S.E.2d 258, 259

(1998) (citing Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349,

352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975)).

Two law enforcement officers with the Virginia State

Police, Special Agent J.C. Miers, III, and Trooper Mike

Hall, were conducting an undercover drug interdiction at

2
the Greyhound bus station in Lynchburg. At approximately

10:15 a.m. on January 7, 1998, Miers and Hall observed

Shackleford exit a bus that had just arrived. At some

point after Shackleford entered the bus terminal, he

approached Miers, who was wearing civilian clothes, and

asked for the telephone number of a local taxicab company.

Miers found a listing for taxicabs in a telephone directory

and pointed it out to Shackleford. After Shackleford made

a telephone call, Miers displayed his police badge to

Shackleford and asked to speak with him. Shackleford

agreed and accompanied Miers to a corner inside the bus

terminal where they engaged in further conversation.

During that conservation, Miers asked Shackleford why

he was in Lynchburg. In response, Shackleford stated that

he was traveling from New York to Lynchburg to visit his

sick aunt in the hospital and that there were things in his

carry-on bag that she needed. 2 According to Miers,

Shackleford then changed his story by stating that his aunt

was not in the hospital but at her residence, and that he

was going to take a taxicab to some other location where

his aunt would pick him up later. Miers testified that he

then became suspicious and asked Shackleford for permission

2
That carry-on bag was the only luggage that
Shackleford had with him.

3
to search the bag. Shackleford did not consent, stating

that the bag contained his aunt’s personal items and that

he did not know what was in the bag.

The taxicab arrived then, and Shackleford told the

taxicab driver to take him to a motel just north of the

city limits of Lynchburg. After Shackleford got into the

taxicab with his bag, the taxicab left the bus terminal;

Hall and Miers, traveling in separate vehicles, followed

the taxicab. En route, Miers and Hall both observed

Shackleford shifting from side to side in the taxicab and

leaning over. When the taxicab arrived at the motel,

Shackleford exited on the passenger side, set his bag on

the ground, and left the back door of the taxicab open.

Miers then advised Shackleford that he was free to go but

that his bag had to remain there long enough for a dog

trained in the detection of narcotics (K-9 unit) to sniff

it. 3 Miers testified that Shackleford then stated, “you can

go ahead and search my bag, there’s no drugs or anything in

it.”

While Miers was talking with Shackleford at the motel,

Hall requested and received permission from the taxicab

3
Prior to arriving at the motel, Hall called another
law enforcement agency and requested that a K-9 unit be
taken to the motel. When Shackleford arrived at the motel,
a uniformed police officer was already there with the dog.

4
driver to search the taxicab. During that search, Hall

discovered a semi-automatic weapon “under the lip part of

the backseat” on the passenger side of the taxicab. The

weapon was in a white, opaque shopping bag. Hall then

requested the uniformed officer “to run” the K-9 unit on

the vehicle, and when he did so, the “dog alerted” on a

package wrapped in tape. That package was located

underneath the front, passenger seat and contained 14

plastic baggies, each of which contained an off-white

substance later determined to be a total of 194.96 grams of

cocaine. The taxicab driver testified that he had cleaned

his taxicab the previous night and that Shackleford was his

first fare that day. The driver further stated that he

heard what sounded like someone sticking a bag or paper

under the seat while en route from the bus terminal to the

motel, although he admitted he did not see Shackleford

doing so.

After the gun and cocaine were discovered, Miers

placed Shackleford under arrest and transported him to the

police station. At the station, Miers advised Shackleford

of his Miranda rights, and because Shackleford had already

told Miers that he was 17 years old, Miers also advised him

that he could have his parents present during questioning.

Shackleford signed a waiver-of-rights form and, without

5
requesting the presence of either a lawyer or his parents,

stated that he was a naturalized citizen and was staying in

New York. He also told Miers that his father and mother

were estranged, that his father lived in Jamaica, and that

his mother had taken a trip to that country.

In a hand-written statement, Shackleford said that he

had received an anonymous telephone call advising that he

could earn some money if he did as he was told. According

to Shackleford, the caller knew Shackleford needed money.

The caller directed Shackleford to pick up a bag at a

certain location and never to look inside the bag. After

writing out that statement, Shackleford told Miers that he

picked up the bag at a city park in the borough of the

Bronx in New York City and that he then purchased a one-way

bus ticket from New York City to Lynchburg with money that

he found in an outside pocket on the bag. 4

The petitions filed in the juvenile court charging

Shackleford with the drug-related offenses listed

Shackleford’s mother’s name and address. They also

contained the name of Shackleford’s father and listed his

address as Kingston, Jamaica. Pursuant to Code § 16.1-

269.1, the Commonwealth moved to transfer Shackleford to

6
the circuit court. After a hearing on that motion, the

juvenile court found probable cause to believe that

Shackleford had committed the delinquent acts alleged, see

Code § 16.1-269.1(A)(2); and that Shackleford was 14 years

of age or older, was competent to stand trial and was “not

a proper person to remain within the jurisdiction of the

juvenile court.” Code § 16.1-269.1(A)(4). Accordingly,

the juvenile court transferred Shackleford to the circuit

court to be tried as an adult.

Shackleford appealed the transfer decision to the

circuit court pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.4. Prior to the

hearing on that appeal, Shackleford moved to continue the

proceedings because his mother had not been notified of the

hearing. The circuit court denied the motion, and

subsequently advised the Commonwealth that it could seek

indictments. See Code § 16.1-269.6(B).

After the grand jury returned a three-count indictment

against Shackleford, he moved to dismiss that indictment,

in part, because of the lack of notice to his parents. He

argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because

neither of his parents was notified of the hearing in

circuit court regarding his appeal of the transfer

4
At trial, Shackleford testified that he followed the
caller’s instructions because the caller threatened harm to

7
decision. He also objected to the court’s jurisdiction

because his father was not notified of either the

initiation of proceedings in the juvenile court or the

transfer hearing in that court. The circuit court

overruled the motion.

Prior to trial, Shackleford moved to suppress his

statement and the physical evidence found in the taxicab.

The circuit court also overruled that motion.

ANALYSIS

Shackleford’s assignments of error raise three

separate questions: (1) whether the circuit court had

jurisdiction to try Shackleford on the indictment because

his parents did not have notice of certain proceedings, (2)

whether his statement to law enforcement officials was

voluntarily given and the physical evidence was legally

seized, and (3) whether there was sufficient evidence to

support his convictions. We will address these questions

in that order.

I. PARENTAL NOTIFICATION

The question of parental notification involves

different facts and issues with regard to each of

Shackleford’s parents. Hence, we will consider each parent

separately.

Shackleford’s family if he did not do so.

8
 First, as to Shackleford’s mother, he contends that

the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try him on the

indictment because his mother was neither notified of nor

present at the hearing before the circuit court on his

appeal of the transfer decision. 5 In making this argument,

Shackleford relies on the provision in Code § 16.1-263(B)

requiring that “[n]otice of subsequent proceedings shall be

provided to all parties in interest.” According to

Shackleford, the hearing in circuit court on his appeal of

the transfer decision was a “subsequent proceeding[],”

about which his mother should have received notice.

We do not accept Shackleford’s contention that his

mother did not have notice of that hearing in circuit

court. At the transfer appeal hearing, Shackleford’s

juvenile probation officer testified that he spoke with

Shackleford’s mother on the morning of that hearing. She

5
Shackleford makes only a jurisdictional argument with
regard to the lack of notice to his mother. He does not
contend that he was prejudiced in any other way because of
her failure to attend the hearing on his appeal of the
transfer decision.
Shackleford also does not contest the fact that his
mother received notice of the petitions and initiation of
proceedings in the juvenile court, and a summons advising
her of the time, date, and place of the initial hearing on
those petitions. Additionally, Shackleford’s counsel
acknowledged to the circuit court that Shackleford’s mother
received notice of and was present at the transfer hearing
conducted in juvenile court.

9
told the probation officer that she could not travel from

New York to attend the hearing because of her financial

situation and work schedule. The probation officer

testified similarly at a subsequent hearing on

Shackleford’s motion to dismiss the indictment. At that

hearing, the circuit court made a factual finding that

Shackleford’s mother had notice of the transfer appeal

hearing in circuit court. That factual finding is

supported by sufficient evidence. See Schneider v.

Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736

(1985) (factual findings of court will not be disturbed on

appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support

them). Accordingly, we hold that Shackleford’s mother had

actual notice of the transfer appeal hearing in circuit

court and that such notice satisfied any statutory notice

requirements of Code § 16.1-263(B). Roach v. Director,

Dep’t of Corrections, 258 Va. 537, 544-45, 522 S.E.2d 869,

872 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 965 (1999); see also

Turner v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 666, 668, 222 S.E.2d 517,

519 (1976). 6

6
Because Shackleford’s mother had actual notice, we do
not reach the question whether a hearing in circuit court
on an appeal of a transfer decision by the juvenile court
is a “subsequent proceeding[]” under Code § 16.1-263(B).
Nor do we decide whether the absence of such notice has any

10
 We now turn to the issue regarding notice to

Shackleford’s father. Unlike his mother, Shackleford’s

father received neither notice of the petitions and

initiation of proceedings in the juvenile court nor the

summons specified in Code § 16.1-263(A). The father also

did not have notice of the hearing in circuit court on the

transfer appeal, nor did he voluntarily appear at any of

the proceedings in either the juvenile court or the circuit

court. Relying on the decision in Commonwealth v. Baker,

258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) (per curiam), aff’g 28 Va.

App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998), Shackleford argues that

the lack of notice to his father divested the circuit court

of its jurisdiction to try him on the indictment after his

transfer from juvenile court.

Pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.6(E), Shackleford raised

the lack of notice to his father in his motion to dismiss

the indictment, which he filed and the circuit court heard

before Shackleford’s arraignment. 7 Nevertheless, the Court

of Appeals held that, because the offenses were committed

after July 1, 1996, the provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E)

jurisdictional or constitutional implications as argued by
Shackleford.
7
Code § 16.1-269.6(E) provides that “[a]ny objection
to the jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant to this
article shall be waived if not made before arraignment.”

11
are controlling. That section states that “[a]n indictment

in the circuit court cures any error or defect in any

proceeding held in the juvenile court except with respect

to the juvenile’s age.” In Dennis Moore v. Commonwealth,

259 Va. 405, 410, 527 S.E.2d 415, 418 (2000), this Court

held that a defect caused by failure to notify a

defendant’s biological father of the initiation of juvenile

court proceedings was cured by a grand jury indictment.

Citing Dennis Moore, the Court of Appeals concluded that,

since Shackleford did not raise the failure to comply with

the parental notification provisions in Code §§ 16.1-263(A)

and –264 before the indictment was returned in circuit

court, that indictment cured any defect resulting from the

lack of notice to his father. Shackleford, 32 Va. App. at

318, 528 S.E.2d at 129. The Court of Appeals reached the

same conclusion regarding the failure to notify

Shackleford’s father of the hearing in circuit court on the

transfer appeal. Id. at 319, 528 S.E.2d at 129.

Shackleford contends that our decision in Dennis Moore

is inapposite. In that case, the juvenile court certified

felony charges to the grand jury after conducting a

preliminary hearing under Code §§ 16.1-269.1(B) and (C).

Dennis Moore, 259 Va. at 408, 527 S.E.2d at 416-17. In

contrast, Shackleford’s transfer to circuit court was under

12
Code § 16.1-269.1(A), and he then appealed that transfer

decision pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.4. The provisions of

Code § 16.1-269.4 authorize an appeal only from a transfer

decision made under subsection A of Code § 16.1-269.1.

Shackleford argues that the procedural posture of his case

is, therefore, different from that in Dennis Moore. Noting

what he terms as a conflict between the provisions of Code

§§ 16.1-269.1(E) and –269.6(E), he argues that Code § 16.1-

269.1(E) does not cure the notice defects because he timely

raised his objection before arraignment in accordance with

Code § 16.1-269.6(E).

Shackleford is correct about the procedural

distinction between his case and the circumstances in

Dennis Moore. However, that distinction is not

dispositive. The terms of Code § 16.1-269.6(E) establish a

deadline before which any objections to the jurisdiction of

the circuit court based on defects in the transfer process

must be raised. See David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va.

431, 440, 527 S.E.2d 406, 410-11 (2000) (holding that

waiver prescribed by Code § 16.1-269.6(E) applies only to

defects in transfer proceedings conducted pursuant to

Article 7). According to the provisions of that section,

the deadline for making such objections is the date of

13
arraignment. If they are not raised before arraignment,

the objections are waived.

In contrast, Code § 16.1-269.1(E) is not a “waiver”

provision but rather a “curative” one. This section states

that an indictment “cures any error or defect in any

proceeding held in the juvenile court.” (Emphasis added.)

Although Shackleford timely raised his objection to the

jurisdiction of the circuit court before his arraignment

pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.6(E), the alleged defect based

on the failure to comply with the notice requirements of

Code §§ 16.1-263(A) and –264 with regard to his father was

cured by the indictment. In other words, the indictment

cured the defect raised in Shackleford’s objection before

he made the objection.

As this Court noted in David Moore, 259 Va. at 440,

527 S.E.2d at 411, “the legislature has the authority to

provide for a waiver of a defect in the transfer

proceeding.” Likewise, the legislature has the authority

to create a cure for any defect in the proceedings in

juvenile court, thereby eliminating certain objections

before the deadline by which they would otherwise have to

be raised. Thus, we hold that any alleged defects in the

juvenile proceedings with regard to Shackleford’s father

were cured by the indictment and that the circuit court,

14
therefore, was not in any manner divested of its

jurisdiction to try Shackleford on the charges set forth in

the indictment.

This holding also applies to the lack of notice to

Shackleford’s father about the hearing in circuit court on

the transfer appeal. While we recognize that Code § 16.1-

269.1(E) speaks in terms of curing defects in the

proceedings in the juvenile court, an appeal from a

transfer decision under Code § 16.1-269.4 is the final step

in the transfer process commenced under Code § 16.1-

269.1(A). We believe that the legislature intended for an

indictment to cure any defects in that entire process.

Thus, the indictment also cured the failure to notify

Shackleford’s father of the hearing in circuit court on the

transfer appeal. 8

II. STATEMENT AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

In this assignment of error, Shackleford asserts three

reasons why the circuit court should have suppressed his

statement and the physical evidence. Two of those reasons

relate solely to his statement: (1) that his rights under

8
At the hearing in circuit court on the transfer
appeal, Shackleford did not object to the lack of notice of
that hearing to his father, as he did with regard to his
mother. Shackleford did not raise the lack of notice to
his father with regard to the transfer appeal hearing in

15
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional

Protocol on Disputes (Vienna Convention), 21 U.S.T. 77,

T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (Apr. 24, 1963), and the Due Process

Clause of the Constitution of the United States were

violated because he was never advised of his right to speak

with an official of the Jamaican Embassy, and (2) that he

was improperly advised of his Miranda rights because the

police officer modified the waiver-of-rights form to say

that Shackleford had a right to have a lawyer “or parents”

present during interrogation.

The third reason pertains to his statement as well as

the seizure of the firearm and cocaine. Shackleford claims

that he was detained at the motel when Miers told him that

his bag had to remain there until the K-9 unit sniffed it.

According to Shackleford, that detention was without

“reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot” and

in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, argues

Shackleford, suppression of the evidence is required under

the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine because the

illegal detention led to both his statement and discovery

of the physical evidence. We find no merit in any of these

arguments.

circuit court or the proceedings in juvenile court until he
filed his motion to dismiss the indictment.

16
 First, in Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 419, 508

S.E.2d 57, 64 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999),

this Court addressed a defendant’s claim that a violation

of his rights under the Vienna Convention required

suppression of a confession. There, we held, contrary to

Shackleford’s argument, that the provisions of the Vienna

Convention create no legally enforceable individual rights.

Id. Continuing, we stated that Article 36, the same

provision upon which Shackleford relies, “merely deals with

notice to be furnished to the consular post of a national’s

state when the national is arrested or taken into custody

in a foreign state.” 9 Id. Accordingly, we conclude that

any failure to advise Shackleford about his purported right

to speak with an official of the Jamaican Embassy did not

violate the Vienna Convention or any rights secured to him

by the Constitution of the United States. Likewise, to the

extent that Shackleford suggests that he would not have

pled guilty if he had been advised that he could contact

the Jamaican Embassy, that contention is, at best,

speculative. See id.

9
After the Commonwealth learned that Shackleford was a
Jamaican citizen, it sent a letter dated March 9, 1998, to
an official of the Jamaican Embassy, detailing the charges
that had been placed against Shackelford and advising where
Shackleford was being detained. The Commonwealth also

17
 Next, with regard to the waiver-of-rights form,

Shackleford contends that Miers’ addition of the words “or

parents” to that form minimized the importance of the right

to counsel and caused him to believe that he had the right

to have either counsel or his parents present during

interrogation, but not both. In pertinent part, the

modified, preprinted form that Shackleford signed contained

the following information:

YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO TALK TO A LAWYER OR PARENTS
FOR ADVICE BEFORE WE ASK YOU ANY QUESTIONS AND TO HAVE
A LAWYER OR PARENTS WITH YOU DURING QUESTIONING.

Miers testified that he told Shackleford that, since

Shackleford was a juvenile, he had the right to have his

parents present “in addition to or in substitute for a

lawyer.”

We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that

“Shackleford voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth

Amendment rights to remain silent and to have counsel

present during a custodial interrogation.” Shackleford, 32

Va. App. at 323, 528 S.E.2d at 131. The modification to

the waiver-of-rights form did not diminish Shackleford’s

right to counsel. Considering Miers’ additional

explanation to Shackleford, we fail to see how Shackleford

explained the proceedings then pending in the juvenile
court.

18
could have been misled into believing that, if he asked to

have his parents present during the questioning, he could

not also have counsel present. Moreover, Shackleford did

not request to have either present during the

interrogation; so, the options presented to Shackleford

regarding his rights did not, in fact, lead to any election

that even arguably affected his right to counsel. Miers

also testified that Shackleford acknowledged that he

understood his rights and so indicated by checking the

appropriate box on the waiver form and signing it.

Therefore, we find that Shackleford was fully advised of

his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them. The Court

of Appeals did not err in upholding the circuit court’s

refusal to suppress Shackleford’s statement.

Last, we do not decide whether Miers’ statement at the

motel that Shackleford was free to go but that his bag had

to remain there long enough for the narcotics dog to sniff

it was tantamount to detaining Shackleford. The physical

evidence that Shackleford claims should have been

suppressed was not found on his person or in the bag.

Rather, the weapon and cocaine were found in the taxicab

that Shackleford had exited. At that point, Shackleford

had no expectation of privacy in the items that he left in

the taxicab. See Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263,

19
274, 513 S.E.2d 400, 408, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952

(1999) (defendant had no expectation of privacy in box left

at sister’s home). And, Hall searched the taxicab only

after the taxicab driver consented to the search. See

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (search

conducted pursuant to valid consent does not implicate

Fourth Amendment).

Once the firearm was lawfully seized and the package

was discovered in the taxicab, probable cause existed to

place Shackleford under arrest. Consequently,

Shackleford’s statements were made after his lawful arrest

and after he had been advised of his Miranda rights. Thus,

as the Commonwealth argues, there simply was no “fruit”

from the allegedly “poisonous tree.” Neither the physical

evidence nor Shackleford’s statement was obtained in

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence after a

conviction, we consider that evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, and we affirm the conviction

unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support

it. Horton, 255 Va. at 614, 499 S.E.2d at 262 (citing

Higginbotham, 216 Va. at 352, 218 S.E.2d at 537)). The

circuit court sitting without a jury in this case acted as

20
the fact finder; hence, the court’s judgment is accorded

the same weight as a jury verdict. Evans v. Commonwealth,

215 Va. 609, 613, 212 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1975). As the fact

finder, the court “need not believe the accused’s

explanation and may infer that he is trying to conceal his

guilt.” Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 842, 284

S.E.2d 608, 610 (1981).

After reviewing the evidence and considering

Shackleford’s arguments, we conclude, as did the Court of

Appeals, that there is sufficient evidence to support his

convictions. We need not repeat all the evidence and

reasons outlined by the Court of Appeals that warrant this

conclusion. See Shackleford, 32 Va. App. at 324-29, 528

S.E.2d at 132-34 for a discussion of these points.

However, we will emphasize some key reasons why the Court

of Appeals did not err in finding sufficient evidence to

support the convictions. In doing so, we reiterate that

the circuit court, as the fact finder, was not bound to

accept Shackleford’s explanation and may have concluded

that he was lying to conceal his guilt. See Black, 222 Va.

at 842, 284 S.E.2d at 610.

First, in regard to his conviction for possession of

cocaine with the intent to distribute, Shackleford asserts

that he had no idea what was in the bag that he brought to

21
Lynchburg from New York City at the request of an allegedly

anonymous telephone caller. He claims that the

Commonwealth failed to prove that he was aware of the

presence and character of the substance, and that he was

intentionally and consciously in possession of it. See

Gillis v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 298, 301, 208 S.E.2d 768,

771 (1974) (“[t]o establish possession of a controlled

substance, it generally is necessary to show that the

defendant was aware of the presence and character of the

particular substance and was intentionally and consciously

in possession of it”).

Relevant to this issue is the fact that Shackleford

gave several inconsistent statements. He first told Miers

that his aunt was in the hospital but later said that she

was at her residence. Then, after removing the firearm and

package of cocaine from his bag, hiding them in the

taxicab, and exiting the taxicab, he declared to Miers,

“you can go ahead and search my bag, there’s no drugs or

anything in it.” However, at the bus terminal, Shackleford

would not consent to a search of the bag on the pretext

that it contained his aunt’s personal items.

Shackleford also asserts that the Commonwealth did not

establish that he intended to distribute cocaine. This

argument overlooks the fact that a police officer, who

22
testified as an expert in the use and distribution of

narcotics, stated that illegal drugs are routinely packaged

in individual bags to facilitate distribution. The package

found in the taxicab contained 14 plastic baggies, each

containing cocaine, which, according to the expert, has a

street value of approximately $100 to $150 per gram.

As to the conviction for transporting more than one

ounce of cocaine into the Commonwealth, Shackleford attacks

the testimony of the forensic scientist who tested the

substance in the 14 baggies. Shackleford claims that,

since the forensic scientist did not determine what portion

of the 194.96 grams of substance was actually cocaine, the

Commonwealth failed to establish that he transported the

requisite one ounce. He also challenges the fact that the

circuit court took judicial notice of the fact that 194.96

grams is more than one ounce.

Contrary to Shackleford’s argument, a conviction under

§ 18.2-248.01 does not require the Commonwealth’s forensic

scientist to test each gram of the substance to determine

its purity. That section provides that “it is unlawful for

any person to transport into the Commonwealth . . . with

intent to sell or distribute one ounce or more of cocaine,

coca leaves or any salt, compound, derivative or

preparation thereof . . . .” We agree with the Court of

23
Appeals that the plain terms of this statute “mandates that

the quantity of the mixture—the ‘compound’ or

‘preparation’—rather than the purity of the cocaine in the

mixture” is to be used to determine the weight of the

substance transported into the Commonwealth. Shackleford,

32 Va. App. at 328, 528 S.E.2d at 134. We also conclude

that the circuit court did not err in taking judicial

notice of the conversion ratio between grams and ounces.

See Ryan v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 439, 445, 247 S.E.2d 698,

703 (1978) (“[c]ourts may take judicial notice of generally

known or easily ascertainable facts”).

Finally, on the conviction for possession of the

firearm, Shackleford posits that the evidence did not

establish that he was in possession of the firearm while

also knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine. He

concedes that he was in possession of the firearm once he

opened the bag and found the weapon inside, but argues

that, after he hid the firearm under the seat of the

taxicab, he no longer possessed it. During the brief time

of admitted possession, Shackleford claims that he was not

simultaneously aware of the character and presence of the

cocaine.

Since we have already concluded that the evidence was

sufficient to convict Shackleford of possession of cocaine

24
with intent to distribute, the evidence is likewise

sufficient to support his conviction for possession of the

firearm. Shackleford concedes that he possessed the

weapon.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we conclude that the Court of

Appeals did not err in affirming Shackleford’s convictions.

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of

Appeals.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN joins, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I do so because, in my view,

the majority effectively usurps for this Court an authority

that properly rests exclusively with the General Assembly

by altering the meaning of the express language of the

statutes pertinent to this appeal. Specifically, in the

context of this case the majority expands the meaning of

the express language of Code § 16.1-269.1(E) to render

meaningless the equally express language of Code § 16.1-

269.6(E).

Code § 16.1-269.1(E) provides, in pertinent part,

that: “An indictment in the circuit court cures any error

or defect in any proceeding held in the juvenile court

25
except with respect to the juvenile’s age.” (Emphasis

added). Code § 16.1-269.6(E) provides that: “Any

objection to the jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant

to this article shall be waived if not made before

arraignment.” (Emphasis added).

Undoubtedly, with regard to an offense committed by a

juvenile on or after July 1, 1996, we have held that “an

indictment by a grand jury cures any defect or error . . .

which has occurred in any juvenile court proceeding”

pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(E). Dennis Moore v.

Commonwealth, 259 Va. 405, 410, 527 S.E.2d 415, 418 (2000).

However, that case, unlike the present case, did not

involve an appeal pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.4 of a

transfer decision by the juvenile court under Code § 16.1-

269.1(A). Moreover, in David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259

Va. 431, 527 S.E.2d 406 (2000), we explained that “[t]he

plain language of [Code § 16.1-269.6(E)] clearly manifests

legislative intent that any defect in the transfer

proceedings conducted in the juvenile court as provided in

Article 7 is waived such that the circuit court acquires

the authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction

over the offenses charged against the juvenile unless the

juvenile raises an objection based on a defect in the

juvenile court transfer hearing prior to arraignment in the

26
circuit court.” (Additional emphasis added). Id. at 440,

527 S.E.2d at 410-11.

In the present case, Dorian Lee-Kirk Shackleford

challenged the jurisdiction of the circuit court based on a

defect in the juvenile court transfer hearing and he did so

prior to his arraignment in the circuit court in accord

with Code § 16.1-269.6(E). The defect created by the lack

of the required notice to his father of that transfer

hearing is not disputed. Nevertheless, the majority

concludes that, notwithstanding the provisions of Code

§ 16.1-269.6(E), under Code § 16.1-269.1(E) “the indictment

cured the defect raised in Shackleford’s objection before

he made the objection.” To support this conclusion the

majority reasons that although “Code § 16.1-269.1(E) speaks

in terms of curing defects in the proceedings in the

juvenile court, an appeal from a transfer decision under

Code § 16.1-269.4 is the final step in the transfer process

commenced under Code § 16.1-269.1(A)” and that “the

legislature intended for an indictment to cure any defects

in that entire process.” Under this reasoning, for all

practical purposes, any objection to the jurisdiction of

the circuit court pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.6(E) could

never be effective, even though timely asserted, once an

indictment has been returned against the juvenile

27
defendant. Certainly, the legislature did not intend to

create a right under Code § 16.1-269.6 without a remedy. ∗

It should be self-evident that the proceeding held in

the circuit court on an appeal of a transfer decision is

not a “proceeding held in the juvenile court.” Moreover,

Code § 16.1-269.1(E) makes no reference to a “final step in

the transfer process;” the majority simply adds that

language, as it must, in order to support its expanded

interpretation of the express terms of this statute. But,

“[c]ourts are not permitted to add language to a statute

nor are they ‘permitted to accomplish the same result by

judicial interpretation.’ ” Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261

Va. 501, 511, 544 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001) (quoting Harbor

∗
Code § 16.1-272.1, enacted in 2000, further undermines
the majority’s conclusion with regard to the legislative
intent embodied in Code § 16.1-269.1(E). This statutes
provides, in pertinent part, that:

In addition to any other curative provisions,
waivers, procedural defaults, or requirements for
timely objections, including but not limited to
those in . . . subsection E of § 16.1-269.1 and
subsection E of § 16.1-269.6, any claim of error
or defect under this chapter, jurisdictional or
otherwise, that is not raised within one year
from the date of final judgment of the circuit
court or one year from the effective date of this
act, whichever is the later, shall not constitute
a ground for relief in any judicial proceeding.

If the majority’s expanded interpretation of Code § 16.1-
269.1(E) is correct, then the inclusion of that Code

28
Cruises, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 458, 461, 230 S.E.2d

248, 250 (1976)).

In my view, under Code § 16.1-269.1(E) the effect of

an indictment in the circuit court is to cure defects in

the juvenile proceedings for purposes of establishing the

subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court, and not

to divest the circuit court of its authority under Code

§ 16.1-269.6 to consider objections to and appeals of a

transfer decision by the juvenile court made prior to

arraignment on that indictment. See David Moore v.

Commonwealth, 259 Va. at 437, 527 S.E.2d at 409

(distinguishing between the power of a court to adjudicate

a specified class of cases and the authority of a court to

exercise that power in a particular case). Where, as here,

the record shows that the Commonwealth failed to provide

both of Shackleford’s parents with notice of the

proceedings in the juvenile court as then required by Code

§§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264, Code § 16.1-269.6(E), in addition

to the other provisions of Code § 16.1-269.6, provided

Shackleford the right to assert that defect in the

subsequent proceedings held in the circuit court.

Moreover, that defect caused the transfer of jurisdiction

section in Code § 16.1-272.1 would have been entirely
unnecessary. Clearly the legislature concluded otherwise.

29
from the juvenile court to the circuit court to be

ineffectual and Shackleford’s subsequent convictions to be

void. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 1, 2, 516 S.E.2d

219, 220 (1999) (per curiam), aff’g Baker v. Commonwealth,

28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998). The circuit court

erred in failing to exercise its authority to remand the

case to the juvenile court for further proceedings in order

to ensure that both of Shackleford’s parents were provided

with the then required notice of the proceedings against

him.

For these reasons, I would reverse Shackleford’s

convictions and remand the case for further proceedings.

Accordingly, I would not reach the other issues raised by

Shackleford in this appeal.

30