Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and
Kinser, JJ., and Compton, S.J.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
v. Record No. 992706 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER
November 3, 2000
CHRISTOPHER LYANCE CHATMAN
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal, we address a question of first
impression in this Commonwealth, whether a 13-year-old
juvenile has either a constitutional or statutory right to
assert an insanity defense at the adjudicatory phase of a
juvenile delinquency proceeding. Because we conclude that a
juvenile does not have that right in such proceedings under
either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or
the statutes of this Commonwealth, we will reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the
availability of the insanity defense in such juvenile
proceedings is essential to due process.
MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS
Christopher Lyance Chatman was charged with delinquency
in a petition alleging that he had committed the crime of
malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51. The City
of Emporia Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court
adjudged Chatman a delinquent upon finding that he had
committed unlawful wounding. Chatman appealed that finding
to the Circuit Court of Greensville County. See Code § 16.1-
296.
In the circuit court, Chatman moved for a psychiatric
evaluation to determine whether he was insane at the time of
the offense. In support of his motion, Chatman asserted that
he “has a long history of mental illness and seeks a
psychiatric evaluation to establish an insanity defense.” He
alleged that on the day of the offense, a medical doctor
examined him and opined that Chatman displayed homicidal
ideations. Chatman further alleged that a licensed clinical
psychologist evaluated him two days after the offense and
diagnosed a “Schizophreniform Disorder.” 1
At a hearing on Chatman’s motion, the Commonwealth did
not contest that Chatman’s alleged mental problems would
entitle him to a psychiatric evaluation to determine his
sanity at the time of the offense if he were an adult. 2
However, the Commonwealth argued that, as a 13-year-old
juvenile, Chatman had neither a due process right under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
nor a statutory right to assert an insanity defense at the
_______________________
1
Other than Chatman’s allegations, the record does not
contain any reports from those mental health evaluators.
2
The Commonwealth acknowledges this fact on brief before
this Court.
2
adjudicatory phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The
circuit court agreed with the Commonwealth and denied the
motion. After a bench trial on the petition charging
delinquency, the court, in an amended order, found “the
defendant guilty of the delinquency charge of unlawful
wounding” and committed Chatman “to the Department of Youth
and Family Services . . . .” 3
Chatman then petitioned the Court of Appeals for an
appeal from the circuit court’s judgment. The Court of
Appeals awarded the appeal, reversed the judgment of the
circuit court, and remanded the case for a determination of
whether Chatman is entitled to a mental health evaluation
pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.5 and for further proceedings if
the Commonwealth be so advised. Chatman v. Commonwealth, 30
Va. App. 593, 601, 518 S.E.2d 847, 851 (1999). The Court of
Appeals acknowledged that the provisions of the Code
pertaining to the juvenile and domestic relations district
courts do not expressly provide for or prohibit an insanity
defense by a juvenile at an adjudicatory hearing. However,
the court found “no reasonable basis for concluding that an
insanity defense is unavailable to a juvenile at a proceeding
_______________________
3
The circuit court incorrectly referred to the
“Department of Juvenile Justice” under its former name of
“Department of Youth and Family Services.” See Code § 16.1-
228.
3
to adjudicate him or her delinquent as it would be to an
adult defendant in a criminal trial.” Id. The Court of
Appeals concluded that “the right to assert an insanity
defense is an essential of ‘due process and fair treatment’
which is required at a juvenile delinquency adjudication.”
Id.
The Commonwealth petitioned the Court of Appeals for
rehearing and also requested a rehearing en banc. The Court
of Appeals denied both petitions, and we awarded the
Commonwealth this appeal.
FACTS
Since the facts of the underlying offense are not
essential to the issue on appeal, we will not discuss them in
detail. Both Chatman, who was 13 years old at the time of
the offense, and the victim were students in a public school
special education program. They had exchanged angry words at
school on January 22, 1997, and after school rode home
together in a school vehicle. When the vehicle stopped at
Chatman’s house for him to exit, the victim also got out of
the vehicle. Chatman then pulled out a knife and stabbed the
victim in the shoulder.
ANAYLSIS
Although the Court of Appeals based its decision on the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
4
Commonwealth argues that Chatman has neither a constitutional
nor a statutory right to raise an insanity defense. These
are the two sources upon which Chatman relies to assert that
he has such a right. Consequently, we will address the
arguments seriatim.
In Virginia, we have recognized the defense of insanity
as set forth in M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. and F. 200, 8 Eng.
Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843), since 1871. Price v. Commonwealth, 228
Va. 452, 459, 323 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1984); Dejarnette v.
Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 876-78 (1881); Boswell v.
Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860, 874-76 (1871). Under
the M’Naghten definition, an accused must establish that he
or she did not know the difference between right and wrong,
or that he or she did not understand the nature and
consequences of the acts in question. Price, 228 Va. at 457-
58, 323 S.E.2d at 108-09. If a defendant relies on the
defense of insanity, the burden rests on the defendant “to
prove to the satisfaction of the jury” that he or she was
insane at the time of the offense. Thompson v. Commonwealth,
193 Va. 704, 711, 70 S.E.2d 284, 288 (1952).
Chatman asserts that he has a right under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to assert this
insanity defense. Relying on the decisions of the Supreme
Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and In re Winship,
5
397 U.S. 358 (1970), Chatman argues that “the right to
present an insanity defense goes to fundamental due process
fairness and is not one of those rights that can be withheld
from him.”
The Commonwealth, however, disagrees and argues that,
since the Constitution does not require states to recognize
an insanity defense for adults charged with committing
criminal acts, see Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,
(1992); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, (1968) (plurality
opinion), it follows that a juvenile likewise does not have a
right under the Due Process Clause to assert such a defense
in a delinquency proceeding. The Commonwealth contends that,
even if the insanity defense were constitutionally guaranteed
in adult criminal trials, the right to raise the defense
would nonetheless still not apply in juvenile delinquency
proceedings. Continuing, the Commonwealth asserts that, in
contrast to those rights that were afforded to juveniles in
Gault and Winship, the insanity defense is not fundamental to
the factfinding process because sanity, unlike mens rea, is
not an element of the offense. We agree with the
Commonwealth’s position.
The question in Powell was whether a conviction for
public drunkenness violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. In analyzing that question,
6
the plurality’s opinion addressed the role of the states vis-
a-vis the Supreme Court in developing common law concepts to
assess an individual’s accountability for criminal acts:
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity,
mistake, justification, and duress have historically
provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment
of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal
law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and
medical views of the nature of man. This process of
adjustment has always been thought to be the province of
the States.
Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court
to be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test
in constitutional terms. . . . If a person in the
‘condition’ of being a chronic alcoholic cannot be
criminally punished as a constitutional matter for being
drunk in public, it would seem to follow that a person
who contends that, in terms of one test, ‘his unlawful
act was the product of mental disease or mental defect,’
would state an issue of constitutional dimension with
regard to his criminal responsibility had he been tried
under some different and perhaps lesser standard, e.g.,
the right-wrong test of M’Naghten’s Case.
392 U.S. at 536 (citation omitted). Twenty-four years later
in Medina, the view expressed in Powell concerning the role
of the states in developing certain doctrines was expressed
more succinctly with regard to the insanity defense. The
Court in Medina stated, “while the Due Process Clause affords
an incompetent defendant the right not to be tried, we have
not said that the Constitution requires the States to
recognize the insanity defense.” 505 U.S. at 449 (citations
omitted) (citing Powell, 392 U.S. at 536-37); accord Golden
v. State, 21 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Ark. 2000) (recognizing that,
7
under Medina, there is no constitutional right to raise
insanity defense; thus defendant may assert such defense only
if provided by statute). 4
The Court of Appeals did not discuss the decisions in
Powell or Medina. 5 Nor did it acknowledge the fact that the
Supreme Court has never held that the Due Process Clause
requires states to recognize the defense of insanity for an
adult accused of committing a crime. Yet, in Gault and
Winship, the rights that were afforded to juveniles under the
Due Process Clause, i.e., adequate written notice; advice
concerning the right to counsel, retained or appointed; the
right to confront evidence and to cross-examine witnesses;
the privilege against self-incrimination; and the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, were rights that were
unquestionably available to adults in criminal proceedings.
Neither the Court of Appeals nor Chatman has explained why a
13-year-old juvenile should be granted a right under the Due
_______________________
4
However, the Supreme Court has held that an incompetent
defendant has a right under the Due Process Clause not to be
tried. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172-73 (1975); Pate
v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966). The General Assembly
has established a procedure to determine if a juvenile is
unable to understand the pending proceedings or to assist an
attorney in a defense. Code §§ 16.1-356 through –361.
5
Similarly, the cases cited by the Court of Appeals from
states that have held that a juvenile has a right under the
Due Process Clause to assert an insanity defense at an
8
Process Clause in a proceeding to adjudicate delinquency when
that right is not constitutionally mandated for adults in
criminal proceedings to adjudicate their guilt or innocence. 6
The plurality in Powell recognized the difficulties in
elevating the opportunity to assert an insanity defense to a
right of constitutional dimensions. Not all states that
allow a defendant to raise an insanity defense utilize the
M’Naghten test for insanity. See, e.g., Hart v. State, 702
P.2d 651, 657-58 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Wilson, 700
A.2d 633, 638 (Conn. 1997); State v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884,
888-89 (Mont. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005 (1994).
Thus, if due process includes the right to assert the defense
of insanity, the Supreme Court would “be impelled into
defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms.”
Powell, 392 U.S. at 536. But, as the plurality said,
“formulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not
eliminate, [the] fruitful experimentation [with different
standards], and freeze the developing productive dialogue
between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold.”
______________________
adjudicatory proceeding did not discuss Powell and were
decided before Medina.
6
The fact that the General Assembly has created a
statutory mechanism for an adult to assert an insanity
defense in a criminal proceeding, see Chapters 11 and 11.1 of
Title 19.2, does not transform the insanity defense into a
constitutional right for either adults or juveniles. Chatman
9
Id. at 536-37; see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-
01 (1952) (adoption of the irresistible impulse test is not
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” because “choice
of a test of legal sanity involves not only scientific
knowledge but questions of basic policy as to the extent to
which that knowledge should determine criminal
responsibility”).
Thus, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the circuit court violated Chatman’s due process
rights when it denied his motion for a psychiatric
evaluation, thereby preventing him from asserting an insanity
defense at the adjudicatory proceeding on the petition
charging Chatman with delinquency.
Having disposed of Chatman’s constitutional claim, we
now turn to his argument that he also has a statutory right
to raise an insanity defense. With regard to this issue,
Chatman first notes that Chapter 11 of Article 16.1, dealing
with juvenile and domestic relations district courts, does
not contain any language prohibiting a juvenile from
presenting such a defense. Continuing, he posits that the
use of the term “person” in Code §§ 19.2-168 and 16.1-278.11
______________________
has not argued that he has a right under the Equal Protection
Clause to raise an insanity defense.
10
necessarily includes both adults and juveniles. 7 Otherwise,
the General Assembly would have used some term other than
“person” in these two provisions. We are not persuaded by
Chatman’s arguments.
We begin the statutory analysis by reviewing the
provisions of the Code pertaining to the adjudication and
disposition of a 13-year-old juvenile charged with
delinquency. 8 A “[d]elinquent child” is defined as “a child
who has committed a delinquent act.” Code § 16.1-228. A
“[d]elinquent act” is “an act designated a crime under the
law of this Commonwealth . . . .” Id. When a juvenile is
found to be delinquent, the juvenile court or the circuit
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7
Code § 19.2-168 provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]n
any case in which a person charged with a crime intends . . .
to put in issue his sanity at the time of the crime charged
. . . , he . . . shall give notice in writing to the attorney
for the Commonwealth . . . .” Irrespective of whether the
term “person” includes both juveniles and adults, Chatman was
not “charged with a crime.” Instead, he was charged with
delinquency.
Code § 16.1-278.11 states, in pertinent part, that “[i]n
cases involving a person who is adjudged mentally ill . . .,
disposition shall be in accordance with the provisions of
Chapters 1 (§ 37.1-1 et seq.) and 2 (§ 37.1-63 et seq.) of
Title 37.1.”
8
The provisions of Chapter 11 of Title 16.1 regarding
juveniles 14 years of age or older are not relevant to our
discussion because Chatman was 13 years old at the time of
the offense at issue in this case. Thus, he could not be
tried as an adult. See Code § 16.1-269.1 Accordingly, the
cases cited by the Court of Appeals and Chatman in which
juveniles were transferred to circuit court for proper
11
court has several available options with regard to making
“orders of disposition for [the juvenile’s] supervision, care
and rehabilitation.” Code § 16.1-278.8. One of those
options, which is relevant to the present case, is to commit
a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent to an
appropriate hospital pursuant to the provisions of Code
§§ 16.1-338 through –345 of “The Psychiatric Inpatient
Treatment of Minors Act” when the court “reasonably believes”
that the juvenile is mentally ill. Code § 16.1-280. The
court’s authority under Code § 16.1-280 is, however,
predicated upon a finding of delinquency. Furthermore,
§ 16.1-337 of “The Psychiatric Inpatient Treatment of Minors
Act” provides that “[a] minor may be admitted to a mental
health facility for inpatient treatment only pursuant to
§§ 16.1-338, 16.1-339, or § 16.1-340 [of that act] or in
accordance with an order of involuntary commitment . . . .” 9
(Emphasis added.)
Notably, in contrast to the specific statutory
provisions dealing with a juvenile’s incompetence to stand
______________________
criminal proceedings as an adult are not relevant to the
questions presented in this appeal.
9
Code § 16.1-278.11 also provides that “[i]n cases
involving a person who is adjudged mentally ill . . . ,
disposition shall be in accordance with the provisions of
Chapters 1 (§ 37.1-1 et seq.) and 2 (§ 37.1-63 et seq.) of
Title 37.1.” To the extent, if any, that there is a conflict
12
trial, see Code §§ 16.1-356 through -361, the Code does not
contain any provision allowing the use of an insanity defense
at the adjudicatory phase of a delinquency proceeding.
Instead, the General Assembly elected to make a juvenile’s
mental illness or insanity a factor to be considered during
disposition after the juvenile had been adjudicated
delinquent. Code § 16.1-280. “Courts ‘cannot read into a
statute something that is not within the manifest intention
of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself.’ ”
Jordan v. Town of South Boston, 138 Va. 838, 844, 122 S.E.
265, 267 (1924)(quoting 25 R.C.L. 963, § 218).
Nevertheless, Chatman contends that the provisions of
Chapters 11 (proceedings on questions of insanity) and 11.1
(disposition of persons acquitted by reason of insanity) of
Title 19.2 should be interpreted as applying to juveniles
during an adjudication of delinquency. In response, the
Commonwealth points out that, under the provisions pertaining
to the disposition of persons acquitted by reason of
insanity, it is possible to have an indeterminate period of
commitment for inpatient treatment. Because of this
possibility, the Commonwealth reasons that those provisions
cannot apply to juveniles because the juvenile and domestic
______________________
between this provision and the terms of Code § 16.1-337, that
issue is not before us.
13
relations district courts do not have jurisdiction over a
juvenile beyond the juvenile’s 21st birthday. We agree with
the Commonwealth.
When a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity at
the time of the offense, the court must place the acquittee
in the temporary custody of the Commissioner of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services for
an evaluation to determine whether that acquittee can be
released or requires commitment. Code § 19.2-182.2. If an
acquittee is mentally ill and in need of inpatient
hospitalization, the court must commit the acquittee. Code
§ 19.2-182.3. When an acquittee is committed for inpatient
hospitalization, the committing court must conduct periodic
assessments of the confined acquittee’s continuing need for
such treatment. Code § 19.2-182.5. As the Commonwealth
points out, the provisions of the Code dealing with the
disposition of persons acquitted by reason of insanity do
not, however, limit the length of time that an acquittee can
be confined for inpatient treatment. Thus, it is conceivable
that an acquittee could be confined for inpatient treatment
for many years or for the remainder of his or her life, if
14
the acquittee continues to be mentally ill and in need of
inpatient treatment. 10 Code §§ 19.2-182.5(C) and –182.6(C).
However, the juvenile and domestic relations district
courts retain jurisdiction over a juvenile only until that
juvenile attains the age of 21 years. Code § 16.1-242. 11
Thus, if the statutory scheme governing the disposition of
persons acquitted by reason of insanity were available to a
13-year-old juvenile, that scheme’s indeterminate period of
commitment for inpatient hospitalization could run afoul of
the limited duration of the juvenile and domestic relations
district courts’ jurisdiction. If the General Assembly had
intended for a juvenile such as Chatman to assert an insanity
defense under Chapters 11 and 11.1 of Title 19.2, we believe
that it would have resolved this conflict. Thus, we conclude
that Chatman does not have a statutory right to raise the
_______________________
10
The factors that must be considered when initially
committing an acquittee and also when reviewing the need for
continued confinement are: (1) to what extent the acquittee
is mentally ill or mentally retarded; (2) the likelihood that
the acquittee will engage in conduct that presents a
substantial risk of bodily harm either to other persons or to
the acquittee; (3) the likelihood that the accquittee can be
adequately supervised and treated as an outpatient; and (4)
any other factors deemed relevant by the court. Code § 19.2-
182.3.
11
On appeal, a circuit court has the powers and
authority granted to the juvenile and domestic relations
district courts. Code § 16.1-296(I).
15
defense of insanity at the adjudicatory phase of his
delinquency proceeding.
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit
court adjudicating Chatman to be delinquent. 12
Reversed and final judgment.
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting.
Today a majority of this Court permits Christopher
Lyance Chatman, a 13-year-old juvenile who well may not have
known the difference between right and wrong or not have
understood the nature and consequences of his act, to be
adjudicated a delinquent upon a finding that he committed the
crime of unlawful wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51,
and then to be committed to the Department of Juvenile
Justice for an indeterminate period of time pursuant to Code
§§ 16.1-278.8 and 16.1.285. The majority permits this child
to be adjudicated and committed by the trial court because it
concludes that a 13-year-old child does not have a right to
assert an insanity defense at the adjudicatory phase of a
juvenile delinquency proceeding under either the Due Process
_______________________
12
Chatman also argues on brief that the circuit court
erred in not granting his motion for a psychiatric evaluation
because the results of the evaluation might have been
relevant to the disposition of his case. However, Chatman
did not present that argument to the circuit court. Thus, we
will not consider it on appeal. Rule 5:25.
16
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the statutes of this
Commonwealth. 13 The majority permits this child to be so
treated even though it acknowledges that this Court has
recognized the defense of insanity for adults, under the so-
called M’Naghten Rule, since 1871. See Boswell v.
Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860, 874-76 (1871).
The citizens of this Commonwealth and, indeed, the
General Assembly may be rightfully troubled and surprised to
learn that over the ensuing 129 years since 1871, according
to the majority, this well-established common law right of
adults has not been extended to 13-year-old juveniles charged
with acts that would be crimes if committed by adults. For
my part, I cannot join in such a conclusion and, accordingly,
I respectfully dissent.
The Court of Appeals properly noted that the “Juvenile
and Domestic Relations District Court Law [contained in
Chapter 11 of Title 16.1 of the Code of Virginia] does not
expressly provide for or prohibit an insanity defense at
either an adjudicatory hearing in [juvenile] court or in an
_______________________
13
The majority states that “[t]hese are the two sources
upon which Chatman relies to assert that he has [the right to
assert an insanity defense].” Indeed, as related by the
majority, it was the Commonwealth that asserted this
limitation in the trial court. Regardless, we may not simply
ignore the common law of this Commonwealth as the proper
source of Chatman’s right.
17
appeal to the circuit court upon a finding of delinquency.”
Chatman v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 593, 597, 518 S.E.2d
847, 849 (1999). After referencing the various statutes that
provide the mechanism for a criminal defendant to raise and
prove an insanity defense contained in Chapter 11 of Title
19.2, the Court of Appeals found “no reasonable basis for
concluding that an insanity defense is unavailable to a
juvenile at a proceeding to adjudicate him or her delinquent
as it would be to an adult defendant in a criminal trial.”
Id. at 601, 518 S.E.2d at 851. The Court further concluded
that “the right to assert an insanity defense is an essential
of ‘due process and fair treatment’ which is required at a
juvenile delinquency adjudication.” Id. The Court expressly
noted that because Chatman was not yet 14 years of age at the
time the charged offense was committed, he could not have
been tried as an adult in the circuit court. See Code
§ 16.1-269.l. Finally, the Court also noted that it
expressed no opinion regarding Chatman’s disposition in the
event he were to be found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Upon appeal to this Court, the majority carefully limits
its holding to apply only to a juvenile under age 14.
Undoubtedly this is so because under the pertinent statutory
scheme age 14 is the critical age in determining whether a
juvenile may be tried as an adult and under certain
18
circumstances sentenced to incarceration as an adult. See
Code §§ 16.1-269.1 and 16.1-272. The apparent significance
of making this careful distinction in the majority’s analysis
between age 13 and age 14 is that presumably there would be
no question that when a juvenile 14 years old or older is
tried as an adult, such a juvenile would have the same right
as an adult to assert a defense of insanity to the charged
offense.
The majority, relying upon Code § 16.1-280, concludes
that “the General Assembly elected to make a juvenile’s
mental illness or insanity a factor to be considered during
the [dispositional phase and] after the juvenile had been
adjudicated delinquent.” This statute, however, specifically
addresses a case where the juvenile court “reasonably
believes” that a juvenile “is mentally ill or mentally
retarded.” (Emphasis added). Clearly this statute addresses
the court’s dispositional options with regard to a juvenile’s
mental condition at the time of the proceeding; the insanity
defense, in sharp contrast, addresses the juvenile’s mental
condition at the time the charged offense was committed.
Thus, under the majority’s analysis, where a 13-year-old
juvenile is proven to be insane at the time he or she
committed the charged offense, but not mentally ill at the
time of the adjudicatory hearing regarding that offense, that
19
juvenile may nevertheless be adjudicated a delinquent.
Surely there can be no such offense as being delinquent by
reason of being insane.
The United States Supreme Court’s statement that “while
the Due Process Clause affords an incompetent defendant the
right not to be tried . . ., we have not said that the
Constitution requires the States to recognize the insanity
defense,” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992), is
not dispositive of the issue whether a 13-year-old juvenile
has the right to assert that defense in this Commonwealth.
Under well-established principles, that holding does not
prevent this Commonwealth from extending the right to assert
the insanity defense both to adults and to all juveniles as a
matter of state law. And in doing so, the Commonwealth is
free, for purposes of state law, to find that “fundamental
fairness” requires that both adults and juveniles be
permitted to assert this defense. In my view, the General
Assembly, relying upon this Court’s long recognition of the
insanity defense without express limitation to the age of the
accused, also has not limited or restricted this defense to
cases involving adults charged with criminal acts.
The pertinent statutes contained in Chapter 11 of Title
19.2 provide the mechanism for a criminal defendant to raise
and prove an insanity defense. The right to assert that
20
defense, however, arises from this Court’s recognition of
that right as a matter of the common law of this Commonwealth
unless otherwise limited or restricted by statute. Code
§ 19.2-168 implicitly acknowledges the right for a juvenile
to assert the insanity defense in the adjudicatory phase of
the juvenile court proceeding. The statute provides, in
pertinent part, that “[i]n any case in which a person charged
with a crime intends . . . to put in issue his insanity at
the time of the crime charged . . . he, or his counsel, shall
give notice in writing to the attorney for the Commonwealth
. . . .” (Emphasis added). 14 The broad language in this
statute does not limit its application to proceedings
involving adult defendants. A juvenile, even one 13-years-
old, is “a person.” That conclusion is not merely a
_______________________
14
In footnote 7, the majority reasons that Code § 19.2-
168 is not applicable in Chatman’s case because “Chatman was
not ‘charged with a crime.’ Instead, he was charged with
delinquency.” The fine distinction the majority thus
attempts to draw between “a crime” and “delinquency” in this
case is simply not supported in the pertinent statutes. Code
§ 16.1-228, in part, states that “ Delinquent act’ means (i)
an act designated a crime under the law of this Commonwealth”
and a “ ‘Delinquent child’ means a child who has committed a
delinquent act.” Chatman was charged with having committed
the crime of malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-
51. Such a crime is designated a “violent juvenile felony.”
See Code §§ 16.1-241(A)(6) and 16.1-269.1(C). See also Code
§ 16.1-278.8(14)(permitting a juvenile to be committed to the
Department of Juvenile Justice if older than ten years of age
for “an offense” which would be a felony or a Class 1
misdemeanor if committed by an adult and the juvenile has
21
simplistic one. Certainly, the Supreme Court’s decisions in
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and in In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970), are clear that for certain constitutional
rights the juvenile in each of these cases was a “person”
under the Due Process Clause. In addition, because the
insanity defense has been recognized as a part of the common
law of this Commonwealth and has been deeply engrained in the
practice of criminal law here since 1871, we can assume that
the General Assembly intended “fair treatment” for both
adults and juveniles when it enacted Code § 19.2-168 and,
thus, used the term “person” in this statute to accomplish
that purpose.
Admittedly, it is mere speculation as to whether Chatman
could successfully establish his insanity at the time of the
charged offense. Judicial experience reflects that the
insanity defense is seldom successfully asserted. However,
the majority reasons, in part, that because the pertinent
statutory scheme pertaining to the disposition of persons
acquitted by reason of insanity conceivably could result in
an indeterminate period of commitment, those provisions
cannot apply to juveniles because the juvenile courts do not
have jurisdiction over the juvenile beyond the juvenile’s
______________________
previously been found to be “delinquent” based on such
offenses).
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21st birthday. See Code §§ 19.2-182.2 through 19.2-182.6.
There is, however, a significant difference between the
existence of the right for the juvenile to assert an insanity
defense on the one hand, and, on the other, in what manner
the juvenile court upon acquitting the juvenile by reason of
his or her insanity would apply the statutory provisions for
the treatment of a person so acquitted.
The answer to the “conflict” which the majority
perceives in this statutory scheme, in my view, is that the
acquitted juvenile would remain committed until his or her
21st birthday only if he or she remained mentally ill. Upon
reaching his or her 21st birthday the acquitted juvenile
would have to be released absent any further action by the
Commonwealth. In that regard, nothing would prohibit the
Commissioner of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and
Substance Abuse Services, into whose custody the juvenile was
originally committed, to file a petition in the appropriate
court to have the person recommitted under the provisions of
Chapters 1 and 2 of Title 37.1-1.
Finally, and more importantly, the holding of the
majority has the potential of considerable adverse impact on
a juvenile who is subsequently found guilty of other criminal
acts after having been adjudicated delinquent at age 13, or
younger, for an offense committed while insane. This is so
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because the adjudication of delinquency for violating a
criminal statute could then be used by the Commonwealth to
effectively increase the juvenile’s punishment for the
subsequent criminal acts. See, e.g., Code § 16.1-278.8
(permitting enhanced punishment were juvenile has been
previously adjudicated delinquent); § 16.1-269.l(e)
(permitting consideration of prior commitments to juvenile
correctional centers in transfer of juvenile to circuit court
to stand trial as an adult). In short, while made in a
different context, the familiar quote from Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966), seems applicable. There
Justice Fortis observed that “[t]here is evidence . . . that
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the
worst of both worlds; that he gets neither the protection
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children.”
If such is the case for a 13-year-old juvenile with
regard to the right to assert an insanity defense at the
adjudicatory phase of the juvenile proceedings in this
Commonwealth, then perhaps the General Assembly, in its
wisdom, will determine that such is not “fair treatment” and
legislate accordingly. Again, for my part, I am compelled to
believe that the common law of this Commonwealth, rather than
the Due Process Clause or the various statutes addressed by
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the majority, already protects such a child by affording the
right to assert an insanity defense to any child charged with
an offense that would be a crime if committed by an adult.
For these reasons, in my view, the Court of Appeals
properly determined that Chatman was entitled to a mental
health evaluation in anticipation of asserting an insanity
defense. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
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