Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International, Inc.

Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz,
and Kinser, JJ., and Compton, Senior Justice

NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC.

v. Record No. 991168 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER
April 21, 2000
UMBRO INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
M. Langhorne Keith, Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In this case of first impression, we address the issue

whether a contractual right to use an Internet domain name

can be garnished. In doing so, we “apply traditional legal

principles to [a] new avenue[] of commerce,” Intermatic Inc.

v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (N.D. Ill. 1996), and

conclude that such a contractual right is “the product of a

contract for services,” Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp.2d 558, 561

(E.D. Va. 1999), and hence is not subject to garnishment.

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit

court holding that the domain name registrations at issue in

this appeal are garnishable.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 1997, appellee Umbro International, Inc. (Umbro),

obtained a default judgment and permanent injunction in the

United States District Court for the District of South

Carolina against 3263851 Canada, Inc., a Canadian corporation
(the judgment debtor), and also against a Canadian citizen

who owns the judgment debtor. Umbro Int’l, Inc. v. 3263851

Canada, Inc., No. 6:97-2779-20, slip op. at 5, 8 (D.S.C. Dec.

31, 1997). That proceeding involved the judgment debtor’s

registration of the Internet domain name 1 “umbro.com.” In its

order, the district court permanently enjoined the judgment

debtor from further use of the domain name “umbro.com” and

awarded judgment to Umbro in the amount of $23,489.98 for

attorneys’ fees and expenses. Id. at 8.

Umbro subsequently obtained a Certification of Judgment

for Registration in Another District from the district court

in South Carolina. Umbro then filed that document in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia, which, in turn, issued an Exemplification

Certificate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963. Using that Certificate

and a copy of the district court’s judgment, Umbro obtained a

writ of fieri facias from the Circuit Court of Fairfax County

and instituted a garnishment proceeding that is the subject

of this appeal.

In the garnishment summons, Umbro named Network

Solutions, Inc. (NSI), as the garnishee and sought to garnish

38 Internet domain names that the judgment debtor had

1
An explanation and discussion of an “Internet domain
name,” as well as related terms, appears infra at pages __-
__.

2
registered with NSI. Accordingly, Umbro asked NSI to place

those domain names on hold and to deposit control of them

into the registry of the circuit court so that the domain

names could be advertised and sold to the highest bidder.

NSI answered the garnishment summons, stating that it

held no money or other garnishable property belonging to the

judgment debtor. Instead, NSI characterized what Umbro

sought to garnish as “standardized, executory service

contracts” or “domain name registration agreements.” NSI

also asserted that 8 of the 38 domain names listed in the

garnishment summons either were not then, or never had been,

subject to a domain name registration agreement between NSI

and the judgment debtor. 2

Umbro subsequently filed a motion for NSI to show cause

why it had not deposited control of the judgment debtor’s

domain names into the registry of the circuit court. NSI

opposed that motion and the garnishment on the grounds that

the writ of fieri facias does not attach to the judgment

debtor’s contractual rights that are dependent on unperformed

conditions, that the judgment debtor’s domain name

registration agreements with NSI are contracts for services

and thus not subject to garnishment, that domain name

services do not have a readily ascertainable value, and that

3
the domain name services are not similar to patents and other

forms of intellectual property.

In opposing the garnishment, NSI submitted an affidavit

from its director of business affairs, who stated that domain

names cannot function on the Internet in the absence of

certain services being provided by a domain name registrar

such as NSI. He further stated that NSI performs these

domain name registration services pursuant to a standard

domain name registration agreement.

After a hearing on Umbro’s show cause motion, the

circuit court determined that the judgment debtor’s Internet

domain name registrations are “valuable intangible property

subject to garnishment.” In a letter opinion, the court

concluded that the judgment debtor has a possessory interest

in the domain names registered with NSI. The court further

found that there are no unperformed conditions with regard to

the judgment debtor’s contractual rights to use the domain

names, that NSI is not being forced to perform services for

entities with whom it does not desire to do business, and

that the domain names are a “new form of intellectual

property.”

_______________________
2
Umbro now seeks to garnish 29 domain name registrations
by the judgment debtor with NSI.

4
 Accordingly, the court ordered NSI to deposit control

“over all of the [j]udgment [d]ebtor’s Internet domain name

registrations into the [r]egistry” of the court for sale by

the sheriff’s office. Because of the intangible nature of

the domain names, the court directed the sheriff’s office to

sell the domain names in whatever manner it “deem[ed]

appropriate” after consultation with Umbro, and to notify NSI

as to the name of the successful bidder for each domain name.

According to the court’s order, NSI then had to “transfer the

domain name registration” to the successful bidder “as soon

as commercially practicable following NSI’s receipt of a

properly completed registration application for the domain

name from the winning bidder.” This appeal followed.

Before analyzing NSI’s assignments of error, we will

discuss the Internet, the nature of domain names, and our

statutory garnishment proceedings.

III. THE INTERNET AND DOMAIN NAMES

The Internet, which began as a United States military

computer network called ARPANET, is now a “vast and

expanding,” Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1230, worldwide

network of interconnected computers, Reno v. American Civil

Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997). Anyone

connected to the Internet can access an exponentially

expanding wealth of information through an array of

5
communication methods such as electronic mail, electronic

mailing list services known as listservs, chat rooms,

newsgroups, and the World Wide Web (the Web). Id. at 851.

The Web is probably the most widely known and utilized method

of communication on the Internet. Id. at 852. In simple

terms, the Web consists of information or documents presented

on “pages” 3 of graphics, text and/or sound. Lockheed Martin

Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 951 (C.D.

Cal. 1997), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999); Intermatic,

947 F. Supp. at 1231. Pages may “contain ‘links’[ 4 ] to other

pages either within the same set of data files (‘Web site’)

or within data files located on other computer networks.”

Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 951. See also Robert L.

Tucker, Information Superhighway Robbery: The Tortious Misuse

of Links, Frames, Metatags, and Domain Names, 4 Va. J.L. &

Tech. 8, ¶ 6 (Fall 1999)

.

Each method of communicating on the Internet depends on

the use of a unique domain name, also known as a “fully

3
“Pages” are computer data files. Intermatic, 947 F.
Supp. at 1231.
4
A “link” is a graphic, text or combination of the two
that an Internet user may select, generally with a computer’s
mouse, and that provides an “avenue to other documents” on

6
qualified domain name,” Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1230, to

locate a specific computer or network, Lockheed Martin, 985

F. Supp. at 951. Domain names have been compared to

trademarks, addresses, or telephone numbers, but domain

names, addresses, and telephone numbers, unlike some

trademarks, are unique. MTV Networks, A Division of Viacom

Int’l, Inc. v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 204 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.

1994); Adam Chase, A Primer on Recent Domain Name Disputes, 3

Va. J.L. & Tech. 3, ¶ 2 (Spring 1998)

.

Each “host” computer that is “more-or-less permanently”

connected to the Internet is assigned its own “Internet

Protocol” (IP) number or address, which specifies the

location of the computer. Tucker, supra, ¶ 12. See also

Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1230. The IP number is comprised

of four groups of numbers, with each group separated by a

decimal point called a “dot.” Tucker, supra, ¶¶ 12-13. See

also Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 952; Panavision Int’l,

L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (C.D. Cal. 1996),

aff’d, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). For example, the IP

number for this Court is 208.210.219.101.

_______________________
the Internet. Reno, 521 U.S. at 852. See also Intermatic,
947 F. Supp. at 1232.

7
 Because Internet users can more readily remember a name

as opposed to a lengthy sequence of numbers composing an IP

number, each individual computer or network also has an

alphanumeric name called a “domain name.” Lockheed Martin,

985 F. Supp. at 952; Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1299; Chase,

supra, ¶ 2; Tucker, supra, ¶ 12. Reading from right to left,

each portion of a domain name identifies a more specific area

on the Internet, and as with IP numbers, is separated by a

“dot.” For example, in this Court’s domain name,

courts.state.va.us, “us” is the top-level domain, 5 and is a

country code or identifier which signifies that the domain

name is registered in the United States. See Sally M. Abel,

Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The Brave New Frontier, 5

Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 91, 93 n.4 (1999); Kenneth

Sutherlin Dueker, Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: Trademark

Protection for Internet Addresses, 9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 483,

492 n.50, 494-95 n.59 (1996); Stuart D. Levi, The Domain Name

System & Trademarks, 563 PLI/Pat 449, 453 (1999). “[V]a,” the

5
Top-level domains indicate a broad class to which the
domain name belongs. For example, “edu” represents
educational institutions, “gov” is reserved for federal
government entities, and “net” is reserved to networks. The
top-level domain “com,” short for “commercial,” is a catch-
all domain, and is generally available to registrants who
have no special attributes which would qualify them to use
another top-level domain. Tucker, supra, ¶ 13. Top-level
domains are assigned by a domain name registrar, such as NSI.
Sally M. Abel, Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The Brave New
Frontier, 5 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 91, 93 (1999).

8
second-level domain, 6 indicates a sub-network used in the

Commonwealth of Virginia; “state,” the third-level domain,

describes a sub-network used by the state government of

Virginia; and “courts” further indicates a computer used by

Virginia’s judiciary. See Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at

952; Dueker, supra, at 492-93.

If an Internet user knows the domain name for a

particular Web site, such as this Court, the user can type

the name into a Web browser, 7 and access that site directly

without having to conduct what may be a time-consuming

search. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1299. See also MTV, 867

F. Supp. at 204 n.2 (noting absence of “satisfactory Internet

equivalent of telephone company white pages or directory

assistance”). Even when a user does not know the specific

domain name for a Web site, the user can often deduce the

name and still find the site without performing a search.

Most businesses on the Internet use the “com” top-level

domain. See Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 952. Thus, a

6
All second-level domains are unique, and frequently
contain the corporate or trade name of the domain name
holder. Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 952. Second-level
domains are selected and requested by the domain name
registrant. Abel, supra, at 93.
7
A Web browser is a computer program that allows a user
of an Internet-connected computer to access content on the
Web. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 852; Jason R. Berne, Court
Intervention but not in a Classic Form: A Survey of Remedies

9
user could intuitively find a company’s Web site by typing

into a Web browser the corporate or trade name, such as

“umbro.com.” 8 Because the second-level domain name, i.e.,

“umbro” in the example, must be exclusive, a company would

obviously want to use its recognized name in the second level

of its Internet domain name. See id. See also Panavision,

945 F. Supp. at 1299 (“businesses frequently register their

names and trademarks as domain names”); supra note 6. The

advantage of having such a domain name thus explains the

value that is attached to some domain names and the reason

why litigation has occurred between trademark owners and

domain name holders. 9 Id. See also Intermatic, 947 F. Supp.

at 1233.

NSI’s role in the Internet domain name system is to

manage certain domain name registrations. Lockheed Martin,

985 F. Supp. at 953. At one time, NSI held the exclusive

_______________________
in Internet Trademark Cases, 43 St. Louis U. L.J. 1157, 1167
& n.71 (1999).
8
When an Internet user enters a domain name in his or
her browser, the browser sends the request through the
Internet in a process administered by a computer termed a
“top-level server.” Top-level servers maintain a registry of
each domain name active in a given top-level domain and match
requests for domain names to IP numbers in their registries.
Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1231; Berne, supra, at 1167.
9
Much of the litigation regarding domain names has
focused on trademark infringements. We cite to several of
those cases and related law review articles in this opinion,
but none of those cases squarely addresses the question
before us.

10
right, pursuant to a contract with the National Science

Foundation, to assign Internet domain names using the top-

level domains “gov,” “com,” “org,” “net,” and “edu,” see id.,

but it now shares that right with other domain name

registrars, Jason R. Berne, Court Intervention but not in a

Classic Form: A Survey of Remedies in Internet Trademark

Cases, 43 St. Louis U. L.J. 1157, 1168 (1999); Levi, supra,

at 456; Register.com - Domain Name Registration Services

(visited Apr. 12, 2000) . NSI

charges an initial registration fee of $70 for each new

domain name. The registration is valid for two years and may

be renewed on a yearly basis for a fee of $35 per year. 10

In assigning the second-level domain names, NSI performs

basically two services. NSI first compares applications with

a database of existing domain names to prevent the

registration of identical second-level domain names. NSI

then matches the domain name to the corresponding IP number

for the desired Web site. Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at

953. Domain names are available essentially on a first-come,

first-serve basis. MTV, 867 F. Supp. at 204 n.2; Chase,

supra, ¶ 5.

_______________________

10
NSI has recently begun to register domain names for up
to ten years. NSI – Catalog -- Web Address Registration

11
 NSI performs these services pursuant to domain name

registration agreements. NSI does not independently verify a

registrant’s right to use a domain name, but does require a

registrant to make certain representations and warranties,

such as certifying that the registrant has the right to use

the domain name and that such use does not interfere with the

rights of another party. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1299.

A registrant also agrees to be bound by NSI’s “Domain

Name Dispute Policy.” In accordance with that policy, when

litigation arises with regard to the registration and use of

a domain name, NSI deposits control over the domain name into

the registry of a court by furnishing the plaintiff in such

litigation with a “registry certificate.” 11 In such

instances, NSI agrees to be bound by the provisions of any

temporary or final court orders regarding the disposition of

a domain name without being named a party to the litigation,

provided the domain name registrant is named as a party. The

terms of the “Domain Name Dispute Policy” also authorize NSI,

in its sole discretion, “to revoke, suspend, transfer or

otherwise modify a domain name registration upon thirty (30)

_______________________
(visited Apr. 12, 2000)
.
11
The record in this case does not contain any “registry
certificate” that was filed in the litigation in the federal
district court in South Carolina, but it does contain a
“Declaration” by NSI’s “Internet Business Manager,” which was

12
calendar days prior written notice, or at such time as [NSI]

receives a properly authenticated order from a court . . .

requiring the revocation, suspension, transfer or

modification of the domain name registration.”

NSI has also developed a procedure that allows a new

domain name registrant to acquire a previously registered

domain name with the consent of the former registrant of that

name. The old registrant relinquishes its domain name

registration, and the new registrant agrees to be bound by

the terms of NSI’s current “Domain Name Registration

Agreement” and “Domain Name Dispute Policy.” NSI requires

the old and new registrants to execute a form agreement

titled “Registrant Name Change Agreement[,] Version 3.0 —

Transfers” in order to effect this change.

IV. GARNISHMENT PROCEDURES

Under Virginia law, a judgment creditor can enforce a

judgment for money by requesting the clerk of the court where

the judgment was rendered to issue a writ of fieri facias and

then by delivering that writ to a “proper person” of the

court for execution. Code § 8.01-466. See also Code § 8.01-

465.2 (foreign judgment properly filed with clerk is subject

to same procedures as judgments rendered by circuit court).

The writ commands the officer “to make the money therein

_______________________
filed in that litigation. The “Declaration” contains

13
mentioned out of the goods and chattels of the person against

whom the judgment is.” Code § 8.01-474. See also Code

§ 8.01-478 (“writ of fieri facias may be levied on the goods

and chattels of the judgment debtor”). When property of a

judgment debtor is not capable of being levied on, as in the

case of intangible personal property, such property is

nevertheless subject to the execution lien upon delivery of

the writ to a sheriff or other officer. Code § 8.01-501;

Virginia Nat’l Bank v. Blofeld, 234 Va. 395, 399, 362 S.E.2d

692, 694 (1987).

Garnishment, like other lien enforcement remedies

authorizing seizure of property, is a creature of statute

unknown to the common law, and hence the provisions of the

statute must be strictly satisfied. See Long v. Ryan, 71 Va.

(30 Gratt.) 718, 724 (1878); Mantz v. Hendley, 12 Va. (2 Hen.

& M.) 308, 315 (1808). As pertinent here, a judgment

creditor can institute garnishment proceedings if “there is a

liability” on a third person to the judgment debtor. Code

§ 8.01-511. Accord Blofeld, 234 Va. at 399, 362 S.E.2d at

694. “Liability” in this context means a “legal

obligat[ion]”, “enforceable by civil remedy,” “a financial or

pecuniary obligation,” or a “debt.” Black’s Law Dictionary

925 (7th ed. 1999). Accord Webster’s Third New International

_______________________
essentially all the elements of a “registry certificate.”

14
Dictionary 1302 (1993)(an “amount that is owed . . . [;]

pecuniary obligations . . .[;] debts”).

“[A] proceeding in garnishment is substantially an

action at law by the judgment debtor in the name of the

judgment creditor against the garnishee, and therefore the

judgment creditor stands upon no higher ground than the

judgment debtor and can acquire no greater right than such

debtor . . . possesses.” Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 521,

84 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1954). A garnishment summons does not

create a lien itself, but, instead, is “a means of enforcing

the lien of an execution placed in the hands of an officer to

be levied.” Knight v. The Peoples Nat’l Bank of Lynchburg,

182 Va. 380, 392, 29 S.E.2d 364, 370 (1944).

V. ANALYSIS

In its first assignment of error, NSI asserts that the

circuit court erroneously concluded “that Internet domain

names are a new form of intellectual property, separate and

apart from the domain name services provided by NSI, in which

the judgment debtor has a possessory interest.” NSI argues

that the registration services agreement is the only source

of rights acquired by a registrant and that a “registrant

receives only the conditional contractual right to the

exclusive association of the registered domain name with a

given IP number for a given period of time.” In NSI’s words,

15
a domain name is “simply a reference point in a computer

database . . . [or a] vernacular shorthand for the

registration services that enable the Internet addressing

system to recognize a particular domain name as a valid

address.” Thus, NSI contends that such services are not

subject to the execution lien of a writ of fieri facias.

In response, Umbro contends that, when NSI processes a

registrant’s application and assigns a specific domain name

to the registrant under NSI’s first-come, first-serve policy,

that registrant acquires the right to use the domain name for

an initial period of two years, to exclude others from using

the name, and to effect a transfer of the name by using NSI’s

“Registrant Name Change Agreement.” Thus, Umbro posits that

NSI not only agrees to associate a particular domain name

with an IP number, thus making the domain name an operational

Internet address, but also grants to the registrant the

exclusive right to use a unique domain name for a specified

period of time. That contractual right, according to Umbro,

is the intangible property in which the judgment debtor has a

possessory interest and that is subject to garnishment.

Initially, we must point out that NSI acknowledged

during oral argument before this Court that the right to use

16
a domain name is a form of intangible personal property. 12

That position is consistent with the one NSI took in Network

Solutions, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 858 (D.

Colo. 1996). There, in order to “assign registration and

use” of a domain name “as determined by the [c]ourt,” NSI

initiated a statutory interpleader action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1335. Id. at 860. That statute requires that a

plaintiff have possession or custody of money or property in

which adverse parties claim conflicting interests. Id.

However, NSI’s acknowledgement is not dispositive of this

appeal. Likewise, we do not believe that it is essential to

the outcome of this case to decide whether the circuit court

12
Congress recently passed the “Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act.” This amendment to Section 43 of
the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, et. seq.,
authorizes an in rem civil action against a domain name in
the judicial district in which the domain name registrar is
located. The amendment also states that the remedies in such
an action are limited to an order “for the forfeiture or
cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain
name to the owner of the mark.” Id. at § 1125(d)(2)(A) and
(D)(i). Finally, the amendment requires the registrar of the
domain name to deposit with the court “documents sufficient
to establish the court’s control and authority regarding the
disposition of the registration and use of the domain name.”
Id. at § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i)(I). While it could be argued that
this legislation supports the position that Internet domain
names are intangible property since the amendment provides
for an in rem proceeding, the language of the amendment does
not address the relationship between an operational Internet
domain name and its attendant services provided by a
registrar such as NSI.

17
correctly characterized a domain name as a “form of

intellectual property.” 13

Irrespective of how a domain name is classified, we

agree with Umbro that a domain name registrant acquires the

contractual right to use a unique domain name for a specified

period of time. However, that contractual right is

inextricably bound to the domain name services that NSI

provides. In other words, whatever contractual rights the

judgment debtor has in the domain names at issue in this

appeal, those rights do not exist separate and apart from

NSI’s services that make the domain names operational

Internet addresses. Therefore, we conclude that “a domain

name registration is the product of a contract for services

between the registrar and registrant.” Dorer, 60 F. Supp.2d

at 561. A contract for services is not “a liability” as that

term is used in § 8.01-511 and hence is not subject to

garnishment. See Sykes v. Beal, 392 F. Supp. 1089, 1094-95

13
Historically, certain types of intangible,
intellectual property have not been subject to levy and sale
under execution. See Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126, 131
(1881) (“debtor’s interest in the patent-rights . . . cannot
be taken on execution at law”); Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S.
528, 531 (1852) (copyright “is not the subject of seizure or
sale by means of” an execution, but it “may be reached by a
creditor’s bill”); Stutzman v. C.A. Nash & Son, Inc., 189 Va.
438, 446, 53 S.E.2d 45, 49 (1949) (“there is no property in a
trade-mark” aside from its use in a trade or business). But
see McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 138 F.2d
493, 500 (3rd Cir. 1943) (allowing judgment creditor to reach
judgment debtor’s patent by using writ of fieri facias).

18
(D. Conn. 1975) (analyzing garnishment of services and

concluding that automobile insurer’s duty to defend is not

garnishable); cf. J. Maury Dove Co., Inc. v. New River Coal

Co., 150 Va. 796, 827, 143 S.E. 317, 327 (1928) (where

“contract contains mutual obligations and liabilities, or

involve[s] a relation of personal confidence,” one party

cannot assign it without consent of other party); McGuire v.

Brown, Guardian, 114 Va. 235, 242, 76 S.E. 295, 297 (1912)

(holding contract for personal services is not assignable).

If we allow the garnishment of NSI’s services in this

case because those services create a contractual right to use

a domain name, we believe that practically any service would

be garnishable. For example, if a satellite television

customer prepaid the fee for a particular channel

subscription, Umbro’s position would allow garnishment of the

subscription service. We also are concerned that a decision

to uphold the garnishment at issue would be opening the door

to garnishment of corporate names by serving a garnishment

summons on the State Corporation Commission since the

Commission registers corporate names and, in doing so, does

not allow the use of indistinguishable corporate names. See

Code §§ 13.1-630 and –631. Cf. Gue v. The Tide Water Canal

Co., 65 U.S. 257, 263 (1860) (a “franchise being an

incorporeal hereditament, cannot . . . be seized under a

19
fieri facias”). Without statutory changes, we are not

willing to allow such results in Virginia simply because in

today’s case we are dealing with “a unique and wholly new

medium of worldwide human communication” known as the

Internet. Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 (quoting American Civil

Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa.

1996)).

Nevertheless, Umbro attempts to draw a distinction

between the judgment debtor’s contractual right to use the

domain names, which came into existence after NSI screened

its database to guard against registering identical names and

matched the judgment debtor’s domain names to the

corresponding IP numbers, and NSI’s services that continue to

make those domain names operational Internet addresses. We

are not persuaded by Umbro’s argument, although at least two

jurisdictions have made a similar distinction with regard to

telephone numbers.

The court in Georgia Power Co. v. Security Inv.

Properties, Inc., 559 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1977), found such a

distinction. In discussing the principle that a bankruptcy

court cannot exercise summary jurisdiction over property

unless the debtor or trustee has actual or constructive

possession of the property in question, the court observed

that “for a business, . . . telephone numbers constitute a

20
unique property interest, the value of which increases as the

number becomes widely known through publication in

guidebooks, posting on billboards, and imprinting on

publicity items.” Id. at 1324. The court then distinguished

the property interest in such numbers “from a subscriber’s

rights to the telephone utility’s service.” Id. See also

Darman v. Metropolitan Alarm Corp., 528 F.2d 908, 910 n.1

(1st Cir. 1976) (approving sale of telephone numbers in order

to increase value of bankruptcy estate and noting distinction

between “a subscriber’s rights derived from a contract for

telephone service and a subscriber’s possible claim to a

possessory interest in the telephone number”). However,

other courts have reached different results. See Slenderella

Sys. of Berkeley, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Telegraph Co., 286

F.2d 488, 490 (2nd Cir. 1961) (finding that telephone numbers

were neither property of, nor in possession of, bankrupt

subscribers); Rothman v. Pacific Tel. & Telegraph Co., 453

F.2d 848, 849-50 (9th Cir. 1971)(following decision in

Slenderella), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).

We are cognizant of the similarities between a telephone

number and an Internet domain name and consider both to be

products of contracts for services. See Dorer, 60 F. Supp.2d

at 561. In our opinion, neither one exists separate from its

21
respective service that created it and that maintains its

continued viability.

Our view is not changed by the fact that NSI has

developed a policy whereby control of Internet domain names

is deposited with a court when the domain names are the

subject of litigation and, as a part of that policy, agrees

to abide by the terms of any court order regarding the domain

names. That NSI routinely follows that procedure, in which

the end result requires practically the same actions by NSI

as those which would be required of it under the terms of the

circuit court’s order in this case, does not mean that NSI’s

Internet domain name services should be subject to

garnishment.

By our decision today, we do not suggest that

contractual rights can never be garnished. We recognized

otherwise in Lynch. There, a judgment creditor attempted to

garnish a sum due and payable under the terms of a fire

insurance policy. The judgment creditor claimed that only

the judgment debtor was to be indemnified by the insurance

policy, that there was a present liability on the part of the

insurance company to pay the judgment debtor for the insured

loss, and that the funds held by the insurance company were

garnishable. Lynch, 196 Va. at 521, 84 S.E.2d at 422. This

Court determined that the judgment creditor’s position would

22
be correct if the judgment debtor had the right to demand

payment from the insurance company for his sole benefit. Id.

However, the Court concluded that because of an agreement

between certain parties, which was made contemporaneously

with a deed of conveyance, the insurance proceeds stood “in

the place of the destroyed property,” and that none of the

several persons whose interests in the property were insured,

including the judgment debtor, was individually entitled to

any of the insurance proceeds. Id. at 525, 84 S.E.2d at 424.

Similarly, while applying Virginia law, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit allowed a

judgment creditor to garnish money that a builder owed to a

judgment debtor under the builder’s contract with the

judgment debtor. United States v. Harkins Builders, Inc., 45

F.3d 830, 835 (4th Cir. 1995). In its discussion of

garnishment proceedings under Virginia law, the court stated,

and we agree, that “where the property is in the form of a

contract right, the judgment creditor does not ‘step into the

shoes’ of the judgment debtor and become a party to the

contract, but merely has the right to hold the garnishee

liable for the value of that contract right.” Id. at 833.

Notably, in Lynch and Harkins, the property that each

judgment creditor sought to garnish was a sum of money due

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under a contract, not the performance of services by a

garnishee.

VI. CONCLUSION

Under Code § 8.01-511, a garnishment summons may be

issued with respect to “a liability on any person other than

the judgment debtor.” In a garnishment proceeding,

“[o]rdinarily, the only adjudicable issue is whether the

garnishee is liable to the judgment[]debtor, and if so, the

amount due.” Butler v. Butler, 219 Va. 164, 166, 247 S.E.2d

353, 354 (1978). In the present case, the only “liability”

due on the part of NSI is the provision of its Internet

domain name services to the judgment debtor. Code § 8.01-

511. Although, as Umbro points out, domain names are being

bought and sold in today’s marketplace, we are not willing to

sanction the garnishment of NSI’s services under the terms of

our present garnishment statutes. To do so would allow Umbro

to “step into the shoes” of the judgment debtor. Harkins, 45

F.3d at 833. Even though the Internet is a “new avenue[] of

commerce,” Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1229, we cannot extend

established legal principles beyond their statutory

parameters. See Bickle v. Chrisman’s Adm’x, 76 Va. 678, 691

(1882) (garnishment “cannot be enforced beyond [its]

statutory authority”).

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 For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the

circuit court, dismiss the garnishment summons, and enter

final judgment in favor of NSI. 14

Reversed and final judgment.

SENIOR JUSTICE COMPTON, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO
joins, dissenting.

Relying heavily on decisions of federal trial courts,

the majority concludes that a domain name registration is the

product of a contract for services between the registrar and

the registrant. The majority goes on to decide that such a

contract is not subject to garnishment because it is not "a

liability," as the term is used in Code § 8.01-511 ("On a

suggestion by the judgment creditor that, by reason of the

lien of his writ of fieri facias, there is a liability on any

person other than the judgment debtor," garnishment

proceedings may be instituted). I disagree that the

registration is a contract for services not subject to

garnishment.

NSI, the garnishee, correctly acknowledges that the

right to use a domain name is a form of intangible personal

property. Code § 8.01-501 clearly provides for an execution

lien on intangible personal property, that is, property not

capable of being levied upon. Virginia Nat'l Bank v.

14
We do not need to address NSI’s remaining assignment

25
Blofeld, 234 Va. 395, 399, 362 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1987). That

lien attaches to the extent the judgment debtor has a

possessory interest in the intangible property subject to the

writ. International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Ashland Lumber Co.,

250 Va. 507, 511, 463 S.E.2d 664, 666-67 (1995).

Therefore, the question becomes whether the judgment

debtor has a possessory interest in the domain names it

registered with NSI. In my opinion, the trial court

correctly ruled that the judgment debtor, by virtue of the

domain name registration agreements with NSI, has a current

possessory interest in the use of the domain names, that is,

a contractual right to the exclusive use of the names it has

registered with NSI.

However, NSI contends that the judgment debtor's

contractual rights are not subject to garnishment because

they allegedly are contingent, dependent on unperformed

conditions, or are like personal services. The majority

erroneously has bought into this idea.

NSI's contractual obligation to the judgment debtor

already is presently due, not contingent or akin to a

personal service agreement. The judgment debtor has

submitted its registration forms and paid the registration

fees. NSI has completed the registration of the judgment

_______________________
of error.

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debtor's Internet domain names under NSI's "first come, first

served" policy, and the judgment debtor acquired the right to

the exclusive use of the domain name for an initial period of

two years.

Because NSI has received everything required to give the

judgment debtor the exclusive right to use the domain names

it registered, the contractual right, a valuable asset, is

the intangible personal property in which the judgment debtor

has a possessory interest. This right is a "liability"

within the meaning of Code § 8.01-511 and is subject to

garnishment.

In my view, contrary to the majority's conclusion, this

right exists separate and apart from NSI's various services

that make the domain names operational Internet addresses.

These services, as the trial court correctly ruled, are mere

conditions subsequent that do not affect the garnishment

analysis.

Consequently, I would affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

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