Present: All the Justices
BRENDA HUBBARD
v. Record No. 971060 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
February 27, 1998
HENRICO LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
T/A HENRICO ARMS APARTMENTS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
Lee A. Harris, Jr., Judge
In this appeal, we decide whether a tenant in an unlawful
detainer action who pays the overdue rent and related charges
before the first court return date automatically invokes the
rights afforded by Code § 55-243 to retain possession of the
leased premises.
Brenda Hubbard leased an apartment from Henrico Limited
Partnership t/a Henrico Arms Apartments (Henrico Arms) under the
terms of a written lease that required her to make monthly rent
payments to Henrico Arms. In February, April, and June 1996,
Hubbard failed to make the required rent payments. On each of
these occasions, Henrico Arms sent Hubbard a written notice,
pursuant to Code § 55-225, stating that she must pay the overdue
rent and related charges within five days or surrender
possession of the leased premises. When Hubbard failed to pay
the amounts specified within five days of each written notice,
Henrico Arms filed a summons for unlawful detainer on each
occasion, seeking payment of past due rent, costs, and
possession of the leased premises.
Prior to the return date on each of the unlawful detainer
summonses, Hubbard paid to Henrico Arms all overdue amounts.
Henrico Arms accepted each payment with reservation, pursuant to
Code § 55-248.34, to preserve its right to seek possession of
the premises. After accepting the rent with reservation, but
prior to trial, Henrico Arms dismissed each unlawful detainer
summons as “paid.”
In September 1996, when Hubbard again failed to make the
required rent payment, Henrico Arms sent Hubbard a written
notice stating that she must pay the overdue rent and related
charges within five days or surrender possession of the
apartment. After Hubbard failed to pay the amount specified
within five days, Henrico Arms filed a summons for unlawful
detainer in the general district court, seeking payment of rent,
costs, fees, and possession of the premises. Although Hubbard
paid the entire amount due to Henrico Arms prior to the return
date, and Henrico Arms accepted the payment with reservation,
Henrico Arms did not dismiss the action.
At trial, Hubbard notified the general district court that
she had paid all amounts due and sought to invoke her rights
under Code § 55-243, which provides, in relevant part:
A. If any party having right or claim to such lands
shall . . . before the first court return date in an
action of unlawful detainer seeking possession of a
residential dwelling based upon a default in rent, pay
or tender to the party entitled to such rent . . . all
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the rent and arrears, along with any reasonable
attorney’s fees and late charges contracted for in a
written rental agreement, interest and costs, all
further proceedings in the . . . unlawful detainer
shall cease. . . .
B. In cases of unlawful detainer, the tenant may
invoke the rights granted by this section no more than
one time during any twelve-month period of continuous
residency in the rental dwelling unit.
Hubbard informed the court that she had not exercised these
rights within the preceding twelve-month period. Henrico Arms
argued that Hubbard had invoked the rights on the earlier
occasions when she paid the amounts due prior to the first court
return dates. The general district court agreed with Henrico
Arms and entered judgment in its favor for possession of the
leased premises.
Hubbard appealed the judgment to the circuit court. After
a trial de novo, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of
Henrico Arms for possession of the premises, ruling that Hubbard
had invoked her rights under Code § 55-243 within the preceding
twelve-month period and, therefore, was prevented from asserting
those rights in the current action.
On appeal to this Court, Hubbard contends that the trial
court erred in awarding possession of the premises to Henrico
Arms because she had not invoked her statutory rights in any of
the earlier unlawful detainer actions. Hubbard asserts that a
tenant can only invoke these statutory rights by manifesting an
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intent to do so through “some words or conduct,” after paying
all overdue rent and related charges. Hubbard also argues that
Henrico Arms should not be permitted to rely on the annual
limitation in Code § 55-243(B) because Henrico Arms failed to
inform Hubbard on any of those earlier occasions that she was
exercising her rights under the statute.
In response, Henrico Arms contends that under the express
terms of Code § 55-243, once a tenant pays accrued rent,
attorney’s fees, late charges, interest, and costs, the unlawful
detainer proceeding “shall cease.” Thus, Henrico Arms asserts
that when a tenant pays all overdue rent and related charges
before the first court return date on the unlawful detainer
summons, the tenant has invoked the rights provided by the
statute and the unlawful detainer action terminates by operation
of law. Henrico Arms also argues that the statute does not
require a landlord expressly to acknowledge that a tenant has
invoked these statutory rights at the time the rights are
exercised. We agree with Henrico Arms.
We repeatedly have stated the principles of statutory
construction that apply when a statute, such as Code § 55-243,
is clear and unambiguous. In such circumstances, a court may
look only to the words of the statute to determine its meaning.
Harrison & Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assocs., 253 Va. 364,
368, 484 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1997); Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316,
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321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). The intention of the legislature
must be determined from those words, unless a literal
construction would result in a manifest absurdity. Abbott v.
Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997); Barr v. Town
& Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672,
674 (1990). Thus, when the legislature has used words of a
clear and definite meaning, the courts cannot place on them a
construction that amounts to holding that the legislature did
not intend what it actually has expressed. Id.; Weinberg v.
Given, 252 Va. 221, 225-26, 476 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1996).
The plain language of Code § 55-243 gives a residential
tenant a limited right to avoid a judgment for possession of
leased premises by tendering to the landlord or paying into
court at any time before the first court return date on the
unlawful detainer summons all overdue rent and related charges.
This right is limited by paragraph B of the statute, which
affords the tenant this protection only once during any twelve-
month period of continuous residency in the dwelling unit.
The tenant’s act in tendering the amount due before the
first court return date triggers the protection provided by the
statute. Thus, no further act is required from the tenant
before “all further proceedings in the . . . unlawful detainer
shall cease.” Code § 55-243(A).
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We disagree with Hubbard’s contention that the
legislature’s use of the word “invoke” in paragraph B of the
statute requires us to reach a different conclusion. When, as
here, a statute contains no express definition of a term, the
general rule of statutory construction is to infer the
legislature’s intent from the plain meaning of the language
used. City of Virginia Beach v. Flippen, 251 Va. 358, 362, 467
S.E.2d 471, 473-74 (1996); Marsh v. City of Richmond, 234 Va. 4,
11, 360 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1987). In the present context, the
plain meaning of the term “invoke” is “to put into legal
effect.” See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1191
(1993). Thus, Hubbard “put into legal effect” the protection of
the statute when she timely tendered payment for the overdue
rent and related charges for February 1996, the period covered
by the first unlawful detainer summons.
This interpretation of paragraph B also is compelled by the
language in paragraph A of the statute that the unlawful
detainer proceedings “shall cease” upon a timely tender by
the tenant of the delinquent amounts due. This language is
unconditional and leaves nothing more to be done by the
tenant before the statutory protection takes effect. Once
in effect, this protection requires the landlord to
terminate the unlawful detainer action.
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Hubbard’s interpretation of Code § 55-243 would require us
to render meaningless the statutory language which provides that
an unlawful detainer action “shall cease” on the tenant’s tender
to the landlord of the overdue rent and related charges. Such
an interpretation would violate the settled principle of
statutory construction that every part of a statute is presumed
to have some effect and no part will be considered meaningless
unless absolutely necessary. Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman
Corp., 251 Va. 398, 405, 468 S.E.2d 905, 909 (1996); Raven Red
Ash Coal Corp. v. Absher, 153 Va. 332, 335, 149 S.E. 541, 542
(1929).
We also find no merit in Hubbard’s contention that, since
Henrico Arms intended to rely on the annual limitation in Code §
55-243(B), Henrico Arms was “required to recognize when the
right was used and to acknowledge this fact to the tenant.”
Such a construction would constitute a rewriting of the statute,
an act in which the courts are not permitted to engage. See
Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. at 295, 396
S.E.2d at 674; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 566, 29
S.E.2d 838, 841 (1944). Thus, we hold that the trial court
correctly ruled that Hubbard was not entitled to invoke the
rights afforded by Code § 55-243 in the present unlawful
detainer action.
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For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Affirmed.
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