IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
(HEARD AT KNOXVILLE) FILED
April 12, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
FOR PUBLICATION
Filed: April 12, 1999
NATHAN BREWER, )
)
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, ) WAYNE COUNTY CIRCUIT
)
v. ) Hon. Jim T. Hamilton, Judge
)
LINCOLN BRASS WORKS, INC., ) No. 01S01-9609-CV-00196
)
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. )
FOR APPELLANT: FOR APPELLEE:
MARK C. TRAVIS JAY R. SLOBEY
COOKEVILLE NASHVILLE
OPINION
TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART; CASE
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE HOLDER, J.
OPINION
We granted this appeal to address whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-231
precludes an enlargement of an award under § 50-6-241(a)(2) when the original
award was paid in a lump sum. Upon review, we hold that a lump sum award
may later be enlarged if the criteria in § 241(a)(2) are satisfied. We further hold
that § 241(a)(2) is not applicable when there is either a subsequent injury or an
aggravation of the original injury which increases a worker's anatomical disability.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Nathan Brewer, began working for the defendant, Lincoln
Brass Works, Inc. ("Lincoln"), in 1991. Mr. Brewer sustained a work-related
injury to his back in December of 1992. He underwent two laminectomies as the
result of the 1992 injury. He returned to work for Lincoln in August of 1993 at a
wage equal to or greater than his pre-injury wage.
Mr. Brewer was assessed a 15 percent anatomical disability rating. Mr.
Brewer received workers' compensation benefits based on a 37.5 percent
permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole, with Lincoln's liability
capped by the 2.5 multiplier in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1)1. The award
was paid in lump sum.
1
"For injurie s aris ing on or aft er Au gus t 1, 19 92, in cas es w here an inj ured em ployee is
eligible to receive any permanent partial disability benefits, . . . and the pre-injury employer returns
the employee to employment at a wage equal to or greater than the wage the employee was
receiving at the time of injury, the maximum perm anent partial disability award that the employee
may receive is two and one-half (2 ½) times the medical impairment rating . . . . In making
dete rm inatio ns, th e cou rt sha ll cons ider a ll pertin ent fa ctors , inclu ding la y and e xpe rt test imo ny,
employee’s age, education, skills and training, local job opportunities, and capacity to work at
types of em ployme nt available in c laiman t’s disabled condition.”
2
Mr. Brewer continued working at Lincoln for approximately ten months
after his return to employment in August of 1993. He initially returned to a line
job, which required sitting and repetitive stretching, bending, and twisting. He
stated that the line job aggravated his back and caused his "leg to go numb." He
then transferred to a janitorial position, but his pain became increasingly
unbearable. His last day at work was June 20, 1994. Lincoln, however,
stipulated that he was still an employee of Lincoln as of March 20, 1996.
Mr. Brewer was referred to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Allen. Dr. Allen
diagnosed Mr. Brewer in September of 1994 as having a "very large recurring
disc rupture at the L4-5 level." Dr. Allen opined that Mr. Brewer's prior surgeries
to the L4-5 region rendered the disc "more susceptible to rupture." Dr. Allen,
however, further testified that:
I think the natural progression, degeneration takes some trauma to
take place, whether it's trauma that is incidental twisting, turning,
standing, sitting, rolling over in bed, sneezing, coughing, but
presumably some trauma, even if it's not -- even if it's not
something you can put a finger on and say this is the episode, but
some trauma would be necessary to break this piece of disc loose
and allow it to come out through the hole.
Dr. Allen performed a laminectomy on Mr. Brewer on January 9, 1995, and a
second laminectomy on June 2, 1995. Dr. Allen testified that both the January
and the June surgeries increased Mr. Brewer's anatomical impairment.
Mr. Brewer filed a petition for increased workers' compensation benefits
pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2). 2 The petition alleged he was no
2
"[T]he courts may reconsider upon the filing of a new cause of action the issue of
industrial disability. Such reconsideration shall examine all pertinent factors, including lay and
expert testimony, employee’s age, education, skills and training, local job opportunities, and
capacity to work at types of employment available in claimant’s disabled condition. Such
reconsideration may be made in appropriate cases where the employee is no longer employed by
the pre-injury employer and makes application to the appropriate court within one (1) year of the
(continue d...)
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longer "able to function in his previous employment" following the 1994 disc
rupture and requested an enlargement of the 1992 award. The trial court
awarded Mr. Brewer increased benefits. The workers' compensation panel
reversed the trial court, finding:
1. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-231 provides that lump sum payments
shall be final and precludes increased benefits under § 241(a)(2) if
the original award was paid in lump sum;
2. the petition for increased benefits was time barred because it
was not filed within one year of June 20, 1994, the last day Brewer
reported to work; and
3. the trial court failed to render specific findings of fact as required
by § 50-6-241(c).
We granted review.
ANALYSIS
An employer's workers' compensation liability is capped at 2.5 times the
anatomical impairment rating when the employer returns an injured employee to
work at a wage equal to or greater than the wage at the time of the injury. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1). 3 If, however, the employer's attempts to
2
(...continued)
emp loyee’s loss of em ployme nt . . . .”
3
Awards limited by the 2.5 multiplier may or may not be an accurate reflection of
vocational disability. For instance, an injured worker may have sustained a 20 percent anatomical
imp airm ent. If the inj ured work er is re turne d to w ork a t his p rior w age , the e mp loyer's liability is
limited at 50 percent even if expert testimony indicates that the injured worker's vocational
disability is 90 pe rcent.
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accommodate an injured worker become futile, the worker may file for increased
benefits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 241(a)(2). Pursuant to § 241(a)(2), a court
may enlarge a workers' compensation award that was previously capped by the
2.5 multiplier in § 241(a)(1). Among the factors for consideration for
enlargement of an award under § 241(a)(2) are the "employee's age, education,
skills and training, local job opportunities, and capacity to work at types of
employment available in the claimant's disabled condition." Increased
anatomical impairments and subsequent injuries are not factors for consideration
under § 241(a)(2). The focus is purely on the issue of industrial disability.
A petition to enlarge a previous award under § 50-6-241(a)(2) is not the
appropriate vehicle to use when a worker sustains additional injuries or
additional anatomical impairment. A § 241(a)(2) petition is proper when the
injured worker attempts to return to work but the original work-related disability
later renders the injured worker unemployable with the pre-injury employer.
Section 241(a)(2) then allows the injured worker to receive a new industrial
disability rating when the employer's attempts to accommodate the worker fail.
The new disability rating is not limited by the § 241(a)(1) cap and is based on the
worker's previous anatomical impairment rating. We hold that if the worker,
however, sustains additional impairment, whether caused by a subsequent work-
related injury or work-related aggravation injury or aggravation of the original
injury, the worker must file a new claim for workers' compensation rather than
attempting to enlarge a previous award under § 241(a)(2).
Mr. Brewer received an award of 37.5 percent attributable to his 1992
work-related injury to his lower back. He subsequently aggravated or re-injured
his lower back. Expert testimony established that the aggravation or re-injury
caused additional anatomical impairment. Accordingly, Mr. Brewer's claim
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should have been filed as a new and separate action for workers' compensation
benefits.
LUMP SUM PROVISION
We granted this appeal to address whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-231
prohibits petitions to enlarge previous awards under § 241(a)(2). Pursuant to
§ 231, "[a]ll amounts paid by the employer and received by the employee . . . by
lump sum payments, shall be final . . . ." Section 241(a)(2) permits an injured
worker whose workers' compensation benefits were capped by § 241(a)(1) to
seek an enlargement of the capped award "in appropriate cases where the
employee is no longer employed by the pre-injury employer . . . ." Our holding
that Mr. Brewer's cause of action cannot be sustained under § 241(a)(2) has
rendered this issue moot. We, however, will address this important legal issue.
Initially, we note that statutes shall be construed in light of the purposes
the legislature intended to accomplish by their passage. Business Brokerage
Ctr. v. Dixon, 874 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1994). Section 241 was codified to
promote uniformity in workers' compensation awards. Brown v. Campbell
County Bd. of Educ., 915 S.W.2d 407, 414 (Tenn. 1995). Permitting
enlargement of awards ordered paid in periodic payments but not lump sum
awards is inconsistent with § 241's policy of promoting uniformity of awards.
The language in § 241 provides an avenue for an enlargement of awards
without regard to whether the original award was paid in lump sum or periodic
payments. Section 241 was codified after the codification of § 231. Where two
statutes conflict and cannot be reconciled, the prior act will be repealed or
amended by implication to the extent of the inconsistency between the two
6
statutes. Steinhouse v. Neal, 723 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tenn. 1987); State v.
Moore, 722 S.W.2d 367, 374 (Tenn. 1986). Specific statutory provisions
generally prevail over general provisions when there is a conflict between
statutes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-103; see also Moore, 722 S.W.2d at 374; State
v. Nelson, 77 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). Accordingly, we hold
that § 241(a)(2) controls over the provisions of § 231 to the extent the two
statutes conflict. A petition under § 241(a)(2) is not prohibited in a case where
the original workers' compensation award sought to be enlarged was paid in
lump sum.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Mr. Brewer suffered increased pain while working and was unable to
continue working in June of 1994. He was referred to Dr. Allen who performed a
myelogram in September of 1994 The results of the myelogram revealed a
"large recurrent disc rupture at the L4-5 level." Accordingly, the full nature and
extent of his injury was not manifested until Dr. Allen discovered the ruptured
disc. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Cannon, 523 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. 1975)
(holding limitations period began to accrue upon discovery of the herniated disc
and not from the date of the accident). Mr. Brewer's statute of limitations for a
new claim of workers' compensation began to accrue upon the September 1994
discovery date.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's petition for an enlargement of a previous award is
dismissed. The plaintiff's remaining issue concerning the trial court's findings
under § 241(c) has been rendered moot. Our analysis of the application of
7
§ 241, however, addressed an issue of first impression, and the defendant has
not been prejudiced by lack of timely notice of Mr. Brewer's attempt to obtain
additional workers' compensation benefits. The plaintiff's cause of action is,
therefore, dismissed without prejudice. Costs of this appeal shall be taxed
against the plaintiff for which execution may issue if necessary.
JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE
CONCURRING:
Anderson, C.J.
Birch and Barker, J.J.
Tipton, Sp.J.
Drowota, J., Not Participating
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