COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, * Judge Elder and
Senior Judge Duff
Argued in Alexandria, Virginia
WILLIAM von RAAB
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0669-97-4 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
DECEMBER 23, 1997
SUSAN von RAAB
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
Alfred D. Swersky, Judge
Daniel G. Dannenbaum (Glenn C. Lewis; Leslie
Weber Hoffman; Wendy H. Schwartz; The Lewis
Law Firm, on briefs), for appellant.
Richard C. Shadyac, Jr. (Alane A. Peragallo;
Shadyac & Shadyac, P.C., on brief), for
appellee.
William von Raab (husband) appeals the trial court's award
of equitable distribution in his divorce from Susan von Raab
(wife). He contends the trial court erred when it classified the
marital home (Prince Street property) as wholly "marital" and
declined to award him his pre-marital equity in the property.
1
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
*
On November 19, 1997, Judge Fitzpatrick succeeded Judge
Moon as chief judge.
1
Husband also argued that the trial court's award of
equitable distribution was erroneous on other grounds. He
challenged the trial court's decisions regarding the
classification and distribution of a farm property in Madison
County, the apportionment of the marital debts, and the
classification and distribution of wife's retirement accounts.
We affirmed the trial court's decisions on these issues in an
unpublished memorandum opinion released simultaneously with this
opinion.
I.
FACTS
The parties were married in October 1979, had one child in
October 1989, separated in November 1994, and divorced in 1996.
The Prince Street property served as the parties' primary marital
residence from 1980 until their separation. The property was
purchased by husband with his first wife in 1972 for $62,500. As
an incident of his divorce from his first wife in 1979, husband
purchased her interest in the property, and the property was
retitled exclusively in his name. At the time of husband's
marriage to wife in 1979, the value of the Prince Street property
was $185,000. The principal due on the mortgage secured by the
property was $70,000, and husband's equity in the property was
$115,000.
In 1990, Fred Karam, a businessman and former client of
husband, asked husband to lend him $150,000 for ninety days so
that he could pay the current debts of his cash-strapped
business. Because husband believed that Karam was "reliable" and
because it was "the thing that friends do for friends," husband
decided to "bail him out" of his business problems. Husband used
the equity in the Prince Street property to borrow $150,000 from
Burke & Herbert Bank for a term of ninety days. Husband gave the
bank a ninety-day note for $150,000 that was secured by a second
deed of trust on the Prince Street property. Husband then lent
this money to Karam in exchange for a promissory note. When
2
Karam did not repay the loan from husband within ninety days as
promised, husband refinanced his loan from the bank by "rolling
it over" into a continuing series of ninety-day notes. In 1993,
the bank refused to extend husband's ninety-day note and insisted
that he obtain "permanent financing" for the debt. At the time,
husband's annual income was $8,291, while wife's was $61,603.
Husband and wife agreed to refinance husband's existing mortgage
on the Prince Street property with a jointly-obtained mortgage
that would cover husband's debt to Burke & Herbert. The Prince
Street property was retitled to husband and wife as tenants by
the entirety as part of the refinancing transaction. The record
established that Karam has yet to fully repay husband and still
owes him between $110,000 and $112,000.
Both husband and wife testified about wife's monetary and
non-monetary contributions to the Prince Street property. Wife
testified that she was responsible for most of the maintenance of
the property, including hiring a maid to clean the premises.
Wife also played a substantial role in the ongoing renovation of
the interior and exterior of the property. Wife testified that
she assisted in the payment of the mortgage and utility bills for
the Prince Street property by contributing her paycheck to the
joint checking account that was used to pay these obligations.
The renovations to the property were also paid for with funds
drawn from this joint checking account. Wife also paid for
several expenses associated with the property with funds from her
3
personal checking account, including utility bills, real estate
taxes, the maid, and renovation of the kitchen. Husband
testified that wife contributed her salary into the parties'
joint checking account, "which [was] then disbursed over a full
range of matters." Husband also testified that wife managed both
the redesign of the kitchen and the replastering and painting of
their son's room and procured one set of curtains.
After the parties separated in November 1994, husband made
all mortgage payments and paid all expenses associated with
maintaining the Prince Street property. Husband's
post-separation mortgage payments totaled $47,000 and increased
the equity in the property by $3,666. Husband also retained
exclusive use of the property after the parties separated.
On the date of the equitable distribution hearing, the value
of the Prince Street property was $355,000, the principal due on
the mortgage was $250,315, and the equity in the property was
$104,685.
The trial court classified the Prince Street property as
marital property and awarded wife one-half of the equity in the
property. The trial court found that husband acquired the
property before the marriage and that the equity in the property
at the time of the marriage was $115,000. However, the trial
court concluded that the Prince Street property had been
transmuted from husband's separate property into marital property
by "the monetary and non-monetary contributions of [wife]
4
together with the refinancing and the conveyance by [husband] to
husband and wife as tenants by the entiret[y]." Regarding the
loan to Karam in 1990 and the subsequent refinancing of the
property's mortgage in 1993, the trial court found:
The evidence is . . . clear that [husband]
put this marital asset at risk when he made
the loan to Karam. This ultimately required
the equity in Prince Street be used to secure
his loan made to obtain funds to lend to
Karam. While [wife] may have dealt with the
administration of the Karam loan, there is no
evidence she was consulted beforehand nor
acquiesced in the loan. She had little or no
choice but to join in the refinancing.
The trial court did not award husband any credit for his
pre-marital equity in the property or his post-separation
reduction in the principal of the mortgage. The trial court also
valued the Karam note "at between $110,000.00 and $112,000.00"
and classified it as husband's separate property.
II.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRINCE STREET PROPERTY
Husband contends the trial court erred when it failed to
classify the Prince Street property as part marital and part
separate and award him a credit for his pre-marital equity in the
property. He also contends the trial court erred when it
declined to award him a credit for his post-separation
contributions to the property. We disagree.
A.
Code § 20-107.3, which governs awards of equitable
distribution, "is intended to recognize a marriage as a
5
partnership and to provide a means to divide equitably the wealth
accumulated during and by that partnership based on the monetary
and non-monetary contributions of each spouse." Williams v.
Williams, 4 Va. App. 19, 24, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1987). "Where an
equitable distribution is appropriate, then all of the
provisions of Code § 20-107.3 must be followed." Artis v. Artis,
4 Va. App. 132, 136, 354 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1987). The court must
determine "the legal title as between the parties" and "the
ownership and value" of all of the parties' property and then
classify this property as "marital," "separate," or "part
separate and part marital." Code § 20-107.3(A). After this is
done, the court may (1) order the division or transfer, or both,
of jointly owned marital property, (2) apportion and order the
payment of marital debts, or (3) grant a monetary award to either
party. See Code § 20-107.3(C), (D). The court must determine
the amount of its award of any of these remedies "upon the
factors listed in [Code § 20-107.3(E)]." Code § 20-107.3(C),
(D). Subject to these enumerated statutory factors, "this
division or transfer of jointly owned marital property, [the
apportionment of marital debts,] and the amount of any monetary
award, is within the sound discretion of the trial court." Dietz
v. Dietz, 17 Va. App. 203, 216, 436 S.E.2d 463, 471 (1993).
On appeal, the trial court's award of equitable distribution
will not be reversed "unless it appears from the record that the
chancellor has abused his discretion, that he has not considered
6
or has misapplied one of the statutory mandates, or that the
evidence fails to support the findings of fact underlying his
resolution of the conflict in the equities." Robinette v.
Robinette, 10 Va. App. 480, 486, 393 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1990)
(citations omitted).
B.
We hold that the trial court's classification of the Prince
Street property as marital property was not erroneous. Because
husband acquired the Prince Street property prior to October
1979, it was husband's separate property at the beginning of the
parties' marriage. However, depending on how property is
utilized during the marriage, property that was at one time
"separate" can be converted into either "marital" property or
"part marital property and part separate property" for the
purposes of equitable distribution. See McDavid v. McDavid, 19
Va. App. 406, 410-11, 451 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1994) (citations
omitted). Code § 20-107.3(A)(1) states how the increase in value
of separate property during the marriage may be classified as
marital property.
The increase in value of separate property
during the marriage is separate property,
unless marital property or the personal
efforts of either party have contributed to
such increases and then only to the extent of
the increases in value attributable to such
contributions. The personal efforts of
either party must be significant and result
in substantial appreciation of the separate
property if any increase in value
attributable thereto is to be considered
marital property.
7
In addition, Code § 20-107.3(A)(3) sets forth the means by which
property may be "transmuted" into a different class. Of
particular relevance to the classification of the Prince Street
property in this case is Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(f), which states:
When separate property is retitled in the
joint names of the parties, the retitled
property shall be deemed transmuted to
marital property. However, to the extent the
property is retraceable by the preponderance
of the evidence and was not a gift, the
retitled property shall retain its original
classification.
Applying these code sections to the facts of this case, we
conclude that the entirety of husband's separate interest in the
Prince Street property was transmuted to marital property during
the parties' marriage. The value of the Prince Street property
increased from $185,000 at the beginning of the marriage to
$355,000 on the date of the hearing. The record established
that, during the marriage, wife made significant monetary and
non-monetary contributions to the maintenance and renovation of
the property. The increase in value of the Prince Street
property that occurred prior to the retitling of the property
that was attributable to these contributions was marital
property. See Code § 20-107.3(A)(1). Furthermore, all of
husband's separate interest in the Prince Street property was
transmuted to marital property when husband retitled the property
to himself and wife as part of the transaction to obtain
permanent financing for the money he borrowed from Burke &
Herbert Bank and lent to Fred Karam. See Code
8
§ 20-107.3(A)(3)(f).
Because husband's separate interest in the Prince Street
property was transmuted into marital property, the correctness of
the trial court's classification of the property as wholly
marital hinges upon whether husband's separate interest was both
"retraceable" and "not a gift." Id. Although our prior cases
address how to determine whether a particular retitling of
separate property in the joint names of the parties is "not a
gift," 2 we have heretofore said little about how separate
property is traced back from property that has been transmuted
during the marriage. See Rowe v. Rowe, 24 Va. App. 123, 136, 480
S.E.2d 760, 766 (1997) (holding that evidence was sufficient to
retrace property claimed by husband as separate).
The goal of the tracing process is to link a transmuted
asset to its primary source, which is either separate property or
marital property. See Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of
Property § 5.23 (2d ed. 1994). Whether a transmutted asset can
be traced back to a separate property interest is determined by
the circumstances of each case, including the value and identity
of the separate interest at the time of the transmutation.
Because all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage and before the last separation of the parties is
2
See Rowe v. Rowe, 24 Va. App. 123, 136-37, 480 S.E.2d 760,
766 (1997); Lightburn v. Lightburn, 22 Va. App. 612, 616-17, 472
S.E.2d 281, 283 (1996); Theismann v. Theismann, 22 Va. App. 557,
565-66, 471 S.E.2d 809, 813, aff'd en banc, 23 Va. App. 697, 479
S.E.2d 534 (1996).
9
presumed to be marital property, see Code § 20-107.3(A)(2), the
party claiming a separate interest in transmuted property bears
the burden of proving retraceability. See id. If the party
claiming the separate interest in transmuted property proves
retraceability, the burden shifts to the other party to prove
that the transmutation of the separate property resulted from a
"gift." Lightburn v. Lightburn, 22 Va. App. 612, 617, 472 S.E.2d
281, 283 (1996) (citing Turner, supra, § 5.18); see also
Theismann v. Theismann, 22 Va. App. 557, 565-66, 471 S.E.2d 809,
813, aff'd en banc, 23 Va. App. 697, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996).
We hold that, in the aftermath of the two-step, tripartite
transaction to lend Karam $150,000, husband's initial separate
interest in the equity of the Prince Street property was no
longer retraceable from the current joint title to the property
held by husband and wife. Husband's equity in the Prince Street
property on the date of the marriage was $115,000. The record
indicates that husband leveraged his equity in the Prince Street
property to borrow $150,000 from Burke & Herbert which he
subsequently lent to Karam in exchange for an unsecured note.
When Karam failed to repay the loan, wife assumed joint liability
for the amount of money husband borrowed from Burke & Herbert.
Wife assumed liability for this debt to ensure that the bank
would not foreclose on what was both husband's "separate"
property and the marital home. The combination of husband's
initial leverage of his separate interest in the Prince Street
10
property and wife's intervention to secure the parties'
uninterrupted possession of the marital home effectively severed
any link between husband's prior separate interest and the
transmuted marital property. If husband's initial interest in
the Prince Street property is retraceable at all, it can be
traced back from the Karam note, which the trial court found to
be husband's separate property. Because husband's separate
interest in the Prince Street property was no longer retraceable
from anything other than the Karam note, the trial court did not
err when it classified the entire property as "marital."
C.
We also hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it refused to award husband a credit for his
post-separation payments that increased the equity in the marital
property by $3,666. The trial court's award indicated that it
considered husband's "direct monetary contributions" to the
Prince Street property. The record also established that husband
retained exclusive use of the property after the parties
separated. Although the separate contribution of one party to
the acquisition, care, and maintenance of marital property is a
factor that the trial court must consider when making its award
of equitable distribution, Code § 20-107.3 does not mandate that
the trial court award a corresponding dollar-for-dollar credit
for such contributions. See Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App.
48, 56, 378 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1989). Furthermore, no evidence
11
established that husband's source of funds for making the
post-separation mortgage payments on the Prince Street property
was actually his separate property. In light of the trial
court's analysis, we cannot say that its refusal to award husband
a credit for his post-separation contributions to the Prince
Street property was an abuse of discretion.
12
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's award
of equitable distribution regarding the Prince Street property.
Affirmed.
13
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick,*** Judge Elder and
Senior Judge Duff
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
WILLIAM von RAAB
MEMORANDUM OPINION**** BY
v. Record No. 0669-97-4 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
DECEMBER 23, 1997
SUSAN von RAAB
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
Alfred D. Swersky, Judge
Daniel G. Dannenbaum (Glenn C. Lewis; Leslie
Weber Hoffman; Wendy H. Schwartz; The Lewis
Law Firm, on briefs), for appellant.
Richard C. Shadyac, Jr. (Alane A. Peragallo;
Shadyac & Shadyac, P.C., on brief), for
appellee.
William von Raab (husband) appeals the trial court's award
of equitable distribution in his divorce from Susan von Raab
(wife). He challenges the trial court's award regarding three
separate subject matters. First, regarding the farm in Madison
County (farm property), husband contends that the trial court
erred when it (1) declined to award him his pre-marital interest
in the property and the subsequent appreciation in the value of
this interest and (2) declined to award him a credit for his
post-separation contributions to the property. Second, regarding
***
On November 19, 1997, Judge Fitzpatrick succeeded Judge
Moon as chief judge.
****
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
14
the marital debt, husband contends that the trial court erred
when it (1) apportioned the bulk of the debts to him and
(2) declined to award him a credit for his post-separation
payments of these debts. Third, regarding wife's retirement
accounts, husband contends that the trial court erred when it
declined to award him a portion of the marital share of these
accounts. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 3
Code § 20-107.3, which governs awards of equitable
distribution, "is intended to recognize a marriage as a
partnership and to provide a means to divide equitably the wealth
accumulated during and by that partnership based on the monetary
and non-monetary contributions of each spouse." Williams v.
Williams, 4 Va. App. 19, 24, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1987). "Where an
equitable distribution is appropriate, then all of the provisions
of Code § 20-107.3 must be followed." Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App.
132, 136, 354 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1987). The court must determine
"the legal title as between the parties" and "the ownership and
value" of all of the parties' property and then classify this
property as "marital," "separate," or "part separate and part
marital." Code § 20-107.3(A). After this is done, the court may
(1) order the division or transfer, or both, of jointly owned
3
Husband also argued that the trial court's award of
equitable distribution was erroneous on another ground. He
challenged the trial court's decision regarding the
classification and distribution of the marital home (Prince
Street property). We affirmed the trial court's award regarding
the Prince Street property in a published opinion released
simultaneously with this memorandum opinion.
15
marital property, (2) apportion and order the payment of marital
debts, or (3) grant a monetary award to either party. See Code
§ 20-107.3(C), (D). The court must determine the amount of its
award of any of these remedies "upon the factors listed in [Code
§ 20-107.3(E)]." Code § 20-107.3(C), (D). Subject to these
enumerated statutory factors, "this division or transfer of
jointly owned marital property, [the apportionment of marital
debts,] and the amount of any monetary award, is within the sound
discretion of the trial court." Dietz v. Dietz, 17 Va. App. 203,
216, 436 S.E.2d 463, 471 (1993).
On appeal, the trial court's award of equitable distribution
will not be reversed "unless it appears from the record that the
chancellor has abused his discretion, that he has not considered
or has misapplied one of the statutory mandates, or that the
evidence fails to support the findings of fact underlying his
resolution of the conflict in the equities." Robinette v.
Robinette, 10 Va. App. 480, 486, 393 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1990)
(citations omitted).
I.
FARM PROPERTY
Husband contends that the trial court erred when it
(1) declined to award him his pre-marital interest in the farm
property and the subsequent appreciation in the value of this
interest and (2) declined to award him a credit for his
post-separation contributions to the property. We disagree.
16
We hold that the trial court's credits to husband for his
contribution of the sixty-eight-acre parcel to the farm property
and for his post-separation monetary contribution to the property
were not an abuse of discretion.
First, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it awarded husband a $45,000 credit for his
contribution of the sixty-eight-acre parcel. The trial court's
award indicates that it considered husband's contribution of the
sixty-eight-acre parcel and awarded him a credit of $45,000, the
amount of his downpayment on the property. The trial court
subsequently awarded husband sixty percent of the value of the
farm property after deducting husband's credits. Its factual
finding regarding the value of husband's contribution is
supported by credible evidence in the record, and we cannot say
that the amount of the credit it awarded to husband was an abuse
of discretion. Although applying the "Brandenburg Formula" was
one of the approaches available to the trial court when
determining husband's credit for his separate contribution to the
farm property, Code § 20-107.3 does not currently mandate the use
of this formula. As such, the trial court's use of an
alternative approach was not an abuse of discretion.
Husband failed to preserve for appeal his argument that the
trial court erroneously valued the farm property at $533,000 and
that it should have deducted $200,000 from this value due to
husband's transfer of the sixty-eight-acre parcel to the parties'
17
son in November 1994. In both his testimony and "attachment 2"
to his "schedule A," husband requested the trial court to
distribute the farm property based on a value of $533,000, a
mortgage balance of $228,655, and an equity value of $304,345.
In addition, in his list of exceptions to the trial court's award
of equitable distribution, husband did not object to the trial
court's description or valuation of the farm property. Because
husband failed to object to the trial court's ruling on the value
of the farm property, we are barred from considering this issue
on appeal. Rule 5A:18.
Finally, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it awarded husband a $10,000 credit for his
post-separation monetary contributions to the farm property. The
record supports the trial court's finding that husband "spent
$10,000 for repairs of flood damage." Thus, the only
post-expense that was established at the equitable distribution
hearing for which husband did not receive a credit was his
post-separation payments of the mortgage.
We disagree with husband that the trial court erred when it
failed to award him a credit for his post-separation mortgage
payments on the farm property. Husband does not contest the
trial court's classification of the farm property as marital.
Husband incorrectly couches these payments as the post-separation
acquisition of separate property. Instead, because the farm
property is marital, any post-separation contribution by husband
18
of his separate funds that increased the value of the farm
property presents a commingling scenario. Code
§ 20-107.3(A)(3)(d) states:
[w]hen marital property and separate property
are commingled by contributing one category
of property, resulting in the loss of
identity of contributed property, the
classification of the contributed property
shall be transmuted to the category of
property receiving the contribution.
However, to the extent the contributed
property is retraceable by a preponderance of
the evidence and was not a gift, such
contributed property shall retain its
original classification.
In this case, husband offered no evidence that established the
source of the funds he used to make the post-separation payments
on the mortgage. Because no evidence proved that husband
commingled his separate property with the farm property when he
made the payments that increased the farm property's equity, the
trial court's refusal to award husband a credit for these
payments was both supported by the evidence and not erroneous.
II.
MARITAL DEBT
Husband contends that the trial court erred when it (1)
apportioned eighty-nine percent of the marital debt to him and
(2) declined to award him a credit for his post-separation
payments of these debts. We disagree.
We hold that neither the trial court's apportionment of the
marital debt nor its refusal to award husband a credit for his
post-separation payments was an abuse of discretion.
19
First, we hold that the trial court's apportionment to
husband of half of the joint Burke & Herbert loan ($8,500), six
of the seven Whitman loans ($31,000), the Slaughter loan
($5,000), and the loans from husband's mother ($45,000) was not
an abuse of discretion. The record indicates that the trial
court considered all of the statutory factors when it determined
its apportionment of this marital debt. The trial court found
that both parties made contributions to the family and the
marital property. It found that the proceeds from the Whitman
loans "were used primarily for the education of [husband's]
daughter from a previous marriage." It also found that husband
suffered an unintentional decline in his income that "resulted in
the accumulation of significant debt" while at the same time
using marital funds to pay expenses stemming from his adulterous
affair with Misty Cantey. All of these findings are supported by
evidence in the record. We find no basis on which to conclude
that the trial court's apportionment was an abuse of discretion.
We also hold that the trial court did not err when it
declined to award husband a credit for his post-separation
payments of the joint loan from Burke & Herbert Bank and the
mortgages on the Prince Street property and the farm property.
The provisions in Code § 20-107.3 regarding the classification
and apportionment of marital debt do not mandate that a party who
makes post-separation payments on marital debt be awarded a
corresponding credit. See Code § 20-107.3(C). Instead, whether
20
to award a credit for post-separation payments of marital debt is
one of the tools available to the court when determining an
over-all scheme of apportionment. In arriving at its
apportionment of the marital debt, the trial court considered all
of the factors enumerated in Code § 20-107.3(E) and its factual
findings in this regard were supported by credible evidence. We
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it
decided against awarding husband a credit for his post-separation
payments of the marital debt.
III.
WIFE'S RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
Husband contends that the trial court's award regarding
wife's retirement accounts was erroneous. He argues that the
trial court failed to consider all of wife's retirement accounts
and erroneously classified them as entirely wife's separate
property. We disagree.
Although the trial court's ruling on wife's retirement
accounts could have been more clearly worded, it indicates that
the trial court considered all three of wife's retirement
accounts and analyzed the marital share of these accounts as
"marital" property. First, the trial court's finding that wife's
"retirement account" was valued at $40,000 indicates that it
considered all three of wife's retirement accounts in its ruling.
"Marital" property includes that portion of a spouse's
retirement accounts "acquired . . . during the marriage, and
21
before the last separation of the parties." Code § 20-
107.3(A)(2), (G)(1). The evidence proved that the combined
marital share of wife's thrift savings plan and her Legg Mason
IRA was approximately $40,000 ($11,227 + $29,917.74). No
evidence established the value of wife's federal pension. See
Bowers v. Bowers, 4 Va. App. 610, 618, 359 S.E.2d 546, 550 (1987)
(stating that the parties have the burden to present sufficient
evidence from which the trial court can value their property).
Thus, contrary to husband's argument, the trial court's valuation
indicates that it considered all of her accounts.
Furthermore, the trial court's reasoning indicates that it
classified the marital share of wife's retirement accounts as
marital property. The trial court stated that its award
regarding wife's retirement accounts was "[f]or the reasons
stated for assignment of the marital debts." (Emphasis added).
All of the debts apportioned by the trial court were "marital,"
and its reasons for its apportionment were based upon
consideration of the factors stated in Code § 20-107.3(E).
Despite the trial court's awkward statement that wife's
retirement accounts "will be retained by her as her separate
property," the trial court's reasoning indicates that it
classified and analyzed the marital share of these accounts as
"marital" property.
Moreover, the trial court's valuation of the retirement
accounts and all of its pertinent factual findings are supported
22
by evidence in the record. After reviewing the record, we cannot
say that the trial court's decision to award the entire martial
share of these accounts to wife was an abuse of discretion.
Finally, we note that husband received well over fifty
percent of the marital assets from the trial court's award of
equitable distribution. The total value of the marital assets
subject to distribution (the equity values of the Prince Street
property and the farm property plus wife's retirement accounts)
was $407,385. Of this amount, the trial court awarded husband
$264,107, or 64.8%.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's award
of equitable distribution.
Affirmed.
23