Willamette Industries, Inc. v. Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE FILED
September 3, 1999
WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES, INC., ) C/A NO. O1A01-9812-CH-00639
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Appellate Court Clerk
)
)
v. )
) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE
) DAVIDSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
)
)
TENNESSEE ASSESSMENT APPEALS )
COMMISSION, WAYNE COUNTY )
ASSESSOR OF PROPERTY, and )
WAYNE COUNTY TRUSTEE, )
) HONORABLE CAROL L. McCOY,
Respondents-Appellees. ) CHANCELLOR

For Appellant For Appellee Tennessee
Assessment Appeals Commission
JERRY C. SHELTON
Lyell, Seaman & Shelton PAUL G. SUMMERS
Nashville, Tennessee Attorney General & Reporter
Nashville, Tennessee

SEAN D. CLANCY
Assistant Attorney General
Nashville, Tennessee

For Appellees Wayne County
Assessor of Property and
Wayne County Trustee

JAMES Y. ROSS, SR.
Waynesboro, Tennessee

O P I N IO N

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED Susano, J.

1
 The petition in this case seeks judicial review of real

property valuations established by a final order of the Tennessee

Assessment Appeals Commission (“AAC”), a body created by the

State Board of Equalization to hear “appeals regarding the

assessment, classification and value of property for purposes of

taxation.” T.C.A.§ 67-5-1502(a). The AAC’s order in the instant

case fixed, for ad valorem tax purposes, the separate values of

15 parcels of Wayne County woodland owned by the petitioner,

Willamette Industries, Inc. (“Willamette”). Upon review of the

AAC’s order, the trial court held, among other things, that the

appraisal methodology utilized by the AAC was not per se contrary

to Tennessee law, and that the record contained substantial and

material evidence to support the AAC’s valuations based upon that

methodology. Accordingly, it affirmed the AAC’s order.

Willamette appeals, raising the following issues for our

consideration:

1. Do Tennessee statutes and case law, prior
decisions of the AAC, and the administrative
procedures manual for Wayne County require
woodland with growing trees to be valued by
the “residual method,” whereby the value of
standing timber is subtracted from the sale
price of comparable land with standing timber
to arrive at the “residual value” for the
land only?

2. Is there substantial and material
evidence to support the value set by the AAC
for Willamette’s woodland?

3. Did the appraisal methodology used by the
Wayne County Assessor and State Division of
Property Assessments for Willamette’s
woodland, but not for any other woodland
appraisals in Wayne County, deny Willamette
equal protection under the United States and
Tennessee Constitutions?

2
3
 I. Facts and Procedural History

In 1992, the respondent, the Wayne County Assessor of

Property (“the County”),1 assisted by the State Department of

Property Assessments (“DPA”), completed a reappraisal of all

taxable real property in Wayne County. Information regarding 70

property sales was compiled by Leon Oliver, a DPA employee, who

analyzed each sale and subtracted from the sales price an

estimated value for any appropriate deductions, including

standing timber. This information was compiled into a “Rural

Land Schedule2,” which in turn formed the basis for the appraisal

of, among other things, all woodland in Wayne County, including

the 15 parcels owned by Willamette.3

Application of the Rural Land Schedule resulted in a

weighted average value4 of $178 per acre for Willamette’s 10,061

acres. The $178 per acre value was arrived at by substracting

from the gross value per acre the sum of $62 per acre

representing the alleged value of the standing timber.5 Arguing

that this adjustment for the excepted-from-taxation timber was

1
The Wayne County Trustee, as well as the AAC, were also named as
respondents in the Chancery Court proceeding. For ease of reference, the
Wayne County Assessor of Property and the Wayne County Trustee will
collectively be referred to as “the County” in this opinion.
2
The Rural Land Schedule consists of a grid of per-acre values, with
four land types broken down into four location factors and three quality
factors--good, average, and poor.
3
Willamette’s properties in Wayne County range in size from 43 to 2,973
acres, and aggregately comprise some 10,061 acres.
4
The weighted average value per acre was determined by multiplying the
number of acres in each tract by the per acre value assigned to that tract,
adding the products of those multiplications, and dividing the total by the
10,061 acres.
5
Timber is included in the statutory list of “growing crops” that have
been specifically excepted from taxation in Tennessee. See T.C.A. § 67-5-
216(a).

4
inadequate, Willamette appealed the County’s assessments to the

Wayne County Board of Equalization. After receiving an

unfavorable determination there, Willamette then appealed to the

State Board of Equalization. A hearing before an administrative

law judge was held on January 4 and 5, 1994. The administrative

law judge determined that the timber values had been

underestimated and ordered that the appraisal of Willamette’s

properties be reduced by an additional $67 per acre, i.e., that

the average adjustment for timber be increased from $62 per acre

to $129 per acre -- the amount calculated by Willamette based

upon research by its own experts, as well as U.S. Forest Service

statistics. In so holding, the administrative law judge adopted

the “residual method” of woodland valuation advocated by

Willamette. Under that method, the value of each parcel was

reduced by the estimated value of its standing timber to

determine the land’s “residual” value for tax assessment

purposes.

Being dissatisfied with the judgment of the

administrative law judge, the County appealed to the AAC. A

hearing was held before that body on February 25 and 27, 1997.

At the hearing, the County presented testimony from three

witnesses, including Charles Smith (“Smith”), a DPA employee and

certified general appraiser who was qualified as an expert with

regard to the valuation of rural land. Smith calculated the

weighted average value of Willamette’s properties -- without the

standing timber -- at $168 per acre. In reaching this

conclusion, he utilized a “direct comparable sales” comparison

method, whereby he determined the value of the subject properties

5
by comparing them to sales of land from which the timber had

either been removed or sold independent of the land. In the

course of his analysis, Smith visited all of Willamette’s

properties and compared them to 28 similar properties selected

from the 70 sales that had formed the basis of the Rural Land

Schedule.

In addition to the direct comparable sales method

advocated by Smith and the County, the AAC heard testimony

regarding the residual method, described above, and the “land

expectation” method, under which an expected income from timber

is projected for the land and capitalized at an appropriate rate.

Extensive proof regarding the latter two methods was offered by

Willamette through the testimony of its expert witnesses.

Willamette contended that the values for its properties should be

reduced by an average adjustment of $136 per acre, representing

the alleged value of the timber on the respective parcels. The

AAC, however, found as follows:

...the direct [comparable sales] method is an
attractive alternative if sufficient
qualified sales are available, and that is
the case here. The Division of Property
Assessments reexamined its collection of
sales in the course of defending taxpayer’s
appeal, and while this data is not uniformly
beyond reproach, it offers a credible
alternative to the difficult adjustments
required by the residual method.

The AAC referred to two particular sales cited by the County and

DPA, noting that use of such sales to determine the value of the

subject parcels “offer[ed] a more credible alternative to the

residual method as applied by [Willamette’s] experts in this

6
case.” Therefore, the AAC modified the decision of the

administrative law judge and determined that Willamette’s

properties should be assessed at a weighted average of $160 per

acre.6 It assigned total values to each of the 15 parcels in an

exhibit attached to its final decision and order, which was

entered on March 18, 1997.

Willamette subsequently petitioned the trial court for

review of the AAC’s decision. After hearing argument based upon

the proof in the administrative record, the trial court affirmed

the findings of the AAC. The trial court held as follows:

[Willamette] contends that as a matter of
law, the residual method is the only method
that should be utilized in valuing woodland.
The Court does not reach that conclusion.
The case of Richardson v. Tennessee
Assessment Appeals Commission, 828 S.W.2d 403
(Tenn.App. 1991) does not declare an
exclusive method of valuation. This Court
cannot find Tennessee case law or [any]
statute that designates a sole methodology
for valuing woodland. In light of this, the
Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law,
that the residual method is the only method
to be utilized in valuing woodland. Indeed,
the legislature established specific
administrative agencies to determine property
values which have acquired extensive
knowledge and expertise. The process of
valuing property is intensely factual, and
flexibility is necessary for the expert
agencies to value property in wide ranging
circumstances. “Courts will defer to the
decisions of administrative agencies when
they are acting within their area of
specialized knowledge, experience, and
expertise.” Wayne County [v. Tennessee Solid
Waste Disposal Control Board, 756 S.W.2d 274,
279 (Tenn.App. 1988)].

6
The AAC did note that the DPA had erroneously treated certain of
Willamette’s parcels as small tracts because they comprised portions of larger
tracts that extended into other counties. It therefore recalculated the
values assigned by the DPA to reflect the true size of the respective parcels.

7
 The record reveals that the AAC examined
sales compiled by Charles Smith and found
there were sufficient qualified sales to use
the direct comparable [sales] method in
valuing [Willamette’s] woodland. The AAC
identified two sales out of Mr. Smith’s
report to support its decision to use the
direct comparable sales method. Both of
those sales involved the sale of land only,
with timber not being a factor in the sale.
These land only sales support the AAC’s
valuation of [Willamette’s] properties.
[Willamette] contends the AAC merely adopted
Mr. Smith’s conclusions; however, that is not
evident from the record. The AAC, after
hearing all the testimony and reviewing the
exhibits, found the direct comparable [sales]
method offered a credible basis to determine
the land values compared to the questionable
values resulting from use of the residual
method. The Court concludes there is
substantial and material evidence in the
record to support the AAC’s decision.

The trial court also held that the AAC had not erred in

allowing Smith to testify regarding his report and opinions

despite the fact that the witness had relied upon hearsay

information obtained from buyers and sellers of the subject

properties. Furthermore, the Court held that the AAC’s valuation

of Willamette’s property had not resulted in any denial of equal

protection to Willamette. Accordingly, the trial court affirmed

the decision of the AAC in its entirety, and this appeal

followed.

II. Applicable Law

Generally speaking, courts will “defer to decisions of

administrative agencies when they are acting within their area of

specialized knowledge, experience, and expertise.” Wayne County

v. Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Board, 756 S.W.2d 274,

8
279 (Tenn.App. 1988). Thus, judicial review of such

determinations is governed by “the narrow, statutorily defined

standard contained in [T.C.A.] § 4-5-322(h) rather than the broad

standard of review used in other civil appeals.” Wayne County,

756 S.W.2d at 279. Specifically, T.C.A. § 4-5-322(h)(5)7

provides, as relevant here, that the reviewing court

may reverse or modify the decision if the
rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings,
inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

* * *

(5) Unsupported by evidence which is both
substantial and material in the light of the
entire record.

In determining the substantiality of
evidence, the court shall take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from
its weight, but the court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact.

Thus, we will not substitute our judgment regarding the weight of

the evidence for that of the agency, even where the evidence

could support a different result. Wayne County, 756 S.W.2d at

279 (citing Humana of Tennessee v. Tennessee Health Facilities

Comm’n, 551 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tenn. 1977)); Grubb v. Tennessee

Civil Serv. Comm’n, 731 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tenn.App. 1987); Hughes

v. Board of Commissioners, 319 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tenn. 1958)).

Stated another way,

7
T.C.A. § 4-5-322 is contained in the Uniform Administrative Procedures
Act, codified at T.C.A. § 4-5-101, et seq.

9
 [a]n agency’s factual determination should be
upheld if there exists “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to
support a rational conclusion and such as to
furnish a reasonably sound basis for the
action under consideration.”

Wayne County, 756 S.W.2d at 279 (quoting Southern Ry. v. State

Bd. of Equalization, 682 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tenn. 1984); Sweet v.

State Technical Inst., 617 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tenn.App. 1981)). As

further explained in Wayne County,

[t]he general rules governing judicial review
of an agency’s factual decisions apply with
even greater force when the issues require
scientific or technical proof. Appellate
courts have neither the expertise nor the
resources to evaluate complex scientific
issues de novo. When very technical areas of
expertise are involved, they generally defer
to agency decisions, and will not substitute
their judgment for that of the agency on
highly technical matters.

However, the court’s deference to an agency’s
expertise is no excuse for judicial inertia.
Even in cases involving scientific or
technical evidence, the “substantial and
material evidence standard” in [T.C.A.] § 4-
5-322(h)(5) requires a searching and careful
inquiry that subjects the agency’s decision
to close scrutiny.

Wayne County, 756 S.W.2d at 280 (citations omitted).

With regard to the valuation of real property for tax

purposes, T.C.A. § 67-5-601(a) mandates that

[t]he value of all property shall be
ascertained from the evidence of its sound,
intrinsic and immediate value, for purposes
of sale between a willing seller and a

10
 willing buyer without consideration of
speculative values....

The Tennessee Constitution provides that “all property real,

personal or mixed shall be subject to taxation... except the

direct product of the soil in the hands of the producer, and his

immediate vendee....” TENN .CONST . art. II, § 28. Growing crops

-- including timber -- are specifically exempted from property

taxation by T.C.A. § 67-5-216(a).

III. The Parties’ Contentions

On appeal, Willamette argues that the appropriate

method of valuing woodland is by means of the residual method,

i.e., analyzing sales of comparable property with growing trees

and deducting the value of the timber to arrive at a residual

value for the land itself. Willamette insists that use of the

residual method is mandated by Tennessee statutes, case law,

prior decisions of the AAC, and the appraisal manual used by the

County and the DPA. Willamette chiefly relies upon the decision

of this court in Richardson v. Tennessee Assessment Appeals

Comm’n, 828 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn.App. 1991), in which we affirmed the

lower court’s use of the residual method of valuing property with

surface and mineral values. In its brief, Willamette argues that

Richardson “unequivocally” sets forth “the appraisal methodology

required by law for valuation of land exclusive of timber and

mineral values.”

11
 Willamette also contends that the record does not

contain substantial and material evidence to support the AAC’s

decision that the direct comparable sales method was appropriate

for valuation of the subject woodland. In this connection,

Willamette argues that the only credible proof regarding the

growing timber’s value came from its own witnesses, and that the

testimony of the County’s witnesses was unreliable, erroneous,

and based upon inadmissible hearsay. Willamette also contends

that the AAC improperly relied upon two sales of cut-over

property selected by Smith, and that the AAC was simply

attempting to affirm whatever values the assessing officials had

previously determined.

Finally, Willamette argues that it has been denied

equal protection under the United States and Tennessee

Constitutions, by virtue of the administrative agencies’

application of the direct comparable sales method to its

properties, but allegedly to no others in Wayne County.

Willamette contends that the County and DPA, in an effort “to

approximate the erroneous Rural Land Schedule values,” “devised

this ‘cut-over’ or ‘direct sales comparison’ valuation theory to

apply only to Willamette’s property.”

The County, on the other hand, contends that Richardson

is inapplicable to the instant case; that neither Richardson, nor

any other authority, mandates the exclusive use of a single

appraisal method; that the record supports the AAC’s

determination that, under the circumstances of this case, the

direct comparable sales method was preferable to the residual

12
method; and that Willamette did not prove that application of the

direct comparable sales method had resulted in any denial of its

right to equal protection.

The AAC likewise argues in its brief that the appraisal

methodology applied to Willamette’s woodland did not deny

Willamette equal protection under either the state or federal

constitution. The AAC also argues that “[t]here is no legal

requirement that only the residual assessment method be used to

determine the value of timberland,” and that, as a matter of

public policy, the assessing agencies “should be permitted to use

the assessment methodology for ad valorem tax purposes that

produces the fairest and best valuation of a given piece of

property.”

IV. Analysis

A.

Turning first to Willamette’s issue regarding the

proper method of valuation, we do not find that the applicable

statutory scheme, Tennessee case law, or the appraisal manual

used by the County and DPA8 require that the residual method be

utilized in the valuation of timberland. On the contrary, no

authority suggests that any single method is mandated, to the

exclusion of all others. Although we affirmed the lower court’s

8
The DPA’s “Rural Land Procedures Manual “provides that “[t]imber is
considered as a growing crop and is always treated as a negative adjustment,”
and that its “value must be removed from the selling price to arrive at a
value indication for land only.” These provisions are consistent with T.C.A.
§ 67-5-216(a), which exempts timber from taxation. They do not mean -- as
Willamette argues -- that the residual method is the only permissible
methodology to achieve this objective.

13
use of the residual method in the Richardson case, we did not

hold that it was the exclusive method available to the assessing

agencies; on the contrary, that case simply holds that, under the

facts prsented there, use of the residual method was appropriate.

See Richardson, 828 S.W.2d at 407-08. By the same token, we are

not aware of, nor have we been cited to, any other authority

mandating use of a single appraisal methodology.

We therefore must consider the question of whether the

record contains substantial and material evidence to support the

AAC’s decision to accept appraised values that were determined by

means of the direct comparable sales method. The record contains

extensive testimony regarding several different methods of

valuation, each of which possesses inherent advantages and

disadvantages. The County’s witnesses opined that the direct

comparable sales method was preferable in the instant case.

Smith testified that he would only use the residual method where

an insufficient number of sales of vacant land were available for

comparison. Another of the County’s witnesses, Bob Rusk,

testified that the direct comparable sales method was useful

where, as here, sufficient information regarding other sales is

available; he also stated that the residual method was not as

suitable for use in Wayne County as it would be in a more stable

market where timber and land prices had not changed much over a

long period of time. Rusk further testified regarding the

various advantages and disadvantages of the two methods.

Willamette, on the other hand, presented extensive testimony

regarding the residual method. One of Willamette’s witnesses,

Dr. Robert Parker, disputed the timber values calculated by Smith

14
and Rusk, and maintained that the residual method was the best

way to arrive at an accurate valuation of the taxable raw land.

Willamette also offered other testimony based upon the residual

method, including that of Robert Williams, who supported

Willamette’s contention that the appropriate average timber

deduction should be approximately $136 per acre.

It is clear that the AAC was confronted with a conflict

in the expert testimony. As explained in Wayne County,

[a]gencies are not bound by the expert
opinions presented to them. Because of their
presumed expertise and knowledge, agencies
are accorded “wide discretion in determining
the weight or probative value to be given the
testimony of the expert witness....”

Resolving conflicting evidence is for the
agency. Thus, when conflicts in expert
testimony arise, it is the agency’s
prerogative to resolve them, not the court’s.

Id. at 281 (citations omitted).

As previously explained, courts typically will defer to

an agency decision where the agency is acting within its area of

knowledge and expertise, Id. at 280, and this is particularly

true where technical or scientific matters are involved. Id.

Admittedly, the record contains evidence regarding both

advantages and disadvantages of each appraisal method, as well as

evidence that the residual method could, in certain instances, be

the preferable means of valuation. On the other hand, it also

contains credible evidence indicating that, under the

15
circumstances of this case, the direct comparable sales method

represented the appropriate choice.

The evidence establishes that the use of the direct

comparable sales method in this case satisfies the requirements

of T.C.A. § 67-5-601(a). Having decided that the valuation

methodolgy utilized by the AAC was, in general terms, in

compliance with the statutory mandate, we now must decide if the

record reflects “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept to support a rational conclusion and such as to

furnish a reasonably sound basis for the” valuations determined

by the AAC.” Wayne County, 756 S.W.2d at 279.

B.

Willamette contends that the record does not contain

substantial and material evidence to support the appraisal values

calculated by the AAC. In reaching its conclusion, the AAC

essentially accepted the values suggested by Smith and Rusk, and

rejected those advanced by Willamette’s witnesses. Again, these

determinations required the AAC to resolve conflicting expert

testimony regarding valuations of the subject properties. Under

these circumstances, we cannot substitute our judgment for that

of the AAC, as affirmed by the trial court. We find that the

record does contain substantial and material evidence to support

the appraisal values assigned to Willamette’s properties by the

AAC in the exhibit to its final order. Id. at 279.

C.

16
 Willamette also argues that the testimony of the

County’s witnesses was based on inadmissible hearsay -- in

particular, statements from various buyers and sellers of

property in Wayne County -- and did not “possess sufficient

indicia of credibility” to be admissible under Rule 703,

Tenn.R.Evid. Rule 703 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the
facts or data [relied upon by the expert]
need not be admissible in evidence. The
court shall disallow testimony in the form of
an opinion or inference if the underlying
facts or data indicate lack of
trustworthiness.

Rule 703, Tenn.R.Evid.

The record indicates that obtaining information from

buyers and sellers of property is a common practice utilized by

real estate experts in forming opinions such as those at issue in

the instant case. Therefore, in accordance with the above-quoted

language from Rule 703, the County’s witnesses were entitled to

rely upon the facts and data in question. Furthermore, although

the record certainly contains some testimony contrary to that

offered by the County’s witnesses, it does not reflect such a

lack of trustworthiness as to render the testimony of the

County’s witnesses inadmissible. Willamette’s argument on this

point is found to be without merit.

D.

17
 We next turn to Willamette’s equal protection argument.

In this context, Willamette relies in part upon the decision of

the United States Supreme Court in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co.

v. County Comm’n of Webster County, West Virginia, 488 U.S. 336,

109 S.Ct. 633, 102 L.Ed.2d 688 (1989). In that case, the Supreme

Court held that certain property valuations by the county tax

assessor had resulted in “gross disparities in the assessed value

of generally comparable property9,” and had therefore denied the

taxpayers equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.,

109 S.Ct. at 635. In so holding, the Court stated as follows:

That two methods are used to assess property
in the same class is, without more, of no
constitutional moment. The Equal Protection
Clause “applies only to taxation which in
fact bears unequally on persons or property
of the same class....” In each case, the
constitutional requirement is the seasonable
attainment of a rough equality in tax
treatment of similarly situated property
owners.

Id., 109 S.Ct. at 637-38 (citations omitted). The Court also

noted that

[t]he States, of course, have broad powers to
impose and collect taxes. A State may divide
different kinds of property into classes and
assign to each class a different tax burden
so long as those divisions and burdens are
reasonable.... In each case, “[i]f the
selection or classification is neither
capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some

9
The “gross disparity” in Allegheny resulted from the Webster County Tax
Assessor’s valuation of the petitioners’ property on the basis of its recent
purchase price, as compared to her valuation of similar properties that had
not recently been sold by making only minor adjustments to their most recent,
but much older, sale price.

18
 reasonable consideration of difference or
policy, there is no denial of the equal
protection of the law.”

Id., 109 S.Ct. at 638 (citations omitted).

In the Allegheny case, the Court found that the

property of the petitioners had been assessed at approximately “8

to 35 times more than comparable neighboring property, and [that]

these discrepancies have continued for more than 10 years with

little change.” Id., 109 S.Ct. at 638. Noting that the

petitioners had “suffered from such ‘intentional systematic

undervaluation by state officials’ of comparable property” in the

County, the Court held that “[t]he relative undervaluation of

comparable property in Webster County over time therefore denies

petitioners the equal protection of the law.” Id., 109 S.Ct. at

639.

Upon review of the record in the instant case, we

cannot say that Willamette has suffered a denial of equal

protection by virtue of “gross disparities in the assessed value

of generally comparable property” such as occurred in Allegheny.

See Id., 109 S.Ct. at 635. Although there is proof in the record

showing that different appraised values for Willamette’s

properties resulted depending upon which valuation method was

employed, such differences generally were not of the magnitude of

those in Allegheny. As explained in that case, the mere fact

that the assessing agencies have employed different appraisal

methods “is, without more, of no constitutional moment.” Id.,

109 S.Ct. at 637. The record here simply does not contain proof

19
that the AAC’s use of the direct comparable sales method

resulted in an absence of “rough equality in tax treatment of

similarly situated property owners.” Id., 109 S.Ct. at 638. We

therefore hold that the Chancery Court correctly held that

Willamette had not been denied equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Also with regard to its equal protection argument,

Willamette relies upon Article II, § 28 of the Tennessee

Constitution, which section provides, in pertinent part, as

follows:

The ratio of assessment to value of property
in each class or subclass shall be equal and
uniform throughout the State, the value and
definition of property in each class or
subclass to be ascertained in such manner as
the Legislature shall direct. Each
respective taxing authority shall apply the
same tax rate to all property within its
jurisdiction.

There is no proof in the record before us establishing that the

“ratio of assessment to value” of Willamette’s property was not

equal or uniform to other properties in the same class throughout

the state. Furthermore, as explained earlier, the appraisal and

assessment of Willamette’s properties was in compliance with the

requirement of T.C.A. § 67-5-601(a) that “[t]he value of all

property shall be ascertained from the evidence of its sound,

intrinsic and immediate value, for purposes of sale between a

willing seller and a willing buyer without consideration of

speculative values.”

20
 Willamette’s equal protection issue is found to be

without merit.

V. Conclusion

The judgment of the Chancery Court is affirmed. Costs

on appeal are taxed to the appellant. This case is remanded to

the trial court for the collection of costs assessed there,

pursuant to applicable law.

__________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.

CONCUR:

________________________
Houston M. Goddard, P.J.

________________________
Herschel P. Franks, J.

21