FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 08-50454
v. D.C. No.
SEYED MAHMOOD MOUSAVI, AKA 2:07-CR-00513-
Seyyed Mahmood Mousavi, AKA PA-1
Seyed Mahmoud Mousawi, OPINION
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
March 1, 2010—Pasadena, California
Filed May 5, 2010
Before: Ronald M. Gould and Sandra S. Ikuta,
Circuit Judges, and Lloyd D. George,*
District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Ikuta
*The Honorable Lloyd D. George, United States District Judge for the
District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
6739
6742 UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI
.
COUNSEL
George C. Harris, Morrison & Foerster LLP and Stacy Tol-
chin, Van Der Hout, Brigagliano & Nightingale, attorneys for
the appellant.
Susan J. De Witt, Assistant United States Attorney, attorney
for the appellee.
UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI 6743
OPINION
IKUTA, Circuit Judge:
Seyed Mahmood Mousavi appeals from his federal crimi-
nal convictions for, among other things, willfully providing
services to Iran in violation of the International Economic
Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1705, and the
Iranian Transaction Regulations (ITR), 31 C.F.R. § 560.206,
commonly referred to as the United States’ trade embargo
against Iran. Mousavi argues that the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to allow any rational juror to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of willfully vio-
lating the ITR. We conclude, viewing the evidence presented
at trial in the light most favorable to the government, that evi-
dence sufficiently supports Mousavi’s conviction under 50
U.S.C. § 1705 and 31 C.F.R. § 560.206. See Jackson v. Vir-
ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).1
I
Mousavi immigrated to the United States from Iran in the
late 1980s, becoming a legal permanent resident in 1991 and
a naturalized citizen in 1999. At times relevant to this appeal,
Mousavi and his wife owned Mousavi Digital Services, doing
business as Global Digital Services, a partnership that
installed television satellite systems. At the same time, Mou-
1
Mousavi also appeals from his convictions for unlawfully procuring
naturalization, 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), making material false statements to
government agents, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, willfully filing a false tax return, 26
U.S.C. § 7206(1), and corruptly endeavoring to obstruct administration of
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). Mousavi argues that evi-
dence was insufficient to support these convictions, that the trial court
committed plain error in instructing the jury, that he was deprived of
effective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence seized allegedly in flagrant disregard of the
terms of a search warrant. We address these claims in a concurrently filed
memorandum disposition.
6744 UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI
savi was president of the Hejrat Educational Center, a non-
profit organization that provided services to the Islamic
community, and also ran a business that organized travel
packages to Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage by obtaining nec-
essary visas and arranging flights, hotels, and meals.
In January 2006, agents of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) discovered evidence of concealed income on Mousavi’s
2002 personal and business tax returns. In the resulting inves-
tigation, agents found evidence that some of Mousavi’s undis-
closed income was from a Kuwaiti company, Al Mal Kuwaiti
Company (Al Mal), which had entered into an agreement with
Mousavi to provide consulting services related to business
ventures in Iran. Based on this evidence, a grand jury returned
an indictment against Mousavi in March 2008, charging him
with, among other things, conducting unlawful dealings with
Iran in violation of IEEPA and the ITR. 50 U.S.C. § 1705; 31
C.F.R. § 560.206. A jury trial commenced in district court in
April 2008.
At trial, the government presented evidence showing that
Mousavi contracted with Al Mal to provide consulting ser-
vices directed at establishing business ventures in Iran. To
that end, the government produced a document entitled
“Agreement,” signed by Mousavi and Mohammad Al Sager,
Chairman and Managing Director of Al Mal, dated June 11,
2002, and two attached documents: one entitled “Incentive
Plan,” also dated June 11, 2002; and the other a letter from Al
Mal’s Assistant General Manager to Akbar Torkan, Chairman
and Managing Director of Petroparts, Ltd. in Tehran, Iran,
dated August 25, 2002.
The Agreement provides, in relevant part:2
The two parties agreed on the following:
2
Errors appear in the original.
UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI 6745
1. Al Mal will hire Mr. Mousavi (consultant) to
help Al Mal in its endeavor to do the following:
a) To bid for GSM license jointly with Iran
Electronic Development Company.
b) To help establishing a bank and leasing Co.
with Industrial Development & Renovation
Organization of Iran (IDRO).
2. The consultants responsibilities will be to follow
up with the authorities and concern parties all
required steps to help establish and accomplish
our planed co-joint projects.
...
4. Al Mal will hire the consultant for a period of
six months for a remuneration of US$ 50,000
(US $ fifty thousand only) to be paid 50% in
advance and 15% after reaching a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) with each party with
the last project getting an extra 5% (total 100%).
5. Al Mal will appoint Mr. Mousavi in one of com-
pany established jointly by the Iranian Partners.
...
7. An incentive plan will be drafted and agreed
upon separately in case that Mr. Mousavi
accomplished any of the above joint companies.
The attached Incentive Plan provides for additional commis-
sions to be paid in the event of success in several projects. For
example, Section B(1) of the Incentive Plan provides: “Gra-
vell Project: Al Mal will pay Mr. Mousavi after successfully
completing the purchase of ship and establishing the company
6746 UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI
jointly with the Iranian partner US$ 50,000.” Section 3 states:
“Also, Mr. Mousavi will be exclusive to Al Mal on Iran and
will not approach other parties for these projects.”
The attached letter from Al Mal to Petroparts references a
meeting in Tehran regarding Al Mal’s interest in investing in
the Iranian market, and notes Al Mal’s particular interest in
“exploring further the feasibility of a project for commission-
ing a gas pipeline from the Republic of Iran (say, from Kharg
Island) to Kuwait.” In the letter, Al Mal nominates “Mr. Mah-
moud Al Mousawi as our liaison for this project.”
In addition to the Agreement, Incentive Plan, and letter, the
government introduced evidence showing a course of dealings
between Mousavi and Al Mal. The documents introduced at
trial included Mousavi’s Iranian and United States passports
with stamps indicating travel to Kuwait and Iran in late April
and early June 2002, as well as a boarding pass from Iran Air
dated April 22, 2002, found in the same file as the Agreement.
The government introduced bank statements showing wire
transfers from Al Mal into Mousavi’s personal account during
the same time period. The statements showed transfers of
$6,170 on April 17, $8,870 on June 6, and $30,000 on June
13, 2002, for a total of $45,040. Mousavi’s 2002 personal tax
return, also introduced by the government, did not report any
income from Al Mal. Instead, it indicated a total income of
only $11,152, all from Mousavi Digital Services.
Finally, the government presented evidence to demonstrate
that Mousavi was a sophisticated businessman, whose ties to
Iran and organization of travel in the area would have made
him familiar with the United States’ restrictions on trade with
that country. This evidence included Mousavi’s naturalization
application and resume, indicating that Mousavi grew up in
Iran and was engaged in business there during the period fol-
lowing the embargo. Mousavi had high-level contacts in Iran
and continued to travel to Iran regularly after moving to the
United States. In addition, evidence indicated that Mousavi
UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI 6747
ran a business that provided travel packages to persons travel-
ing to Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage. In making travel
arrangements for clients seeking to visit Iran as part of their
pilgrimage, Mousavi sought visas from the Pakistani
embassy; using that embassy is required, the government’s
witness testified, because there is no Iranian embassy in the
United States as a result of the trade embargo and diplomatic
sanctions. Mousavi likewise was forced to coordinate his own
and others’ travel to Iran through third-party countries (e.g.
Kuwait) because there are no direct flights to Iran from the
United States as a result of the embargo.
Also at trial, an employee of the Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the agency charged
with administering the ITR, testified that, in his opinion, deal-
ings such as those reflected in the Agreement would be a vio-
lation of the ITR absent a license from OFAC. The OFAC
employee testified that Mousavi never applied for or received
a license to conduct such business with Iran.
Following the close of the government’s case, Mousavi
moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29 for a
directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to
support the charges against him. Specifically, the defense
argued that the government failed to provide sufficient evi-
dence that Mousavi violated the ITR, or (if he did so) failed
to prove that he acted willfully. The court reserved ruling on
the motion until after the verdict. The defense presented no
evidence.
The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Defense
counsel renewed his motion under Rule 29, which the court
denied as to Mousavi’s convictions under IEEPA and the ITR.
Mousavi filed a timely notice of appeal, contending that evi-
dence presented at trial was constitutionally insufficient to
support his conviction.
6748 UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI
II
We begin with a review of the relevant law. IEEPA autho-
rizes the President to “deal with any unusual and extraordi-
nary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign pol-
icy, or economy of the United States . . . .” 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701(a). In relevant part, it authorizes the President to
impose trade embargoes against foreign countries with which
the United States has engaged in hostilities. See id. § 1707(a).
A violation of an embargo imposed under IEEPA is a criminal
offense. Specifically, § 1705(a) provides that it is “unlawful
for a person to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate,
or cause a violation of any license, order, regulation or prohi-
bition issued under this chapter.” Id. § 1705(a). One who
commits or attempts to commit such a violation “willfully”
can be fined or imprisoned. Id. § 1705(c).3
In response to the seizure of the American Embassy in Teh-
ran in 1979, President Carter issued a series of Executive
Orders authorizing OFAC to promulgate regulations blocking
transactions with Iran. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 662-63 (1981). Consequently, OFAC promulgated the
ITR, which provide, in relevant part:
(a) Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this
part . . . no United States person, wherever located,
may engage in any transaction or dealing in or
related to:
(1) Goods or services of Iranian origin or
3
50 U.S.C. § 1705(c) provides, in full: “A person who willfully com-
mits, willfully attempts to commit, or willfully conspires to commit, or
aids and abets in the commission of, an unlawful act described in subsec-
tion (a) of this section shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than
$1,000,000, or if a natural person, may be imprisoned for not more than
20 years, or both.”
UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI 6749
owned or controlled by the Government of
Iran; or
(2) Goods, technology, or services for
exportation, reexportation, sale or supply,
directly or indirectly, to Iran or the Govern-
ment of Iran.
(b) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the
term transaction or dealing includes but is not lim-
ited to purchasing, selling, transporting, swapping,
brokering, approving, financing, facilitating, or guar-
anteeing.
31 C.F.R. § 560.206. The ITR also prohibit “attempts” to vio-
late these restrictions: “Any transaction . . . that evades or
avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts
to violate, any of the prohibitions contained in this part is
hereby prohibited.” 31 C.F.R. § 560.203. The ITR provide for
a process by which one may obtain a license from OFAC to
conduct transactions otherwise prohibited by the ITR. See 31
C.F.R. § 560.501.
III
Mousavi makes two arguments as to why the evidence
introduced by the government at trial was insufficient to allow
any reasonable jury to convict him of a violation of IEEPA.
First, he argues that the government failed to prove any viola-
tion of the ITR at all. Second, Mousavi argues that even if his
acts constituted a violation of the ITR, the government failed
to introduce sufficient evidence that such violation was will-
ful.
A
Our review of the sufficiency of evidence to support a
criminal conviction is governed by Jackson v. Virginia, which
6750 UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI
requires a court of appeals to determine “whether, after view-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S.
at 319. Jackson “establishes a two-step inquiry for consider-
ing a challenge to a conviction based on sufficiency of the
evidence.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc). “First, a reviewing court must consider
the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to
the prosecution” without “considering how it would have
resolved the conflicts, made the inferences, or considered the
evidence at trial.” Id. “Second, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, [we] must deter-
mine whether this evidence, so viewed, is adequate to allow
‘any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319) (brackets omitted). We review the evidence pre-
sented at Mousavi’s trial under this standard.
B
We first turn to Mousavi’s contention that the evidence
presented at trial is constitutionally insufficient to support his
conviction because the government failed to prove any viola-
tion of the ITR. According to Mousavi, the government
proved at most that Mousavi entered into an agreement to pro-
vide future services to a Kuwaiti company that sought to do
business in Iran. Mousavi argues that because 31 C.F.R.
§ 560.206, the ITR at issue, does not proscribe an agreement
to take steps in the future, the conduct alleged by the govern-
ment does not fall within the scope of the regulation. Further-
more, Mousavi argues that § 560.206 is not clearly applicable
to agreements with companies that are not located in Iran. At
a minimum, Mousavi argues, § 560.206 is ambiguous with
respect to its applicability to agreements for prospective ser-
vices with Kuwaiti companies, and the rule of lenity demands
that such ambiguity be construed in defendants’ favor.
Accordingly, Mousavi claims that because there was no evi-
UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI 6751
dence that he either engaged in a transaction with Iran or
attempted to do so, the government’s evidence at trial was
insufficient to support his conviction for violation of IEEPA
and the ITR.
[1] We disagree. The relevant provision of the ITR prohib-
its “any transaction or dealing in or related to” providing
“[g]oods, technology or services” to Iran or its government,
whether directly or indirectly. 31 C.F.R. § 560.206. Further,
the ITR indicate that any transaction that “attempts to violate”
the prohibition against entering into the specified business
transactions is prohibited. 31 C.F.R. § 560.203. Contrary to
Mousavi’s argument, these provisions are not ambiguous;
rather, they broadly prohibit any transaction that is related to
providing goods or services to Iran, and any attempt to engage
in such a transaction. The plain language of this regulation
prohibits an agreement to provide future services to Iran: such
an agreement would both be a transaction “related to” provid-
ing services to Iran, as well as an “attempt to violate” the pro-
hibition against providing such services. See 31 C.F.R.
§ 560.206. Moreover, the regulation bars transactions or deal-
ings to provide goods, technology or services “directly or
indirectly” to Iran, which would preclude transactions or deal-
ings with non-Iranian companies for that purpose. 36 C.F.R.
§ 560.206. Because there is no ambiguity in the regulation,
the rule of lenity is inapplicable. See Rewis v. United States,
401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
[2] In light of this clear prohibition, the evidence presented
by the government, viewed in the light most favorable to its
case, was sufficient to establish a violation of the ITR. See
Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164. The jury could reasonably determine
that the Agreement between Mousavi and Al Mal, in conjunc-
tion with the Incentive Plan and the August 25, 2002 letter,
constituted a transaction “related to” the provision of services,
“directly or indirectly,” to Iran. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.206.
Moreover, in light of these documents, a juror could reason-
ably conclude that Mousavi agreed to help Al Mal engage in
6752 UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI
several specified transactions with its Iranian partners, includ-
ing assisting Al Mal’s bid for a license “jointly with Iran
Electronic Development Company,” and establishing a “bank
and leasing” company with the Industrial Development and
Renovation Organization of Iran. Moreover, a jury could rea-
sonably conclude that the correlation between the wire trans-
fers from Al Mal and the evidence of travel to Iran during the
time frame in which the Agreement was finalized indicated
that the payments and trips were related to each other, and
that Mousavi had actually assisted Al Mal in providing ser-
vices to Iran.
C
Mousavi next argues that the government failed to intro-
duce sufficient evidence that Mousavi’s violation of the ITR
was “willful,” as required for the imposition of criminal liabil-
ity under IEEPA. As noted above, under § 1705(c), the gov-
ernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant acted willfully in committing or attempting to com-
mit a violation of pertinent regulations. See 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1705(a), (c). Mousavi argues that to prove willfulness in
this context, the government must prove that he was aware of
the ITR’s licensing requirements and knew that entering into
the Agreement without a license issued by OFAC was unlaw-
ful. According to Mousavi, the government must prove his
knowledge of the licensing scheme, not just prove that Mou-
savi knew he was violating the law, because IEEPA and the
ITR establish highly technical requirements, which under the
reasoning of Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), and
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), require proof
of a defendant’s knowing violation of a specific provision of
law. Because the government failed to provide any evidence
that Mousavi knew of the relevant licensing provision, Mou-
savi argues, the evidence was insufficient to convict him.
1
[3] Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has previ-
ously addressed the definition of “willful” under IEEPA, 50
UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI 6753
U.S.C. § 1705(c). As the Supreme Court has noted, the term
“willfully” is “a word of many meanings whose construction
is often dependent on the context in which it appears.” Bryan
v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this
area has evolved over time, but now appears to establish two
standards, one higher than the other, for “willfulness” in the
criminal context. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S.
47, 58 n.9 (2007); see, e.g., Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200-07; Rat-
zlaf, 510 U.S. at 135; Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191. In the context
of criminal statutes, the word “willful” generally indicates a
requirement of specific intent. United States v. Henderson,
243 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2001). “As a general matter,
when used in the criminal context, a ‘willful’ act is one
undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’ ” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191.
Said otherwise, “in order to establish a ‘willful’ violation of
a statute, ‘the Government must prove that the defendant
acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.’ ” Id. at
191-92 (quoting Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137). But in a context
involving “highly technical statutes that present[ ] the danger
of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent con-
duct,” id. at 194, the Supreme Court has suggested that “will-
fulness” requires the government to prove that the defendant
acted with “specific intent to violate a known legal duty,”
Safeco, 551 U.S. at 58 n.9.
[4] The Supreme Court’s cases do not make clear the prac-
tical effect, if any, of this heightened standard. Bryan and
Safeco both identify Cheek and Ratzlaff as examples of cases
where the heightened burden of proof applied. See Bryan, 524
U.S. at 181; Safeco, 551 U.S. at 58 n.9. Neither of these cases,
however, required the government to prove the defendant’s
knowledge of a specific provision of law. In Cheek, the
Supreme Court held that “willfulness,” as used in the criminal
provisions of the tax code, required the government to prove
that the defendant knew of the legal duty to file an income tax
return and to treat his wages as income. 498 U.S. at 202. But
the Court noted that the “jury would be free to consider any
6754 UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI
admissible evidence from any source” showing that the defen-
dant was aware of this duty. Id. While Cheek listed “aware-
ness of the relevant provisions of the Code or regulations” as
one source of such evidence, it did not identify it as the exclu-
sive source. Id. Similarly, Ratzlaff held that the government
could not carry its burden to prove the “willfulness” require-
ment in a prosecution for illegal structuring of financial trans-
actions merely by proving that the defendant knew of the
bank’s duty to report cash transactions of more than $10,000.
510 U.S. at 663 n.19. Nevertheless, the government did not
have to prove that the defendant was aware of the provision
of the federal statute that made it illegal to structure his cash
deposits to avoid triggering the bank’s reporting obligation. It
was sufficient if a jury could reasonably conclude that the
“defendant knew of his duty to refrain from structuring,” a
conclusion which could be based on “reasonable inferences
from the evidence of defendant’s conduct.” Id. Similarly,
prior to Cheek and Ratzlaff, we indicated that “willfulness”
under a complex anti-exportation statute required proof of “a
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty,”
United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828 (9th
Cir. 1976), but we considered this standard satisfied where the
government proved “that the defendant [knew] that his con-
duct . . . is violative of the law.” Id. at 828-29. These cases
make clear that even in the context of “highly technical stat-
utes that presented the danger of ensnaring individuals
engaged in apparently innocent conduct,” Bryan, 524 U.S. at
194, the term “willfulness” requires the government to prove
that the defendant was aware of the legal duty at issue, but not
that the defendant was aware of a specific statutory or regula-
tory provision.
[5] Even more to the point, the Supreme Court has not
interpreted “willfulness” in criminal statutes to require the
government to prove that a defendant was aware of a specific
licensing requirement. In Bryan, the Supreme Court consid-
ered the arguments of a defendant convicted of a conspiracy
to violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), which criminalizes will-
UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI 6755
ful violation of its prohibition on engaging in firearms trading
without a license. 524 U.S. at 187 n.2. The evidence produced
at trial showed that the defendant “used so-called ‘straw pur-
chasers’ in Ohio to acquire pistols that he could not have pur-
chased himself; that the straw purchasers made false
statements when purchasing the guns; that [the defendant]
assured the straw purchasers that he would file the serial num-
bers off the guns; and that he resold the guns on Brooklyn
street corners known for drug dealing.” Id. at 189. The Court
held that this evidence was “unquestionably adequate to prove
that [the defendant] was dealing in firearms, and that he knew
his conduct was unlawful.” Id. Furthermore, although the
government presented no evidence that the defendant “was
aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms
without a federal license,” the Supreme Court held that the
government had no obligation to prove that the defendant had
such knowledge. Id. at 189, 194. Rather, the term “willfully”
in that context required the government to prove only that the
defendant “knew that his conduct was unlawful.” Id. at 195.
[6] In light of these precedents, we conclude there is no
basis for requiring the government to prove that a person
charged with violating IEEPA and the ITR was aware of a
specific licensing requirement. While the prohibitions
imposed by IEEPA and the ITR are for conduct that is not
“obviously illegal,” see Henderson, 243 F.3d at 1173, the
“danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently inno-
cent conduct,” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194, is no greater under
IEEPA than under the statute analyzed in Bryan; and, there,
the Court held that defendants were adequately protected by
reserving criminal punishment only for those who know that
their actions are illegal, id. at 195-96. Similarly, defendants
charged with a violation of IEEPA and the ITR are adequately
protected by requiring the government to prove that the defen-
dants knew their actions violated the United States’ embargo
on transactions with Iran. See id. Indeed, there is even less
reason than in Bryan to require the government to prove the
defendant knew of the availability of a license, because the
6756 UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI
ITR licensing requirement is not, as it was in Bryan, an intrin-
sic part of the criminal offense at issue. The ITR under which
Mousavi was convicted does not even explicitly mention a
licensing requirement. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.206. Rather, it
prohibits transactions “[e]xcept as otherwise authorized pur-
suant to this part.” Id. These authorizations include licenses as
well as other exemptions. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 560.210
(“Exempt transactions”). Accordingly, we conclude that
“willfulness” under IEEPA requires the government to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with
knowledge “that his conduct was unlawful,” Bryan, 524 U.S.
at 186, but not that the defendant was aware of a specific
licensing requirement.
In so holding, we join those of our sister circuits to have
considered and rejected analogous challenges under IEEPA.
See United States v. Homa Int’l Trading Corp., 387 F.3d 144,
147 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that, to sup-
port a conviction for willful violation of IEEPA and the ITR,
the government was not required “to prove that [defendant]
knew he was not a depository institution entitled to avail itself
of an expressed exception to the Embargo” because “the law
does not require such a negative finding by the jury to estab-
lish willfulness”); United States v. Dien Duc Huynh, 246 F.3d
734, 739, 744 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that sufficient evidence
supported conviction for willful violation of the Vietnamese
trade embargo, where defendant “knew that there was an
embargo in place against Vietnam, and [a witness] testified
that [the defendant] told him he was shipping goods to Viet-
nam by way of Singapore because of the embargo”); see also
United States v. Quinn, 403 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D.D.C. 2005)
(holding that, under Bryan, proof of “willfulness” under
§ 1705(c) of IEEPA does not require knowledge of the licens-
ing requirements under the ITR).
Applying these principles to the circumstances of this case,
we hold that in order to sustain a conviction for willful viola-
tion of the ITR at issue, 31 C.F.R. § 560.206, the government
UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI 6757
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mousavi knew
he was acting unlawfully. But we reject Mousavi’s argument
that the government also had to prove that Mousavi had a spe-
cific understanding of the ITR’s licensing requirements.
2
Using the correct definition of “willfully,” we now must
determine whether, taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, any rational juror could con-
clude that Mousavi knew that his conduct was unlawful.
[7] A rational juror could conclude that the evidence
showed that Mousavi knew that his agreement with Al Mal,
and his subsequent provision of services under that agree-
ment, was unlawful. The evidence showed that Mousavi con-
cealed his income from Al Mal from the government on his
tax returns, and the Supreme Court has recognized such evi-
dence of concealment as sufficient to indicate knowledge of
unlawfulness. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 189 & n.8 (holding evi-
dence of types of concealment “unquestionably adequate” to
prove Bryan’s knowledge of unlawfulness).
[8] Furthermore, evidence viewed in the light most favor-
able to the government indicated that Mousavi had first-hand
knowledge of the embargo against Iran. A jury could reason-
ably conclude that a sophisticated and politically connected
businessman like Mousavi who lived and conducted business
in Iran after 1979 was aware of the 1979 United States trade
embargo. Moreover, Mousavi had scheduled numerous trips
for himself and others to Iran, which necessitated obtaining
Iranian visas through the Pakistani embassy and coordinating
travel through third-party countries because the embargo and
trade sanctions prohibited direct flights from the United States
to Iran. Mousavi also traveled regularly to Iran. Taking these
facts in the light most favorable to the government, they are
sufficient to permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that Mousavi knew that conducting business
6758 UNITED STATES v. MOUSAVI
with Iran was illegal and acted willfully by nevertheless con-
ducting such business. See Jackson, 434 U.S. at 319.
IV
Accordingly, for the reasons stated here and in the concur-
rently filed memorandum disposition, we affirm Mousavi’s
conviction under 50 U.S.C. § 1705 and 31 C.F.R. § 560.206.
We reverse Mousavi’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001
and 1425, and affirm the remaining convictions.
AFFIRMED IN PART & REVERSED IN PART.