Parsons v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL CO.

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY PARSONS; DAVID BOOTHE; 
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF
AMERICA,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
 No. 09-1822
v.
POWER MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
David A. Faber, Senior District Judge.
(2:07-cv-00719)

Argued: March 24, 2010

Decided: May 5, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON
and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Duncan
joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: John R. Woodrum, OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, PC, Washington, D.C., for
2 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL
Appellant. Bradley James Pyles, PYLES & TURNER, LLP,
Logan, West Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: W. Greg-
ory Mott, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &
STEWART, PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

This case involves a claim by two former coal miners,
Gregory Parsons and David Boothe, to collect retirement
health benefits allegedly owed to them by Power Mountain
Coal Company ("Power Mountain"), a coal operator in West
Virginia. Under the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment to which Power Mountain was a signatory, a coal opera-
tor is responsible for the health benefits of certain miners
"whose last signatory classified employment was with such
Employer." Power Mountain asserted that it was not their last
signatory employer, but the designated arbitrators under the
collective bargaining scheme disagreed. The district court
upheld the arbitrators’ decisions, and we affirm. Lest we risk
the disruption of the carefully negotiated rules governing
labor-management relations within the coal industry, we
decline to second-guess the judgment of arbitrators interpret-
ing a complicated collective bargaining scheme comprised of
interwoven agreements.

I.

A.

Parsons and Boothe are UMWA members who worked for
many years as coal miners for Pehem Industries ("Pehem"), a
company that at one time operated a coal preparation plant in
West Virginia. In 1997, Parsons and Boothe were laid off
from their jobs with Pehem.
 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL 3
Later that same year, Power Mountain purchased the plant
where Parsons and Boothe had previously worked. As a result
of its purchase, Power Mountain became subject to two labor
contracts between the UMWA and numerous coal operators.
Specifically, Power Mountain assumed its predecessor’s obli-
gations under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
of 1993 ("1993 NBCWA") and also became a direct signatory
to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1998
("1998 NBCWA"). Power Mountain also inherited a duty to
honor the "panel rights" of Pehem’s laid-off employees.
Under the panel system, laid-off employees were placed on a
panel and given the opportunity to be recalled back to
employment, in order of seniority, for any work falling within
the scope of the 1998 NBCWA’s work jurisdiction clause.

While the 1998 NBCWA was in effect, however, Power
Mountain hired non-union contractors for work allegedly fall-
ing under the 1998 NBCWA’s work jurisdiction clause. As a
result, a number of UMWA members, including several panel
members, filed grievances against Power Mountain, seeking
to collect pay for the work they claimed they were contractu-
ally entitled to perform. Without admitting liability, Power
Mountain settled the grievances for a total of almost $43,000
in two separate settlement agreements, one in 2002 and one
in 2003. Both settlements were short and included brief dis-
claimers, reciting that the agreements would not set a prece-
dent for future cases.

Neither agreement specified how the monies were to be
distributed. As a practical matter, Power Mountain simply
paid the bulk sum to the local union, which in turn distributed
the proceeds in equal shares to those union members who
likely would have been hired if not for the alleged violation.
Specifically, the local union determined that if Power Moun-
tain had not hired the non-union contractors, then Parsons and
Boothe, given their relative seniority on the panel, would have
been recalled to employment for Power Mountain. Parsons
and Boothe therefore received a proportionate share of the
4 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL
2002 and 2003 settlement proceeds. Power Mountain claims
it had no knowledge of who might or did receive such distri-
butions.

B.

The settlement payments received by Parsons and Boothe
gave rise to the claim for health benefits in this case. The cen-
tral purpose of the 1998 NBCWA is to provide lifetime health
benefits to retired, laid-off, and disabled UMWA members
and their dependents. The 1998 NBCWA places the burden
for these lifetime benefits on a miner’s last signatory
employer, and, if the last signatory employer is out of busi-
ness, on the 1993 Benefit Plan.

To achieve its overarching goal of lifetime benefits, the
1998 NBCWA works in tandem with a set of separate plans
and trusts, which establish a comprehensive, albeit compli-
cated, scheme specifying who is eligible for what benefits and
from whom. One such plan is the 1974 Pension Plan. All
questions of pension eligibility are determined under the
detailed rules of the 1974 Pension Plan, as adjudicated by the
plan’s trustees ("1974 Trustees"). As explained by Article
VIII(A), "[t]he Trustees . . . shall have full and final determi-
nation as to all issues concerning eligibility for benefits."

In the instant case, the 1974 Trustees determined that as a
result of the settlement payments, Power Mountain was
required to pay retirement health benefits to Parsons and
Boothe under Article XX(c)(3)(i) of the 1998 NBCWA,
which requires an employer to provide certain health benefits
to "pensioners under the 1974 Pension Plan and Trust whose
last signatory classified employment was with such
Employer." See also 1998 NBCWA, Art. XX(h). The Trust-
ees’ conclusion that Power Mountain was obligated to pay
health benefits under this section rested on two findings.
 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL 5
The 1974 Trustees first determined that Parsons and Boothe
were "pensioners under the 1974 Pension Plan and Trust"
because they were eligible for a "Special Permanent Layoff
Pension." To receive such a pension, a retired miner must
have worked a minimum of twenty years of signatory service,
with 1000 hours of "credited service" per year. In calculating
the number of hours of "credited service," the 1974 Pension
Plan treats hours actually worked and hours constructively
worked virtually the same. In this sense, and consistent with
the 1974 Trustees’ past practice, settlement agreements may
lead to awards of "credited service" if the settlement pay-
ments are "back pay" representing compensation for hours
that the employee ought to have worked but did not. The basis
for this general rule is Article I(A)(12), which provides that
"back pay," which is "agreed to by an Employer [and]
intended to compensate an Employee for periods which the
Employee would have been engaged in a performance of
duties for the Employer," yields "credited service" for "hours
worked." Using this provision, the 1974 Trustees interpreted
the 2002 and 2003 settlement payments as "back pay," and
the resulting adjustment to "credited service" for "hours
worked" meant that Parsons and Boothe met the threshold for
a "Special Permanent Layoff Pension."1

Second, the 1974 Trustees concluded that the settlement
payments made Power Mountain Parsons and Boothe’s last
signatory employer. An employee’s last signatory employer is
the employer on his last day of "credited service." Here,
because Parsons and Boothe’s last day of "credited service"
derived from settlement payments made by Power Mountain,
it was attributable to Power Mountain. In other words, the
1974 Trustees found that the settlement agreements repre-
sented constructive employment and that Power Mountain’s
constructive employment of plaintiffs (paying them for hours
1
Although Parsons and Boothe received payments under both the 2002
and the 2003 settlement agreements, Boothe received "credited service" on
the basis of the 2002 agreement alone.
6 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL
they did not work, but should have worked) was sufficient to
make it their last signatory employer.

When Parsons and Boothe attempted to enroll in its health
benefits plan, however, Power Mountain denied their claims,
insisting that it was not their last signatory employer. In
response, the UMWA invoked the Resolution of Dispute
("ROD") procedure under Article XX(e)(5) of the 1998
NBCWA. Under this provision, contested issues of health
benefits are adjudicated by the Trustees of the 1993 Benefit
Plan ("1993 Trustees"). After evaluating a disputed matter,
the 1993 Trustees typically issue an opinion, commonly
referred to as a "ROD," which "shall be final and binding on
the parties." In RODs for both Parsons and Boothe, the 1993
Trustees informed Power Mountain that the subsidiary ques-
tion of Parsons and Boothe’s last signatory employer would
be addressed by the 1974 Trustees through the procedure
authorized by Article XX(g) of the 1998 NBCWA. Under this
provision, the 1974 Trustees were authorized to "promptly
investigate and determine the eligibility or ineligibility of any
beneficiary whose right to receive benefits from the Trusts
has been challenged by . . . any Employer."

As to both Parsons and Boothe, the 1974 Trustees re-
affirmed their earlier conclusion that Power Mountain was
properly named as the last signatory employer and informed
the 1993 Trustees of this determination in a thoroughly rea-
soned letter. The 1993 Trustees issued ROD opinions in Par-
sons’s case on January 20, 2007, and in Boothe’s case on
October 24, 2007. In both rulings, the 1993 Trustees not only
adopted the 1974 Trustees’ decision on the issue of last signa-
tory employer but also confirmed the existence of additional
facts crucial to a determination of eligibility. The Trustees
concluded Power Mountain was required to provide health
benefits to Parsons and Boothe.

When Power Mountain refused to comply with the ROD
decisions, the UMWA, Parsons, and Boothe sued in the
 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL 7
Southern District of West Virginia, seeking, in part, enforce-
ment of the RODs as arbitration awards. The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court
subsequently granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg-
ment and denied defendant’s. Parsons v. Power Mountain
Coal Co., 2009 WL 899457 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2009). The
district court held that eligibility issues, including the last-
signatory-employer issue, were subject to arbitration under
the 1998 NBCWA, and that the RODs were thus subject to
the deferential standard of review afforded to arbitration
awards. Id. at *9. As the court explained, courts must enforce
an arbitrator’s decision on a matter properly submitted to arbi-
tration so long as the decision "draws its essence from the
agreement." Id. at *10 (citing United Steelworkers v. Enter.
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)). The court
found that the RODs in this case satisfied this "circumscribed
level of review" and that enforcement was therefore war-
ranted. Id.

II.

This court has previously recognized that ROD opinions,
issued under the authority of the NBCWAs, are arbitration
awards. See, e.g., Upshur Coals Corp. v. UMWA, Dist. 31,
933 F.2d 225, 227-28 (4th Cir. 1991). And arbitration awards
are entitled to considerable deference. United Paperworkers
Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). As the
Supreme Court has instructed: "Collective-bargaining agree-
ments commonly provide grievance procedures to settle dis-
putes between union and employer with respect to the
interpretation and application of the agreement and require
binding arbitration for unsettled grievances. In such cases, . . .
courts play only a limited role [in] review[ing] the decision of
an arbitrator." Id.

Under this standard, we must uphold a ROD so long as it
"draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement"
and is not merely the arbitrator’s "own brand of industrial jus-
8 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL
tice." Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960). "[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the
scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." Misco,
484 U.S. at 38; see also Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem.
& Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir.
1996).

Power Mountain contends, however, that the RODs must
be overturned, either because they do not deserve the usual
deferential review or because they do not survive it. In
appealing the district court’s ruling, Power Mountain asserts
several grounds of error. We address each in turn.

A.

Power Mountain begins by arguing that the standard of
review generally applicable to arbitration awards does not
apply here, at least not to the precise question of whether
Power Mountain was plaintiffs’ last signatory employer. As to
this issue, Power Mountain contends there was an impermissi-
ble delegation. According to Power Mountain, the 1993 Trust-
ees had an arbitral duty to decide the last-signatory-employer
issue, and their referral of the issue to the 1974 Trustees there-
fore constituted an abdication of their authority as arbitrators.
Under these circumstances, Power Mountain suggests that the
last-signatory-employer designation is entitled to "no defer-
ence."2
2
Power Mountain also appears to argue that even if the 1993 Trustees
were permitted to consult the 1974 Trustees on the last-signatory-
employer issue, their decision to do so removed the issue from the context
of arbitration altogether—and hence from the standard of review applica-
ble to arbitration decisions. But the ROD process fully contemplates the
1974 Trustees deciding the issue of last signatory employer. The 1974
Trustees’ ruling and the 1993 Trustees’ decision to adopt it are themselves
part of the arbitration decision to which we must defer.
 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL 9
We find this argument unpersuasive. Reviewing questions
of a labor arbitrator’s authority de novo, Mountaineer, 76 F.3d
at 608, we see nothing improper about the 1993 Trustees’
choice to request and accept the 1974 Trustees’ decision on
the singular issue of whether Power Mountain was plaintiffs’
last signatory employer.

"The parties bargained for arbitration . . . and were free to
set the procedural rules for arbitrators to follow if they chose."
Misco, 484 U.S. at 39. Here, by signing the 1998 NBCWA,
Power Mountain opted to give the 1993 Trustees considerable
leeway as arbitrators. Article XX(e)(5) of the 1998 NBCWA
imbues the 1993 Trustees with complete authority to resolve
disputes in "final and binding" decisions and further permits
them, without limitations, to "develop procedures for the reso-
lution of such disputes." Nothing in the agreement constrains
their ability to consult the 1974 Trustees.

In fact, the 1993 Trustees’ decision to enlist the advice of
the 1974 Trustees was fully contemplated by the collective
bargaining agreements in place. Several provisions support
this conclusion. As the 1993 Trustees noted in their RODs,
Article XX(g) of the 1998 NBCWA assigns to the 1974 Trust-
ees the task of "promptly investigat[ing] and determin[ing]
the eligibility or ineligibility of any beneficiary whose right to
receive benefits from the Trusts has been challenged by . . .
any Employer." Moreover, Article VIII(B)(13) of the 1974
Pension Plan cloaks the 1974 Trustees with the "further pow-
ers contained in" the ROD provision of the 1998 NBCWA,
thereby indicating that the 1974 Trustees’ responsibilities do
not necessarily cease once the ROD process begins. Finally,
and importantly, Article VIII(A) of the 1974 Pension Plan
vests in the 1974 Trustees a "full and final determination"
power as to "all issues concerning eligibility for benefits."
This court has repeatedly recognized that this provision
imparts broad discretionary authority to the 1974 Trustees.
See Sargent v. Holland, 114 F.3d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1997);
Lockhart v. UMWA 1974 Pension Trust, 5 F.3d 74, 77 (4th
10 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL
Cir. 1993); Boyd v. Trs. of UMWA Health & Ret. Funds, 873
F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Baker v. UMWA Health
& Ret. Funds, 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1991).

Power Mountain, however, responds that the 1974 Trustees
were given the power only to determine eligibility for pension
benefits, not health benefits. This argument is unavailing.
Whatever allure such a bright-line distinction between pen-
sion and health benefits might have in theory, it breaks down
in practice where, as here, issues of pension and health bene-
fits are so intimately related that they are impossible to untan-
gle. In this case, for example, Power Mountain’s liability for
health benefits depended on plaintiffs’ eligibility for pension
benefits. Only if the settlement agreements constituted "back
pay" warranting "credited service" did plaintiffs become enti-
tled to a pension, and only if they were entitled to a pension
could they collect health benefits from their last signatory
employer. In addition, Power Mountain’s status as last signa-
tory employer for health-benefits purposes depended on plain-
tiffs’ last day of "credited service" for pension eligibility
purposes.

Moreover, the 1993 Trustees themselves decided the larger
issue of whether Parsons and Boothe were eligible for health
benefits, calling upon the 1974 Trustees’ expertise only as to
a solitary, narrow question. Power Mountain’s status as last
signatory employer was but a small piece of the health-
benefits puzzle. To support its ultimate conclusion that Power
Mountain was responsible for plaintiffs’ health benefits, the
1993 Trustees needed to first establish that plaintiffs were
entitled to health benefits at all. They therefore addressed
whether plaintiffs met the service hours and age requirements,
determined the effective dates of eligibility, and identified the
agreements to which Power Mountain was a signatory. Far
from simply handing over their duties, the 1993 Trustees
retained for themselves several crucial aspects of Parsons and
Boothe’s claims. Thus, because the 1993 Trustees performed
 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL 11
their arbitral role consistently with the ROD procedure under
the 1998 NBCWA, their ROD opinions warrant deference.

B.

Power Mountain next argues that the district court erred in
enforcing the RODs because the 1993 Trustees are not neutral
arbitrators. Under the collective bargaining agreements, the
1993 Benefit Plan, which the 1993 Trustees administer, is
obligated to pay the benefits of any retired employees whose
last signatory employer is out of business. If the 1993 Benefit
Plan decided that Pehem rather than Power Mountain was
Parsons and Boothe’s last signatory employer, the 1993 Bene-
fit Plan would have had to pay their benefits, inasmuch as
Pehem was out of business. Power Mountain contends that
this conflict of interest warrants overturning the RODs. In
support, it relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2346
(2008), which held that when an employer administers an
employee benefit plan, both "determin[ing] whether an
employee is eligible for benefits and pay[ing] benefits out of
its own pocket," there is a conflict of interest that "a review-
ing court should consider . . . in determining whether the plan
administrator has abused its discretion." See also Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).

Under Glenn, however, a conflict of interest is simply one
factor among many to be weighed, Glenn, 128 S.Ct. at 2351-
52, and by no means compels reversal. We also note that the
conflict in Glenn was weighed in the context of a court’s
abuse of discretion review, id. at 2346, while any potential
conflict in this case would be considered in the context of the
even more forgiving standard of review for arbitration deci-
sions.

And this case is also quite different from Glenn. The con-
flict of interest Glenn envisioned was one in which the plan
administrator had a direct financial stake in eligibility deter-
12 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL
minations, where "every dollar provided in benefits is a dollar
spent by . . . the employer; and every dollar saved . . . is a dol-
lar in [the employer’s] pocket." Id. at 2348 (citation and inter-
nal quotations omitted). Here, by contrast, the 1993 Benefit
Plan suffers no economic hardship when the 1993 Trustees
award additional benefits. It is funded by multiple employers,
who pay a defined contribution regardless of what benefits are
awarded. See 1998 NBCWA, Art. XX(d). If benefits are not
awarded, those funds remain for future claims. And if funds
run out, benefits are simply modified so that the only detri-
ment accrues to the employees who would otherwise receive
greater benefits from the 1993 Benefit Plan. See 1998
NBCWA, General Description. In an analogous situation, this
court held that the trustees of a "fully funded, defined-benefit
plan" had no conflict of interest, even though they made bene-
fits determinations that stood to save or cost the plan "sub-
stantial sums." De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1191
(4th Cir. 1989). "That plan administrators’ decisions have had
a favorable impact on the balance sheet of the trust itself . . .
suggests no ‘conflict of interest.’" Id.; see also Manny v. Cent.
States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension & Health & Welfare
Funds, 388 F.3d 241, 242-43 (7th Cir. 2004) (same).

Furthermore, while we acknowledge that a court must
account for a conflict of interest even where a "settlor . . .
approves a trustee’s conflict," see Glenn, 128 S.Ct. at 2349,
we do not think it irrelevant that the 1993 Trustees’ role here,
despite any possible conflict of interest, was approved by,
among others, Power Mountain itself. As a signatory to the
1998 NBCWA, Power Mountain designated the 1993 Trust-
ees as arbitrators, knowing that they would both play a role
in eligibility determinations and act on behalf of a trust
affected by those determinations. As the district court
explained, "it was precisely this framework which defendant
bargained for in entering into the agreement." Parsons v.
Power Mountain Coal Co., 2009 WL 899457, at *10 (S.D.W.
Va. Mar. 31, 2009).
 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL 13
C.

Finally, Power Mountain contends that even if the very lim-
ited judicial review applicable to arbitration awards were to
apply, the two RODs in this case must be overturned because
they fail to "draw [their] essence from the collective bargain-
ing agreement." Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). Its primary argument is that actual
employment is necessary for the purposes of the last-
signatory-employer inquiry. Power Mountain insists it cannot
possibly be plaintiffs’ last signatory employer because it
never employed them to perform any actual work.

Whatever the intuitive appeal of this claim, it is plainly
unsupported by the language of the various collective bargain-
ing agreements, which make no distinction between construc-
tive and actual employment for purposes of benefits
eligibility. Under Article I(A)(12) of the 1974 Pension Plan,
"credited service" is granted both for hours an employee actu-
ally worked and for "back pay" hours an employee should
have worked and been compensated. In addition, such "cred-
ited service" is used to determine a miner’s last signatory
employer, regardless of whether that "credited service" arose
from actual or constructive hours.

In case there was any doubt, the 1974 Trustees clarified
these rules in a set of guidelines unambiguously entitled
"Guidelines for Awarding Pension Credit Based on Back Pay
Awards or Settlement Agreements," which were created spe-
cifically "to clarify the types of awards or settlements that
may qualify for back pay pension credit." These Guidelines
recognize that settlement agreements may count as "back pay"
awards of "credited service" and, further, that a miner might
be "entitled to back pay because an employer failed to prop-
erly hire him off a recall panel."

In the arbitration context as well, the 1993 Trustees have
previously acknowledged in RODs that settlements may lead
14 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL
to "credited service," which may in turn trigger an employer’s
liability for health benefits. See RODs Nos. 81-422; 81-466;
81-632. The 1993 Trustees themselves summarized their pre-
cedent as standing for the proposition that "an Employee
awarded backpay from an employer for a particular period
shall be considered to have ‘worked’ for the employer and is
therefore entitled to health benefits coverage on the basis of
such constructive employment." ROD No. 84-588.

Stated bluntly, it is unremarkable that Power Mountain
could become plaintiffs’ last signatory employer without
employing them to perform actual work. It is charged with
knowledge of the agreements to which it subscribed. As a
sophisticated actor operating in the context of a transparent
contractual scheme, Power Mountain may not now complain
that it was unaware that the settlement agreements could trig-
ger its responsibility to unknown employees for health bene-
fits.

Alternatively, Power Mountain makes the argument that
even if constructive employment may suffice in some cases,
there was no constructive employment in this particular case.
In Power Mountain’s view, the settlement agreements here
are inadequate to justify an award of "credited service"
because they do not contain the words "back pay," which are
necessary to signal Power Mountain’s intention to compen-
sate plaintiffs for constructive employment.

To be sure, a settlement agreement generally counts as
"back pay" only if the parties intend it to, and including the
terms "back pay" within the agreement’s text may be the sur-
est way to manifest that intention. See Francis v. Rodman
Local Union 201 Pension Fund, 367 F.3d 937 (D.C. Cir.
2004); ROD No. 84-588. These magic words, however, are
not the exclusive method for conveying such an intent. As the
1974 Trustees’ Guidelines make explicit, "[i]t is preferred that
the words ‘back pay’ be included in the award or [settlement]
agreement, but it is not mandatory." Rather, what is important
 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL 15
is simply that it be "clear from the text of the agreement that
the intent is to provide an individual with payment for lost
wages."

We cannot say that the RODs here must be reversed merely
because they permitted the 2002 and 2003 settlement agree-
ments to constitute "back pay" in the absence of that exact
phrase. Under the deferential standard of review applicable to
arbitration awards, we cannot perform so probing an inquiry
into the RODs’ merits as to scrutinize factual evidence of the
parties’ intent dating back to 2002 and 2003. It is more than
enough to observe that a finding of such intent is not implau-
sible here. For one thing, the language of the 2003 settlement
agreement expressly acknowledges that the settlement sum is
intended "to pay 300 hours of back wages . . . for the bargain-
ing unit performed by contractors/supervisors." In context,
"back wages" seems to hold an identical meaning to the term
of art "back pay": compensation for hours that a miner ought
to have worked. Moreover, the genesis of the grievances, and
indeed the whole reason for the settlement agreement, was a
claim by the miners that they were entitled to hourly pay for
the work performed by the non-union contractors. The RODs
in this case thus survive the requisite circumscribed review.

D.

The "reasons for insulating arbitral decisions from judicial
review are grounded in the federal statutes regulating labor-
management relations," which "reflect a decided preference
for private settlement of labor disputes." Misco, 484 U.S. at
37 (citing the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C. § 173(d)). As this court has recognized, "[b]y submit-
ting a dispute to arbitration, labor and management can secure
a decisive resolution of their differences without the delay
inherent in litigation or the disruption of a strike or lockout,"
and "arbitration can succeed in achieving these goals only to
the extent it is accorded finality by the judiciary." Richmond,
16 PARSONS v. POWER MOUNTAIN COAL
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Transp. Commc’ns
Int’l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1992).

Among other things, by enforcing arbitration decisions as
a presumptive matter, courts promote consistency in the inter-
pretation of collective bargaining agreements. See Sargent v.
Holland, 114 F.3d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1997). The 1998 NBCWA
must be interpreted consistently with federal statutes regulat-
ing the coal industry and with the industry trusts and
employer plans that function under it. Determining benefits
eligibility under these interlocking provisions puts a premium
on the experience gained by trustees who deal with the plans
day-in and day-out. See id. Of course, there remains the ulti-
mate check of judicial review, but its purpose is to support,
not to supplant, reasonable arbitration decisions. By casually
replacing the 1993 Trustees’ judgment with our own, we risk
making a complete hash of a collective bargaining scheme
that profoundly affects the coal industry and all who depend
upon it.3 Accordingly, we decline to overturn the RODs in this
case and affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

3
Power Mountain also argues that the disclaimer in the 2002 settlement
agreement, which states that the agreement is not to be used as a precedent
for future cases, prohibits use of the agreement for purposes of establish-
ing responsibility for plaintiffs’ health benefits. Power Mountain, how-
ever, failed to raise this objection in the ROD process, and the argument
is therefore waived. In any event, Power Mountain’s argument is fore-
closed by Dist. 29, United Mine Workers of America v. New River Co.,
842 F.2d 734 (4th Cir. 1988). As compared to the comprehensive release
in the settlement agreement there, id. at 735, the settlement here was, as
the district court noted, "absolutely perfunctory." Parsons v. Power Moun-
tain Coal Co., 2009 WL 899457, at *11 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2009).
Additionally, unlike the employees in New River, Parsons and Boothe did
not sign the agreement in this case or even know about its existence at the
time it was signed.